The EU and LGBTI activism in the MENA – The case of Lebanon

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the role of the European Union (EU) in supporting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) communities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by focusing on the case of Lebanon. It seeks to fill the existing gap in the literature regarding the transversal conceptualization of EU practices in support of LGBTI communities in the MENA by focusing on what is happening on the ground. The paper builds on semi-structured interviews and engages with primary and secondary literature on practices in international relations and the EU’s transversal democracy promotion to answer three main questions: To what extent do the EU agents engage with local actors to improve transversal minority rights? Who are the agents involved? And what influences the EU approach/practice in this area? The main findings reveal the EU as a subtle actor when it comes to LGBTI rights in the MENA; it tends to treat the matter within a broader human rights aspect and to support initiatives taken by locals. This is due to the sensitivity of the domestic context as well as awareness that it might have a negative effect on the LGBTI groups if the EU became more vocal.

KEYWORDS:

• EU democracy promotion
• EU practices
• civil society
• LGBTI
• Lebanon
• MENA

Introduction

The rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons has formed an important basis of the EU liberal democracy (Council of the European Union, 2013, 2015; Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000). Supporting LGBTI rights in third countries (beyond EU borders) and implementing anti-discriminatory policies is part of the EU transversal democracy promotion as summarized in the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (Official Journal of the European Union, 2014). However, despite the EU commitment to promote LGBTI rights, the situation has been problematic even within some EU Member States – especially those with strong religious identity and involvement of religious communities within the society (Ayoub, 2014; Siegel, 2019).

The research on EU promotion of LGBTI rights during the enlargement process and beyond its borders is well documented in the literature (Ayoub, 2016; O’Dwyer, 2010; Slootmaeckers et al., 2016; Swimelar, 2017). The EU role seems to be contested and faces local resistance when it tries to promote these norms beyond its borders (Mos, 2013; Muehlenhoff, 2019a, 2019b; O’Dwyer, 2010, 2012). Even though the EU pushed all members joining in 2004, 2007 and 2013 to issue legislations to protect minority groups, this insistence has ‘provoked political backlashes [and] at least temporarily, worsened the political situation of LGBT groups’ (O’Dwyer, 2012, pp. 333–4). While the short-term effect of such policies created setbacks, this did, however, push LGBTI movements to be better organized and learn how to cope with the situation (O’Dwyer, 2012, pp. 333–4; O’Dwyer & Schwartz, 2010; Stenqvist, 2009). In the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries, the situation is even more problematic – especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The European Parliament raised concerns regarding human rights in the MENA and stressed that the EU, its Member States and all relevant institutions should support civil society organizations (CSOs) fighting for human rights such as ‘LGBTI, indigenous, environmental and land rights, refugee and labour rights defenders, and women, who face specific risks and threats due to their gender’ (European Parliament, 2019).

The EU’s limited margin of action in the area of LGBTI support and strong pressure from the MENA governments have pushed activists to find ways to operate in such a hostile environment – and to benefit from the limited support of the EU and its Member States, as we will see later. Activists have pushed to change attitudes in their communities by cooperating with other groups to unify their efforts, making attempts to hold events, using social media, in addition to pushing for behavioural/social change at the official and legal levels. In Lebanon, LGBTI and women’s rights groups have become more vocal and publicly active. Under a sectarian system that allocates all public offices and political position on a religious basis, and where religious leaders are heavily involved in socio-political activities, the political elites shy away from supporting this increased LGBTI activism. They do so because it might put them at odds with the mainstream religious sects they represent and with the broad public base. These new movements have moved beyond religion and sectarianism (which has long divided the country) and are perceived as a threat to the religious and political communities they belong to (interviews with CSO activists, Beirut, April–August 2019). This situation has also created a massive offensive/defensive action by religious communities, who act as the gatekeepers against such movements in a country that is otherwise considered to be quite liberal.

In line with the special issue’s theme on transversal democracy promotion and EU practices, this paper seeks to study the EU’s engagement with LGBTI groups and asks three questions: To what extent do the EU agents engage with local actors to improve transversal minority rights? Who are the agents involved? And what influences the EU approach/practice in this area? The paper shows that LGBTI activists are creating various means of expression and raising awareness. Despite the EU’s subtle mode of engagement when it comes to such a sensitive issue in the MENA region, the EU Delegation and EU Member States’ embassies have been supportive of the initiatives and activities of LGBTI groups, which take the lead in this area. In Lebanon, on one hand the domestic context (the sectarian political system, religious veto players, societal values and lack of coordination/cooperation among those CSOs) influences the EU practices and the progress of LGBTI groups. On the other hand, for the EU, the issue is not salient due to the security concerns (especially after the Syrian crisis) and that the EU is fearful to ‘burn its fingers’ on a relatively small issue (i.e., an issue that affects a small number of people) but in doing so runs the risk of angering majorities and important political actors.

