Introduction: Arab responses to EU foreign and security policy incentives: Perspectives on migration diplomacy and institutionalized flexibility in the Arab Mediterranean turned upside down

ABSTRACT

Based on analyses of the migration policies of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, the overall idea behind this themed issue is to present a comparative study of responses by Arab Mediterranean states to EU foreign and security policy incentives. The themed issue draws on a historical institutionalist line of thought analysing how the given state-to-EU relationships develop or change over time and how institutions form part of and respond to new developments. Taking its point of departure in different dimensions of resilience attributed to the states analysed, this themed issue aims at shedding light on processes of institutional developments in the context of cooperation between the Arab states Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, and the EU.

KEYWORDS:

• Arab responses
• EU foreign and security policy incentives
• historical institutionalism
• migration diplomacy
• institutionalized flexibility

Introduction

The ‘Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration’, hosted by the Kingdom of Morocco in December 2018, once again emphasized the necessity of a multilateral approach to the challenges posed by unregulated migration. Most Arab states voted in favour of the Compact (Algeria and Libya abstained), while on the EU side, nine member states did not sign it – the Visegrád states Chechnya, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in open rejection, Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, and Romania abstained. The Compact was preceded by ‘The European Union’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)’, presented by High Representative Federica Mogherini in June 2016 (European Union, 2016), with the ambition to focus on the global perspective and to promote a rules-based global order. The launching of the EUGS underlined crisis tendencies both within the EU and in the Mediterranean region. Very much under the impression of the turmoil related to the Brexit referendum held shortly before (Völkel, 2019), policy coherence and integration were in focus in Brussels (Carbone, 2018). At the same time, the European southern neighbourhood was unstable and unpredictable, suffering from civil wars and increasingly restrictive regimes, which led to displacement and emigration of millions of people, especially from Syria (Caporaso, 2018).

Seen from the perspective of the EU, state and societal resilience of the EU’s partners in the South is a strategic priority. As an important aspect of this resilience, the EUGS attempts to support the development of more effective migration strategies, as expressed in the launching document (European Union, 2016, p. 28). Since the European Union in March 2016 pledged €6 billion to the Turkish government in exchange for the ‘EU–Turkey Statement’ on migration, it has become obvious that keeping migrants back in their countries might become a rewarding business for decision-makers across the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, previously signed Mobility Partnerships, like the ones with Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, offer financial incentives in return for cooperation in controlling migration (Seeberg, 2017).

Based on analyses of the migration policies of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, the overall idea behind this themed issue is to present a comparative study of responses by Arab Mediterranean states to EU foreign and security policy incentives – therefore the emphasis on the upside-down perspective. The analyses will focus on how mutual trade-offs have been negotiated according to which the Arab states receive financial aid (or other privileges, such as less criticism of human rights violations or the lack of democratic principles) from the EU for the purpose of launching programmes making it possible for refugees and migrants to become active in the local labour markets, be provided with education and health services, and participate in public life in general manners. The main interest on the EU side may primarily be to meet the challenges in connection with irregular migration, but also to take care of European security concerns related to refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean region (Andersson, 2016; Bourbeau, 2015).

Differentiated migration diplomacy in a historical institutionalist analytical setting

The themed issue links the migration policies of the analysed states and the migration diplomacy between them and the EU. Migration diplomacy should be understood as formal and informal policies, agreements, and practices in negotiations and related cooperation between the involved partners. The concept of migration diplomacy has been applied among others by Hélène Thiollet in the context of Arab countries in two works on the conditions of labour migrants in the GCC states (Thiollet, 2011, 2015). The concept should not only be perceived as an indirect form of foreign policy in connection with changing border and asylum policies. The themed issue contends that this understanding to some extent fails to capture changes regarding the significant political role of migrants and refugees and the increasing securitization of migration, suggesting that we should revise our analytical approaches and speak of migration diplomacy as a significant and direct form of foreign and security policy in which migrants and refugees play a strategic role.

