Youth and activism in Algeria. The question of political generations

ABSTRACT

Many youth movements have formed in Algeria in the years since the demonstrations of October 1988, despite the interruption of the democratic process in 1992 and the ten years of civil war and stagnant political life that followed. These young people’s actions oblige us to examine their actions, act by act, to understand their structural ambiguities, which, contrary to all expectations, turn out to constitute a source of strength. In this article I examine the forms of youth activism in Algeria, drawing on four case studies: activists from opposition political parties in the Mzab region; a national coordinating section of the movement for the unemployed in the city of Ouargla; the Rally for Action and Youth (RAJ) in Algiers; and a sample of Internet ‘activists’ whose practices are a response to the lockdown and stagnation of ‘traditional’ political space. My approach is inspired by research on spaces seen as ‘non-political’ and the transformative actions taken in their public spheres. I propose that we should pay attention to undefined and unpredictable actions, in order to avoid teleological overinterpretation and determinist formulation. At the same time, I aim to understand how the demands made by actors involved in these movements are linked to context, conceptions of history, historical events, and the production of successive political generations.

KEYWORDS:

• Youth
• successive generations
• mobilizations
• politicization
• protest
• Algeria

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Boudjedra (1969). Boujedra (1977); or Mimouni (1982). Mimouni (1989); to mention only two authors. See also Meynier (2004).

2 The “right holders” are the spouses and children of the moudjahids (freedom fighters). It Is an expression used by the official discourse.

3 This is the name given to local officials whether elected or appointed to office by local councils representing community groups. The word may be loosely translated as “community notables”.

4 These relations are quite complex and difficult to explain in only a few lines. For a more detailed explanation, see Ratiba Hadj-Moussa (2019).

5 I conducted several rounds of fieldwork in Algeria (North and South), which took place from 2010–2012 and from 2014–2018.

6 The National Democratic Rally (RND) was formed on 21 February 1997, on the eve of national legislative elections as a so-called “presidential alliance”. It is generally seen as an alternative party of the Algerian political establishment.

7 According to what was reported in interviews conducted with RCD militants, the head of the daïra went in person to gather official signatures in a move to unseat the mayor, while the governor (wali) of Ghardaïa intentionally fanned the sparks of inter-communal conflict among the youth of the two communities during the celebration of mawlid el Nabawi (the Prophet’s birthday celebration), which subsequently degenerated into more substantial intercommunal conflict.

8 I do not have reliable figures on youth participation in either the FFS or the RCD in Berriane or in Ghardaïa or elsewhere in the Ghardaïa wilaya.

9 Kameleddine Fekkhar, 53 years old in 2018, a medical doctor, is a Mozabite leader, and figurehead of the Mzab opposition. He first joined the FFS, switching to the Algerin League for Human Rights before finally identifying himself as an Ibadite and ardent defender of the Berber cause.

10 I will not develop this particular aspect here. The reader is referred to Hadj-Moussa (2019).

11 As in the other countries of the Maghreb, it is young people with formal degrees who are the most affected by unemployment. Employment figures broken down by governorate do not exist. According to Nawfel Chekaoui, the National Coordinator for the CNDDC (Comité national pour la Défense des Droits des Chômeurs), certain wilayate, such as Oum-El-Bouaghi (in the Aurès region) have experienced “mass unemployment”: the job-producing private sector is non-existent while the public sector no longer recruits. Chekaoui points to the example of 5000 applicants for 3 positions in physical education (in Younes Saadi, “Statistiques sur le chômage en Algérie : Le comité des chômeurs conteste les chiffres de l’ONS” :<http://www.maghrebemergent.info/actualite/maghrebine/item/77266?tmpl=component&print=1>).

12 ‘Urban streets not only serve as a physical space where conflicts are shaped and expressed, where collectivities are formed, solidarities are extended and “street politics” displayed. They also signify a crucial symbolic utterance, one that goes beyond the physicality of streets to convey collective sentiments of a nation or community. This I call the political street … [which] denotes the collective sentiments, shared feelings, and public opinions of ordinary people in their day-to-day utterances and practices that are expressed broadly in the public space – in taxis, buses, and shops, on street sidewalks, or in mass street demonstrations.’ (Bayat 2010, 13).

13 For example, in the hydrocarbons sector, the Chakib Khelil affair, which concerned illegal payments made over more than 10 years, remains a mystery, despite information that eventually filtered out into the national and international press. Chakib Khelil, Minister of Mines and Energy (1999–2010) and CEO of the national hydrocarbon and petroleum company (Sonatrach, 2000-2003) was formally accused of misappropriation and money laundering. After three years in exile in the United States, he returned to Algeria in May of 2016 without standing trial for the charges against him and without so much as presenting himself before a judge, as we are reminded by Allilat (2016).