The paper makes two contributions: First, it delves into a taboo area that is under-researched in the MENA, namely, LGBTI rights. And second, the article moves beyond the existing general studies on the topic, and those that focus on processes, substances and outcomes of EU democracy promotion, by contributing to the transversal dimension of democracy promotion and to explore the practices through which it is implemented within the specific area of LGBTI. It focuses on the interactions between EU/Member States’ agents (such as delegations, CSOs, embassies) and Lebanese human rights organizations that work on LGBTI issues. Furthermore, the paper emphasizes the important role of local actors in the democracy promotion process.

The paper is based on primary sources (EU official documents, official reports, and statements) in addition to 12 semi-structured interviews with officials at the EU delegation and EU Member States’ embassies, Lebanese CSO leaders and activists as well as religious elites (conducted between April–August 2019 and in February 2020). The CSO interviewees were chosen from LGBTI groups and from women’s and human rights groups that are involved in LGBTI activism. Each interview lasted for an hour on average and was in Arabic (except for the interviews with officials from the EU Delegation in Lebanon which were partly carried out in English).

Following this introduction, the next section discusses the EU engagement with MENA countries and its practice concerning LGBTI. The theoretical discussion is then situated by laying out the EU practice in the case of LGBTI in Lebanon. This is followed by an analysis of the LGBTI context in Lebanon and how the EU role has contributed to the progress of these groups. The final section concludes with the main findings and limitations.

Unveiling the literature on EU political engagement in the MENA

The scholarly literature on EU democracy promotion in the MENA is often outcome-oriented, and seems to agree that the EU’s efforts have been limited (Dandashly, 2018; Hanau Santini, 2013; Pace, 2010; Schmitter & Sika, 2017; Schumacher, 2018). Many analysts have been critical of the Eurocentric approach in the EU’s foreign policy (Dandashly & Kourtelis, 2020; Keuleers et al., 2016; Lehne, 2014; Smith, 2005) and signalled the need for a new approach towards non-European countries (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018; Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013). There is a need to decentre the EU approach and shift the focus to the role of local actors in the democracy-promotion process or mobilization against authoritarian regimes (such as in Tunisia, Syria, Egypt) (Kamel & Huber, 2015, p. 279; Dandashly & Kourtelis, 2020)

In the post-Arab uprising review of the ENP, the terms ‘deep democracy’ and ‘inclusive growth’ were mentioned by EU policy-makers as key priorities of the revised ENP. Nonetheless, the EU has failed to make significant changes to the ENP, which remains conditional and selective. Now, almost ten years later and despite the various ENP reviews, the EU has not really changed its approach. It continues using the same tools and policies and prioritizes security over democracy (Behr, 2012; Börzel et al., 2015; Dandashly, 2018; Echagüe et al., 2011; Kurki, 2011; Pace & Cavatorta, 2012; Schumacher, 2018; Teti et al., 2013). Most of the studies focus on the outcomes of EU democracy promotion (including human rights issues) and on evaluating the effectiveness of EU policies (Gómez Isa et al., 2016) rather than engaging with the specific policies the EU implements within its democracy promotion strategy, or with the actors involved in democracy promotion and the practices they implement.

Aside from the general literature on EU democracy promotion, there are some scholars who have focused on the role of CSOs in the post-uprising reforms, and have urged the EU to engage more with those CSOs. Some have even called on the EU to move beyond just dealing with like-minded CSOs and the Eurocentric vision of civil society to a more inclusive approach which could bring in other CSOs, for instance, Islamic ones (Bürkner & Scott, 2019; on EU engagement with CSOs, see Weilandt, 2021).