The notion of migration diplomacy has been utilized in analyses of negotiations and related processes between the EU and partners in the Mediterranean, for instance, the EU and Egypt (Tsourapas, 2017) and the EU and Turkey (Seeberg, 2018). Negotiations of this character will often tend to involve a wide range of institutions on both sides: first of all institutions within the specific partner states and the EU, but also international organizations (IMF, IOM, UNHCR, etc.) and, in addition to that, agencies doing the practical work on behalf of the EU, like Frontex or EUNAVFOR. The large numbers of involved institutions add complexity to the negotiations, and furthermore, the migration diplomacy activities will tend to develop a tentatively permanent character: migration phenomena are only rarely temporary processes. Finally, often the migratory movements are characterized by significant fluctuations, as we have seen with the different migration routes in the Mediterranean.

In order to apply an analytical framework for the themed issue, it seems relevant to draw on a historical institutionalist line of thought analysing how the given state-to-EU relationships develop or changed over time and how institutions form part of and respond to new developments. Central in this analytical frame stands the concept of critical junctures and the related notion of path dependence. The important analytical benefit of historical institutionalism is that it focuses on ways in which the relevant institutions adapt to new challenges. Institutions and the legal pathways attached to them can be understood as collections of rules and practices embedded in structures of meaning with the ambition over time to be able to create order and predictability (March & Olsen, 2008, pp. 3–4).

As mentioned by Kathleen Thelen, historical institutionalism also enables a perspective which emphasizes institutional change in complex processes (Thelen, 1999). An example of this can be seen in Roland Dannreuther’s work on the Middle East peace process. Dannreuther, arguing that what constitutes an institution should be defined in a relatively broad perspective, convincingly applies a historical institutionalist perspective on peace initiatives (Dannreuther, 2011, p. 210). And as pointed out by Steinmo and Thelen, historical institutionalism attempts to theorize institutional interaction over time, allowing the analysis to describe and interpret elements of continuity as well as change (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 2).

It is evident that the Arab Mediterranean states represent highly different interests when it comes to the role they play in connection with the regional migratory movements (Norman, 2019). This is reflected in their individual migration policies – and thereby also in their responses to EU policies aiming at tackling the challenges related to the Mediterranean migration crisis (Fakhoury, 2018). It is the ambition of this themed issue to analyse responses from Arab Mediterranean states to incentives offered by the EU in negotiations regarding migration. And, as indicated above, the state and societal resilience of the partners in the Arab Mediterranean is a strategic priority for the EU, which therefore wants to strengthen the adaptive capacities of these states when it comes to the level of institutionalized flexibility inherent in their actual migration governance, as discussed by, for instance, Katharina Natter (2018) and Anne Koch et al. (2018).

The notion of adaptive capacities was analysed by Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders in a work on governance and regime resilience in Iran and Syria, where they argue that ‘resilience refers to the attributes, relational qualities, and institutional arrangements that have long given regimes in the Middle East, conceptualized as institutionalized systems of rule, the capacity to adapt governance strategies to changing domestic and international conditions’ (Heydemann & Leenders, 2013, p. 5). A recent study by Rasmus A. Boserup et al. (2019) shows how authoritarian resilience has prevailed beyond the popular uprisings in the Middle Eastern states in different forms: restoration, transformation, or adaptation. Taking its point of departure in different dimensions of resilience attributed to the states analysed, this themed issue aims at shedding light on processes of institutional developments in the context of cooperation between the Arab states Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, and the EU.

Arab responses to EU foreign and security policy incentives – perspectives

This themed issue discusses responses from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to EU foreign and security policy incentives in a historical institutionalist perspective. The focus is on migration in a wide sense, including migration policies, refugees, security dimensions, and aspects of institutional developments related to this. As underlined by Jan Claudius Völkel, ‘migration policies, after all, have become a potent tool for authoritarian regimes to improve their internal and external image’ (see this themed issue). The migration policies of the analysed countries and the extent to which these live up to EU incentives are important determinants for the level of overall cooperation with external partners.

