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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the practices, decisions and transformations experienced by the Tunisian Politically Relevant Elites (PRE) during the popular uprising of 17 December 2010 – 14 January 2011. Based on a series of interviews with these PREs, we show that this event constituted a political crisis leading to regime change without defection from security, economic and political elites. In other words, Ben Ali's authoritarian regime fell without any regime crisis, i.e. without any break in the relations and rule of command between the major PREs.
KEYWORDS:
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 On 23 October 2011.
2 The term ‘revolution’ is used throughout this paper to describe the 2010 uprisings in Tunisia that led to the dissolution of Ben Ali's regime. Rather than conceptually defining the studied event, the purpose of this paper is to discuss one of its particular aspects, namely the behaviour of the regime's elite during the uprising. As such, use of the term ‘revolution’ as a descriptor simplifies the reading.
3 Our translation.
4 We refer to Perthes to define the strategic or Politically Relevant Elites (PRE) of a regime as ‘those top government, administrative and political leaders who actually exercise political power or persons whose strategic position in large and powerful organisations and movements enable them to influence political decision making directly, substantially, and regularly’. Volker Perthes, (Citation2004).
5 For this study, we conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with major political, administrative, economic, and security actors during three research visits to Tunis, Tunisia (2014, 2015, 2016). Those interviewed include several ministers and MPs, two advisers to the president Ben Ali, various leaders of political parties, CEOs of major companies, bankers, high officials, an army general, the governor of the central bank, the vice-president of the current parliament, etc. For safety reasons, most interviewees asked for anonymity. We also met with numerous officials for informal discussions.
6 See for example Jack Goldstone (Citation2002). ‘Without political struggles that turn elites against the state, or that turn elite factions against each other, large-scale political conflicts are simply unlikely to arise’(9).
7 Ben Ali's minister. Interview with the authors, Tunis, 2014.
8 A regime can be defined as the set of ‘relations among major political actors (parties, corporations, labour unions, organised ethnic groups, patron-client networks, warlords, and more)’. These actors are at the head of major power sectors, we will therefore label them sectorial elites. Charles Tilly (Citation2006, 19).
9 Minister of Ben Ali's government. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
10 Political Adviser to Ben Ali. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
11 Sidi Bouzid is the Tunisian city where the upheaval first started, on 17 December 2010.
12 Minister of Ben Ali's government. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
13 By ‘instruments of coercion’, we mean the resources and rule of command of the security apparatus (police, army, presidential guard, national guard, etc.).
14 There was, of course, the last day confusion at Tunis airport when Ben Ali decides to leave the country (14 January 2011). This event shows a break in the internal security rule of command, coming from 3 Colonels from the anti-terrorism squads and involving 2–3 tens of members at most. However, such an event does not involve the PREs (for example Generals, Minister of Interior or Defense, etc.) we are studying, and does not influence their behaviour during the whole month considered, as it happened during the last hours of the regime.
15 According to our investigation, less than 50,000 people (i.e. the equivalent of a major football game crowd in Tunis) took part to the main demonstration on 14 January 2011 on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, a central area in Tunis.
16 Senior official. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
17 Adviser to Ben Ali. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
18 Adviser to Ben Ali. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
19 Secretary of State to the Privatisation. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
20 Ben Ali's son-in-law, one of the owners of the major holdings in Tunisia. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
21 A businessman close to the Palace. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
22 CEO of a major bank. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
23 When fearing repression, individuals can choose to falsify their preference and thus act in contradiction with their belief or opinion. See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
24 A CEO of a public company that used to interact with prominent businessmen. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
25 Previous member of the government. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
26 It is also relevant to quote a high ranking military official interviewed in 2015: ‘The Generals were not very supportive of Ben Ali's repressive policies. But they did not disobey. When Ben Ali needed the army, it showed dignity and patriotism’.
27 For some scholars, the end of Ben Ali's regime first looked like a Palace revolution. See Béatrice Hibou(Citation2011). For others, it was due to the disintegration of the government coalition. See Éric Gobe(Citation2012).
28 Our emphasis. Ben Ali's son-in-law. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
29 Rafiq Haj Kacem, then Minister of Interior.
30 Mohamed Gheriani, then Secretary General of the RCD.
31 Destourians are the members of the RCD, previously named Social Destourian Party. Destour means Constitution in Arabic.
32 Mohamed Ghannouchi, then Prime Minister.
33 Political Adviser to Ben Ali. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
34 These are the cities the revolt started in, on December 2010. Governors are the representatives of the security apparatus in the 24 Tunisian governorates. During Ben Ali’s era, security decisions were exclusively the president’s prerogative. Similarly, most ministers lacked effective power, since the main political decisions were made by Ben Ali’s advisers in the Palace.
35 We observe similar properties in the Iranian case in 1979, see Charles Kurzman(Citation1996).
36 Member of Ben Ali's government. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
37 Interview, Tunis, 2014.
38 Same source.
39 Interview, Tunis, 2014.
40 Interview, Tunis, 2014.
41 Political adviser to Ben Ali. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
42 Ben Ali's son-in-law, one of the main businessmen of Tunisia. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
43 A. Chebbi is a main figure of the Tunisian opposition, leader of the Parti Démocratique Progressiste.
44 M. Ben Jaafar is the leader of Ettakatol, a socio-democrat opposition party. On October 2011, he was elected President of the National Constituent Assembly.
45 R. Ghannouchi is the leader of the Islamist party, Ennahdha.
46 Leader of an opposition party. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
47 In his last speech, on 13 January 2011, President Ben Ali agreed to reform his regime by promoting freedoms in every social and political sector. During this speech, Ben Ali repeated the expression ‘I understood you’ several times; however, the next day, the repression continued.
48 A. Mourou, founder and vice-president of the Islamist party Ennahdha; vice-president of the parliament at the time of the interview. Interview, Tunis, 2014.
49 A. Mourou. Interview, Tunis, 2014.