Disillusioned militancy: the crisis of militancy and variables of disengagement of the European Muslim Brotherhood

Abstract

Contrary to the various studies on militant Islam in Europe seeking to explain the mobilization and socialization techniques European Muslims’ religious organizations employ, this article aims to understand a poorly researched phenomenon: the militancy crisis within Islamic movements. Although European Islamist movements have encountered some success, the difficulties they face cannot be ignored. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), one of the most important organizations, faces a wave of internal disputes, which has led to numerous defections. This article seeks to explain the different variables driving this exit process. The various semi-structured interviews which were conducted with former executives and militants of the organization in France, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy highlight two factors that led to defection. The first is ideological. These militants are no longer convinced that the MB ideology is capable of solving the problems Muslims face. In addition to ideological disillusion, militants claim that their departure is due to the internal workings of an organization characterized by a totalitarian streak, which fails to satisfy the aspirations of its members, despite their commitment.

The Arab uprisings made Islamist parties, hitherto marginalized or banned, major players on the political scene. Admittedly, these parties have neither initiated nor marshalled the revolts, but they have capitalized on their efficient strategy and deep embedment in society in their struggle against incumbent authoritarian regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) numerous electoral successes (Seurat & Carré, 2002) in Egypt (Vannetzel, 2008; Aclimandos, 2010), Tunisia (Ayari 2012; Cavatorta & Haugbølle, 2012), Morocco (Zeghal, 2008) and Turkey (Eligur, 2010) have all demonstrated the dynamism of this movement as a key political force in the countries on the southern bank of the Mediterranean. However, these MB successes should not mask the difficulties it is currently facing. Confronted with the reality of exercising power, the MB’s political Islam, although victorious and hegemonic in the political, religious and social fields in countries where it is active, seems to have reached an impasse.¹ In his book The Political Failure of Islam published in 1998, Olivier Roy had discussed the Islamist ideology’s paradoxes. Later, Patrick Haenni (2004) took Roy’s argument further and stated that the MBs sprouted both disgruntled Islamists and new forms of committed Islam, of which ‘market Islam’ is the most paradigmatic expression.

This crisis is particularly evident in Egypt and numerous defectors – former Brotherhood executives – explained in writing the reasons behind their departure from the organization.² Widely sold in bookshops, these publications, including Sameh Fayez’s Le Paradis des Frères, Al Sayyid Abdel Sattar’s Mon expérience avec les Frères. De la prédication à l’organisation secrète (My Brotherhood Experience) or the famous MB lawyer Tharwat al-Khirbawi’s From Preaching to the Secret Organization, are reminiscent of books written by former communists in the 1970s and 1980s in which the authors explained the reasons leading to their departure from the party (Abdelkrim, 2015; Louizi, 2016). For Catherine Leclerc,

whereas reading these books does not deprive one of the benefit of knowledge, it is important to remember that the publication of such literature depends on an author’s resources and that it contributes to the restoration of his or her stature; one must look elsewhere to understand the highly variable logics of disengagement. (Leclerc, 2005)

Therefore, the crisis of militancy is not exclusively one of defection (Leclerc, 2005); an additional element is to be found in the difficulty of recruiting new members (Leclerc, 2012). An increasing number of potential applicants simply refuse to organically integrate the MB, a state of affairs inconceivable not so long ago. Finally, despite strong internal socialization, this crisis of militancy extends to the changing nature of members’ commitment, more specifically a withering of the formerly systematic commitment of members, which is increasingly likely to ‘emancipate’ from the MB’s holistic militancy in favour of more ‘distanced’ engagement. Characterized by brief gatherings, more limited goals and isomorphic networks, this new form of post-it commitment contrasts with the holistic commitment the MB advocates (Ion, 1997; Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999).

If this crisis of militancy affects the MB in the Arab world, it also affects the various European branches of the movement (Amghar, 2006; Ternisien, 2006; Amghar, 2008; Maréchal, 2009; Peter, 2010; Rubin, 2010; Dassetto, 2011; Meijer, 2012), which are often presented as the bridgehead for the future Islamization of Europe through a massive influx of militants arranged in battle formations (Besson, 2003; Fourest, 2004; Venner, 2005; Amghar and Haenni, 2010). Many upper tier MB executives as well as ordinary militants and intermediate executives have distanced themselves from the organization, including Kamel Helbawy,³ MB spokesman in Europe and founder of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), Michael Privot,⁴ spokesman of the Mosque of Verviers in Belgium, Farid Abdelkrim,⁵ former President of Jeunes musulmans de France and member of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, and Khalid Shawki, currently an MP in the Italian Parliament and former member of the youth branch of UCOII (Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia). Although MB leaders sit atop a dense network of associations (about 500) in nearly 25 European countries interlinked through the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe,⁶ and despite rallies in Belgium, France or Great Britain attracting tens of thousands of people around renowned preachers and theologians, the MB is confronted with a dwindling number of both militants and executives in Europe (Vidino, 2010). For instance, the Union des organisations I = islamiques de France (UOIF – Union of Islamic Organizations of France) had approximately 1,000 active members at the height of its activism in the mid-1990s. It has only 800 militants today. The Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique (LMB – Muslim League of Belgium) has never had more than 50 active members and the Italian branch of the Brotherhood had at its peak no more than 100 members (UCOII).

Our article proposes an explanation to the militancy crisis within the European MB. The objective is thus to examine the factors leading to the exit processes (Hirschman, 1970) and the decline of commitment in European MB organizations. If the political sociology of Islam and the Arab world has been able to identify the reasons for the development of Islamist organizations, including the MB, it has not yet, to our knowledge, shed light on processes and reasons for Islamist disengagement. Thus, the theme of Islamist dis-affiliation has been one of the most neglected domains of scholarly inquiry. Indeed, few contemporary specialists of Islamism concentrate on the sociology of militant disengagement and religious disaffiliation in order to understand radicalization dynamics, preferring instead to draw on the works of the sociology of mobilization (Lacroix, 2011). Therefore, as Fillieule (2005) argues, understanding exit perspectives is ‘an exciting project, which will hopefully usher in a renewal of approaches linked to the comprehension of engagement dynamics’, especially when it is tempting to identify those commitments through a static and essentialist perspective. Thus, the study of the defection process (Fillieule, 2011) in Islamist circles allows a better understanding of the very conditions of Islamist recruitment. Islamist disillusion, which is characterized by situations of discrepancy between individual aspirations and their possibilities of realization within the Brotherhood’s institutions, usually leads to a decrease in personal satisfaction one draws from commitment (Fillieule, 2005). This results in an alteration of partisan connections and a progressive delegitimation of the institution and its leaders. Thus, since the mid-2000s, Islamists have been experiencing a dual crisis (ideological and organizational) which simultaneously involves a crisis of militancy and a multiplication of defections. This withdrawal is due to the ideological shortcomings of the Brothers (I) and it is also the product of the internal sclerotic modus operandi activists’ experience (II).

At the roots of Islamist disillusion

‘Islam is no longer the solution’: an ideology longing for renewal

The militancy crisis the European MB currently experiences began with the exhaustion of the great narratives and the encompassing Islamist values underpinning the ideological matrix of the MB. ‘Islam is the solution’, the slogan of the MB’s utopia, in which the religious reference was presented as a comprehensive framework providing the answers to all questions concerning the organization of social life, has run out of steam (Haenni, 2004). More than just a slogan, this formula fed on the idea that religion could solve all the problems posed to Muslims (Roy, 1998). If that expression had its moment of glory in the ranks of the Brothers at the beginning of the 1980s (Amghar, 2007), fuelling a literature in Arabic on Islamic responses to the challenges of contemporary Muslim societies, its application to real-world problem-solving has highlighted its limits. Indeed, after two decades of ‘very promising re-Islamization’, MB organizations have failed, according to many activists, to achieve their goals, including a better life through Islam. ‘When one sees the number of Brothers experiencing or having experienced failure, it is hard to believe today the promises of a better life’, explains a former member (Interview with D., Paris, May 2015). The all-encompassing approach of the MB – the idea of an Islamic panacea as a solution to all the problems for Muslims – clashes with the concrete experiences of the MB and is revealed to be ineffective. The European Brotherhood movement therefore suffers from the paradoxes of both its pre- and post-Arab Spring ideology, and also from the absence of a profound reflection on the founding categories of preaching adapted to the European context.

European MBs have adopted innovative positions in the 1990s by attempting to define the contours of a ‘Muslim citizenship’ and a religious practice adapted to the European context. Among the most significant thinkers are Tareq Oubrou and his ‘Minority shari’a’ (Oubrou, 1998; Oubrou, 2004), Mustapha Ceric, Youssouf al-Qarâdâwi (al-Qarâdâwi, 2001) and Taha Jabir al Alwani (al-Alwani, 2007), with their concept of ‘minority jurisprudence’ (fiqh al-aqalliyyât) and Faisal Mawlawi, who deepened the concept of ‘pact’. Each of these tried, in different ways, to contextualize the practice of Islam by adapting it to a non-Muslim environment and to legitimize the Muslim presence in the West, which they consider today as a land of contract (dar al-’aqd) and not as a land of conflict (dar al-harb). Following their gradual settling in Europe, the Brothers expanded their infrastructure in their adopted countries with a plan to defend the Islamic identity of Muslims against the backdrop of two major ideas that already indicate the ‘anachronistic’ dimension of the way their leaders think of their relationship to the world. The first is the contract or pact (‘ahd), linking the Muslim to his non-Muslim land of migration, which is seen as a land of temporary residence. This vision is in line with the vision of the world made by Muslim theologians from the earlier days of Islamic expansion between the ‘abode of Islam’ (dâr al-islâm) and the non-Islamic area, divided between ‘the abode of conflict’ (dâr al-harb) and ‘the abode of pact’ (dâr al-’ahd). This notion of land of contract, developed by the European Brothers in the early 1980s, was put forth just as the children of Muslim migrants began claiming their full citizenship rights through the acquisition of French, Belgian, British, or Dutch nationality. Also if this worldview was historically able to guide international relations in the medieval period between Muslims and non-Muslims, its anachronism is manifest in a world where many citizens of Muslim majority countries emigrated where both the political and the economic situations offered them a considerable degree of freedom, in contrast with those of their countries of origin. The second key idea that structures the relationship of the Brothers to the host societies of Muslims is that of the ‘rootedness of preaching’, which is a literal translation of the Arabic expression tawtîn ad-da’wâ. This idea reflects the inclusion of a sustainable, if not definitive, Muslim presence in Europe. Several renowned theologians among the Brothers have tried to lay the theoretical foundations of this idea of preaching, endogenous to Western countries. As a consequence, fewer speeches were delivered by Middle Eastern theologians. Among these, al Faisal Mawlawi, a French and Lebanese scholar, stands out. During years spent in France, he presided over the creation of the GIF, then the UOIF and intervened in Islamic centres and the UOIF congress. Manna ‘al Qattan, for his part, wrote a pamphlet entitled ‘iqâmatul muslimîne fî baladin ghaïr islâmî’ (issues related to the presence of Muslims in non-Muslim territory). But it is the much mediatized Yusuf al Qaradawi who promoted a theological framework capable of legitimizing the presence of Muslim immigrants on Western soil. One can however only go so far with the concepts employed by ancient theologians. One can assume that contemporaries will be forced to cast a critical eye on the situation in Muslim countries: they will recognize that the freedom to affirm one’s Islamic identity and to comply with the rules of worship is more readily available in Western countries, thanks to the freedom of expression and the respect for minorities that are enshrined in their national laws.

However, despite these attempts at redefining religious practices that would take into account the European reality, there has as yet been no ideological renewal or doctrinal aggiornamento. European MBs seem stuck in fixed ideological positions and are unable to conceptualize reality beyond the borders of religion. This is reflected in the paucity of intellectual activity in Brotherhood organizations. ‘The Brothers are still prisoners of their orthodox and rigid interpretation of Islam. They fail to part with it. To talk of them as a reformed Islam, that is a bit exaggerated’, explains a former Belgian MB executive (Interview with Z., Brussels, April 2015). For sure, if their elitist speech was intended to create an intellectual elite, they were unable to produce many organic intellectuals in the strict Gramscian meaning of the term.⁷ While the Egyptian MB has many intellectuals who publish a considerable number of works, the European branch is characterized by the weakness of its theoretical production, in English as in French, although Tareq Oubrou is the author of several publications relayed in the Francophone world (Oubrou & Babes, 2002; Baylocq and Privot, 2009). Despite numerous conferences held on the need to establish an Islamic citizenship, European Brothers still have very few intellectuals, regardless of the high academic profile of their executives. Indeed, most executives are graduates in ‘hard’ sciences (Kepel & Richard, 1992; Göle, 2003). These ‘da’wa caretakers’, in the words used by an executive of the Bordeaux region (Interview with D., Paris, May 2014), are satisfied with perpetuating the usual ‘clichés’ on the contributions of Islamic civilization to Europe, uttering sanctimonious comments, deploying a rhetoric of victimization and dabbling in conspiracy theories. Thus, in his book L’islam et le réveil arabe (Islam and the Arab Awakening), Tariq Ramadan (Frégosi, 2001; Mohsen-Finan, 2002), although considered a ‘remarkable’ intellectual, argues that the Arab revolts were actually driven by intelligence services and the US State Department. This conspiracy theory-based analysis has led some American journalists to describe Ramadan as the world’s most overrated intellectual (Totten, 2012).