In some aspects, Algeria differs from the three other authoritarian regimes. Despite the fact that Algeria and the EU do have converging interests, for instance, in the sense that a security-oriented approach is a significant element in both Algerian and EU policies regarding human mobility and border management, Chiara Loschi and Federica Zardo demonstrate that EU incentives vis-à-vis Algeria have not been very successful. The Algerian non-cooperative policies have led to a situation where institutional developments like mobility partnerships or migration compacts have never become items on the migration diplomacy agenda. This does not mean, however, that Algeria rules out any external interference: Algeria has become more pragmatic regarding influence from the outside, but still the EU has failed to capture, ‘that the Algerian security regime regulates migration in all its dimensions’ (see their contribution in this themed issue).

Egypt has also been reluctant regarding explicit agreements on mobility and migration. Like Algeria, the regime in Cairo fears that signing such an agreement might lead to a de facto acceptance of excessive readmission for third country nationals (TCNs). Contrary to Algeria and Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have signed mobility partnership agreements with the EU, and this was not because they have not had the same scepticism concerning readmission especially of TCNs, but they have valued – as part of their migration diplomacy – the EU incentives within this field higher than the consequential costs.

The ‘EU–Turkey Statement’ of March 2016 regarding Syrian refugees represents an extremely important agreement between the EU and one of its partners in the Mediterranean. The consequences of the agreement for the relationship between the EU and Turkey can at the same time be interpreted as an expression of what Keohane and Nye (1977) have labelled ‘complex interdependence’. As indicated by Jan Claudius Völkel (see this themed issue), the actual statement and its consequences have been followed closely by the Arab state leaders in the Mediterranean, for practically two reasons: first, it made it obvious that the EU is willing to pay immense sums to Southern Mediterranean governments in order to keep refugees away from the European continent, which is a lucrative financial incentive for particularly the resource-poor regimes in the region; second, the ‘sealing’ of the Turkish-EU border, and thus the closing of the Eastern Mediterranean migration route, provoked fears that migrants might increasingly reroute towards the Central and Western Mediterranean, which actually happened. This has tended to increase the pressure on all four countries analysed, but it has also strengthened their position vis-à-vis the EU when negotiating the financial aid for migrants and refugees. While Turkey has been criticized for insufficient living conditions for some of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, the overall impression has been that Turkey is doing indeed a lot for the more than 3,5 million refugees living in Turkey – which the EU rewards.

One of the reasons for the functioning Turkish efforts is the integration of refugees in the labour market, a development which also can be seen in the case of Jordan – and here it explicitly is a Jordanian response to an EU incentive. In Jordan, there seems, as shown by Peter Seeberg (see this themed issue), to be an internal consensus behind the integration strategy regarding the Syrian (and also concerning the Palestinian and Iraqi) refugees. The Jordanian reality is a result of a development, which has not been without conflicts, but nevertheless seems to be stabilized and is relatively well functioning. The official Jordanian migration diplomacy has been initiated by King Abdullah II referring to the huge costs related to increased pressure on infrastructure, environment, and natural resources. An institutional flexibility has at the same time been developed creating the capacity of the Jordanian state in adapting to changing realities in the given regional context. In this context, we see a consensus between Jordan and the EU. The Jordanian willingness to integrate the refugees via the Jordanian labour market provides the regime with a significant cash-flow from the external donors. At the same time, the cooperation stabilizes the regime – thereby being able to buy off its surrounding elite through refugee rent-seeking behaviour (Tsourapas, 2019).

