Territorial Stress in Morocco: From Democratic to Autonomist Demands in Popular Protests in the Rif

Abstract

This article analyses the evolution of popular protest in the Rif within the Moroccan context of contention. It considers the specificity of the demands expressed and the strategies for mobilization adopted as a result of a long-term process of regional activism. The article finds that protesters in the Rif have had agency to conduct their own strategies, using the opportunity structure opened at state level to advance their own agenda. The pre-existing mobilizing structures and the reproduction of patterns of centre–periphery tension in the course of the contention have fostered a progressive localization of protest in the region, which has strengthened regional identity and regionalist activism in the Rif.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

^1. The Makhzen has been described by Cavatorta and Durac (2010: 57) as an ‘informal governing alliance between the monarch, his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats and tribal chiefs operating as the unelected and unaccountable decision-makers in the country beyond the control of the elected government’.

^2. Development plans and agencies have been central in the state’s strategy for territorial reinforcement and functioned as a cornerstone of Mohammed VI's approach to the Rif, where the promotion of economic development has been implemented via a large number of projects to activate the regional economy and unlock the region from the rest of Morocco geographically. The monarch has personally followed the evolution of this development programme, visiting the Rif on a frequent basis for both official visits and personal holidays (Suárez, 2011).

^3. Because of the continuity of his presence in the region, the local population has started to view the king as a bulwark there, breaking the barrier between the northern provinces and the Makhzen that existed for decades (Suárez, 2011, 2013a).

^4. For Parejo and Feliu (2009), ‘secondary elites’ are made up of secondary figures of the army and intelligence services, state agents in charge of the machinery of repression, members of para-state institutions, the government, leaders of political parties and parliamentary elites, administration elites, businessmen and certain members of the media.

^5. Detailed information about the constitution process of the PAM in the Rif, its electoral strategies and results in Al Hoceima province can be found in Suárez (2009).

^6. For more about the participation of Rifian political elites in the constitution of the PAM, see Suárez (2013a).

^7. 2005 يناير29: فيلجنةإالريفلجنةإعلان. See Suárez (2013a).

^8. Despite the fact that Amazigh associations represent the core of regionalist activism, other local associations have also been integrated, such as local development associations and the so-called associations of memory as well as the local sections of the AMDH and UMT (Suárez, 2010, 2013a).

^9. The Amazigh sectors in favour of the establishment of autonomy or federalized entities in Amazigh regions are the Amazigh Cultural Movement in Moroccan universities and some political organizations linked to Amazigh activism, such as the Amazigh Democratic Party, the Moroccan Amazigh Democratic Party and the Federal Democratic Party (Suárez, 2010, 2013a).

^10. Amazigh associations in Spain, Belgium, Holland and Germany, the European branch of the MAR and associations of Rifians abroad in different European cities (Suárez, 2013a).

^11. See the example of Annahj Addimocrati's section in Al Hoceima in Suárez (2013a).

^12. However, an ‘ethno-territorial mimesis’ was observed in some of these projects with the political systems of certain European countries, especially those with important Rifian communities, such as Spain, Germany and Belgium. These communities have contributed to diffusing the particularities of the political systems where they live (Suárez, 2010, 2013a). For clarification, ‘ethno-territorial mimesis’ refers to the way that certain regions try to imitate the model of the state–region relationship, powers, institutions and symbols previously adopted by others (Moreno, 1997).

^13. Proposals fluctuate from the territory defined as the ‘Greater Rif’ (from the Atlantic to the Algerian border and from the Mediterranean to the Rif Mountains), to the area considered as the ‘Strategic Rif’ (territory formed by the Al Hoceima, Driouch and Nador provinces along with certain parts of Taza and Berkane and Melilla) (See Suárez, 2010, 2013a).

^14. In this respect, the political discourse rests on the consideration of the Rif as a nation, the idea that history has provided the Rifians with a democratic consciousness and its existence as a region with a historical identity and rights. It defies the ideological state apparatus sustaining the Arab and Islamic nationalist character of the modern nation-state, its policies and the dominant historiography of Morocco (Suárez, 2013a).

^15. The MAR political project has been analysed through different documents issued by the organization, such as ‘Le Rif stratégique’ (2008), مشروع أطروحة فكرية لـ ‘حركة سياسية ريفية and ‘Communiqué pour une large autonomie dans le Rif’ (2008) (see Suárez, 2013a).