Routinization of discourses and inability to influence the political agenda

If this ideological crisis is the product of an intellectual inertia and the inability to think of reality outside the religious framework, it is also attributable to a certain routinization of the MB discourse (Amghar, 2012). Active during the final settling phase of Muslims migrants on European soil, the MB saw a decline in the revolutionary verve of its militants coincide with its various projects intended to institutionalize Islam (Makri, 2005). The Brotherhood took part in discussions with governments and maintained relationships with town councils in which it operated mosques (Geisser, 2006). Faced with the reality of Muslim faith management, activists lost their initial utopian impetus and no longer challenged the state framework or the dominant political system.

When we organize a big rally in Paris or Brussels, we cannot do anything and invite anyone. Care is taken not to take anyone who can cause problems with the authorities. It is as if you invite someone to your wedding that cost several thousand euros. You do not want your investment to go to waste (Interview with FK, Brussels, November 2015).

states an executive of the MB branch in France. Thus, they would appear to have become ‘social democrats’. The European Brotherhood associations have become more pragmatic in their strategy with European Governments. For instance, the UOIF leadership, long dominated by people close to the radical Tunisian Mouvement de la tendance islamique (MTI – Islamic Tendency Movement),⁸ has given way to a more pragmatic group since 1995. They now focus almost exclusively on their daily management necessities, economic survival and relations with local and national authorities. This process of institutionalization had multiple consequences for the Brotherhood’s efforts to achieve recognition and to integrate with public bodies (interior ministries, town halls, etc.). With European Muslims seemingly struggling in structures unable to capture their aspirations, the Brotherhood managed to impose itself as the spokesperson of Muslim populations. A member of the MB explains:

Ever since we decided to be more consensual on certain religious issues and ever since we began discussing issues with public authorities, some of our members could no longer recognize themselves in our choices and we have lost quite a lot people (Interview with U., Brussels, September 2015).

This institutional success is inseparable from the maturity the organization has shown, allowing it to act as an interface between institutions and Muslims. This maturity however causes the departure of a number of militants seduced by the ‘original uncompromising face’ of the European MB. These former members criticize the excessive concessions made with the unbelievers,⁹ the collaboration with European political parties and want to preserve Islam from the influences of Western modernity. Indeed, for these disappointed former members, participating in a negotiation process with the government ultimately leads to the betrayal of the Koranic message, de facto diluting the original contentious position of the MB, and thus leaving the field open to more ‘authentic’ movements, such as the Salafists, whose protesting potential has not yet been tested. They criticized the direct links between MB leaders, in France, with Nicolas Sarkozy when he was Minister of Interior or, in the UK, with Tony Blair when he was prime minister. They particularly criticized the low profile the Brotherhood adopted during the enactment of the law prohibiting the wearing of veils in schools in 2004 in France, its relative subdued tone in the case of the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in 2005 or the controversy surrounding the full veil again in France. In any case, the political pragmatism of the European MB prevails over the clear definition of an ideology that is increasingly characterized by a set of general principles evolving according to political circumstances. Moreover, despite pleas from re-Islamized youths since the early 1990s, the MB has always been absent from major debates on social issues such as racial discrimination, social inequality and the problems of the inner cities, preferring to emphasize instead the merits of both academic and professional success and to concentrate on intra-community mobilization.

Although the European MB tried several times to establish a close relationship with public authorities on issues related to the presence and visibility of Islam in the public sphere,¹⁰ it has failed to translate its various religious and social successes into political influence. The Brotherhood is clearly willing to participate in public and political debates through an infiltration strategy in which its supporters integrate national political parties or lobby European institutions in Brussels (Darif, 2004)^, but it failed every time. In 2004, despite the various events organized by associations close to the UOIF, which brought together thousands of people in France, the law on religious symbols in public schools was enacted. In Switzerland, the Swiss Muslim League (LMS) failed to prevent the referendum on banning minarets in 2009. The various calls to boycott products labelled as supporting Zionism (Coca-Cola, Levi’s and Nike, among others) as a symbol of support for the Palestinian cause were only heeded by a minority of Muslims and eventually phased out before militants of the Palestinian cause initiated the current BDS movement. Brotherhood leaders, for their part, tend to distance themselves from ‘problematic’ commitments and mitigate their position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For instance, they attended a meeting with members of the Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF – Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions) in the aftermath of the second intifada. In the same vein, at the last UOIF meeting, in April 2014, the participation of Farida Belghoul, a controversial activist, in a roundtable was rescheduled on the last day of the meeting in a much more intimate setting. This distancing from Belghoul, the initiator of the Journées de retrait de l’école (JRE – Days of Withdrawal from School) to protest against the government’s introduction of gender-equality school programmes, was interpreted as a desire not to offend the government at a time when religious schools linked to UOIF were negotiating association agreements with the National Ministry of Education.

