Non-party ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia

ABSTRACT

Non-party ministers and technocrats have emerged as leading political actors in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Five heads of government out of eight appointed between 2011 and 2020 were not affiliated to any political party. Technocrat-led governments were appointed amidst acute political crises due to their ostensible technical expertise and non-partisan profile. Despite their prominent role in government, existing studies on post-revolutionary Tunisia have largely neglected the role of non-party ministers and technocrats, treating them as relatively marginal actors. The article situates their emergence along a decades-long technocratic turn started under Ben Ali, which opted to replace the professional politicians of the Bourguiba era with technocrats hailing from the public administration. After 2011, a combination of demand- and supply-side factors have contributed to their increased participation in government. In particular, the article argues that the institutional autonomy of the technocratic apparatus, weakness of political parties, a preference for technical expertise and consensual politics, and pressures from international financial institutions were key to the rise of non-party ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

KEYWORDS:

• Tunisia
• non-party ministers
• technocrats
• democratic transition
• government
• elites

The role of political elites during political transitions has attracted considerable scholarly interest (Higley and Burton 1989). Political transitions represent periods of intense fluidity that unsettle the existing social and political order and the power relations between social groups (Banegas 1993). In these critical junctures, competition can emerge between former regime cadres clinging to power and aspirant incumbents who face the question of whether co-opting members of the old regime (Carboni and Raleigh 2021). How the regime is reconfigured and rising political elites are accommodated in the emerging architecture of power is therefore critical to determining the stability of political regimes and the onset of violence (Raleigh, Choi, and Wigmore-Shepherd 2021).

In the post-2011 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, entrenched political elites have often resisted radical change (Owen 2012; Asseburg and Wimmen 2016). However, only a handful of the autocrats who were in power before the uprisings are in power today, suggesting that some reshuffle, albeit limited and often contradictory, have occurred among the ruling elites. Despite different political trajectories, one common trend across the region is the increasing involvement of technocratic elites in government. Between 2019 and 2021 alone, executives largely consisting of independent figures and technocrats were appointed in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen. Technocrats also joined governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. The magnitude of this trend was largest in Tunisia, where five out of eight heads of government appointed since 2011 did not belong to any party and three different cabinets were formed entirely by independent figures.

The emergence of technocratic elites in the MENA is not a new development. Already in the 1970s, technical competence had supplanted political activism and wartime allegiances as the distinctive criterion for elite ascension in Algeria (Zartman et al. 1982). Decades later, technocrats continued to assume political office in several North African states, including Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (Maghraoui 2002; Camau and Geisser 2003; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). By the early 2000s, technocratic governments had become a norm for autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt as well as in Lebanon and Jordan (Kenner 2010). Although they do not have a support base of their own unlike party or military elites, technocrats are often invoked to form cabinets or assume ministerial office. Yet, the current trend involving technocratic elites is one in which these actors have become a central component of the regime.

The existing scholarship treats the involvement of technocrats in government as an exception to ‘professional’ politicians, and has often overlooked their role compared to other political elites in the MENA (Perthes 2004; M’rad 2019, 50). Likewise, typical predictors of inclusion and exclusion, such as party affiliation or ethno-regional identities, fail to explain why incumbents appoint independent ministers in government (Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 2020). Notably, most works on ministerial elites in the global South focus on patronage and clientelism to explain cabinet picks by incumbents. Unlike party and political elites, technocrats have supposedly fewer resources to mobilise a support base, and are therefore less preferable to appoint in government than other figures. Additionally, non-party-ministers are often linked to a technocratic mode of governance, which opposes experts against politicians (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019). Yet, this framework overlooks the political exchanges between technocrats and politicians, and most importantly, the political function of non-party ministers. These considerations raise the question of why incumbents and political parties across the MENA have increasingly opted to appoint non-party ministers.

I examine this puzzle by focusing on Tunisia, a country where the participation of non-party ministers has significantly increased for over a decade. Drawing on existing work on technocratic rule in the wake of political transitions (Centeno 1993), I identify what factors explain the frequent appointment of independent ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Their appointment is not the mere by-product of the country's institutional architecture or an inevitable response to technological change requiring technical expertise. It rather stems from a combination of factors, which include the emergence of a consensus-based governance that privileges compromise over polarisation, a weakened party system, the limited availability of political elites with significant experience in government, and institutional autonomy from political power. Domestic factors also combined with external constraints linked to the country’s integration into global financial markets.

The article, which draws on an original dataset on cabinet appointments in Tunisia¹ and on selected interviews with party officials, former ministers, journalists and civil society activists, highlights two additional points. First, the rise of technocrats after 2011 is the result of changes occurred in over three decades, as they gradually replaced professional politicians under the Ben Ali regime. Second, the article cautions against branding Tunisia as a ready-made example of a successful democratic transition ushered in by technocrats, recommending instead that the political conditions allowing their rise are considered.

The article is structured as follows. The first section examines the role of non-party ministers and technocrats, and discusses how the existing scholarship explains their increasing presence in government. After discussing the evolution of government elites in Tunisia since independence, the article analyses the profile of independent ministers during the authoritarian era and in the post-revolutionary decade. The factors explaining the rise of technocrats as influential political actors after 2011 are discussed in the concluding section.

Understanding the role of technocrats and non-party ministers

Cabinet formation is a highly political process. Ministerial positions are not allocated randomly, and the composition of the cabinet typically reflects the different political weight of constituent groups in the ruling coalition (Bermeo 2003; Arriola 2009; Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 2020). The allocation of ministerial positions to distinct groups allows politicians to redistribute material and symbolic rents from the centre to the periphery, strengthening the ties with, and securing the support of, their constituencies. How cabinet ministers are selected and appointed will therefore depend on the nature of the political system, with political, regional, and other socio-demographic attributes being among the factors explaining the inclusion of certain political elites in the government (Cheibub 2007).

Amidst this transactional process of cabinet formation, there also exist members who are appointed in the cabinet without representing a specific constituency. Among these are ministers with no political affiliation or with a technocratic background, who have served as heads of government or in other ministerial capacity in several governments of Europe, Africa, South America and Asia over the past decade, often in the wake of acute political and economic crises (Schleiter 2013; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Costa Pinto, Cotta, and de Almeida 2018; Lee 2018; Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019). Unlike technocrats who are defined by the lack of political experience prior to their appointment and the specialist expertise related to the ministry they occupy (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014, 657), non-party ministers are more broadly described as ‘cabinet members who do not act on behalf of a party in government’ (Schleiter 2013, 35). As such, they may include technocrats hailing from the public administration or businessmen from the private sector, as well as independent political figures such as trade union representatives, human rights activists, and former government officials who are no longer members of any political party.