^16. The reform of the constitution, the resignation of the Abbas Al Fassi government, the dissolution of parliament, an effective separation of powers, the prosecution of persons and authorities responsible for human rights abuses and corruption, the liberation of political prisoners, the official recognition of Amazigh language and identity and sanitary and education equality.

^17. ‘Une enquête au pays de Khattabi’, Mamfakinch, 22 July 2011. Available at http://www.mamfakinch.com/une-enquete-au-pays-de-khattabi/ (accessed 22 July 2011).

^18. ‘Más pruebas acusan a la policía marroquí de la muerte de 5 personas el 20 de febrero en Alhucemas’, Kaos en la red, 11 April 2011. Available at http://old.kaosenlared.net/noticia/mas-pruebas-acusan-policia-marroqui-muerte-5-personas-20-febrero-alhuc (accessed 2 May 2011).

^19. Ilyas El Omari had been one of the Rifian activists who led the Rif Declaration Committee and has political experience in the GSU and local and national associations.

^20. New mass demonstrations took place on 21 February in Imzouren, with the participation of 7,000 people and on 25 February across the Al Hoceima province with 10,000 participants. Rifian youth organized their own gatherings both in the secondary schools in Imzouren, Ait Bouayach and Ajdir on 23 February and at Oujda University where Rifian students received the support of all sections of the UNEM. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature = player_embedded&v = ulvuBQ3gcbw#t = 0s; http://asenti.blogspot.com.es/2011/02/blog-post_22.html and احداثالحسيمةتساهمفيتوحيدطلبةالريفبجامعةوجدةرغمالاختلافاتالسياسية, Dalil Rif, 22 February 2011. Available at http://www.dalil-rif.com/home/-hoceimaunemoujda (accessed 22 February 2011).

^21. بلاغ لحركة 20 فبراير موقع تماسينت and بيان:ساكنة ايت بوعياش تستمر في مسيراتها النضالية بعد 20 فبراير (Statements of local associations in Ait Bouyach and Tamassint) (see Suárez, 2013a).

^22. الحسيمة إقليم الهيئات والفعاليات الشبابية ب (statement of organizations and youth of Al Hoceima province), 8 March 2011.

^23. Ibid.

^24. Ibid.

^25. ‘Chakib El Khayari libéré’, Bladi, 14 April 2011. Available at http://www.bladi.net/chakib-el-khayari-libere.html (accessed 11 April 2011).

^26. In this context, two remarkable events took place at the beginning of the summer when, first, on 13 June, a policeman, after attacking a taxi driver with a bladed weapon, uttered insults toward Rifians, including aubach, the word Hassan II had used to refer to the Rif population after the 1984 uprisings and ‘sons of Spaniards’. Some days later, other policeman attacked and insulted four young men who were participating in a popular demonstration. The local population reacted in both cases by organizing protests, resulting in increased tension with the security forces and the ending of the king’s visit to the region. See مدينةالحسيمةوسطاحتجاجليليعارم, Hespress, 14 June 2011. Available at http://hespress.com/permalink/32901.html (accessed 15 June 2011) مواطنينيشعلغضبالساكنةإعتداءبعضالمحسوبينعلىالشرطةبالحسيمةعلى, Rifnow, 13 June 2011. Available at http://www.rifnow.com/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 3214%3A2011-04-13-15-07-04&catid = 39%3A2009-04-12-16-06-34&Itemid = 87 (accessed 15 June 2011).

^27. ‘Miles de manifestantes colapsan el centro de la ciudad marroquí de Alhucemas’, Alhucemas Press, 15 June 2011. Available at http://www.alhucemaspress.com/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 2134:miles-de-manifestantes-colapsan-el-centro-de-la-ciudad-marroqui-de-alhucemas&catid = 36:noticias-del-rif&Itemid = 126 (accessed 15 June 2011).

^28. ساكنةايتبوعياشتستجيبللاضرابالعامومسيرةحاشدةتطالب Central Committee Ait Bouayach, 22 May 2011. Available at http://bouayach-comite.blogspot.com.es/ (accessed 20 April 2012); علىإهانتهلكرامةالمحتجينساكنةأزلافتفتحأفقاجديدالإحتجاجاتها،وتطالببمحاسبةرئيسمجلسالجماعة, Rifnow, 29 June 2011. Available at http://www.rifnow.com/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 3276:2011-06-24-18-45-15&catid = 39:2009-04-12-16-06-34&Itemid = 87 (accessed 1 July 2011).

^29. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature = player_embedded&v = D_OBZAVIzUk#t = 126s.

