Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus

Abstract

The collapse of the Annan Plan notwithstanding, the vast support it received from Turkish Cypriots marked the culmination of a far-reaching process of social and political transformation in North Cyprus. In this article this transformation is charted and explained in terms of a reimagining of political community and cultural identity that challenged the previously prevailing Turkish nationalism. While the political implications of this reconstruction of identity patterns could be controlled by the incumbent regime until 2000, the exhaustion of the state's distributive capacities has made it possible for alternative visions of political community to be developed. However, the massive rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots has effectively deprived pro-settlement forces of a unifying political project. Under these circumstances, the Turkish Cypriots' will to resolve the Cyprus conflict may rapidly dissipate if reciprocity remains elusive.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Tugrul Ilter, Thomas Diez, Sertac Sonan and Baris Elmener, as well as the reviewers of Mediterranean Politics, for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

That is not to say that Cyprus is no longer an impediment to Turkey's path to the EU; Turkey now faces the demand for at least an implicit recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by 3 October 2005, the day when accession negotiations are to start. Nevertheless, this is a relatively modest success for Papadopoulos and foreign minister Iacovou, who had previously spelled out a number of “red lines” (among them outright recognition, the withdrawal of all Turkish military forces, the repatriation of all Turkish settlers) the crossing of which would provoke his veto of Turkish membership negotiations; see, Iacovou softens demands in Brussels, Cyprus Mail, Tuesday, 14 December 2004.

See Günter Verheugen's statement upon Papadopoulos' call for a no-vote in the Greek Cypriot referendum where he draws the “conclusion from his [Papadopoulos'] words that the government of Cyprus opposes the international settlement”. Verheugen moreover continued: “… I will be very undiplomatic now in saying that I personally feel that I have been cheated by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus”. Chris Patten, then EU commissioner for External Relations, referred to an overall feeling within the EU Commission of “being badly let down”, and repeated Verheugen's comment about deception; for both, see http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2004/04-04-22.ana.html#29 (accessed 20 February 2005).

See Kofi Annan's report to the UN Security Council, 28 May 2004 (UN Document S/2004/437). According to Annan, what was rejected by the Greek Cypriots on April 24 “was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint” (p. 20). Annan further notes that while Greek Cypiots “strongly state their wish to reunify, many see in a settlement very little gain, and quite a lot of inconvenience and risk” (accessed 20 February 2005).

See, for instance the controversies within the Greek Cypriot community reported in Psyllides, G., Prove her wrong, Cyprus Mail (South Nicosia), 27 August 2004.

Demonstrations during 2003 in support of a settlement had shaken, but not dislodged, Turkish Cypriot “president”, Rauf Denktash and his coalition of nationalist forces; they responded by seeking to shore up support by all necessary means, including the large-scale naturalization of new “citizens” from Turkey, and army officers campaigning on behalf of the incumbent parties. The Erdogan government did little to stop these measures (though unlike previous Turkish governments, it did not lend active support); but when they proved insufficient to prevent a victory of pro-settlement parties, even by the narrowest of margins, Erdogan was able to push for a dramatic revision of Turkish strategy.

This was possible because the failure of previous “state policy” had become so obvious that a part of the diplomatic establishment could simply no longer close their eyes to this. The Republic of Cyprus had been admitted, against expectations in Turkey, to the EU (something that was, to be sure, not always clear, see Nugent, 2000), and the costs of ignoring the Loizidou verdict of the European Court of Human Rights increased rapidly. This verdict held Turkey responsible for the ongoing expropriation of Greek Cypriot properties in the North, and held out the threat of billions of dollars worth of compensation claims.

Clearly, a similar focus needs to be developed with respect to the social and political development of Greek Cypriot society in order to explain the overwhelming rejection of the Annan Plan and the extreme polarization of its political culture. Unfortunately, as in the case of the North, social inquiry in the South has been closely circumscribed by official discourses and partisanship in the Cyprus conflict.

Nationalist mobilization for competing elite projects has been put at the centre of the study of nationalism and ethnicity by Paul Brass (1991). This insight also constitutes the core of an increasing number of studies of supposedly “ethnic conflicts” in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the transformations in eastern Europe (see, for instance the contributions to Crawford & Lipschutz, 1998; for an excellent case study, see Lemarchand, 1994). Lipschutz (1998) in particular, stresses that conflicts denoted as “ethnic” are no different from other political conflict in that they involve struggles about the distribution of authority, wealth and status. “Ethnicity” is one among many social cleavages that can become predominant in such struggles. Why a particular social conflict assumes an ethnic form, therefore, requires explanation - an explanation that is all but precluded by the routine designation of conflicts as ethnic, as this categorization can then stand in for the real task of explanation; cf. Banton, 2000 and Fenton, 2004.