There is debate over what explains the increasing participation of technocrats and non-party ministers in government. Functionalist arguments highlight how increasingly complex policies inevitably require specialised expertise (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). Unlike politicians, technocratic ministers are not selected according to a logic of representation of parochial interests, but arguably on the basis of the specialised expertise they bring to the government (Centeno 1993). Political parties and ruling elites, which often lack technical skills among their ranks, therefore rely on experts recruited from the bureaucracy, the academia, or the private sector to formulate policy proposals (Jones 2019).

Other studies link the rising technocratic trend to institutional factors. For example, presidential systems in Europe, South America and Asia are associated with higher rates of ministers appointed from outside the political parties, especially when the executive enjoys a strong negotiating power compared to the legislative assembly or the party system is weak (Schleiter 2013; McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Lee 2018). Yet, many young democracies in Western Europe relied on ministers with legislative experience to advance the cabinet’s agenda in parliament (Bermeo 2003, 209). In the MENA region, the role of technocrats is typically viewed through the prism of authoritarian politics, whereby these elites are either functional to the consolidation of authoritarian regimes (Zartman et al. 1982; Camau and Geisser 2003; Heydemann 2007) or mere enforcers of authoritarian policies (Perthes 2004; Owen 2012). Democratic transitions are instead expected to be highly contentious phases, and less suited to a government elite consisting of technocrats (M’rad 2019, 60).

The rise of non-party technocrats is therefore interpreted as a response to either technological change or a by-product of the underlying institutional environment. What these explanations fail to highlight, however, is how technocratic elites achieve power and fulfil a political role across a wide spectrum of democratic and authoritarian regimes. Although technocrats are defined in opposition to politicians, a rigid distinction between political and technocratic elites is fallacious (Mac Ginty 2012). These actors are embedded in a wider socio-political environment which provides recognition to their role and power, and operate alongside the same political elites they often come to replace (Amir 2007, 88).

Despite an ostensible proximity between technocracy and market capitalism reflected in their common focus on efficiency, technocrats may not always share the same ideology but possess ‘chameleon-like’ qualities which make them qualified to serve under different political regimes (Stepan 1978, 57). Rather than an ideology of issues, technocracy is best viewed as ‘an ideology of method’, which finds its legitimacy on the neutral nature and superior efficiency of the practices it supports (Centeno 1993, 312). What this means for democracy is controversial. While some scholars contend that technocracy is not incompatible with democracy, other authors note that the selection of technocratic ministers over elected politicians reveals a faulty democratic process, characterised by weak accountability ties between the electorate and the government and the prevalence of unelected officials (Pastorella 2012).

The rise of a technocratic elite can be instead viewed as an inherently political process, resulting from the interaction between environmental and institutional factors (Centeno 1993, 316). Structural demand- and supply-side factors, along with other short-term intervening variables (i.e. variations in electoral results or in the role of the head of state) concur to determine the technocratic presence in the cabinet and the influence of technocrats in politics (Cotta, in Costa Pinto, Cotta, and de Almeida 2018, 271). Technocrats are therefore not mere by-products of a specific political system or the outcome of technological change requiring specialised expertise, as functionalist and institutional arguments suggest. They actively contribute to uphold the conditions that created them in the first place and, in doing so, they exercise an important political role that deserves attention.

Government elites in Tunisia

Political elites have featured prominently in historical and sociological studies on Tunisia (Hénia 1997). The origins of what is considered Tunisia's modern political elite are linked to the establishment of the Sadiki College in 1875, the French-inspired educational institute which supplanted traditional schools in training the urban middle class (Latif-Béatrix 1988). Starting from the 1920s, graduates of the Sadiki College, increasingly exposed to nationalist ideas at odds with the French domination, were among the leaders of the nascent anti-colonial movement (Sraïeb 1994). Among them was Habib Bourguiba, who founded the Neo-Destour Party in 1934 along with other Sadiki graduates. After independence in 1956, Bourguiba's Neo-Destour takes control of the state apparatus, turning Tunisia into a one-party state (Henry Moore 2007). Opposition within the Neo-Destour as well as trade unions and other political parties were eventually marginalised.

Under the authoritarian regime, political elites were only considered those who operated within the borders set by the state and its ruling party. In Charles Tilly's words, earlier elite studies became ‘prisoners of the State’, fetishising the authoritarian state and its structures while neglecting the plurality of political actors existing across Tunisian society (Tilly 1992, cited in Camau 2020, 6). More recently, however, research has acknowledged the plurality and changing nature of Tunisian government elites under Bourguiba and later Ben Ali (Charfi 1989; Camau and Geisser 2003; Erdle, in Perthes 2004; Erdle 2010; Kchouk 2017; Buehler and Ayari 2018; Wolf 2018). Among other merits, this literature has highlighted the emergence of dissent within the ruling elite and the interaction of political elites with other societal domains, including the public administration and the private sector.

A theme that has attracted considerable interest among elite scholars is the relationship between the technocratic apparatus and the political class in Tunisia. This is reflected in studies examining the origins of Tunisia's state administration (Latif-Béatrix 1988; Mohsen 2016) as well as in other analyses focusing on the symbiotic relationship between the authoritarian regime and the state bureaucracy (Camau and Geisser 2003; Erdle, in Perthes 2004; Erdle 2010; M’rad 2015a). With the ousting of Ben Ali in 2011, and the onset of a democratic transition, ministers have become leading political actors, and among them, independents and technocrats have assumed several government roles (see Table 1). Political parties frequently relinquished positions in the executive to non-elected, independent figures, which have accounted for the largest share of cabinet appointments since 2011.

Table 1. Non-party ministers in Tunisia, April 1956 – December 2020^a.