The relatively harmonious EU–Jordan relationship is only to some extent finding its parallel in Morocco. Where Morocco traditionally has been understood as a one-directional migrant-sending country, providing European states with Moroccan work migrants, this pattern has changed, so we today have highly differentiated migratory movements, where the Moroccan state plays an important role in an Euro-African migration system (see the article by Irene Fernandez-Molina and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi; this themed issue). A series of critical junctures has taken Morocco through a development, where complex-institutionalized environments have influenced the Moroccan realities and created substantial changes. Morocco has in its official discourse recognized that it has become a migration destination and thereby an integrated part of African migratory movements, to some extent in the form of irregular migration from Africa south of the Sahara. In addition to this African-Moroccan migration new developments in Mediterranean migration have given Morocco a more significant role vis-à-vis the EU, in particular as a result of increasing migration along western routes following the ‘EU–Turkey Statement’ and the strengthened efforts by Frontex and related agencies especially along the Libyan coast in blocking the eastern and central migration routes.

The focus on how authoritarian resilience in different ways is secured by institutional adaptation to the challenges related to the migratory processes is one of the benefits of the historical institutionalist approach. It is obviously in the interest of the EU to strengthen the state and societal resilience of the partners in the south. This strategic priority constitutes the background for the financial contributions to the macroeconomic stability of the partner states, but – as shown – the comparative approach has at the same time provided us with an opportunity of tracing typological particularities in the context of the four states, as it is the ambition of this themed issue: to look at responses from the side of the Arab governments to incentives from the EU. This requires not only an analysis of state and societal resilience understood as macroeconomic stability, integration via the local labour markets or in education and health-care offers. Adding the security dimension, cooperation on counterterrorism and border control: it is clear that complicated and differentiated security regimes are unfolding in the four cases. It might still be relevant to point to common interests (in some cases converging interests) between the EU and the given state, but the plurality is noticeable and changing over time.

The Algerian particularity is a result of the historical development of its security conditions – influenced by the traumatic liberation process from France, the underlying conflict with Morocco at varying intensities and the different phases of the civil war from 1991 onwards. In addition, the 2011 Arab uprisings, as one of the most recent critical junctures of the Algerian security regime, has not resulted in the Algerian regime engaging in closer security coordination with its neighbours and with the EU – a clear difference to particularly Jordan and Morocco. The EU focus on the border management component has not contributed to motivating Algeria for taking EU incentives into consideration: Algeria finds that the suggested programmes concerning migration and its security-related dimensions remain too EU-driven and tailored for European needs. The historical institutionalist approach has proved useful in pointing to main explanations of the relatively low level of cooperation between Algeria and the EU, which still is the case.

The incumbent authoritarian Egyptian regime has prevailed on a different strategy – also related to national and regional security. As mentioned by Jan Claudius Völkel in this themed issue, the Egyptian borders are hotspots of insecurity, and it is also for the EU important to keep Egypt as a stable partner in this particularly volatile region (Israel, Libya, Sinai, Sudan). A restorative logic is therefore adapted by Egypt in developing and strengthening its security institutions – the EU has practically buckled to this, despite voicing occasionally critical concerns over the Egyptian regime’s devastating human rights records. A comprehensive security apparatus has been developed to a level even beyond what was known in the times of Mubarak, and irregular migrants and refugees are per se perceived as potential security threats – under the direct surveillance of the Egyptian security forces.

Migration and refugees have also played an important role while framing the Jordanian foreign and security policy. This is without doubt a result of Jordan’s specific situation, where regional conflicts frequently have involved or even in some cases have been catalysed by the presence of more than five million Palestinian refugees, a little more than 40 percent of which reside in Jordan (UNRWA, 2019). The 700,000–800,000 Iraqi refugees arriving in Jordan after the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 were met with restrictions when obtaining residence permits and the recent more than 1,3 million Syrians staying in Jordan have also been exposed to problematic measures of this character. The official explanation is that the authorities fear influx of smugglers and criminals, but also jihadists planning attacks on Jordanian soil against citizens or critical state institutions as well as infrastructure. The measures taken by the Jordanian authorities related to refugees have become part of the regime’s overall counterterrorism activities – again without tangible criticism from the EU.