In terms of LGBTI rights, some scholars discuss the transnational activism of LGBTI groups linking their own agenda to the EU liberal norms. By doing so, these LGBTI groups have influenced the EU approach towards LGBTI generally and more so in the enlargement and integration policies towards Central and East European Countries (Ayoub & Paternotte, 2014; O’Dwyer, 2018). Other scholars study the extent to which the EU could promote LGBTI rights in the Global South. For example, Thiel (2019) focuses on the EU’s capability to push its LGBTI norms when negotiating agreements in other areas such as trade or foreign aid and investments. EU conditionality could create more visibility for LGBTI CSOs in addition to opening a window for them to be more active in the society. However, this increased visibility could result in an unintended negative consequence as it might portray LGBTI groups as different – which ‘raises the question whether LGBT communities want to assimilate or be radically different’ (Muehlenhoff, 2019b, p. 206). Other studies focused on the effect of (de)politicization on the legitimacy and acceptance of LGBTI groups. The (de)politicization of the matter increased the impact of the EU support and promotion of its neo-liberal norms to LGBTI groups (in the case of Turkey, e.g.) (Muehlenhoff, 2019a, p. 91).

The research on LGBTI in the MENA has not been especially developed – particularly when it comes to EU engagement with such groups. Earlier scholars rejected the idea that LGBTI movements even exist, ‘outside of the small groups of men in metropolitan areas such as Cairo and Beirut’ (Massad, 2002, p. 373). However, later publications and country-by-country analysis indicate that the number and visibility of LGBTI organizations in the MENA has changed significantly (Fortier, 2015; Ritchie, 2010). The situation of LGBTI groups differs according to the country, and we should avoid lumping all the MENA countries from the Mashrek to the Maghreb into a single category. Since the Arab uprisings, a number of scholars have studied the role of agencies and voices of activists (such as LGBTI, women’s groups, etc.) in the uprisings themselves and in the transition period afterwards (Bürkner & Scott, 2019; Dalacoura, 2019; Fortier, 2015; Huber & Kamel, 2015; Khalid, 2015; Khalil, 2014). Some have studied the visibility of LGBTI groups and the tools they have utilized such as social media and the Internet (Kreps, 2012). Others have discussed the challenges LGBTI groups face in divided societies (such as Lebanon), what strategies they adopt for mobilization and support, and how they identify themselves (Moussawi, 2015; Nagle, 2018).

In sum, the literature seems either to focus on EU democracy promotion in the MENA and the limited effect it has had, or on the role of minority groups such as LGBTI in the uprisings and the transition. However, when it comes to the EU efforts (direct/indirect) or practices and the rationale for such policies to promote these liberal norms in the MENA, the literature is not as well developed. The following sections aim to fill this gap by studying the EU’s involvement with LGBTI groups in the MENA.

The EU practice towards LGBTI groups

As the introduction of the Special Issue highlights, this article moves beyond the existing literature to delve into the issue of practices and how EU agents implement specific policies beyond the general democracy promotion agenda, processes and outcomes. The focus is on how EU actors (such as personnel in EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies), human rights activists (such as LGBTI groups), and political and religious elites interact in a specific context. Therefore, the the focus on the implementation of democracy promotion programmes and the stakeholders involved offers the opportunity to examine the practices of international donors for the promotion of democracy in third countries. (see Khakee & Wolff, 2021).

Before moving into the explanation of EU engagement with LGBTI groups, it is important briefly to outline what is meant by ‘practices’ in this article, as Andersen and Neumann (2012, p. 468) argue that one can view ‘states, organisations, wars, social movements, class or even personhood as practices’. Practices are defined as ‘socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possible reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 4).

The International Relations literature addresses practices in various ways: as being ‘embodied, shared, and patterned’, grounded in agency (Cornut, 2015, p. 5); or again, as an ‘organised constellation of different people’s activities’, an ‘open ended, spatially-temporarily dispersed nexus of doings and sayings’ (Schatzki, 2012, pp. 13–14). When talking about international organizations, some scholars explore the practices resulting from their work. International organizations can exert agency not only to ‘regulate the social world’ such that actors ‘conform with existing rules and norms of behaviour […] but also to constitute the world, creating new interests, actors, and social activities’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 7). Others have viewed instruments – such as ‘informational, procedural, declaratory, transference and overt’ (Whitman, 1997, pp. 67–68) – used by international organizations as a ‘set of practices which shape existing and emergent social structures’ in their relations with others (such as EU relations with its neighbourhood) (Korosteleva et al., 2013, p. 259).

International organizations can influence the actions of actors by setting the criteria for ‘best practices’, ‘good governance’, good behaviour, values, human rights, the ‘nature of social actors, and categories of legitimate social action in the world’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 7). International organizations, the EU for example (EU Delegation, Member States, European Parliament, European CSOs, etc.), can influence the actions of CSOs in terms of human rights, gender equality, LGBTI groups, and so on (for a survey of the literature, see Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016; Cornut, 2015; on gender equality and women empowerment, see Wolff, 2021). So ‘practices produce ratchet effects by creating “baselines” for interaction. They form the social structure under which deals are made, debates are conducted, decisions are taken, and challenges are raised’ (Pouliot & Thérien, 2015, p. 234).

This article considers practices as the day-to-day activities and what the actors are really doing on the ground in a specific time and space (social setting) – that is, how policies are developed and implemented in practical terms (Adler & Pouliot, 2011). These practices are based on previous experiences and ‘inform future ones. What social and political actors do (and the way they do it) stems from a know-how that is derived experientially, that is, from the “done thing”’ (Pouliot & Thérien, 2015, p. 233). Therefore, the focus is not on the treaties and institutions which ‘are part of the processes’ but more on ‘what social actors are doing, rather than predetermining what actors will actually do’ (Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016: 394; see also Khakee & Wolff, 2021). In what follows, the analysis shows what EU actors are doing on the ground in terms of LGBTI support, and takes one further step to briefly shed light on the impact those practices have on ‘producing social life, something which is to a large extent contingent on situated understandings and reproduced only through human interaction’ (Bremberg, 2016, p. 425).

EU and Member States’ support to LGBTI groups

The 2015–2019 Action Plan reiterates the EU’s commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and the support to democracy in third countries, mainly Neighbourhood countries. To achieve this, the Action Plan emphasizes the importance of collaborating with third countries’ governments and CSOs, international and regional organizations to ensure that issues of human rights are respected considering the UN declarations. Among the strategies that the EU implements to promote and develop human rights at the bilateral level with targeted countries are best practices, knowledge transfer, funding, and dialogue with governments and stakeholders (Council of the European Union, 2015; also interviews with officials at the European Delegation in Lebanon, April 2019). Furthermore, the EU promotes dialogue between third countries’ governments and CSOs to ensure that CSOs are not only involved in the decision-making but also hold their governments accountable (Council of the European Union, 2015).

When it comes to explicitly emphasizing the issue of LGBTI, due to pressures from third countries, the EU seems to use the broader terms of freedoms, equality and respect of human rights and women’s rights (Danisi, 2017). For example, during both the fourth and fifth EU–Africa Summits (April 2014 and November 2017), the final statements avoided mentioning anything explicit about LGBTI, or discrimination due to sexual orientation or gender, but rather focused on respecting human rights and gender in general terms (African Union-European Union Summit, 2017; Danisi, 2017; EU-Africa Summit, 2014). As we can see, due to strong resistance in third countries, the EU is pushed to tone down its commitment to LGBTI rights promotion.

While the 2015–2019 Action Plan highlights the key priorities for the EU relations with third countries in its neighbourhood, the Single Support Framework is a specific programming document of the European Neighbourhood Instrument developed by the Commission to apply the objectives set in the Action Plan for Lebanon. The priorities set in that programme are mostly focused on security issues and development whereas human rights issues are not as salient. What is noticed is the vague language and weak (even absent) official commitment to support LGBTI groups, which is not viewed negatively by some CSOs activists who emphasize they are ‘not sure what or how the EU can be more involved as this might harm the cause more than help, so better as it is’ (interview with CSO activist, Beirut, April 2019). But having such an ‘EU avoidance approach’ at the official discourse level towards LGBTI rights in Africa and the MENA due to political resistance to discuss these issues openly could lead to indirectly ‘legitimating the idea’ that LGBTI rights ‘are “domestic” sensitive topics and/or that LGBTI people may be excluded from the enjoyment of “some” human rights’ (Danisi, 2017, p. 353).

In what follows, I discuss the different practices of EU external action (financial and non-financial support). In the case of financial assistance for LGBTI groups, it should be noted that this type of support is indirect as it is framed within the broader human rights area or the rights of vulnerable and marginalized groups (vaguely defined). This is because of Lebanese legal restrictions that prohibit the establishment of official LGBTI organizations. Therefore, I first discuss briefly the EU financial support/practice here before moving on to the non-financial ways of interaction.

Financial support

Trying to determine the amount of funds the EU provides for LGBTI is not easy as most of the EU documents are framed broadly to cover CSOs and human rights issues. According to the Single Support Framework 2017–2020, Lebanon benefits from several funding schemes that move beyond issues related to CSOs and human rights, such as the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, EU Humanitarian Aid, CFSP/energy, transport, et cetera (European Commission, 2017). Three main instruments that combat the most salient human rights’ issues facing civil society rights are: the European Neighbourhood Instrument, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and Development Co-operation Instrument. The European Neighbourhood Instrument supports registered CSOs, and in the case of LGBTI in Lebanon it is a bit problematic; for example, the main LGBTI CSOs, such as Helem (Dream in Arabic, standing for Himaya Lubnaniya lil Mithliyeen wal Mithliyat, Lebanese Protection for Gays and Lesbians), are not officially registered. The European Endowment for Democracy supported Helem’s community centre in 2014/15. But aside from that, the Endowment has been more supportive to youth, accountability and women’s CSOs initiatives, especially Syrian women in Lebanon following the refugee crisis (European Endowment for Democracy, 2020).

One of the main EU actors playing an important role in managing financial support is the EU Delegation in Lebanon, through its continuous call for applications under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights instruments for supporting civil society groups working within the area of human rights generally and on the rights of LGBTI persons, freedom of expression and freedom of the media (Delegation of the European Union to Lebanon, 2019). Both funding schemes through the so-called Single Support Framework for EU support to Lebanon (2014–2016 and 2017–2019) have focused on CSOs and issues related to human rights such as gender equality, women’s rights and labour rights, and vulnerable and marginalized groups. Thus, the EU Delegation releases regular calls for funding to CSOs on many issues including human rights in general and women and LGBTI rights in particular (interviews with EU officials at the European Delegation in Lebanon, April 2019).

EU Member States such as Germany and the Netherlands provide aid. Through their embassies in Lebanon, both countries issue calls for funds focusing on human rights and LGBTI explicitly. The 2019 Human Rights and Democracy Programme Funds focused on various themes including Freedom from Torture and Inhumane Treatment, LGBT rights, and women’s participation in politics and public decision-making processes and institutions, welcoming proposals from relevant CSOs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018) (see Table 1 for a summary).

Table 1. EU interaction/practice with LGBTI groups.

EU interaction on LGBTI rights in Lebanon (The What?)	EU agents/actors involved (The Who?)	Practice (The How?)
Funding	EU Member States (through embassies), Commission, EU Delegation via various schemes such as European Neighbourhood Instrument, Endowment for Democracy, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights	Applying for funds through calls Through the Single Support Framework
Capacity building	EU Delegation EU Member States (through embassies) Other CSOs	Sharing best practices Training sessions Lectures and workshops
Promoting dialogue with governments	EU Delegation EU Member States (through embassies)	Via EU officials mainly EU Member States officials
Coordination among CSOs	EU Member States (through embassies) EU Delegation Other CSOs	Roundtables Coordination meetings to avoid multiple diverse actions on the same issue

Non-financial support

The EU engages in various non-financial instruments to support LGBTI groups within the broader theme of human rights. Among those instruments are the engagement in political dialogue with Lebanese authorities, security forces and relevant stakeholders at the level of the Higher Representative and the EU Delegation. The dialogue starts from the context of human rights and decriminalization concerning the legal aspect, in addition to linking the LGBTI case to the freedom of speech and organization (interviews at the EU Delegation, Beirut, April 2019). Thus, the EU Delegation addresses the issue of LGBTI rights both ‘directly and indirectly’, such as by meeting with relevant ministers to discuss issues of human rights in general or LGBTI rights in particular (interviews with CSOs activists, Beirut, April–August 2019).

The EU Delegation is available for consultations, structural dialogue, sharing best practices, collaboration with EU Member States, issuing calls for funding schemes to CSOs, sharing information, etc. (mainly within the framework of human rights) (interviews with officials at the EU Delegation and an EU Member State Embassy, Beirut, April 2019). CSOs can approach the Delegation and propose certain programmes which are then discussed, and certain measures are taken. However, some have been critical of the EU Delegation; according to a civil society activist, perhaps if the EU Delegation personnel consulted more with LGBTI groups on steps and needs and put this into action, then the policies would be more effective (Cornelissen & Hammelburg, 2016, p. 27).

Furthermore, there have been roundtables with EU Member States’ embassies, and recommendations sent to the Lebanese government within the framework of the UN human rights context. According to a CSO leader, there have been active collaborations with LGBT CSOs and best practices from EU Member States (interview with a CSO leader, Beirut, April 2019). The interviewee adds that despite the EU support, ‘the South–South alliances in the area of LGBTI rights are stronger as they share expertise, resources, best practices, sometimes language, outreach and research’.