For the full text of Papadopoulos' televised speech of 7 April 2004, see http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Tassos-Annan.htm (accessed 20 February 2005).

Papadopoulos, a former EOKA member himself, even went as far as to suggest, in an interview with the Khaleej Times (Dubai): “From 1963 to 1974, how many Turkish Cypriots were killed? The answer is none”; see Khaleej Times Online, 4 December 2004. Available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/displayarticle.asp?section=exclusiveinterview&xfile=data/exclusiveinterview/2004/september/exclusiveinterview_september2.xml (accessed 20 February 2005). For the prevailing historiographical consensus, see Constantinou & Papadakis (2001: 136–139).

This view prevails, in particular, on the right of the Greek Cypriot political spectrum (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001: 138], which has dominated politically since 1974.

For alternative versions of the argument that the US played a crucial role in the division of Cyprus, see O'Malley & Craig (2001) and Fouskas (2003). For a distinct perspective, see Nicolet (2001). We remain agnostic on the matter of these debates, which all abstract from the inter-ethnic dimension of the Cyprus conflict.

As reported by the Turkish Cypriot news agency TAK on 30 September 2003.

“Basbakan Eroglu: ‘Rum'un insafinda yasayamayiz” (Prime Minister Eroglu: we cannot live at the mercy of Greek Cypriots), Volkan, 14 November 2002.

Evidence on these issues remains, unsurprisingly, sketchy (and invites urgent further research) as relevant documents are usually not made available to the public. Nevertheless, documents are frequently leaked (leaving questions as to their authenticity) to Turkish Cypriot newspapers. See, for instance, the front page story, Nicin “Bir karis toprak verilmez” ve barisa nicin hayir (Why “We will not cede one inch of land” and why no to peace), Yenidüzen, 6 March 2003, on the transfer of land. Cf., Ülkeyi böyle yagamaladilar (How they robbed the country), Yenidüzen, 24 February 2003. Note that Yenidüzen is a publication of the left-wing CTP; similar reports on property issues, but also on the political determination of the banking system and credit provision abound in Ortam (TKP-affiliated), Kibrisli and Afrika (both independent). One of the most vocal critics of the economic benefits accorded to status quo politicians and their clients is the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. In a statement of 6 July 2003, it suggested that “those who received ill-gotten gains from the unsolved Cyprus Problem lead the resistance to a solution” (authors' translation). Available at http://www.ktto.net/turkce/20030607.html (accessed 20 February 2005).

Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 EHRR 513 (1996) (judgment on the merits), and Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50), 1998-IV (judgment on just satisfaction). In late 2003, prior to the TRNC elections, Turkey paid the fines plus interest that had accrued to Loizidou, but still refrained from implementing the substance of the verdict on use of property.

This trend was even more clear-cut in presidential elections, with Rauf Denktash the right-wing incumbent. For more data on the development of Turkish Cypriot election results, see Carkoglu & Sözen (2004).

There is no doubt that until early 2004, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots did not negotiate to achieve a result based on compromise. The question as to whether the Greek Cypriots were never willing to make the necessary concessions, but could hide this stance behind the intransigence of the other side is more difficult to argue. Certainly, former president Clerides seemed more inclined to cutting a deal, though whether the Greek Cypriot voters would have endorsed it remains unclear. Clearly, in the spring of 2003, a rejection of the then version of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots would have jeopardized EU membership; this pressure had gone by April 2004, when the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey finally changed their position.

Opposed to the argument presented here, some commentators have dismissed the demonstrations as “merely motivated by material interests, not shifts in their ethnic self-identification” (Lindley, 2003: 4).

As reported by the Turkish-Cypriot daily Kibris, Gercek Kibrislilar (Genuine Cypriots), 24 March 2000.

Cf. Güven-Lisaniler & Rodriguez (2002: 184). Among these differences, diverging attitudes about the role of religion figure strongly. It should be noted that there was also an increasing differentiation of occupational roles; whereas settlers supplemented the relatively thin population for the sake of agricultural production, Turkish Cypriots found employment in the public sector.

After 1974 many Turkish Cypriots moved into properties vacated by Greek Cypriots. Thus, Turkish Cypriots did not face scarcity in housing. As equity system was established in the form of vouchers that could be used in bidding towards particular properties opened for purchase by the authorities. Points were exchanged on the free market, allowing for consolidation among the nouveau riche.

The required number of years was until recently 20 (and has since been increased to 25), but only 10 years for veterans of the struggle against the Greek Cypriots. Thus, a large number of administrators employed after 1974 started to retire in the mid-1980s with full salaries and benefits.

UN Security Council Resolution 541 of 1983 “deplores” the declaration of independence and considers it “legally invalid” and calls on “States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus”.

On the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision, see Talmon (2001: 727–750). The ECJ decided in 1994 that without certificates from relevant Republic of Cyprus authorities, produce from the TRNC could not be imported into the European Community.

According to recently released numbers by the Turkish Embassy, the total figure of transfer payments since 1974 was just over $3bn. For the fiscal year 2005, the contribution of Turkey to the TRNC budget amounts to $357m. The 2004 gross domestic product (GDP) of the TRNC is reported to have been around $1.6bn.

A personality clash between Denktash and UBP leader Dervish Eroglu led to the formation of the Demokrat Parti (DP). The DP sought to increase its share of the vote by giving voice to the concerns of the Turkish settlers, and in 1993 it subsumed a settlers' party, the Yeni Dogus Partisi or New Birth Party (YDP), established in the mid-1980s at the initiative of the Turkish embassy.

Account holders were later fully compensated. On the other hand, a sense of injustice also subsisted as Salih Boyaci, businessman and father-in-law of Serdar Denktash, was acquitted of financial crimes involved in the insolvency of the Kibris Kredi Bank. He was retried and convicted by the High Court in January 2004.

A controversial draft of the “economic package” actually included incentives for indigenous Turkish Cypriots to marry settlers and citizens of Turkey.

The then Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem quoted by Hellenic Resources Network. Available at http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2001/01-05-04.ana.html (accessed 20 February 2005).

Critique was also transmitted through the educational system, where regime opponents got the upper hand in teachers' syndicates. Meanwhile, critical media exasperation with the transformation of the economy into a safe haven for casino money laundering and related offshore banking apparently affected public opinion.

Denktash's rhetoric masks the fact that the ability to veto EU accession is not a right of Turkey, as such, but a power vested in the Turkish Cypriot community in the 1960 constitution that Turkey is meant to guarantee (see Article 50 of the constitution).

The massive demonstrations in support of the Annan Plan in the winter of 2003 reflected this new sense of “self”. Actual numbers remain contested, with claims varying between 25,000 and 60,000 – an eighth to a third of the total TRNC population.

According to Vural and Rüstemli's survey data analysis, interviewees reveal a number of sub-identities within the Turkish Cypriot sample electorate. Among these is a tendency for some to see themselves as primarily “Cypriot” rather than “Turkish”. Another subset of respondents consider themselves primarily “European”. “Cypriots” were more likely to endorse a federal settlement to the Cyprus problem than those who identified themselves as primarily “Turkish” or “Muslim”.

• One of the leading proponents of this claim, the Cypriot daily Simerini, (Talat, Annan and Solomon, 24 May 2004) derives this conclusion that Talat is of the same kind as Denktash from a statement it attributes to Talat: “Denktash had forgotten to claim the legitimate demands of the Turkish Cypriot community before I appeared”. For a different perspective on this issue, see the editorial in the pro-solution Greek-Cypriot daily Cyprus Mail: Talat is no “Denktash Mark II”, 30 May 2004. It states that:

  • …Papadopoulos' government and its backers... never pass an opportunity to publically put [Talat] down and present him as another Denktash in the making. Countless politicians and commentators have remarked that he is no different from Denktash, condescendingly branding him ‘Ankara's puppet' in Cyprus. Even Demetris Christofias, whose party had enjoyed very close ties with Talat's, has been publically attacking him for supposedly behaving like Denktash.

Cf. the article by Faize Özdemirciler: Turkey not the only obstacle to peace, Afrika, 12 April 2004. Compare the article by Özdem Sanberk in the Turkish daily Radikal, Asil Sorun Rum Tarafinda (The real problem lies with the Greek side), 1 February 2005.

See for instance the article by Dimitri Andreou: Ghosts made in the UK, Simerini, 17 September 2004; cf. Michael Theodoulou's report on the Greek Cypriot media's response to the Annan Plan in The Scotsman, 2 April 2004. Such language is rather popular amongst Greek Cypriot politicians and clergy. One bishop thus denounced the UN plan as “Satanic, accursed and an abomination that will not work”. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/29/cyprus.ap/ (accessed 20 February 2005).