Governments	Total number of ministers	Non-party ministers	Share (%)
Bourguiba era (April 1956 – November 1987)	136	0	0%
Baccouche I (November 1987 – July 1988)	25	2	8%
Baccouche II (July 1988 – April 1989)	21	1	4.8%
Baccouche III (April 1989 – September 1989)	17	1	5.9%
Karoui (September 1989 – November 1999)	62	2	3.2%
Ghannouchi I (November 1999 – January 2011)	81	11	13.6%
Ghannouchi II (January 2011 – February 2011)	32	21	65.6%
Essebsi (February 2011 – December 2011)	30	30	100%
Jebali (December 2011 – March 2013)	32	9	28.1%
Laarayedh (March 2013 – January 2014)	28	13	46.4%
Jomaa (January 2014 – February 2015)	22	22	100%
Essid (February 2015 – August 2016)	39	20	51.3%
Chahed (August 2016 – February 2020)	53	29	54.7%

^a Author's own elaboration.

Despite some remarkable exceptions (M’rad 2019), non-party ministers and technocrats have largely remained at the margins of works examining the changes occurred in the aftermath of the uprisings. Rather, scholarly attention has more often focused on Tunisia's democratising trajectory, the role of religion in politics, and voting behaviour in national and local elections (see, among others, Gana, Van Hamme, and Ben Rebah 2012; Stepan 2012; Cavatorta and Merone 2013; Van Hamme, Gana, and Ben Rebah 2014; Gana and Van Hamme 2016; Geisser and Perez 2016; Grewal et al. 2019). Why Tunisia's post-2011 political environment has been defined by the widespread participation of non-party ministers and technocrats is the puzzle addressed in this article.

The authoritarian era

Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali brought the cabinet under the direct control of the presidency. Ministers enjoyed little political autonomy and responded directly to the president until 1970, when a constitutional amendment created the virtually powerless post of prime minister. The ruling Neo-Destour party – renamed Socialist Destourian Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien, PSD) in 1964 – monopolised cabinet appointments. The party's domination over the government became formalised at the eighth congress of the PSD in 1971, when an amendment to the statute stipulated that all cabinet ministers automatically served in the party's central committee (Charfi 1989, 52). By reversing the traditional mechanism whereby ministers are recruited from the party executive body, Bourguiba turned the PSD into a para-state structure operating in parallel with the government. In line with its predecessor, Ben Ali required that all ministers also serve in the executive body of the newly established Constitutional Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD), which he set up months after his rise to the presidency to replace the PSD (Camau and Geisser 2003).

Despite being emptied of actual political powers, the composition of the cabinet was meant to reflect the exclusionary nature of the authoritarian regime. Since independence, regionalism had represented a key determinant for the selection of ministers in Tunisia (Charfi 1989, 28). This practice contributed to reproduce pre-existing socio-economic inequalities and shaping the nature and the forms of Ben Ali and Bourguiba's elite networks (Camau and Geisser 2003, 199). Under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the Sahel – a coastal region encompassing the governorates of Sousse, Monastir and Mahdia – accounted for the largest share of cabinet appointments along with the Grand Tunis area. However, while Bourguiba's closest allies hailed from his home region of Monastir, Ben Ali typically privileged Sousse. At the same time, the regions of the interior were politically marginalised: Kebili, Sidi Bouzid and Tataouine had only one minister between 1956 and 2010, while Zaghouan is the only governorate with no ministerial representation (see Table 2).

Table 2. Regional origin of ministers during the authoritarian era (April 1956 – January 2011).

	Bourguiba (April 1956 – November 1987)^a		Ben Ali (November 1987 – January 2011)^b
	Number	Share (%)	Number	Share (%)
Grand Tunis	36	26.5%	34	25.0%
Monastir	20	15.0%	14	10.3%
Sousse	15	11.0%	16	11.8%
Sfax	14	10.3%	9	6.6%
Kairouan	9	6.6%	8	5.9%
Mahdia	7	5.1%	4	2.9%
Nabeul	7	5.1%	11	8.1%
Bizerte	6	4.4%	4	2.9%
Gafsa	5	3.7%	7	5.1%
Medenine	4	2.9%	6	4.4%
Le Kef	3	2.2%	1	0.7%
Beja	2	1.5%	2	1.5%
Gabes	2	1.5%	5	3.7%
Kasserine	2	1.5%	1	0.7%
Tozeur	1	0.7%	3	2.2%
Jendouba	1	0.7%	1	0.7%
Siliana	1	0.7%	2	1.5%
Kebili	1	0.7%	0	0%
Tataouine	0	0%	1	0.7%
Zaghouan	0	0%	0	0%
Sidi Bouzid	0	0%	1	0.7%
Unknown	0	0%	6	4.4%
Total	136	100%	136	100%

^a Data from Charfi (1989, 27).

^b Author's own elaboration.

Under Bourguiba, no political party other than the Neo-Destour could take part in the government (M’rad 2019, 54). In the five governments appointed by Bourguiba between 1956 and 1987, all cabinet ministers were members of the PSD (Charfi 1989). Ben Ali, instead, gradually began to recruit ministers from outside the RCD until they ceased to represent an exception in Tunisian politics. While the first cabinet led by Hédi Baccouche in 1987 comprised thirty-one members of the ruling party and only two independents, close to one third of cabinet members in the last government of Mohamed Ghannouchi in January 2011 had no party membership. In fact, the allocation of ministerial positions to non-party figures increased markedly during the first government led by Mohamed Ghannouchi – himself a state bureaucrat affiliated with the RCD.

The appointment of non-party ministers in the cabinet reflected Ben Ali's system of governance, highly centralised around his figure and deprived of a strong political character that could overshadow or challenge the leader. Under Ben Ali, strategic decisions were taken in the presidential palace in Carthage by the president and his closest advisers who acted as de facto shadow ministers (Camau and Geisser 2003, 193; Wolf 2018, 254). Among Ben Ali's advisers were some of his family members, who could leverage their access to the president to influence political and bureaucratic appointments and centralise the decision-making process in the presidency (Hibou 2011a, 329).

