Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military

Abstract

Institutional change has become a primary issue in recent institutionalist literature. By analyzing the civilianization process of the Turkish political system in the context of the Europeanization process, this study attempts another theoretical answer. The puzzling question is why the Turkish military, a veto player in the Turkish political system, has accepted its loss of power? This study shows that the military, which expressed its commitment to further integration with the EU on several occasions, found itself ‘rhetorically entrapped’. Thus, the military refrained from blocking the civilianization process due to the likely damage such an action would cause to its ideational interests (legitimacy and credibility).

Acknowledgement

An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) 64th Annual National Conference, 20–23 April 2006, Chicago IL. I would like to thank B. Guy Peters, Daniel Thomas, Frank Schimmelfennig, Alberta Sbragia, Olga Avdeyeva, Amy Erica, Jay Fisher and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments on the drafts of the manuscript. In addition, I thank the European Union Center of Excellence at the University of Pittsburgh for supporting this project.

Notes

¹ South European Society and Politics released a special issue on Turkey's Europeanization process (April 2005). This special issue, which provides a systematic and theoretical analysis of the Europeanization process in the Turkish context across several issue areas (civil society, civil-military relations etc), fills a significant gap in the literature on EU-Turkey relations.

² Interviews were with political elites (active and retired), retired military officials, and some civil society and media representatives in Ankara and Istanbul (June, July, December 2005; and June 2006). The primary purpose of interviewing was to define positions of MGK actors in a two-dimensional bargaining space (their expectations in terms of logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness dimensions) and also to understand reason(s) for shifts within that space during tacit bargaining process. For a list of interviewees, see Appendix.

³ On the LoC dimension, framing is usually used to persuade other actors that a certain action would create a win-win outcome in terms of ‘material interests’.

⁴ According to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law (January 1961), the military is responsible for protecting the territorial integrity and the nature of the Turkish regime (including Kemalist principles: particularly secularism and republicanism) (Articles 35 and 85/1).

⁵ The Turkish Republic has experienced two direct (1960–61 and 1980–83) and two indirect (1971–73 and 1997) military interventions.

⁶ Financial Times, 30 July 2003. Also see the declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU (11921/03 (Presse 231) P 95/03).

⁷ Law No 4963, Available at: www.tbmm.gov.tr

⁸ Power analysis, here, is based on ‘relational power’ rather than ‘power-as-resources’. Power-as-resources, also referred as power-as-possession, power-as-property, power-as-capabilities, limits the notion of power to material capabilities. Relational power is much more sensitive to social context and to symbolic means. For more discussion on this, see Baldwin, 2002 and Hagström, 2005.

⁹ In the case of tacit bargaining, the parties to bargaining ‘watch and interpret each others behaviours’ rather than explicitly negotiate on formal settings (Schelling, 1963: 21).

¹⁰ See appendix for a list of interviewees.

¹¹ There are also some exceptions to this general attitude. For instance in the early 1980s, the military tried to promote Islam as an antidote against the threat of communism (Demirel, 2005: 136).

¹² Radikal (İstanbul Daily), 1 August 2003.

¹³ Turkish Daily News, 1 August 2003.

¹⁴ For more discussion on the notion of rhetorical entrapment see Schimmelfennig, 2003.

¹⁵ For instance, see the speech given by Chief of the General Staff General, Hilmi Özkök, in April 2005. Available at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/bashalk/konusma_mesaj/2005/yillikdegerlendirme_200405.htm.

¹⁶ For the results of one nationwide survey (1990), see Ergüder, Esmer and Kalaycıoğlu 1991.

¹⁷ Author's interviews in Ankara, Istanbul and Bodrum, Turkey (June, July, August 2006).

¹⁸ Author's interview in Ankara, Turkey (July 2005).

¹⁹ Author's interview in Istanbul, Turkey (July 2006).

²⁰ Radikal (İstanbul Daily), 31 July 2003.

²¹ See Yaşar Yakış' address to the parliament on behalf of the AKP (30 July, 2003, 113th Parliamentary Session). Parliamentary debates over the draft law are available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr.