Analyzing the nexus of creativity, Islam, and democracy: Evidence from Turkey

ABSTRACT

While the relationship between Islam and democracy has received considerable attention in the social science literature, very few studies have explained the dynamics of support for democracy through a micro-level, socio-psychological lens. Applying a novel perspective, this study analyzes the empirical nexus among Islamic religiosity, being open to new ideas and creativity (ONIC), and pro-democratic attitudes to probe the following two questions: Are Muslims who are open to new ideas and think creatively more supportive of democracy than those who are not? Could ONIC be an intervening factor between religiosity and support for democracy? To this end, the paper systematically (1) examines the interrelationship between ONIC and Islamic religiosity; (2) estimates the effects thereof on support for democracy; (3) assesses the mediating potential of ONIC between devoutness and pro-democratic attitudes through an illustrative case of Turkey. The findings indicate that ONIC and Islamic religiosity are not mutually exclusive. The evidence also suggests that, ceteris paribus, while religiosity is positively associated with pro-democratic attitudes, the mediating potential of ONIC is inconclusive. Religiosity and ONIC appear to have an independent effect on support for democracy. Educational reforms or policies that cultivate and support creative thinking might be consequential for building and fostering democracy in Islamic societies.

KEYWORDS:

• Creative thinking
• Islam
• democracy
• religion
• innovation
• Turkey

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Viewing ‘critical thinking’ strictly in an analytic and non-generative domain is inadequate; for example, it would be unfeasible to ‘evaluate’ a problem without considering its ‘generative’ dimension. See, for instance, Bailin (1987), for more detailed discussion on ‘creative’ vs. ‘critical’ thinking.

2. World Values Survey (2010–204) wave 6 data. URL: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org .

3. For the first time, a non-CHP party won the national elections in 1950.

4. In this study, the operational definition of conservatism refers to a ‘religious-conservatism’ conceptualized as an attitudinal and behavioural support for the increased role of traditional Islam in society and/or politics of Turkey that defy or resist rapid social changes.

5. These crackdowns targeted not only the conservative-leaning activists and but also secular leftist supporters during 1970s and 1980s.

6. Over the years, the AKP regime built a vast pro-government media empire, often by either outright seizing or buying off major media outlets using its pro-government business conglomerates (e.g., Kalyon Group, Demiroren Holding). In March 2018, the Dogan Media group was forced to sell its newspapers Hurriyet (second largest in Turkey) and Posta (fourth largest), and two of Turkey’s main, highly popular entertainment/news channels—Kanal D and CNN Turk. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/europe/turkey-media-erdogan-dogan.html.

7. Erdogan quickly blamed the coup on his one-time ally, a self-exiled Islamic scholar and preacher—Fethullah Gulen—living in the U.S. who is the founder of the Hizmet movement. Gulen publicly denied his involvement in the 2016 attempted coup and called for the international, independent investigation. Turkey officially requested the extradition of Gulen from the U.S. The Obama administration argued that Turkey failed to provide clear evidence linking Gulen to the attempted coup and that extradition decision is subject to review by the US Justice Department (and is ultimately decided by a federal judge). Erdogan also blamed the U.S. for being complicit in the attempted coup, which Obama administration promptly and sternly denied. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/us/politics/obama-denies-us-coup-turkey.html.

8. The official public newspaper of Turkey published all dismissals, under emergency rule, through government decrees. T.C. Resmi Gazete, URL: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/ .

9. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) report, URL: https://cpj.org/2017/12/record-number-of-jailed-journalists-for-second-yea.php, accessed May 25,018.

10. Reporters without borders report, URL: https://rsf.org/en/ranking, retrieved in May 2018.

11. The Economist, 2018: Turkey’s constitutional court has been rendered irrelevant. URL https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21737059-lower-court-ignores-higher-one-ordered-journalist-freed-and-president-erdogan, retrieved in February, 2018.

12. Ibid.

13. Quoted in Faruq (2006): Sulayman ibn Khalaf al-Baji, ed. Nazih Hammad, Kitab al-Hudud al-Usul (Beirut: Al-Zu’bi li-al-Tiba’a, 1973), 64.

14. For the Arab world, see Jamal and Tessler (2008); for Africa, see Bratton 2003; for Central Asia, see Rose 2002; for non-Middle East states, see Hofmann 2004.

15. The official website of the AKP party. URL: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/ak-parti-iktidara-3y-ile-mucadele-icin-geldi/57624#1, retrieved in January 2018.

16. Emphasis added.

18. For robustness, both OLS and Logistic regression models were run and similar results were obtained. For the sake of space, only OLS model results are reported.

19. The likelihood estimates are derived from logistic regression with a dummy (dependent) variable.

20. Confirmation bias is often referred to a condition when individuals express (consciously or subconsciously) a preference for a favourable circumstance, which in this case a preference to appear ‘more open and creative.’ Overconfidence effect occurs when individuals’ confidence exceeds the objective accuracy; that is, individuals’ assessment about their feelings or ratings of a reality are overshadowed by their subjective overconfidence.