Through the promotion of loyal technocrats with minimal public profile, Ben Ali succeeded in marginalising Bourguiba's remaining allies in the Neo-Destour (Buehler and Ayari 2018). Frequent cabinet reshuffles and party congresses – five in twenty years – allowed regular turnover within the RCD and prevented senior party officials from cultivating autonomous patronage networks. These strategies extended far beyond political institutions. Fearing coups from inside the army or the security services, Ben Ali purged members of the security services close to Habib Bourguiba while also limiting the political involvement of the army (Barany 2011; Brooks 2013).² These strategies succeeded in coup-proofing the regime, yet frustrated political ambitions and arouse dissent within the RCD (Wolf 2018). At the grassroots level, thanks to a pervasive presence throughout the country, the ruling party operated as both an arm of the police state which discouraged or actively repressed any form of opposition, and a clientelist cartel which provided its members with lucrative opportunities (Erdle 2010).³

While the RCD existed to represent societal interests and stifle dissent, the government became increasingly depoliticised. To this end, Ben Ali recruited his ministers predominantly from the public administration (Murphy 1999, 184). This new generation of ministers replaced the former Neo-Destour and trade union activists who had previously served under Bourguiba (Charfi 1989, 47). They instead included civil servants drawn predominantly from the National School of Administration (École Nationale d’Administration in Tunis, ENA) and the state bureaucracy, whose technocratic background and lack of political experience turned ministers from political figures into the ministry's administrative heads (M’rad 2019, 56). Under Ben Ali, over 50 per cent of all ministerial appointments were hauts fonctionnaires, including diplomats, magistrates and high-ranking officials in the state ministries, and another 25 per cent were university professors and schoolteachers (see Table 3). Few boasted any political experience in the PSD, in the trade unions, or in the students’ organisations.

Table 3. Professional background of ministers under Ben Ali (November 1987 – January 2011)^a.

Professional background	Total number	Share (%)	Non-affiliated	Non-affiliated share (%)
Public administration (diplomats, magistrates, ministerial officials)	72	52.9%	9	56.3%
Teaching, research	34	25.0%	6	37.5%
Army, police	3	2.2%	0	0%
Other public sector	15	11.0%	1	6.3%
Private sector (corporate managers, journalists, lawyers)	6	4.4%	0	0%
Unknown	6	4.4%	0	0%
Total	136	100%	16	0%

^a Author's own elaboration.

A notable example of state bureaucrats serving in the executive is former prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, who graduated in social sciences from the ENA before starting his administrative career at the ministry of Planning. A long-time technocrat who had never been a member of the PSD, he quickly joined the RCD in March 1988. Upon deposing Bourguiba, Ben Ali appointed Ghannouchi to head the ministry of Planning, and, later, the ministries of Finance and International Cooperation. From 1999 to 2011, Ghannouchi served as prime minister, and joined the RCD’s political office in 2001. Yet his longevity largely depended on him not posing a challenge to Ben Ali. Other senior figures in the government and in the RCD with a technocratic background were long-time ministers Abdallah Kallel, Ali Chaouch and Abdelwahab Abdallah, Ben Ali's special advisor Abdelaziz Ben Dhia and security official Mohamed Ali Ganzoui.

Alongside these political considerations, external constraints upheld the decision of allocating ministerial portfolios to non-party ministers. Starting from the 1990s, international financial institutions had increasingly promoted a model of technocratic governance that was deemed necessary to implement economic reforms in Tunisia.⁴ The World Bank encouraged the Tunisian government to upgrade its governance by removing the political obstacles obstructing economic liberalisation (Perkins 2013, 39). Despite a seemingly positive economic performance, a highly centralised decision-making process was detrimental to the private sector while ‘conditions seem[ed] right for a more active participation of civil society in the development process’ (World Bank 2000, 26).

The RCD's occupation of institutional and administrative positions was widely perceived as an obstacle to achieving effective liberalisation. Starting from 2001, several technocrats not affiliated with the ruling party were appointed at the helm of economic ministries, including Industry, Economic Development, Planning, International Cooperation, and Information Technology, among others. These ministers typically possessed little or no political experience and hardly any popular support. Their names were often unknown to the general public, obscured by the ubiquitous public figure of Ben Ali. Co-opted into government, they were considered to have the necessary competence for implementing the structural adjustment programmes negotiated with the international financial institutions while nurturing modest political ambitions (Erdle 2010, 159). Ben Ali could thus preserve the rentier economy that flourished around his extended family through the ‘selective borrowing’ of international financial agreements (Hibou 2011b).⁵

The growing involvement of non-party ministers and technocrats under Ben Ali epitomised a broader transformation of the authoritarian regime and its political elite. Ben Ali replaced the ‘professional’ politicians of the Neo-Destour with technocrats hailing from the public administration (Camau 2020). Ministers were appointed on the basis of their technocratic credentials and their loyalty, turning the government into an extension of the state apparatus. While no defections occurred among key party figures, the ultimate identification of the state institutions with the figure of Ben Ali and the RCD allowed little margin for political manoeuvring and no alternative to the departure of the leader and his closest associates (Kchouk and Mamuji 2019). The belated dismissal of secondary regime figures on 29 December 2010,⁶ followed by a pledge to hold legislative elections and step down in 2014, failed to placate the unrest that had started to spread across Tunisia. Days later, Ben Ali and his family fled into exile or were arrested; the RCD was dissolved; and several ministers and secretaries of state with ties to the ruling family faced trial on charges of corruption and embezzlement.⁷ Ben Ali's ouster, however, has not resulted in an overhaul of the political elite. Notably, a new generation of non-party ministers and technocrats have joined the government since 2011.

Non-party ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia

Heightened political instability and frequent cabinet reshuffles have characterised the first decade following Ben Ali's ouster. The appointment of technocrat-led, partisan, and coalition governments coincides with distinct phases of the post-revolutionary political environment (Boubekeur 2016; M’rad 2019). The immediate transitional phase (January-October 2011) includes two governments appointed in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. The abrupt collapse of Ben Ali's regime left Tunisia with a government led by his long-time prime minister Mohammed Ghannouchi. His cabinet consisted of members of the dissolved RCD who defected from Ben Ali or were considered relatively independent from the former leader, elements of the opposition and the trade unions,⁸ and other independent figures such as technocrats and academics. Facing widespread popular opposition against the reintegration of former RCD members, prime minister Ghannouchi resigned at the end of February 2011. Tunisian interim president Fouad Mebazaa replaced Ghannouchi with Béji Caid Essebsi, an experienced former minister under Bourguiba who formed a caretaker government which remained in charge until the first democratic elections were held in October 2011 (Ben Achour 2016, 102). None of the ministers appointed by Essebsi were members of a party, although Essebsi, along with Mohamed Ennaceur and Taïeb Baccouche, had been a member of the Neo-Destour.

The second phase (October 2011 – January 2014) coincides with the two Ennahda-led governments. A moderate Islamist party, Ennahda won the elections for the national constituent assembly (Assemblée Nationale Constituante, ANC), but lacking an absolute majority, formed a coalition government – popularly known as Troïka – with two junior secular parties, the Congress for the Republic (Congrés de la Republique, CPR) and Ettakatol (Gana, Van Hamme, and Ben Rebah 2012). Hamadi Jebali served as prime minister for Ennahda between December 2011 and March 2013, when he resigned following the assassination of Chokri Belaïd. Interior Minister Ali Laarayedh replaced Jebali and remained in the post until January 2014. Both governments consisted of a majority of party members, although with a strong presence of independents and technocrats, many of whom were considered to be close to Ennahda (M’rad 2019, 63).

The third phase (January 2014 to February 2020) includes the governments born out of the National Dialogue, a roadmap brokered by the main political and social forces to placate the unrest arising from the murder of a two left-wing politicians and defuse a political and constitutional crisis (M’rad 2016). Under the framework of the National Dialogue, Ennahda consented to cede power to a fully technocratic government that would lead the country until new elections. After the ANC adopted the new constitution in January 2014, the head of state designated former Industry minister Mehdi Jomaa as prime minister.

This phase is characterised by the alternation of multiple national union governments with a strong participation of technocrats and independents. Following the 2014 parliamentary elections, Nidaa Tounes – a secular party created in 2012 by former prime minister Essebsi bringing together several factions opposed to Ennahda – obtained the majority in parliament, while its founder was elected head of state (Gana and Van Hamme 2016). Under the auspices of the new president, who had sponsored the National Dialogue initiative, Nidaa Tounes entered a coalition government with its ostensible archenemy and other smaller formations. Habib Essid, a former minister and technocrat hailing from the public administration, served as prime minister from January 2014. Amidst increasing political infighting, nine political parties and three trade unions signed the Carthage Agreement, a political pact sponsored by president Essebsi to revive government action through political compromise (M’rad 2016, 225). Local Administration minister Youssef Chahed was appointed head of a new national unity government until new general elections were held in the fall of 2019.

During this phase, the share of cabinet positions allocated to independent ministers and technocrats grew from the Ben Ali era. Two out of nine governments appointed between 2011 and 2019 – Essebsi and Jomaa – consisted entirely of non-partisans (see Table 1). With the exception of the two Ennahda-led governments, over half of the ministers appointed in each cabinet were not affiliated to a political party. Unlike the authoritarian era where technocrats often oversaw economic ministries, since 2011 independent ministers have been assigned to a variety of cabinet positions, with some – National Defence and Religious Affairs, among others – reserved exclusively for non-affiliated figures. The socio-demographic profile of government ministers also changed after 2011. The representation of southern and interior regions increased considerably compared to the Ben Ali era. The governorates of Sidi Bouzid, Le Kef, and Kasserine, each represented with only one minister under Ben Ali, had four cabinet members each between 2011 and 2019 (see Table 4). Jendouba, Medenine, and Tozeur also saw their ministerial representation more than double. While this shifting geography partially reflects Ennahda's historical constituencies (Camau and Geisser 2003), many of the independent ministers appointed between 2011 and 2019 also hailed from Tunisia's southern and interior regions.⁹ Technocratic governments, typically appointed on the basis of their technical expertise, also attempted to provide more equitable representation to traditionally marginalised regions (Ben Hammouda 2016, 19).

Table 4. Regional origin of ministers in post-revolutionary Tunisia (January 2011 – December 2020)^a.

	Transition (January 2011 – October 2011)		Troïka (October 2011 – January 2014)		National dialogue (January 2014 – February 2020)
	Number	Share (%)	Number	Share (%)	Number	Share (%)
Grand Tunis	15	31.9%	1	26.8%	25	24.8%
Medenine	2	4.3%	4	9.8%	11	10.9%
Sfax	5	10.6%	3	7.3%	8	7.9%
Monastir	3	6.4%	2	4.9%	9	8.9%
Sousse	5	10.6%	1	2.4%	6	5.9%
Nabeul	2	4.3%	3	7.3%	5	5.0%
Mahdia	3	6.4%	3	7.3%	5	5.0%
Gafsa	4	8.5%	0	0%	5	5.0%
Gabes	1	2.1%	3	7.3%	3	3.0%
Bizerte	0	0%	2	4.9%	5	5.0%
Tozeur	2	4.3%	1	2.4%	3	3.0%
Sidi Bouzid	1	2.1%	1	2.4%	2	2.0%
Le Kef	1	2.1%	1	2.4%	2	2.0%
Kasserine	0	0%	3	7.3%	2	2.0%
Kairouan	2	4.3%	1	0%	3	3.0%
Jendouba	0	0%	1	2.4%	2	2.0%
Beja	0	0%	0	0%	3	3.0%
Zaghouan	0	0%	1	2.4%	0	0%
Siliana	0	0%	0	0%	1	1.0%
Tataouine	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Abroad	1	2.1%	0	0%	0	0%
Kebili	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Unknown	0	0%	0	0%	1	1.0%
Total	47	100%	41	100%	101	100%

^a Author's own elaboration.

Notably, a significant share of cabinet ministers continued to be recruited from the public administration, although this share has decreased from 53 to 36 per cent (see Table 5). Along with a growing involvement of the private sector, the political participation of trade unions, human rights groups, and other national organisations has represented the distinctive character of all post-revolutionary governments (Boubekeur 2016). Not only have these organisations been involved in the political process since 2011,¹⁰ some of their representatives or former members have also joined the government, especially since the signing of the Carthage Agreement in 2016. This marks a dramatic shift from the purely technocratic nature of the government under Ben Ali, who largely recruited technocrats from the public administration to neutralise political challengers.

Table 5. Professional background of ministers in post-revolutionary Tunisia (January 2011 – December 2020)^a.

Professional background	Total number	Share (%)	Non-affiliated	Non-affiliated share (%)
Public administration (diplomats, magistrates, ministerial officials)	79	36.1%	57	39.3%
Teaching, research	57	26.0%	43	29.7%
Army, police	1	0.5%	1	0.7%
Other public sector	22	10.1%	8	5.5%
Private sector (corporate managers, journalists, lawyers)	55	26.0%	32	22.8%
Activists (trade unionists, human rights activists)	3	1.4%	3	2.1%
Total	219	100%	145	0%

^a Author's own elaboration.