^30. Tamsmunt n twengint n Arif gi Lhusima (Statement of Association of Rif Memory), Al Hoceima, 7 March 2011.

^31. Ibid.

^32. E.g. the immediate demilitarization of the area, the release of all detainees and political prisoners, the suspension of arrest warrants against the militants who had not been arrested and investigation into corruption at City Hall. See ساكنة ايت بوعياش تستجيب للاضراب العام ومسيرة حاشدة تطالب, Bouayach Comite, 22 May 2011. Available at http://bouayach-comite.blogspot.com.es/ (accessed 20 April 2012).

^33. E.g. the transformation of the local health centre into a hospital, the rehabilitation of irrigation canals, installing fences on the banks of the Nekor and Souftoula rivers and the cancellation of electricity and water payments for two years in compensation for abuses committed. See ساكنة ايت بوعياش تستجيب للاضراب العام ومسيرة حاشدة تطالب, Bouayach Comite, 22 May 2011. Available at http://bouayach-comite.blogspot.com.es/ (accessed 20 April 2012).

^34. National participation in the constitutional referendum was 75 per cent of registered voters, and in the case of Al Hoceima city 55 per cent of registered voters. National participation in the legislative election was 45.5 per cent whilst in the Al Hoceima province it was 37.2 per cent, 41.2 per cent in Driouch and 33.9 per cent in Nador (Suárez, 2013a).

^35. بيان صادر عن مجلس التنسيق في شأن مستجدات الوضع الحقوقي والديمقراطي بالمغرب, Northern Morocco Forum for Human Rights, 3 December 2011.

^36. الياس العماري يهدد بالحكم الذاتي للريف للعودة إلى دائرة القرار بالبلاد Arrifinu, 24 May 2011. Available at http://www.arrifinu.net/?p = 46008 (accessed 26 May 2011).

^37. Observed by the author in the course of a meeting organized by local section of M20F in Nador, 3 April 2011.

^38. محتجونببنيبوعياشيرفعونعلمجمهوريةالريف, Maghress, 16 October 2011. Available at http://www.maghress.com/dalilrif/5982 (accessed 16 October 2011).

^39. ‘Ce Rif si rebelle’, Telquel, 24 April 2012. Available at http://www.telquel-online.com/Le-mag/Reportage-ce-rif-si-rebelle/519 (accessed 2 May 2012).

^40. ‘Rassemblement de solidarité avec les populations du Rif victimes de la répression au Maroc’, Tamazgha, 21 March 2012. Available at http://tamazgha.fr/Rassemblement-de-solidarite-avec,3317.html (accessed 3 April 2012). فعاليات ريفية تخلد فاتح ماي بمدريد, Midar 24, 1 May 2012. Available at http://www.midar24.com/?p = 5933 http://www.midar24.com/?p = 5933(accessed 3 June 2012).

^41. Statement of National Council for Support of the Feb 20 Movement, Rabat, 12 March 2012 (distributed by e-mailing list Presse Maroc on 14 March 2012).

^42. ‘Duras penas de prisión contra militantes del 20F de Ait Bouayach’, AlhucemasPress, 1 May 2012. Available at http://www.alhucemaspress.com/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 2496:duras-penas-de-prision-contra-militantes-del-20f-de-ait-bouayach-rif&catid = 50:ultimas-noticias-slide-show (accessed 2 May 2012).

^43. ‘Les activistes Rifains réclament l’indépendance du Rif à l'occasion du 92e anniversaire de la bataille d'Anoual', Siwel, 23 September 2013. Available at http://www.siwel.info/Maroc-Les-activistes-Rifains-reclament-l-independance-du-Rif-a-l-occasion-du-92e-anniversaire-de-la-bataille-d-Anoual_a5245.html (accessed 12 October 2013).

^44. ‘Lancement du projet pour la création du musée du Rif en vue de promouvoir la réconciliation et de préserver le patrimoine de la région’. Available at http://www.cndh.org.ma/fr/bulletin-d-information/lancement-du-projet-pour-la-creation-du-musee-du-rif-en-vue-de-promouvoir-la (accessed 1 November 2014).

^45. It was created in 2013 by Rifians in the diaspora, after the spring uprisings in rural areas and subsequent state repression. The organization's main concern is the Rif Republic's Self-Determination Cause. See http://rif.livenations.net/ (accessed 19 November 2014).

^46. لقاءروزندال: الريفيحتاجلتحريرالعقولقبلتحريرالأرض Anoual.Net, 2 December 2013. Available at http://www.anoual.net/archives/5091 (accessed 5 January 2014).