Converging, Diverging and Instrumentalizing European Security and Defence Policy in the Mediterranean

Abstract

This article addresses the degree of convergence, divergence and in some cases indifference of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries towards the European Security and Defence Policy. Focusing on two cases, Morocco and Turkey, but also referring to other Mediterranean partners, this contribution analyses the dynamics of this specific issue area, arguing that policy convergence in the field of security and defence has reflected process-oriented goals rather than a substantive convergence of strategic interests. The article concludes by exploring how the EU's differentiated geographical approach in security and defence cooperation in the Mediterranean impacts on the broader region-building endeavour.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Tobias Schumacher and Anna Herranz for their comments and suggestions and Fadela Hilali and Irene García for their assistance.

Notes

¹ With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP is now called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, the article will refer to ESDP as the empirical evidences and the analysis correspond to a period previous to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

² The concept of a ‘security complex’ is defined by Barry Buzan (1991: 90) as ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’.

³ We refer, here, to the seminal work of Karl Deutsch et al. (1957).

⁴ According to Benantar (2006: 170), when the Mediterranean Dialogue was launched there was quasi-consensus to exclude Algeria due to its internal crisis and Syria and Libya for their ‘alleged support to terrorism’. It was not until 2000 that Algeria joined the Dialogue.

⁵ Among the analyses of these missions see CITpax (2006), Collantes Celador et al. (2008) and Sabiote (2006, 2008).

⁶ Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Valencia Action Plan, 23 April 2002.

⁷ Information provided by an official of a EU Member State based in Brussels (January 2010).

⁸ On these transformations see, among others, Aliboni and Ammor (2008), Gillespie (2008), Barbé (2009), Khader (2009) and Balfour (2009).

⁹ Interviews with Turkish diplomats in Ankara (January 2009) and Brussels (April 2009).

¹⁰ According to Miguel Ángel Medina (2009: 5) the Turkish C130 plane and its crew help to overcome the strategic transport deficit of the Congo mission. Erdal Tatli (2008) also refers to the importance of the C130 aircrafts and adds Turkey's capacity to mobilize up to 50.000 soldiers on short notice and air refueling capacities that make Turkey able to participate in overseas operations.

¹¹ The Annex IV of Nice Presidency Conclusions differentiates consultation and participation mechanisms of non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the UE and foresees regular consultations with this countries on a regular basis when there is no crisis and to associate them to the greatest possible extent in EU-led military operations in times of crisis.

¹² As Didier Billion and Fabio Liberti (2009: 8) put it: ‘Turkey, like Norway, was a member of the WEAG (Western European Armaments Group), the organization responsible for cooperation in the field of armaments within the framework of the WEU. Since the absorption of the WEAG functions within the EDA, Norway has been able to conclude an administrative arrangement with the EDA, which allows it to be associated with certain activities of the agency. On the contrary, Turkey has not been able to obtain such an agreement’.

¹³ The Presidency Conclusions of the 2002 Copenhagen European Council promised Turkey that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.

¹⁴ On the Advanced Status see Florensa (2008) and Martín (2008).

¹⁵ Interview with Moroccan official, Brussels, April 2009.

¹⁶ ‘NATO declines support Turkey's veto over EU's Kosovo mission’ in Today's Zaman, 22 June 2007.

¹⁷ As Didier Billion and Fabio Liberti (2009) explain ‘in the cases of Afghanistan and Kosovo, where the two organizations simultaneously conducted complementary missions, logic would contend that these operations be perfectly coordinated. Turkey is opposed to this type of cooperation and it has thus not been possible to introduce an agreement allowing NATO to guarantee the protection of police forces participating in the European Union EUPOL mission in Afghanistan’.

¹⁸ This sentence can be found in his book Le Défi, published in 1976.

¹⁹ See, for instance, references to the notion of choice in several Moroccan officials' statements such as those of André Azulay, Youssef Amrani, Salahedine Mezouar or Karim Ghelab, collected in Florensa (2008).