It is not rare that ‘neutral’ governments are appointed during political transitions (Shain and Linz 1995). Yet, the appointment of non-party ministers and technocrats across several executives since 2011 shows that these actors are not marginal political figures or exceptions in Tunisian politics. They are rather the foundation of the post-revolutionary political order where elements of change and continuity coexist (Kchouk 2017). Acknowledging this also dispels the myth of their mere technical role, and calls for an analysis of the political conditions that allowed the rise of a technocratic elite in this environment.

Explaining the rise of technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia

According to Centeno (1993), five factors are key to understanding the rise and consolidation of technocratic governance. These include: the emergence of complex technical policy challenges that require specialised expertise; a bureaucratic apparatus with significant independence and power to influence policy; a consensus-oriented political culture; a political environment in which policy efficiency provides legitimacy to the regime; and external constraints deriving from the integration into global financial markets. I argue that these factors also supported the emergence of a non-party government elite in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

Policy complexity

This dimension refers to the competencies required from cabinet ministers to formulate complex policy proposals. Technocrats are, by definition, trained to acquire specific skills relevant to policy-making, and their expertise is often needed to understand the problems and produce policies. Yet, technocratic governments have to address political problems, whether it is reassuring public opinion concerned over the state of the economy, restore public order, or redress social injustice.

In the Tunisian case, the demand of technocrats largely stemmed from the limited parliamentary experience of the political elite. Most parties operated as electoral cartels with little organisational structure or popular support (Geisser and Perez 2016). Others, including Ennahda, had long conducted their activities clandestinely or in exile, and had no experience in government affairs at the national or local level (M’rad 2019, 62). At the same time, those who had political experience in office had often served under Ben Ali, and their political reintegration in government typically came about with a technocratic label in order to avoid the public uproar that would accompany the return of the old regime.¹¹ Political parties have thus opted to leave cabinet positions to independent technocrats with experience in the public administration, the private sector, or the trade unions to negotiate highly technical international agreements in various fields.

After their tenure in government, these ministers often returned to their jobs or remained in government as independents (Jelassi 2016). Others decided to continue their political career joining a party and being elected in parliament (M’rad 2019). By doing so, these technocrats aspired to capitalise on their government experience bolstering the technical credentials of their party.¹² Examples include Naoufel Jemmali and Slim Besbes, both independents who later run for Ennahda, or Mehdi Jomaa, who went on to establish his own party in 2018.

Institutional autonomy

The rise of a technocratic elite in post-revolutionary Tunisia was also a function of the relative power and independence of the state institutions they represent. In other words, state institutions, including the public administration, must be able to influence policy-making and enjoy autonomy from other powers. In Tunisia, civil servants are largely trained in the ENA, constituting a network of closely connected individuals with common organisational interests (M’rad 2015a). National and local administrators have often hailed from the ranks of the state apparatus (Mohsen 2016), and under Ben Ali, they maintained their relative independence by keeping away from party politics and exerting their power within the boundaries of the public administration. Former ministers and technocrats who served under Ben Ali therefore staged a comeback in the post-revolutionary environment by claiming the independence of their institutional roles from political power (Boubekeur 2016). Indeed, they provided a pool of expert policy-makers which could manage government affairs amidst growing polarisation. By exerting control over budget and planning, technocratic elites could eventually consolidate their autonomy from political power and influence other state institutions.

Yet, autonomy from political power, and especially from the political parties, did not benefit only technocratic institutions. Other forces also made their way into government after 2011 in virtue of their independence. This applies, for example, to the trade unions, which were directly invested in steering the political process after Ben Ali's ouster. As noted above, the involvement of ministers hailing from the unions gradually increased from 2011. In particular, the political role of Tunisia's main trade union, the UGTT, grew as much as several parties saw the organisation as a potential political competitor.¹³

Consensus

A stable political environment is considered necessary to the rise and consolidation of technocratic power (Centeno 1993, 324). Through repression or consensus, incumbents can remove political or societal opposition to the implementation of their policies. There are several examples of technocratic governments appointed by authoritarian leaders or with broad parliamentary support (Schleiter 2013; McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015).

Under Ben Ali, the appointment of non-party ministers was a consequence of his decision to neutralise opposition in his own party and across society. Instead, since 2011, a logic of consensus has prevailed across the political spectrum as older and newer main political actors sought mutual recognition and broader legitimacy (Marzouki 2016). In particular, Ennahda – the most organised political party during the transition – opted to join multiple coalition governments with some of its archenemies. The fear of an anti-Islamist counter-revolution, like the one seen in Egypt in the summer of 2013, prompted the party to adopt a ‘low visibility’ strategy renouncing ministerial positions in favour of independents to dispel scepticism over its allegedly authoritarian goals (Marks 2015). At the same time, other parties, including Nidaa Tounes and its successors, accepted to cooperate with Ennahda to limit the Islamist influence in government. Ennahda, as well as other parties, were suspicious that if their counterpart takes too much power, it could be used to exclude them from political competition or to undermine democracy.¹⁴

This consensual politics was not limited to the governmental sphere. The political forces engaged in a collusive competition which hampered the Parliament's ability to adopt efficient policies while outsourcing responsibility for decision-making and policy implementation from the political parties to the technocrats (Boubekeur 2016).¹⁵ Among these was the so-called Consensus Commission (lajnat al tawâfuqât), an unofficial parliamentary committee composed of a single member for each party in the assembly tasked with finding a compromise between the different positions. The commission, which had existed already under Ben Ali, assumed a new role in the ANC as all major policies would be informally adopted consensually.¹⁶ Controversial bills on transitional justice, domestic terrorism, and local administration were also passed consensually, raising cross-party concerns and leading to defections among activists and institutional representatives (Gobe 2017; Grewal and Hamid 2020).

Output legitimacy

The appointment of fully or semi-technocratic governments also serve to reassure public opinion (M’rad 2016, 38). Technocrats are assumed to adopt better policy decisions as they are not dragged into cross-party bickering. Yet, the influence of technocratic institutions can vary according to the specific source of instability and their perceived ability to solve the issues. That is, military and security officials often rise to prominence when a country faces unrest or violence, while economic experts may increase their influence during a financial crisis.

Since 2011, calls to install technocratic cabinets were made amidst severe economic, security, political, and, more recently, public health crises. Béji Caid Essebsi formed a caretaker government consisting of independent figures to assuage the concerns over the presence of RCD ministers, which led to weeks of intense popular mobilisation (Kraïem 2014, 329). Essebsi's successor, Hamadi Jebali, also proposed, without consulting with his party, that Ennahda would relinquish ministerial positions to support an allegedly neutral technocratic cabinet amidst political deadlock.¹⁷ The party's central committee rejected Jebali's proposal, forcing him to resign after the assassination of Chokri Belaïd in February 2013.