Among the active EU Member State in this area is the Netherlands. LGBTI and women’s rights are among the top three priorities for the country’s relations with Lebanon (following security and trade) (Naoufal, 2018). The support is focused on diplomacy and engagement with the government, providing advice and advocacy (interviews with official from an EU Member State Embassy, Beirut, April 2019; see Table 1 for a summary). In an interview with the Dutch ambassador to Lebanon, the ambassador stressed that the Netherlands does not impose its liberal ideas on others; he added that third countries can see how LGBTI rights are treated in the Netherlands, alongside other human rights issues, and if they choose to they can draw lessons and transfer those norms (Naoufal, 2018). Furthermore, the support sometimes can be symbolic, such as raising a rainbow flag next to the national flag (as done by the EU Delegation, the UK and many EU Member State embassies including those of Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, e.g.) during the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia.

One of the domestic problems raised in the interviews was the lack of coordination among CSOs, who end up sometimes competing against each other for funds or drafting laws on the same topic. This pushed EU Member States and the EU Delegation in addition to some local CSOs to work on organizing meetings to unite their efforts and achieve better outcomes as a group. This has been progressing over the past years but the road is still long given the lack of available resources, the EU’s prioritization of security (especially after the Syrian crisis), resistance by political elites, fear on the part of security forces, etc. (interviews with CSOs activists, Beirut, April–August 2019).

As we can see in Table 1, there have been various forms of EU practices. The EU Delegation and EU Member States’ embassies have been supportive of LGBTI groups using financial support, diplomacy, organizing roundtable informative talks, sharing best practices, supporting collaboration among LGBTI groups within Lebanon, and so on. All this support has been crucial for the LGBTI movement in Lebanon and has shown that the lead in this area is in local hands while the EU role is rather subtle. As we have seen, the role of the local context is important to understand the practices in this area. So the local dimension is relevant for the discussion here and ‘rather than looking at the macro-picture, practice approaches privilege micro-movies and micro-stories, and how they underpin the macro-picture’ (Bicchi & Bremberg, 2016, p. 395), which we will turn to in the next section.

The situation of LGBTI groups in the MENA – The Lebanese case: Any progress?

As we have seen in the previous section, the EU plays rather a subtle role in relation to LGBTI groups due to the sensitivity of the issue and domestic constraints. Most MENA governments are hostile to LGBTI groups and even reject the concept of having a gender identity/orientation that does not fall within the historical traditions and culture of the region. For example, laws prohibit and criminalize same-sex acts, whether explicitly (such as in Algeria, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen) or vaguely (such as in Lebanon and Syria) (Human Rights Watch, 2018a, pp. 6–7). In Egypt, ‘even though there are no laws that explicitly criminalize homosexuality, they use the existing debauchery laws in order to criminalize it’ (El-Hady, 2019). Egyptian authorities continue to ‘prosecute LGBTI individuals on the basis of their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity, often subjecting them to forced anal and sex determination tests, a practice that amounts to torture’ (Amnesty International, 2019).

The 2011 Arab uprisings had some positive effects on LGBTI rights in some MENA countries. The use of social media and engaging with regional collaboration, South–South dialogue and best practices has resulted in positive effects on LGBTI activists in countries such as Tunisia.

In Tunisia, gay movement actors used the Arab uprisings as a window of opportunity to be more visible and heard. They collaborated with human rights movements such as women’s rights, played a role in the protests and became more vocal. In an interview, one activist highlighted that while the Tunisian feminist movement was afraid to get involved with LGBTI movements, ‘it’s changed […] The change came from within associations. Young lesbian and bi women joined [feminist associations], and changed things from within’ (Human Rights Watch, 2018a, p. 36). However, in Tunisia, homosexuality is still criminalized. Tunisian ‘authorities occasionally use [article 230] to detain and question persons about their sexual activities and orientation, reportedly at times based on appearance alone’ (United States Department of State, 2015, p. 20).