An internal ‘risk factor’ operating mode

An onerous and restrictive internal socialization

The current ideological crisis of the MB is not the only explanatory variable for its militancy crisis. Other factors, related to the structure and the internal operating mode of Brotherhood organizations, also add to their difficulty. The first factor contributing to the logic of disengagement lies in the recruitment method, which is perceived by militants as onerous and restrictive. Indeed, aspiring members go through two main phases: the first, during which he is called a ‘sympathizer’, is intended to measure his religious assiduity, his investment in, and adherence to, the Brotherhood ideology. This phase concludes with the reciting of an explicit declaration of obedience and self-sacrifice and a formal proposal to integrate the organization. This adherence, organized in the form of a ceremony during which the new ‘Brother’ pledges his allegiance to the Brotherhood of his country of residence, is called bay’a and gives him the title of multazim, or associate member of the Brotherhood. A second and final level of commitment follows this initial phase. A more important oath of obedience and self-sacrifice, which bestows the title of ‘amîl’, or active member, is sworn. Becoming a Brother is therefore a long process of religious and militant socialization, with a preparatory phase and an accession phase that can each last several years. If activists initially accepted this socialization process, they increasingly perceive its adherence not only as restrictive but also as denying an individual his ‘originality’ and generating a mindset suspicious of any initiative that does not correspond to the original Brotherhood matrix. This clashes with the commitment for the militant, which is the result of a personal approach and a commitment to their ‘contribution’ (Aclimandos, 2012). Indeed, an increasing number of members are calling on the organization to ease the recruitment process, which they perceive as both alienating and obsolete, having been modelled on the accession process established by the Arab branches of the MB in radically different circumstances.

A democratic centralism disrupting the expression of differing perspectives

By setting high investment costs (Hirschman, 1970), the Brotherhood’s organizational structure has encouraged allegiance to the movement and restricted internal criticism or defection. Indeed, the MB founder, Hassan al-Banna, called upon his disciples to agree on essential issues and to minimize their differences for fear of fitna (division). Decisions in various meetings (executive office or boards.) are not taken through a majority vote, but a systematic search for consensus (ijma’). This explains why MB institutional bodies are called al-Majlis ash-Shura (literally: the assembly of the consultation), a name which refers to the idea that these institutions are conceived more as advisory bodies than decisional ones. For fear of fitna and with the aim of unifying and harmonizing decisions, the supreme guide (Murshid) seeks to gather and take into account the opinions of his fellow disciples, lest they form antagonistic factions. Executives and militants must approve and defend all decisions taken by leaders in lockstep, for, according to MB theorists, only unity of thought within the movement can lead to meaningful action. For former militants, the MB’s rigid structure had some benefits in Arab countries whose authoritarianism kept the movement underground or under strict control. A former executive from Southern France states:

One of the reasons that forced me to leave is the fact that each of my initiatives or decisions had to obtain the approval of the person in charge. Everything had to go through this person. For me, it was difficult to endure. We are of the same age and I have a Ph.D. I do have capabilities. (Interview with D., Paris, May 2014)

This ideological rigidity allowed the leadership to thwart divergent opinions and hence dissidents themselves (accused often to be associated with the security services). However, in a democratic and pluralistic context such as Western liberal democracies, a number of militants consider this modus operandi obsolete.