When the Troïka faced mounting criticism over its management of internal security and the economy, the opposition accused Ennahda of undermining democracy and called for the resignation of the government (Gobe and Chouikha 2014). The crisis peaked after the assassinations of left-wing opposition leaders Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013, raising fears over the onset of political violence. Under the aegis of the National Dialogue, the Troïka, and Ennahda in particular, reluctantly agreed to cede power to a caretaker government (Ben Hammouda 2016, 29).¹⁸ After weeks of intense negotiations over who would lead the government, the political forces agreed on Mehdi Jomaa, the minister of Industry in the outgoing cabinet who nevertheless boasted a technocratic profile and was able to attract wide support (M’rad 2015b, 50).

The appeal of technocratic cabinets continued under the presidency of Béji Caïd Essebsi due to their ostensibly higher policy efficiency (Ayari 2020). Essid and Chahed led two semi-technocratic governments, where key ministerial portfolios such as Interior, National Defence, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Finance were assigned to independents. Party bickering and the search for compromise paralysed government activity, with political parties growing increasingly unpopular (Gobe 2019). In light of this political deadlock, the International Crisis Group noted that ‘the formation of a government of “technocrats” would be the best of bad options’ (International Crisis Group 2018).

Integration into global markets

Global market pressures also contributed to consolidate the rise of a technocratic elite in Tunisia. Indeed, these external constraints did not emerge with the onset of a democratic transition in 2011, but as outlined above, already appeared during the era of Ben Ali. These policies did not change significantly after his ouster. Hanieh (2015, 126) notes that international financial institutions ‘strongly supported’ the formation of the technocratic government led by Mehdi Jomaa in 2014, noting the ‘risk related to “setbacks in the political transition” and that “commitment to programme objectives will be tested by resistance to some necessary but not always popular reforms”’. According to this view, only a technocratic government could deliver economic stabilisation and structural reforms that international financial institutions were advising to addressing an increasingly difficult economic outlook.

These pressures further pushed political forces to adopt a largely uniform economic agenda. Ennahda, for instance, has moved away from its original vision to adopt a non-interventionist economic approach, which opposes redistributive reforms and supports cutting subsidies. By doing so, senior advisor Lotfi Zitoun claimed that the party had entered a ‘post-ideological stage’, where divisive government policies were presented as ‘expert solutions to technical problems’ (McCarthy 2019, 270–271). At the same time, the nomination of technocratic governments has allowed political parties to distance themselves from deeply unpopular decisions, such as those prescribed in the agreements with international financial institutions.

Conclusion

In this article, I examined the increasing participation of independent ministers and technocrats in Tunisian governments. Their appointment in the post-revolutionary Tunisia is not a mere consequence of the institutional environment or a response to technological change that require increasingly specialised expertise. While these factors arguably played a role, one should instead look at a combination of demand- and supply-side factors to explain the recruitment of ministers from outside the existing political parties. Among these factors are the absence of political expertise within the political parties; the existence of a bureaucracy with relative autonomy from the political power; a consensual political culture; a political environment which values output legitimacy over representation; and structural integration with global financial markets. Taken together, these factors provided the political environment for the rise of independent ministers and technocrats.

The article also highlighted that these changes are not the inevitable consequence of the democratic transition ushered in by the ouster of Ben Ali in 2011. They instead reflect decades-long transformations in Tunisian political elites, which saw technocrats gradually replaced professional politicians under Ben Ali. By doing so, the former president nurtured a new political class largely consisting of technocrats which ultimately allowed him to marginalise rivals within the party and centralise power around himself and his close circle.

In the post-revolutionary era, independent ministers and technocrats have widely participated in government. Not only technocrats, but a multitude of independent trade unionists, human rights activists, and other political figures not affiliated with any party were assigned cabinet positions. Unlike under Ben Ali, when technocrats were mere agents of presidential power, independent ministers and technocrats have emerged as leading political actors. Amidst a political landscape characterised by fragmented political parties who were short of absolute majority in Parliament, their appointment was critical to the formation of national unity and technocrat-led governments. Notably, the appeal of such governments continued under the presidency of Kaïs Saïed, a professor of constitutional law who was elected in October 2019 to replace the late Béji Caïd Essebsi (Gobe 2020).¹⁹

The article makes several contributions. First, it challenges frameworks that explain Tunisia's political transition solely through the prism of an Islamist-secularist cleavage, and instead highlights conflicting patterns of change and continuity. Indeed, the participation of non-party ministers and technocrats in the post-revolutionary governments reflects the dual nature of the new democratic institutions. Arguably, their appointment helped steer the transition from the Ben Ali era, and placate tensions that could have derailed the democratic process. Yet, technocrats emerged as leading political actors after 2011 as a result of their institutional autonomy consolidated under Ben Ali. In fact, the most striking element of continuity lies in the increasingly technocratic nature of the government, a process inaugurated by Ben Ali himself with the gradual marginalisation of professional politicians and continued with few exceptions after 2011.

Second, it cautions against exporting the ‘Tunisian model’ to other divided or post-conflict societies. In particular, some authors have suggested that the Tunisian case demonstrates that ‘a technocratic government could operate more efficiently while providing space for political rivalries to be resolved’ (Al-Akhali, Al-Rawhani, and Biswell 2019, 8). This caretaker government would not be subject to ‘politically-charged ministerial turf wars’, and discourage politicians from using ministerial positions to cultivate patronage networks. The Tunisian experience, however, suggests that technocratic governments are more likely to consolidate when multiple conditions (institutional autonomy, consensus-based political culture, weak political parties, etc.) are met, and that therefore their mere appointment may not be a necessary condition for a democratic transition to succeed.

Third, the article contributes to the wider debate on the role of non-party ministers and technocrats in the MENA and beyond. Recent research has often treated these actors as marginal figures in the political systems across the region, linking their appointment to changing authoritarian techniques (Heydemann 2007), the implementation of neoliberal economic policies (Bogaert 2013), and political scapegoating by shrewd politicians (Thurston 2018). Yet, the Tunisian case suggests that technocrats play a highly political role, as they are expected to provide legitimacy to the system by supplying technical expertise, bolstering credibility in the eyes of international investors and domestic public, and defusing unrest through the de-politicisation of governance.

