Re-emerging Islamism in Tunisia: Repositioning Religion in Politics and Society

Abstract

In this article a widening divergence is observed between Islamist activism aimed at societal change and Islamist activism aimed at political influence in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Both forms of activism remain closely linked through an enduring common Islamist ideology that renders convergence in daily practice inescapable; a convergence that is most clearly observable, it is argued, through shared attempts at Islamizing specific public organizations and state administrations. These attempts are often highly contested between actors both internal and external to the Islamist project. These struggles will be central to defining the future position of public Islam versus state and politics in the country.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my colleagues at the Middle East Working Groups (MEWG) and the participants at the 13th Mediterranean Research Meeting Workshop on Religion, Democracy and Civil Liberties for their useful critiques on earlier version of this article. A special thanks in this respect to Jeff Haynes and Guy Ben-Porat and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable input. For their invaluable assistance during fieldwork I would like to the CEMAT research institute in Tunis. Any remaining mistakes are my own.

Notes

¹ I refer to 14 January 2011 as a ‘revolution’ with the understanding that the label is still contested.

² I use the IJMES transliteration style, an exception is made for names of cities and individuals.

³ The article does not provide a concise historical overview. For an overall discussion of Tunisian Islamism in historic perspective, see Waltz (1986), Moore (1988), Vandewalle (1988), Burgat and Dowell (1993), and Allani (2009).

⁴ Please note that the conceptualization of Islamism is far from clear. Compare for instance the definitions used by Bayat (1996, p. 43), Roy (2006, p. 58) and Volpi (2010, p. 14).

⁵ The existence of these movements led to a large body of literature aiming to explore and analyse this phenomenon. Some examples are Beinin and Stork (1996), Burgat and Dowell (1997), Esposito and Burgat (2003), and Cavatorta (2008).

⁶ For meanings of secularism, see Casanova (1994).

⁷ Similar arguments have been made by Hefner (2000) and Zaman (2002), as well as writers such as Ismail (2006), for Egypt, and Haklai (2009), for the Middle East. A more general contribution that should be mentioned is Esposito (1998).

⁸ The ‘political arena’ here denotes formal institutions with legislative powers.

⁹ Interview with a Islamist youngster, 14 February 2011, Tunis.

¹⁰ ‘Un vent de liberté dans les mosquées’ [A breath of freedom in the mosques], La Presse, 7 February 2011, p. 3.

¹¹ See for a more elaborate discussion on regime repression in Tunisia, related to Ennahda (Esposito & Voll, 2001) and related to Salafism (Allani, 2009).

¹² See http://www.data.gov.tn/.

¹³ Conversation with a civil servant at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 3 November 2011, Tunis.

¹⁴ Interview with senior representative of the Prime Ministry, 28 September 2012, Tunis, Tunisia. Exact numbers are not available.

¹⁵ As observed and according to senior officials at the Ministry for Religious Affairs and the Prime Ministry. Interview with a senior officials at the Ministry for Religious Affairs, 2 October 2012, Tunis.

¹⁶ Interview and observation at state-oriented Quran school, 10 November 2011, Tunis; Interview director of independent chain of Quran schools, 6 October 2011, Tunis.

¹⁷ ‘Report on Zeytuna education: nostalgia for the past or thirst for power?’, Réalités, 23–29 August 2012, pp. 43–45.

¹⁸ Interview with a Nahdaoui director of an (independent) charitable association, 4 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.

¹⁹ ‘Non à l'extrémisme’ [No to extremism], Réalités, 13–19 October 2011, p. 6; and ‘Jam'a al-ghaab ud “Nesma”’ [Friday of anger against ‘Nesma’], Al-Sāri , 15 October 2011, p. 7.

²⁰ ‘Jama al-Iāha bi‘Nesma’ tintahī bi-Muwājahāt ma al-Shura fi Tūnis’ [The Friday of overthrow ends with clashes with the police in Tunis], Al-Sharq al-Awsa , 15 October 2011. Available at www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=645147&issueno=12009 (accessed 19 January 2012).

²¹ Ennahda received 41 per cent of the seats in the constitutive assembly, while it received 54 per cent of the votes. If all votes were counted (including votes that were cast for parties that did not receive enough votes for a seat) Ennahda received 37 per cent.

²² ‘Rasmī: Ennahda taḥaṣal'ala al-Ta'shīra’ [Official: Ennahda obtains official endorsement], Al-Shurūq, 2 March 2011, p. 6; and ‘Barnāmij arakat Ennahda: min ’Ajil Tūnis al-urīya wa al-'Adāla wa al-Tanmīya’ [Programme of Ennahda: for Tunis, freedom, justice and development], arakat Ennahda (September 2011).

²³ ‘Barnāmij Ḥarakat Ennahda: min ’Ajil Tūnis al-Ḥurīya wa al-'Adāla wa al-Tanmīya’ [Programme of Ennahda: for Tunis, freedom, justice and development], Ḥarakat Ennahda (September 2011), p. 5.

²⁴ Interview with a senior Ennahda member of the party's Shura council, 8 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.

²⁵ See ‘fī Awal Nadwa aḥafīya li-izb al-Tarīr: al-Khilāfa Mabda Asāsi’ [At the first press conference of the Liberation party: the caliphate is the principal basis], Al- Ṣabā , 11 March 2011, p. 10; and ‘Wasa al-āima: Masīra li-’Anār “izb al-Tarīr”' [In the middle of the capital: a march of izb al-Tarīr supporters], Al- Ṣabā , 2 April 2011, p. 5.