Although the objective is to eliminate tensions by satisfying the entire group, the organization keeps accumulating tensions that could have been expressed if open debates were permitted. Because the decision-making process within the Brotherhood tends to frustrate ordinary militants, leaders are blamed for being unable to manage dissent. These tensions can grow strong because once the decision is made, it must be wholly adopted by the entire group, including those members who were opposed to it. This limitation of freedom of expression in an organization which cultivates a tradition of secrecy (Simmel, 1998) can provoke ‘cognitive dissonance’ in militants, effectively causing one to follow a line or a strategy with which one disagrees and yet cannot challenge. For a former executive of the Belgian MB: ‘differing opinions from an individual are always initially attributed to a lack of faith and education and, if it persists (in his dissent), he is expelled’ (Interview with L. K., Brussels, September 2014). Thus, the Brothers’ democratic centralism, which aims to ensure party discipline inside and outside the organization, only denies differences and makes conflicts more explosive because they are likely to take an emotional and unrealistic turn (Fillieule, 2005). For Lewis A. Coser,

a conflict’s ‘intensity’ increases as unrealistic elements are introduced in a realistic conflict. Thus, a conflict’s intensity increases when participants are asked to suppress their feelings of hostility. Moreover, the accumulation of these feelings will exacerbate the conflict if it erupts. (Coser, 1984)

As the leadership strives to manage dissension, conflicts tend to increase in proportion to the number of executives involved (Interview with S., Brussels, September 2014). A MB executive from Belgium states: ‘the problem is about authoritarian management of power and decision-making. We often consult with members and there is a debate of ideas, but it serves no purpose because the final decision always falls on the same individuals’. This democratic deficit and lack of transparency in decision-making processes are magnified by the perception that ‘some opinions weigh more than others’ to paraphrase a former MB executive from Belgium. Indeed, among those who left the Brotherhood because they could no longer stand its undemocratic operating mode are many individuals in their 30s or 40s. These former militants often criticize the MB leaders for their overly paternalistic and patriarchal perspectives of younger members. An MB executive from Belgium asserts:

the elders have an excessively outdated perspective of youths similar to that of the 1960s and 1970s in the Arab world. They think that youths’ only function is to fulfill the decisions taken by the elders. Young people do not have a voice. (Interview with L. K., Brussels, September 2014)

In addition, some individuals manage to impose their views because of their religious and/or social capital or even with the help of large Brotherhood ‘families’ (Al-Zayat in Germany, Himmat in Switzerland and Italy and/or Ghannouchi in the UK). Former militants accuse certain MB major historical figures of having transformed the organization into a patrimonial and clientelistic machine. Militants accuse them, among others things, of forming a nomenklatura, a kind of Muslim ‘aristocratic elite’. This impression is reinforced by the practice of endogamous marriages within the ruling class of the MB. For instance, Tareq Oubrou, a member of the board of the UOIF and rector of the Great Mosque of Bordeaux, is the brother-in-law of Hassan Iquioussen, a preacher of the movement. Boukhzer Bachir, director of the communications department, is the brother-in-law of Fouad Alaoui, former Secretary General of the UOIF. Intissar, daughter of Rachid Ghannouchi and former president of the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), is married to a member of the political bureau of the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda. This type of practice is not limited to executives of the European MB. Indeed, many militants, both men and women, think they are providing more cohesion to their relationship by marrying someone with a common ideological matrix.

