Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot Community

Abstract

This paper investigates identity fluctuations in the ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ community and argues that identity descriptions do not necessarily overlap with ethno-cultural boundaries. Age and education-related identity fluctuations emerge as responses to variations in the socialization process. Although the notion of ‘Turkish Cypriots’ implies a unitary entity, a marked cleavage mainly between two identity categories is apparent. Self-descriptions based on civic conceptualizations of identity compete with ethno-national identity and transcend community boundaries. Therefore, despite an official ‘ethno-national’ identity being imposed, ‘Cypriotness’ suggests a model comprising individuals from various ethno-national backgrounds. Data come from a probabilistic sample of 415 Turkish Cypriots who ranked components of collective identity (Cypriot, Turkish, Moslem, and European) from the ‘most important’ to the ‘least important’.

Acknowledgements

Data used in this paper were a part of the Research Project titled ‘Cyprus Problem in Changing International Environment’ conducted by Ahmet Rustemli, Cem Cakmak and Biran Mertan at Eastern Mediterranean University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable suggestions of Cakmak and Mertan and their kindness in allowing the use of their data. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Social and Political Research Meeting organized by European University Institute-Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (21–25 March 2001, Florence). The authors are grateful for the comments and suggestions made by Richard Gillespie, Ray Jureidini, Erol Kaymak and two anonymous referees who read the earlier versions of this paper.

Notes

¹ In a weekly paper, published in Ottoman Turkish, Orthodox Christians of Cyprus were described as vatan kardeşleri [compatriots], Kıbrıs, 14 January 1895.

² One of the prevailing meanings of this concept embraces both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots portraying Cyprus as the ‘motherland’ for both communities. In this usage Greece and Turkey are the places of ‘others’.

³ O Kosmos Simera, 28 February 1970.

⁴ Yeogios Sokratus argues against Cypriotness in his article.

⁵ Editorial: Present to the motherland, Birlik, 26 February 1994.

⁶ Being the religious leader of Moslems, Müftü used to be accepted as the representative of Moslem community under British rule in Cyprus.

⁷ Evkaf has been a pious foundation and has functioned as a social institution dedicated to public benefits. The British colonial administration took control of Evkaf until 1955.

⁸ A limited number of Greek Cypriots have lived in some villages in Karpaz peninsula under Turkish-Cypriot administration since 1974 while a group of Turkish Cypriots stayed in the South under Greek-Cypriot administration.

⁹ In terms of international law, the Green Line is the unrecognized border which separates the south from the north. The Green Line is monitored by the UN peace-keeping forces. Beginning in April 2003, people from both sides have been allowed to cross this unrecognized border using one of the five checkpoints.

¹⁰ S. Ismail (a Turkish-Cypriot nationalist journalist).

¹¹ E. Hasipoğlu (MP and former speaker of Turkish-Cypriot national assembly).

¹² A.H. Tahsin (a Turkish Cypriot leftist journalist).

¹³ S. Paşazade, 27 November 2003.

¹⁴ M. Akıncı (former Turkish-Cypriot deputy prime minister) argues that Cyprus dispute should be solved by Cypriots, Yenidüzen, 7 December 2005.

¹⁵ Hakkı Yücel, 2005.

¹⁶ In the Republic of Cyprus, political rights were allocated on the basis of community membership where each community was distinguished from the other by religion, mother tongue or ethnic origin. See Constitution, article 2(1–2).

¹⁷ This was the clear manifestation of demand of Turkish-Cypriot elite for cultural autonomy from colonial rule.

¹⁸ The meaning attributed to the word ‘mujaheddin’ is ‘a person who fights to the glory of sacred ideals’ (Turkish Linguistic Institution (1992).

¹⁹ See note 12.

²⁰ It is also argued that the demographic characteristics of settlers encourage nationalism in northern Cyprus. See interview with M.A. Talat (the former leader of Republican Turkish Party, Turkish-Cypriot president), Görüş, June 1997.

²¹ Although ‘two separate states’ receives the highest support from both groups, support for ‘integration of Northern Cyprus with Turkey’ is 11.9 per cent in native participants and 35.2 per cent in settlers. ‘Federation’ receives 41 per cent support from native participants and only 19 per cent support from settlers.