It Is Pull-and-Push that Matters for External Europeanization! Explaining Minority Policy Change in Turkey

Abstract

Starting with an empirical puzzle, i.e. the variation in minority-related change in Turkey across time, this article aims to uncover the conditions that promote or constrain domestic change and puts forward a comprehensive theoretical framework for external Europeanization. The article draws on current external Europeanization theories and suggests adopting the pull-and-push model of member state Europeanization in external Europeanization. It argues that domestic change – Turkey's minority policy change in the empirical case – depends on the combination and interaction of EU push and domestic pull factors.

Acknowledgements

I thank Tanja Börzel, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Thomas Diez and anonymous reviewers for their most valuable comments and suggestions. This article is based on the doctoral dissertation ‘From the Push by European Union Conditionality to the Pull by Dissatisfaction: Exploring Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey’, defended at the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies at Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, in June 2012.

Notes

^1. This period starts with the launch of EU candidate country status and ends with the November 2002 elections. I focus on this period as a background analysis for the 2002–10 period, because minority reforms are almost non-existent in this period and the coupling/decoupling of reforms to map policy change is not possible.

^2. Due to the continuum of reforms in the area by 2005, especially in an increasing trend by 2008 – despite the growing impact of veto players – the proposed theoretical model ruled out the veto players as a primary factor in the external incentives model. For the detailed analysis, please see the empirical section.

^3. For the detailed analysis, please see the empirical section.

^4. This article specifically focuses on the dissatisfaction of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in minority rights because the AKP government ruled the country in 2002–10 as the majority in the parliament with the power to force change.

^5. The focus on the direct mechanism of pull-and-push is related to the weak societal impact on policy making in Turkey. For instance, the limited impact of Turkish civil society (which is still in the making) on policy making is a vital illustration of this (see Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010: 10).

^6. As in the original model for member state Europeanization by Börzel (2000), the existence of pull-and-push factors leads to change in external Europeanization even if veto players and other domestic actors incur high adaptation costs. The empirical case also supports this argument. Therefore, veto players as an obstructing factor is ruled out from the analysis.

^7. Although the empirical case does not demonstrate the outcome of effective policy change, in cases of the push with pull the original pull-and-push model by Börzel (2000: 148) expects an increase in the likelihood of adoption and implementation of EU rules, and therefore coupling in legal adoption and implementation, which can be conceptualized as effective policy change.

^8. See Yilmaz (2011) for a detailed mapping of the reforms.

^9. Interview by the author of an AKP Member of Parliament conducted in Ankara on 30 March 2010.

^10. Interview conducted by the author with Baskın Oran in Ankara on 25 December 2009; Interview conducted by the author with Murat Belge in Istanbul on 18 November 2009; Interview conducted by the author with an official in the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) in Istanbul, on 11 November 2009.

^11. Interview conducted by the author with Baskın Oran in Ankara on 25 December 2009.