Denouncing the authoritarian nature of the MB

The MB is known for its bottom-up Islamization strategy, which favours the creation of educational and social infrastructures to control Muslim populations in the various aspects of their cultural and social lives. On the Old Continent, in the early 1990s, the FOIE pushed this strategy even further: it created several satellite associations to guide Muslims in different spheres of life (the European Forum of Muslim Women, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, Islamic Relief, the European Council of Fatwa and Research and others).¹¹ All of these associations are federated within European-wide structures. Meanwhile, in 1992, near château Chinon, the European Brotherhood organization created the Institut européen des sciences humaines (IESH – European Institute of Human Sciences), the French name being a somewhat distorted translation of the Arabic version, which is more specifically entitled ‘European Institute of Islamic Sciences’. A few years later, in 1997, the English complement of that institute, charged with the education of Anglophones, was created in Wales; the European Institute of Human Sciences is now located in Birmingham. Thus, the influence of the MB has never been limited to the sole effectiveness of its own structures. Rather, it depends on a constellation of networks and organizations, each of which has its own logic of development and is more or less autonomous. However, the active presence of MB in these organizations permeates its language and values. As with the Bolsheviks, the German social democrats or the French and Italian Communist Party, the idea was to develop a multitude of networks and associations. These are more or less linked to the MB central branch and function as centres of diffusion for the MB ideology. European MBs, like their Arab colleagues, have sought either to control existing organizations or to create new ones. However, in recent years, the MB has encountered challenges to its holistic organizational practices. On the one hand, a growing number of Muslims refuse to join the organization itself, limiting their investment to associations they know to be affiliated with the MB. This situation prefigures the decoupling between a more or less strong adherence to the thought of Hassan al Banna among some young European Muslims and accession to the organization itself. Furthermore, some associations are trying to emancipate themselves from the tutelage of the MB central branch. Instead of clinging to dense organizational structures encompassed in a pyramidal pattern, which could be described as ‘total institutions’ (Goffman, 1961), such associations are calling for the establishment of ad hoc collaborative projects through flexible networks (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999). Students and youth branches are often at odds with the line defined by the organization as was the case in 2004 when the Étudiants musulmans de France (EMF – Muslim Students of France) and the Jeunes musulmans de France (JMF – Young Muslims of France) called to protest against the bill on conspicuous religious symbols in schools, against the advice of the UOIF. The youth branches of the UOIF (Muslim Students of France and young Muslims in France) seemed to increasingly disagree with the central management in the late 1990s and some officials of these associations also challenged the ideological choices made by leaders of the organization. It is likely the UOIF did not appreciate the EMF and JMF joining, in 2004, the collective Une école pour tous (A school for all), which opposed the law on secularism and supported conspicuous religious symbols, while the Union itself had a more hesitant position on it. A former member of the JMF asserts: ‘when we opposed the law banning veils at school, leaders of the UOIF asked us to separate from the movement, something we refused to do which created a cleavage between elders and youths’ (Interview with O. B., Lille, November 2014). In a more extreme case, the Secours Islamique de France (French Islamic Relief) decided, unilaterally, to leave the Union des organisations islamiques en France (UOIF). In Italy, the leadership’s desire to retain guardianship of the youth branch failed and resulted in an implosion. After the creation in 2003 of the Association of Young Muslims of Italy, some of its executives challenged the UCOII’s¹² right to define the orientations of the association. One of the consequences was the ‘sidelining’ of all young protesters. In retaliation, these youngsters decided to form a board of directors composed almost exclusively of young people. A similar problem caused some MB executives’ defection in Egypt. These defectors criticized their leadership’s extreme authoritarianism and the lack of generational renewal within it.

‘Being a Muslim Brother is no longer worthwhile!’

There is indeed a militancy compensation scheme in the MB but, although important (satisfaction of serving the cause of Islam, a sense of belonging to an enlightened vanguard and religious aristocracy), it is struggling to fulfil members who, over the years, wish to see their commitment rewarded by promotions to ‘best serve the cause of God’, namely a paid employment to put an end to a career of volunteerism (Gaxie, 1977). Expectations of rewards beyond those of an ad honorem and symbolic nature (Gaxie, 1977) are particularly high since a member’s commitment is often experienced as a sacrifice (work, family life or university education) or a ‘deviant career’ (Goffman, 1985). To quote Albert Hirschman, if the militant can be satisfied with a situation in which ‘the individual benefits from collective actions (do not) spring from the difference between the desired outcome and the effort, but from their sum’ (Hirschman, 1982), he nevertheless expects that this sacrifice will be rewarded by a promotion, at the risk of experiencing a burn out phenomenon (Freudenberger, 1974). Indeed, to militate within MB has a high social cost, which an individual hope will be compensated with a promotion. But in this case, unlike in other structures under militant Islam such as the Ahbash, for example, (Amghar, 2013), the MB will rarely reward the activism of their members through hierarchical elevation. For former members,

there was no transition with the new generations. We were getting older, turning 25/27/30 years old and could not enter decision-making structures. In local UOIF associations, we were not allowed access the Administration Council. At the head of the UOIF level, we could not advance in our militant career. At the same time, the UOIF had a system in which leaders gave themselves the right to redirect the activities of associations. (Interview with O. B., Lille, November 2014)

Key positions are often filled by first-generation Brothers, often having arrived in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. The latter believe they are best able to lead the organization because of their many years of experience. ‘Neo-members’, in their 30s and 40s, often from immigrant families, have to settle with being mere transmission belts for the elders. These Brothers not only criticize the hoarding of financial resources by a minority of the MB but also the ongoing patrimonialism in Brotherhood structures (Interview with S., Brussels, September 2014). There had been some talk of expanding the salaried status to certain ‘neos’, but the low financial margins of MB organizations mean that widening their circle of professionals is a luxury they could not afford. In fact, associations affiliated to the European MB cannot offer wage labour opportunities to a multitude of executives, despite them having sacrificed all or part of their university education, thus creating frustration, and also very precarious personal and family situations.