14 The March 2013 sit-ins organised in Ouargla gathered over 10,000 people, something that had never been seen before in a city of the Algerian South.

15 27 February 1962 corresponds to the date set by the French authorities for a referendum on the autonomy of the Algerian Sahara. The Souk el H’djar square was renamed by the demonstrators as Square 27 February. The event is celebrated each year. See photo: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=613951055464487&set=pcb.613928258800100&type=3.

16 Certain individuals were active in other associations and political parties such as the FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes).

17 Hakim Addad, one of the founders of the RAJ, in Djahnine 2011

18 For example, the RAJ had opted for a coordinating position of the Association, not for the presidency. The request was denied by the administration.

19 Law no.90-31 of 4 December 1990, http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/documents/Algerie/legislation/LOI No 90 1990 Relative Aux Associations.doc

20 ‘In the beginning we thought they did not know who we were and that was why they let us do what we did. We later understood that what we were doing was not for internal consumption but external, and that continues to this day. They let us do it because for them we did not represent any danger.’ (Interview conducted by the author).

21 Law No.12-06 of 12 January 2012. http://www.joradp.dz/ftp/jo-francais/2012/f2012002.pdf.

22 The RAJ (Rassemblement-Actions-Jeunesse) launched its web radio on 3 May 2016, "Radio RAJ Voice of the Young", Free radio for free speech. http://voixdefemmesdz.com/fr/?p=1011.

23 Activists were able, simultaneously, to participate as members of a party and of a civic association or union.

24 From the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, political mobilisation in the Maghreb largely favored the web. Frequently, from abroad via YouTubers or bloggers such as the Tunisian site, ‘Nawaat’, created in 2004, and an important communications node against the Ben Ali regime, the Maroccan sites ‘Larbi’, also created in 2004 (Azizi 2016-2017) and ‘Takhouar’ or CJDM (Cercle des jeunes débiles marocains, the Circle of Young Moroccan crazies), created in 2010 (Ibid.) and finally, the Algerian Bloggers’ Collective, founded in Algeria on 28 January 2013.

25 Consider the case of Amir DZ, who posted to his Facebook page sensitive information—supported with evidence—about government officials, and material about the rap singer Lotfi Double Kanon, whose ‘subversive’ political repertoire has circulated since the late 1990s and earned him nickname ‘the rebel.’ Hadj-Moussa (2015).

26 أمير ديزاد AMIR DZ // قلبي تعمر // galbi t3amar. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=59&v=3-JemNhOpis.

27 It should be recalled that the football stadium is widely recognised as the place where the riots started (interview). ‫رسالة الى رئيس الجهورية بوتفليقة من مواطن جزائري [Letter from an Algerian citizen to the President of the Republic, Bouteflika.] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DxjTYxae0xE.

Published on 6 April 2017. 5,099 views

28 بوتفليقة دراهم الفوط اعطيهم لي الايتام. [Bouteflika, the money from voting, give it to the orphans. Trans.] 30,525 views. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaOH37St2LY

tarekalgerien1988. Published on 17 April 2012, 30,650 views, 14823SHARE

29 بوتفليقة أنطق, [Parle Bouteflika, trad.], 374,956 views. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbvFH_KQlrI&t=4s.

30 [ول فيديو للأخ طارق معمري بعد إطلاق سراحه.] [The first video of brother Tarek Mammari after his release from prison, trans.] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-MZ0INcOE4. 63, 428 views, 9 May 2012.

31 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcqvHqbQV94. DZjoker MANSOTICH مانسوطيش 9, 195,730 views (Sepetmber 2017), Dzjoker Chemsou, published on 17 April 2017.

32 In Algerian Arabic, “I do not vote” translates as “mansotish”.

33 Anes Tina El Rissala رسالة إلى البرلمانيين. 5,033,199 views 180K 4K Share Published on 26 April 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4MWN3tkLcw.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Social and Humanities Research Council of Canada under the grant number 435- 2013-1104, which allowed me to undertake several rounds of fieldwork in Algeria, and by the research program ‘Public problems and activism in the Maghreb. The social and political participation of young people in their local and transnational dimensions,’ under the grant number CSO2014-52998-C3-2-P of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, which allowed me to share my findings in Spain and in Morocco.