²⁶ It should be noted that Tunisia has very little (or no) experience with polls, therefore it is hard to tell to what extent these polls are reliable.

²⁷ ‘Barnāmij Jabhat al-Ilā’ [Program of Jabhat al-Ilā], Jabhat al-Ilā [The Reform Front] (2012).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Interview with the president and head of the political bureau of Jabha al-Iṣlāḥ, 10 October 2012, Tunis.

³⁰ Interview with Zeytuna students, Zeytuna University, 2 March 2001, Tunis.

³¹ Interview with a Salafist student at the Zeytuna University, Tunis, 20 October 2011.

³² Interview with a Salafist Jihadist activist in Medenine, Tunisia, 15 October 2011.

³³ ‘al-Filisūf Abū Yarab al-Marzūkī: Anā Nahawī wa la Antamī ila arakat Ennahda’ [The philosopher Abu Yarab Marzouki: I am a Nahdaoui, but I do not belong to the Ennahda movement], Al-Fajr, 30 September 2011, p. 7.

³⁴ Interview with a regional Ennahda leader, 16 October 2011.

³⁵ Interview with a member of the Ennahda Shura Council, 8 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.

³⁶ Interview with two Ennahda-related Islamic activists, 19 September 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.

³⁷ ‘Tunisia recognizes controversial Islamist organization’, Tunisia Live, 21 February 2012.

³⁸ ‘Radio Zitouna accused of airing politicized content’, Tunisia Live, 19 October 2012.

³⁹ See also ‘al-I'lām al-Tūnisī fi Irab Itijājān 'ala Saī al-Islāmiyīn lil Sayara al-I'lām’ [Tunisian press protests against Islamists' attempts to control the press], Reuters, 17 October 2012.

⁴⁰ Khamīs bin Brīk, ‘Jadil bi Tūnis bishān Khakhaa al-I'lām’ [Debate on privatization of media in Tunisia], Al-Jazeera, 21 April 2012.

⁴¹ Observation at the University of Tunis, 5 March 2011, Tunis.

⁴² ‘awl al-Istīlā’ala Qāa Tadrīs bi-Da'wa Istamālha Baytan li-l-Salāa’ [About the seizure of a classroom in the call to use her as a prayer house], University of Tunis Council of Professors, 5 March 2011.

⁴³ ‘Sousse: Itidā’ala Kātib Ām Kuliyat al-Ādāb Raf Tarsīm āliba Munaqaba’ [Sousse: Attack on the academic director of the literature faculty after refusing to register a Niqab student], Al-Shurūq, 9 October 2011, p. 5.

⁴⁴ ‘ulāb Salafiyūn Yuataamūn fī kuliyat al-Adāb bi-Manouba li-Far Artidā’ al-Niqāb’ [Salafist students have a sit in at the literature department in Manouba to force permission for the Niqab], France 24, 25 January 2012.

⁴⁵ Observation at Ministry of Religious Affairs, 11 February 2011, Tunis; conversation with Islamic youngster at the same place and date.

⁴⁶ Conversation with a civil servant at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 3 November 2011, Tunis.

⁴⁷ ‘Arkān al-Dawla wa Mufāalha mā Zālat bi-Yad al-Almāniyīn wa Qasm min al-Tūnisiyīn Yakhāf al-Sharīa’ [The pillars of the state and organizations are still in the hands of the seculars… and a part of the Tunisian is afraid of Shariah], Al-Shurūq, 11 October 2012, p. 6. The leaked tape was not uncontested, see Amr al-Laridh, Balāgh I'lāmī [Press statement], Ennahda, 10 October 2012. The specific contested sentences have been deleted from this quote.

⁴⁸ ‘Arkān al-Dawla wa Mufāṣalha mā Zālat bi-Yad al-Almāniyīn wa Qasm min al-Tūnisiyīn Yakhāf al-Sharīa’ [The pillars of the state and organizations are still in the hands of the seculars… and a part of the Tunisian is afraid of Shariah], Al-Shurūq, 11 October 2012, p. 6.

⁴⁹ For instance: ‘La guerre sur les Mosquées’ [The war over the mosques], Réalités, 13 April 2011, p. 8. Interview deputy of religious affairs in Ariana, 16 March 2011, Greater Tunis.

⁵⁰ Interview with Salafi activists, 4 April 2011, Sidi Bouzzid.

⁵¹ ‘Extremists control hundreds of Tunisia's mosques: religious affairs minister’, Al-Arabiya English, 31 March 2012.

⁵² Interview with a (Salafi) director of a religious school, 2 October 2012, Greater Tunis.

⁵³ Interview with senior ’alim and president of Islamic social organization, 4 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.

⁵⁴ Observation at the governorate of Tunis, 11 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisia: investigate attacks by religious extremists’, 15 October 2012.

⁵⁶ Interview with senior representative of the Zeytuna mosque, 10 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia. See also Hajji (2011).

⁵⁷ For example, in the minutes of the July 2012 Ennahda conference, it is explicitly mentioned (p. 7) that Zeytuna has a central role in rebuilding education in the country so that it reflects better the Arabo-Islamic identity of the nation.

⁵⁸ ‘Entretien avec Houshine al-Abadi, Imam de la Mosquée Zeytuna’ [Interview with Houshine al-Abadi, imam of the Zeytuna mosque], Réalités, 23–29 August 2012, pp. 38–42.

⁵⁹ Interview with senior representative of the Zeytuna mosque, 10 October 2012, Tunis, Tunisia.