Conclusion

Is there a life after the Brothers?

For the displeased Brothers, it is urgent to reassess the Brotherhood culture, (al-ikhwânîa Thaqafa) which, in their view, proscribes free commitments and imposes a rigid hierarchy. In denouncing the organization’s culture of secrecy and its modes of operation considered too ‘Stalinist’, critics are calling for its ‘cleansing’. If some of the militants leaving the MB are ordinary members (Introvigne, 1999) (passive defection), who disappear quietly and apparently without their disengagement representing a significant cost, others are defectors, who leave the MB through negotiated agreement. The latter are considered apostates and competitors of the MB (Introvigne, 1999). The new structures created by defectors become the means by which these ‘former’ members institutionalize their defection and express their opposition to the structures in which they previously operated. (Hirschman, 1970). In France, there are several cases of former MB executives who are today in national or local leadership positions which are in direct competition with the Brotherhood. This is especially the case of Moulay el Hassan Alaoui Talibi, head of the National Muslim Chaplain of Prisons, an appointment made through ministerial decree, despite pressures from the UOIF, or the disappointed former militants of the UOIF, who created the Union des associations musulmanes du 93 (Union of Muslim Associations of 93). Indeed, their actions are sometimes at odds with those undertaken by Brotherhood associations. For the Muslim public, these ex-MBs have contributed in erasing or downgrading the position of certain European MB historical figures who were in a hegemonic position in the early 2000s such as Hassan Iquioussen, Abdallah Ben Mansour and Hani Ramadan.¹³

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Le Monde, 11 juillet 2013.

2. The Islamist parties of Tunisia (Ennahdha), of Morroco (the Party of Justice and Development) and of Turkey (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) are also affected by dynamics of defection.

3. Born in Egypt in 1939, he was one of the founders of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in the 1970s. He moved to Britain in 1994 and participated in the creation of the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslim Association of Britain. He is currently head of the think tank, specializing on terrorism, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism.

4. He is currently Director of the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), a think tank dedicated to the fight against racism, in Brussels.

5. After a career as head of associations, he embarked on a ‘religious’ stand-up routine by giving two shows he wrote (Je vous déclare la paix et Le Chemin de la gare).

6. After having long been led by Swedish Chakib Benmakhlouf, it is currently led by the Franco-Tunisian Abdallah Benmansour. The FIOE is headquartered in Brussels since 2007 – it was previously located in the suburbs of Leicester in the UK – in order to develop a lobbying on European institutions.

7. For Antonio Gramsci, the figure of the intellectual aims at fostering, among members of the class to which it is organically connected, an awareness of their community of interest, to cause in this class a conception of homogeneous and independent world. This analysis was borrowed from Jean-Marc Piotte.

8. Mouvement de la tendance islamique (Islamic Trend Movement) founded in 1981 and later became the Ennahda Movement.

9. Within the core of the MB was circulating a rumour that French officials of the UOIF would not have called for demonstrations against the bill on conspicuous religious symbols in schools, in exchange for which the government would naturalize senior Brotherhood officials who had not yet acquired French nationality.

10. In France, the UOIF is thus engaged alongside veiled schoolgirls expelled in 1990 and issued a fatwa (religious opinion) condemning urban violence during the 2005 riots. In the UK, the Brotherhood associations tried to ban the publication of The Satanic Verses (1988) of the British writer of Indian origin, Salman Rushdie. In many European countries, they have called on Muslims to boycott Danish products in protest against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in Jyllands-Posten in September 2005.

11. In France, several groups, such as les Étudiants musulmans de France, les Jeunes musulmans de France, les Imams de France, l’Association médicale Avicenne de France and ou encore la Ligue française de la femme musulmane, have been created.

12. Unione delle Comunita e Organizzazioni Islamiche is the MB’s Italian branch which would control 60per cent of the country’s mosques.

13. Even within the UOIF, an impressive initiative has arisen recently through the reflection club, Fils de France. Its president, Camel Bechikh, acknowledges both his affiliation to the UOIF and dissenting character of the club within the organization. Inspired by the ideas of Tareq Oubrou, Camel Bechikh promotes a plurality of voices within the organization and tries to propose a parallel theology of acculturation. He calls not only for European Islam to get rid of its traditional trappings through a French practice of Islam, but also for a cultivation of French patriotism in the heart of the Muslim believers in France. There is no equivalent to this initiative at this moment in the European Brotherhood space.