It finally invites to reflect on the long-term consequences of appointing technocratic governments. While partially reining in party polarisation, the politics of consensus has contributed to stall legislative activity (Kubinec and Grewal 2018). A sequence of national unity and technocratic governments has frustrated accountability and political competition and eroded popular trust in political parties and democratic institutions. Low voter turnout in the national and local elections and escalating unrest instead reveal that popular opposition has mounted against the backdrop of consensus.

How independent ministers and technocrats are changing the composition of political and government elites in the MENA has thus far attracted limited scholarly attention. Further work should focus on how technocrats across a multitude of regimes are appointed to oversee different security domains, including security and economy, and what this means for traditional party politics or other elites. Future research shall also address why independent ministers are selected and how they operate, shedding further light on the internal functioning of government institutions. Their appointment challenges deep-seated arguments of regional politics as mainly influenced by patronage and clientelist networks, and calls for a more nuanced understanding of government politics in divided societies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by H2020 European Research Council: [Grant Number 726504].

Notes

1 Data are drawn from the African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project (ACPED), which provides monthly breakdowns of ministerial appointments in several African countries from 1997 through 2017 (Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 2020). The data were supplemented to include all years between 1987 and 2019 and additional socio-professional information, such as trade union affiliation, professional background, and education. Weekly issues of the ‘Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic’, local media sources, archival resources and other publicly available documentation were used to retrieve information on cabinet ministers. Data for the Bourguiba years (1956–1987) were drawn from Charfi (1989).

2 The case of Chedly Hammi, alias Mohamed Larbi Mahjoubi, is emblematic. Hammi had long served in the Ministry of Interior under Bourguiba, having a marginal role in the coup d’état that ousted the old president. He was nevertheless appointed Secretary of State in the Interior Ministry in the government of Hamed Karoui in 1990 but arrested five months after his nomination for the alleged assassination of Palestinian leader Khalil Al-Wazir. Hammi was allegedly tortured and eventually condemned to four years in prison by a military tribunal (Kéfi 2011). Under Ben Ali, a handful of army officials briefly served in the government, such as Abdelhamid Escheikh and Habib Ammar.

3 A notable example is the secretary of state for National Solidarity Funds. Tunisian individuals and businesses were required to contribute to a national fund for development projects managed by Ben Ali himself and an ad hoc Secretary of State, typically a close collaborator of the president like Kamel Haj Sassi, an RCD member from the coastal town of Sfax who served in government almost continuously from 1993 to 2008. Through the National Solidarity Funds, otherwise known as the ‘26.26 account’, the government could discretionally invest millions of francs each year in a multitude of projects in Tunisia's rural regions, enhancing the image of Ben Ali – who was typically reported to be the prime sponsor of these projects – and of the RCD across the wider population (see Beau and Tuquoi 2011).

4 Already in the early 1990s, a foreign–recruited adviser was installed in the Prime Minister's Office to 'support policy determination and develop implementation procedures.' This appointment came in the context of a Public Enterprise Restructuring Loan accorded by the World Bank to the Tunisian Government in July 1989 (Aliriza 2020, 30).

5 By virtue of their kin relationship with Ben Ali, members of the Trabelsi, Mabrouk, Zarrouk, and Chiboub families owned several public enterprises; Hedi Djilani, who chaired the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat, UTICA) for almost twenty-four years, was father-in-law to Leila Trabelsi's brother; prominent businessmen Neji Mhiri and Lotfi Abdennadher were also personal friends of the presidential couple. According to a World Bank study, by late 2010 Ben Ali's family network had captured nearly 2 per cent of Tunisia's private sector profits (Rijkers, Freund, and Nucifora 2014).

6 Among the dismissed were the Ministers of Communication, Commerce and Religious Affairs, along with the governors of Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba and Zaghouan.

7 Notable examples include Leila Trabelsi's nephew Imed, former ministers Abdallah Kallel, Tijani Haddad and Samira Khayach Belhaj, and Secretary of State for National Solidarity Funds Kamel Hadj Sassi.

8 Three members of Tunisia's largest trade union confederation, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), resigned on 18 January before taking office due to strong criticism of their collaboration with members of the RCD. Other opposition figures, including the chairman of Ettakatol Mustapha Ben Jaafar turned down his nomination (Ben Achour 2016, 101).

9 At least half of the ministers from Sidi Bouzid, Le Kef, Kasserine, and Tozeur were initially not affiliated with any political party. Out of seventeen ministers from Medenine appointed between 2011 and 2019, ten were independent.

10 As many as nineteen organisations and trade unions took part to the Higher Authority for Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition (HIROR, or Haute Instance pour la Réalisation des Objectifs de la Révolution, de la Réforme Politique et de la Transition Démocratique), a commission established in March 2011 with the aim of reforming state institutions and preparing the first democratic elections. The National Quartet consisting of the UGTT, UTICA, the Tunisian Human Rights League (Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme, LTDH) and the lawyers’ organisation, played a key role in the political crisis that followed the assassinations of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013. In 2016, the UGTT, UTICA, and the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fisheries (Union Tunisienne de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, UTAP) adhered to the Carthage Agreement, which outlined policy guidelines on the economic, social and security fronts (Jeune Afrique 2016).

11 An estimated 18 out of 43 cabinet members in 2018 had served in government under Ben Ali, were members of the RCD, or were close to the deposed president (Bobin and Haddad 2018). Among the Ben Ali cabinet members who returned to the government after 2011 are former prime minister Habib Essid, Education minister Hatem Ben Salem, Finance minister Mohamed Ridha Chalghoum, Defence minister Abdelkrim Zbidi, and Public Function minister Kamel Morjane.

12 Interview with Ennahda officials, February 2017.

13 Author interview with members of Al Irada and Nidaa Tounes, June 2018.

14 Interview with Ennahda officials, February 2017.

15 According to a civil society activist critical of consensual decision-making, ‘you cannot take consensus accountable’. Author interview with civil society activist, June 2018.

16 Author interviews with members of the Tunisian Parliament, March 2017 and June 2018.

17 Author interview with members of Ennahda, March 2017 and June 2018.

18 Ennahda initially considered an independent government to be ‘an ally of the opposition, under the mantle of technocracy’ (Soudani 2013).

19 Saïed had been an early critic of technocratic governments, arguing that there ‘a member of the government cannot be but political’ (Espace Manager 2014).