Turning to Lebanon, despite some progress, LGBTI groups still face significant constraints whereby public activities are restricted due to religious, cultural and political reasons. The strong religious and sectarian system has influenced the existence and work of CSOs. Strong and well-funded CSOs belong to the main religious/sectarian groups (interview with civil society leader, Beirut, April 2019). Although things are slowly changing and secular, modern CSOs are becoming stronger and more active and vocal about their issues that challenge the mainstream traditions, they are still weak in comparison to the sectarian CSOs which receive support from political parties, religious groups, and the government. Political elites who receive their legitimacy from the sects they belong to cannot ignore the religious elitesand the majority of their constituencies. Religious elites are more conservative when it comes to LGBTI rights which they consider to be against the religious teachings and traditions of the society (interviews with various CSOs activists and religious scholar, Beirut, April-August 2019 and February 2020).

Sectarianism is one of the main problems of the political system. It moves beyond civil society to the judicial system, public administrations, sports competitions, and the daily life – which makes any democratic progress impossible at times. Equality among genders is not fulfilled. For example, women cannot pass their citizenship to their children if they are not married to a Lebanese man. Moreover, women face discrimination in the workplace, lower wages, restrictive social practices, etc. The situation is not better for LGBTI individuals, who are criminalized by law. Article 534 of the penal code prosecutes consensual same-sex conduct. The law, dating back to colonial times, punishes ‘any sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature’. The punishment could be up to one year in prison. This article has been used on several occasions to prosecute LGBTI people (interviews with various CSOs activists, April–August 2019), ‘often affecting particularly vulnerable groups including transgender women and Syrian refugees’ (Human Rights Watch, 2018b). In violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, men suspected of being homosexual are subjected to a forced anal exam – which is considered to be a form of torture (for a discussion on forced anal exam, see Human Rights Watch, 2016). Despite the initial ban on forced anal exams in 2012, there are several cases that show this test is still taking place at detention centres (interviews with CSOs activists, Beirut, April–August 2019). The issue of torture and arrests has been raised in human rights dialogue between the EU and Lebanese authorities. However, the Lebanese government’s answer to the EU officials was that ‘there are no orders to go after the LGBTI community’ – an answer that seemed to be fine by EU officials (Cornelissen & Hammelburg, 2016).

Over the past years, one can, however, notice some progress in terms of LGBTI activism, despite the crackdown by various religious, security and societal groups (interviews with CSO activists, Beirut, April–August 2019; for an overview, see OutRight International & The Arab Foundation for Freedoms and Equality – AFE, 2018). LGBTI groups are now more visible (publicly) taking initiatives using new social media and benefitting as well from applying for EU funds under the human rights umbrella. Relying on this path for support is still fraught with problems, as some LGBTI groups indicate, due to the extensive documentation needed to get the application ‘just right, [such] that it is only possible to access the fund with intensive assistance’ (Cornelissen & Hammelburg, 2016).

LGBTI groups use the available resources and venues provided to them by the EU Delegation or other human rights organizations for strengthening coordination and cooperation across the various CSOs. This has been a problematic area that is improving through the support of the EU Delegation, EU Member States and other CSOs (local and international), who are offering their expertise and help, and are holding roundtables for discussion and organization. However, some interviewees highlighted that the EU officials should listen more to the demands and needs of CSOs in general and LGBTI groups in particular. The EU does not really take into consideration or consult with these CSOs when drafting its policies towards Lebanon. The EU practice in that area has to change as such an interaction is necessary for the progress of the LGBTI situation politically, legally and socially.

Furthermore, two strong LGBTI organizations were formed, Helem in 2002/2004 (Makarem, 2011) and MEEM (Women LGBTI group) in 2007–2014 (Hamdan, 2015) (though, both not officially registered). Both organizations have been active despite the restrictions they face from the security forces and religious groups. LGBTI activists use a variety of available tools to raise awareness on their issues. There are many places in Beirut that are considered LGBTI friendly (Lo, 2018) – despite the occasional security forces crackdown on these places or on events hosted by the LGBTI community. LGBTI groups have celebrated the International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia since 2004, and organized Beirut Pride in 2017, 2018 and 2019 (although some of these events were forced to cancel, especially the parade). As mentioned earlier, the EU Delegation and EU Member State embassies raise the rainbow flag on this day, a symbolic move that lends emotional support and strengthens the cause of these groups who feel they are not alone in their fight (interviews with CSO activists, Beirut, April 2019).

At the official level, some individual initiatives have been taken by judges in support of LGBTI groups. Judges at different levels and during different times have ignored Article 534 which they consider to be vague and not applicable to same-sex activity. The right to gender change became legal in 2016. Furthermore, the Minister of Justice at the time, Chakib Kortbawi, issued an order to end forced anal exam in 2012. The Lebanese Psychological Association and Lebanese Psychiatrist Society declassified homosexuality as a disease in 2013. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, many candidates called for a cancellation of Article 534 and for decriminalization of homosexual behaviour (Qiblawi, 2018). According to some interviewees, the vocal EU support to these steps is important but the amendment of the article is an area where the EU can put more pressure on the Lebanese authorities within the Rule of Law and judiciary reforms.