This (spoken or unspoken) consensus from the EU’s side to a securitized approach in the treatment of refugees and irregular migrants has in particular become a reality after the 2011 Arab uprisings, and in particular in the context of the following tragic developments in Libya, Syria and partly also Iraq and Yemen. Despite some formal similarities between the two kingdoms Jordan and Morocco, the security dimensions of the migration processes to and from Morocco are very different from those in Jordan. The Moroccan authorities were criticized by the EU for being unnecessarily restrictive and security-focused and this constituted a step in the EU’s socialization efforts towards Morocco as a transit country. The character of the relationship has changed significantly: from a pro-EU activism following the ‘Advanced Status’ for Morocco in 2008 to a recent reality, where Morocco more self-reliantly is orienting itself towards regional solutions – placing itself in a position somewhat different from the pragmatic, EU-oriented Jordanian policies and practices.

Summing up the themed issue has had two objectives. The first is to bring about an improved understanding of responses by Arab states to EU foreign and security policy incentives. Through utilizing historical institutionalism as the principal theoretical and methodological approach, applying a comparative perspective on Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco have shown that in all four cases converging interests between them and the EU do exist, but also that significant differences can be found. The different migration diplomacy strategies and practices reflect divergent levels of institutionalized flexibility, which the four states in the Arab Mediterranean have developed in their responses to the EU incentives.

The second objective is to demonstrate and underline the relevance of historical institutionalism in offering tools for identifying and comparing how key critical junctures and path dependencies have emerged and developed in the four cases examined. In order to underline the comparative ambition of the themed issue, a graphic illustration (see Table 1) showcases the similarities and differences in the ways in which critical junctures in the historical development of each of the analysed states and in the region have influenced the responses by Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to the EU’s attempts at reaching its foreign and security policy goals. The table underlines the comparative perspective of this Themed Issue and brings forward a more detailed presentation of the main points analysed in the articles regarding historical changes and critical junctures, EU policies; incentives, institutional responses, reforms, etc., and results.

Table 1. Historical changes & critical junctures; EU policies, incentives; Institutional responses, reforms, etc., of the Arab states; results

