NGO laws after the colour revolutions and the Arab spring: Nondemocratic regime strategies in Eastern Europe and the Middle East

ABSTRACT

How significant were popular mobilizations like the colour revolutions and the Arab Spring in raising legal regulatory barriers for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Eastern Europe and the Middle East? How do different types of nondemocratic regimes approach NGO laws and state-society relations? This paper investigates and provides a comparative analysis of the NGO regulatory environment of nondemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe and the Middle East from 1995 to 2013, based on an original dataset measuring the severity of laws for the registration and operation of civic groups. We examine whether the uprisings instigated the passage of legal initiatives designed to curb NGO activism in each region, and assess whether patterns emerge based on differences in nondemocratic regime types. We determined that while NGO regulations have largely increased in Eastern Europe, they have actually declined in the Middle East on average. Moreover, greater NGO regulations exist in authoritarian and closed regimes that approach civil society by erecting clear legal blockades to civic activism. In contrast, hybrid regimes employ more-intricate legal strategies in order to raise the costs of entering and working in the NGO sector without necessarily overtly stifling civic activism.

KEYWORDS:

• Civil society
• authoritarianism
• hybrid regimes
• colour revolutions
• Arab spring

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. NGOs refer to ‘various types of organizations, which may include associations, foundations, non-profit corporations, public benefit companies, development organizations, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, mutual benefit groups, sports clubs, advocacy groups, arts and culture organizations, charities, trade unions and professional associations, humanitarian assistance organizations, non-profit service providers, charitable trusts, and political parties’ (ICNL and WMD 2012, p. 8). We do not consider trade unions and political parties to be NGOs.

2. There are many contested boundaries and challenges in defining civil society in a broad comparative context. When referring to civil society we draw on the relational definition proposed by Sundstrom and Henry (2006: 2) in which civil society is the ‘space of citizen-directed collective action, located between the family and the state, and not directed solely toward private profit.’

3. On this literature see Carothers (2006); Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014); Diamond (2006); Gershman and Allen (2006); ICNL and NED (2008, 2012); Mendelson (2015); Plattner (2009); and Stewart (2009).

4. For incisive studies that look at the variation of NGO laws in Western states and/or democracies, see Sidel (2009) and Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, and Prakash (2014).

5. For example, see Crotty et al (2014), Flikke (2016), Gilbert (2012), and Robertson (2010) about the ways in which NGO laws in Putin’s Russia have marginalized NGOs that are critical of authorities.

6. This situation contrasts with countries that transitioned to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe after the end communism. As noted by Ekiert and Kubik (2014: 48) these countries moved quickly in the 1990s to change their laws to enable civil society to flourish.

7. See Horvath (2013), Ilkhamov (2005), Jackson (2010), and the special issue in Democratization edited by Finkel and Brudny (2012) as only a few examples of this point.

8. For an in-depth discussion of the older Jordanian law, see Wiktorowicz (2000).

9. See note 3.

10. For a recent review of this literature see Jones and Lupu (2018).

11. Competitive elections are defined as those producing electoral turnover in either the legislative or executive branch over a period of four electoral cycles or 20 years, whichever is sooner.

12. For more detailed discussions on this topic, see Diamond (2002, p. 29–33).

13. For a discussion of these challenges, see Gilbert and Mohseni (2011, p. 287).

14. Thus, we do not examine Libya and Syria from 2011–2013. We also do not consider countries under international tutelage in the case that the international authority conducts day-to-day governance (for example, Iraq in 2003–2004).

15. See Appendix B for more-detailed information about our coding.

16. Our sources include: U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports (1995–2013); International Center for Not-for- Profit Law (ICNL) NGO Law Monitor (2014); U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) NGO Sustainability Index (1998–2014); Freedom House (1996-2014); Nations-in-Transit (NIT) (1997–2014); Human Rights Watch (1996–2014); Global Integrity Report (2006-2014); World Democracy Movement (2014); and NGO Regulation Network (2014).

17. This increase in regulations over time is apparent even when examining different sub-regional groupings of countries in EE/FSU. The trend reported in Figure 1 does not change dramatically even when excluding those countries located in Central Asia or those countries that were not part of the Soviet Union and were likely candidates for membership to the European Union.

18. The difference in barriers to operation is significant at the .00 level.

19. These differences are statistically significant at the .05 and .01 level, respectively.

20. It is important to note that during this time period Russia experienced its largest protests since the end of communism.

21. The differences were all statistically significant at the .05 level or less.

22. Without Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey mean barriers to entry decreased over time from 3.3 to 2.8, whereas with these countries included barriers to entry decreased from 3.3 to 2.4.

23. In 2013 mean barriers to operation is 3.4 without Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey versus 3 with these countries included. That same year, mean barriers to entry is 2.8 without these countries versus 2.4.

24. Approximately 4% of country years in the MENA region are coded as ambiguous.

25. Countries classified as ambiguous (Egypt 2011–2013, Morocco 2011–2013, Tunisia 2011–2013, and Yemen 2011–2013) are those in which politics were in such a time of transition that it was not possible to clearly delineate their regime type.

26. Closed republic: Algeria (1995–1996), Iraq (1995–2002); Libya (1995–2010), Syria (1995–2010); Turkey (1997–1998); Multiparty republics: Algeria (1997–2013), Egypt (1995–2010), Iran (1995–2013), Iraq (2005–2013), Lebanon (1995–2013), Tunisia (1995–2010), Turkey (1995–96, 1999–2013), Yemen (1995–2010). Non-multiparty monarchies: Bahrain (1995–2001), Oman (1995–2013), Qatar (1995–2013), Saudi Arabia (1995–2013), United Arab Emirates (1995–2013). Multiparty monarchies: Bahrain (2002–2013), Jordan (1995–2013), Kuwait (1995–2013), Morocco (1995–2010).

27. These regime designations also capture some of the sub-regional geographic distinctions among countries in EE/FSU. For example, the authoritarian category is largely composed of countries located in Central Asia (the exception is Azerbaijan, which is authoritarian but not in the region; while Kyrgyzstan is in the region, but is classified as a hybrid).

28. Results for closed regimes in EE/FSU should be regarded cautiously since they represent data largely for just one country, Turkmenistan. In 1995–1999 Kazakhstan was also classified as closed.

29. Stricter reporting procedures were also introduced with the law. Groups can also incur considerable administrative penalties if they do not voluntarily register, including criminal prosecution – the only instance of such a penalty for NGO laws in Russia at this time.

30. This appendix builds on the methodology outlined in Gilbert and Mohseni (2018). The only difference is that this paper adds an additional level of ‘severe’ to the index of barriers to entry and operation.