Multidimensional Threats and Military Engagement: The Case of the Italian Intervention in Libya

Abstract

The military operation in Libya (2011) is a paradigmatic case regarding the growing interaction of new security challenges: regional instability, transnational organized crime and illegal immigration. The main aim of the paper is to answer the question: Why has Italy employed a specifically military instrument to tackle transnational and non-military threats? Through process tracing the research looks at the political debate over the decision-making process in the case of the Italian military engagement in Libya, emphasizing the role played by the strategic culture, international norms and domestic dynamics.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

^1. Several authors have focused on the relevance of the military tool as a primary asset in Italy’s power projection, among others by analysing: the main characteristics of the major military operations undertaken from the Balkans to Lebanon (Ignazi et al., 2012); the transformation of the Armed Forces since the adoption of the New Model (Coticchia & Moro, 2014); the continuities and discontinuities in the choices related to security by centre-left and centre-right governments (Brighi, 2007; Croci, 2002; Ignazi, 2004); the evolution of military and strategic culture (Ignazi et al., 2012; Pirani, 2010); the relationship between prestige, national interest and multilateralism (Davidson, 2011); the link between public opinion, multilateral setting and military interventions (Cotta et al., 2005).

^2. At this stage of research the goal is not that of testing different hypotheses and variables. Rather, the paper aims at assessing different arguments to provide preliminary insights for further studies. Indeed, a broader research agenda also focuses on additional cases (such as Haiti, Kosovo and Horn of Africa).

^3. Primarily, Lexis-nexis analysis (La Stampa and Il Corriere della Sera) and web archive of newspapers (La Repubblica, Il Messaggero, Il Sole24Ore, Libero, Il Manifesto, Il Giornale, L'Unità and Il Mattino), official documents and parliamentary debates.

^4. In 2014 the cabinet finally announced that a new Libro Bianco (White Paper) would be drafted. The last national strategic document was drafted in 2002.

^5. During the cold War, due to the constraints posed by the bipolar era, the ‘domestic operations’ represented a quasi-unique possibility of operational employment for the Italian armed forces.

^6. There could be a contradiction between “humanitarian rhetoric” and the use of force. For a critical perspective on the political discourse of Italy's elites see Ignazi et al. (2012).

^7. As stressed above, the main focus of the paper is the military involvement aimed at contrasting non-military threats (such as humanitarian disasters, flow of illegal migrants or energy scarcity). But completely separating the different aspects of the intervention is not possible. However, our research can provide additional interpretations regarding the drivers of the whole Italian mission in Libya.

^8. The operation aims to underpin the mandates of UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Rear Admiral Claudio Gaudosi was appointed EU Operation Commander of EUFOR Libya and the Operational Headquarters of EUFOR Libya was located in Rome.

^9. On the controversial extension of the UN mandate during the operation ‘Unified Protector’, as well as on the role played by military advisors, see Vira and Cordesman (2011).

^10. On 28 March the US, French, German and British leaders met in order to analyse the Libyan crisis. The exclusion of Berlusconi was perceived as humiliating for Italy.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research under Grant PRIN ‘The Italian Foreign Policy in front of the new challenges of the international system: actors, institutions and policies’, Research Unit, Scuola Sant’Anna, Project SPRIN11FS.