Algeria	Historical changes & critical junctures	Conflict with Morocco after independence (Sands War in 1963 and Battle of Amgala in 1976)	Algerian civil war during the 1990 s and terrorist attack in the US (9/11)	Arab upheavals in 2011 and crisis in Mali 2012	EU migration crisis (2015) and EU border closures (EU-Turkey deal 2016, control of the Libyan route 2017)
	EU policies; incentives	Cooperation through the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972–1992)	Cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement within the EMP and advanced cooperation through the ENP	Cooperation through the ENP Partnership Priorities, Migration Compact, Member States’ security support	Funding through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), increased Funding for Security and Migration (ISF, AMIF), strengthened bilateral security cooperation Member States
	Institutional responses, reforms, etc.	Attempt to revive the Arab Maghreb Union. Institutional reform strengthening the role of the Army in the migration domain and in border control	Reform of the migration policy, criminalization of illegal migration, signature of international conventions, bilateral readmission agreements with Member States, EU Association Agreement including migration-related provisions (2005). Creation of a coordination cell run by the Joint Military Staff Committee in the southern part of the country	Substantial change in the laissez-faire approach to border control. Militarization of cross-border commercial routes	Returns of Nigerien and Malian nationals. Signature of the 2017 Partnership Priorities, endorsement of the EUTF during the Valletta Summit
	Results	No cooperation on migration issues.	No operationalization of cooperation on migration, limited readmission rates	Limited diplomatic relations and no cooperation on migration and border issues with the EU	U-turn on cooperation under the EUTF, no operationalization of cooperation on migration, refusal to let IOM supervise migrants’ repatriation to Niger, official rejection of cooperating with Frontex and to open regional disembarkation platforms
Egypt	Historical changes & critical junctures	January 2011: Begin Arab uprisings; February 2011: Removal H. Mubarak	3 July 2013: Removal Mohamed Morsi, reinstatement military regime	2014: Creation of NCCPIM	November 2016: IMF grant of 12 USD billion
	EU policies; incentives	2004: Association Agreement May 2011: Revised ENP strategy ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’; invitation to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia to launch a ‘Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security’	Balancing between normative claims and adaptation to factual reality	Financial support of committee through IOM; minimal criticism of military supremacy	Support of negotiations in IMF Board (EU Member States) Promotion of EU-Turkey Statement as ‘model’ for Egypt
	Institutional responses, reforms, etc.	Rejection of EU-proposed ‘Mobility Partnership’ by Egypt	Militarization of borders, esp. in Sinai	Elaboration of Anti-Smuggling Law (‘milestone’)	Improved surveillance of Egypt’s North coast
	Results	Migration cooperation remains minimal	Increase of irregular migrants in Egypt	November 2016: Anti-Smuggling Law	Tangible reduction of outgoing migration
Jordan	Historical changes & critical junctures	Arab uprisings and Syrian crisis starting 2011	2012-2014 Increasing number of refugees and migrants in Jordan	2014-2016 Need of further reforms making labour market work	2016-2019 Realization of probable long-term presence of Syrians
	EU policies; incentives	2002: Association Agreement; post-2011: Security cooperation, alliance against IS	Increasing focus on migration, signing of Mobility Partnership (2014)	Negotiating Jordan Compact (2016) followed by Brussels conferences	2017–2019 Annual Brussels conferences; EU accepts relaxed rules of origin
	Institutional responses, reforms etc.	Counterinsurgency, later focus on returning ‘foreign fighters’, anti-radicalization activities	Migration Partnership not legal framework for Syrian refugees; development of migration diplomacy	Adapting to EU incentives as part of trade-off related to labour market, special economic zones	Increasing attempts at implementing labour market measures, insisting on ‘Jordanian’ view
	Results	Security cooperation, only partly successful regarding anti-radicalization	Development of institutional flexibility contribute to resilience of Jordanian state	Jordan Compact & path dependence related to cooperation tend to prevent more negative scenarios	Partly unsuccessful measures and low economic growth result in problematic realities for Syrian refugees
Morocco	Historical changes & critical junctures	1999–2005 Spanish-Moroccan bilateral crisis including pressure on migration control through the EU (2001–2003)	2005–2011 Wave of migrant assaults on border fences of Ceuta and Melilla (2005)	2011–2015 Arab uprisings and short-term pacification of Western Mediterranean migration route (2012–2013)	2015–2019 Renewed salience of Western Mediterranean migration route. Morocco-EU bilateral crisis (2015–2019). Morocco’s accession to AU (2017)
	EU policies; incentives	Action Plan for Morocco on asylum and migration (1999). MEDA programme II (2000–2006). Demand for readmission agreement (2000-). SIVE surveillance system (2002) and Frontex (2004)	EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan (2005). Aeneas programme (2004–2008). EU-Morocco Advanced Status (2008)	EU invitation to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia to launch a ‘Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security’ with ultimate aim of concluding Mobility Partnerships	Suggestions for North African regional disembarkation platforms (2018). Increased EU border management assistance
	Institutional responses, reforms, etc.	Discourse on ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (2001–2011). Deputy Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad (2002). 2003 Immigration Law. Directorate for Migration and Border Surveillance (2003)	Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat (2006)	New Migration Policy (2013). Directorate of Migration Affairs (2013). 1st regularization process (2014). National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (2015)	2nd regularization process (2017). AU leadership on migration affairs (2017-). Intergovernmental Conference on the Global Compact for Migration in Marrakech (2018). Increased crackdown on migrants (2018-)
	Results	Enhancement of border control practices and cooperation with EU/Spain, securitization. No readmission agreement	Effective cooperation on border control. Rabat Process as diplomatic success for Morocco. No readmission agreement	EU-Morocco Migration Partnership (2013); Launch of first genuine immigration policy in North Africa, but deferred legal development and implementation	Foreign policy role as ‘African champion of migration’. Implementation stalemate and contradictions of New Migration Policy

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