This progress has not been without problems; in many instances, the security forces and religious groups force LGBTI communities to cancel their events; arrests and crackdowns are not uncommon (interviews with CSO activists, Beirut, April–August 2019). Furthermore, with the Arab uprisings, especially the Syrian crisis, the EU prioritized security. The EU gave more attention to dealing with refugees in Lebanon and the other Neighbourhood countries, at the expense of human rights – a shift that was noticed by CSOs dealing with issues of gender and human rights (interviews with CSO activists, Beirut, April 2019; on gender equality see Wolff, 2021). Over the years, LGBTI activists/groups have learned how to operate within the margin they have in Lebanon and have found ways to push through their agenda (interviews with CSO activists, Beirut, April–August 2019). They are using the available venues for funds, knowledge transfer and know-how, best practices that are provided to them by various EU embassies and the Delegation. The try to collaborate with other local/regional/international CSOs. Moreover, LGBTI groups have benefitted significantly from the protests that erupted on 17 October 2019 and attracted more visibility. According to Tarek Zeidan, executive director of Helem, ‘we need to be very aware of the ramifications of all of our steps and to ensure that we understand the system and how far we can push, and push to the limit of that extent’ (Choukeir & Poladoghly, 2019).

In sum, as indicated in the interviews, this implicit and informal support to initiatives and activities undertaken by local human rights and LGBTI groups is more helpful than being explicit and outspoken on such issues, as many domestic political and religious elites are bound to reject LGBTI advocacy activities. Moreover, as one CSO leader stated, their efforts are mainly to seek out be treated as human beings – that is, to be accepted. They are not seeking to be similar to equivalent LGBTI in the EU and the West, for instance, they are not calling for more far-reaching objectives, such as the legalization of same-sex marriage (interviews with CSO activist, Beirut, April 2019).

Conclusion

This paper aimed to fill the existing gap in the literature regarding the transversal conceptualization of EU practices in support of LGBTI communities in the MENA. Despite the slow and incremental progress, LGBTI groups have achieved over the past two decades, there is still much more needed for full equality of the LGBTI compared to the rest of the population in Lebanon. Political elites, society and religious communities are universally hostile to LGBTI people, as they do not accept them. While the EU support to Lebanon has been minimal in this area compared to areas such as security and economy, one can notice some activity on the ground among local, international, and EU actors.

Following the Arab uprisings, the LGBTI movement gained momentum in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, where the LGBTI community became more vocal and public. In the case of Lebanon, progress had been ongoing prior to the Arab uprisings. Perhaps surprisingly, the uprisings had a negative impact on the EU approach to human rights and democracy. The reason is that following the uprisings, in the case of Lebanon, the EU focused on high priority issues such as dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis and the related security/terrorist threat. This EU concentration on security did not stifle the efforts of local LGBTI groups to continue their attempts to increase their rights. According to the interviews, what those groups are seeking is not to mimic the Western-style liberal values, but rather to be respected as human beings whose basic human rights ought to be protected. Furthermore, based on the interviews, there are increased demands by LGBTI groups that the EU officials move beyond just communicating with officials to listen to their demands and take them more seriously.

In terms of EU practices on the ground, one can notice the diversity of activities undertaken by different EU agents and the importance of the local context. These activities include capacity building, promoting dialogue with governments and coordination among CSOs (see Khakee and Wolff, 2021). These practices strengthen the LGBTI CSOs’ ability to speak with one voice and influence decision-making. Many of the initiatives are taken by local CSOs, rendering the role of EU agents more support-oriented. In terms of funds, the CSOs must apply for funding via, for instance, the EU Delegation. The Delegation personnel are involved in supporting LGBTI rights (in addition to other human rights issues) – not only through direct/indirect funds, but also in other ways for instance, by sharing best practices with CSOs, holding coordination meetings, and offering support to those groups whenever asked. Moreover, EU Member States are not only involved through their embassies by offering funds and training, but also by criticizing human rights abuses and torture, promoting dialogue with the government, strengthening coordination among CSOs, as well as through their capacity to influence political elites. EU Member States, the EU Delegation and other (local/regional) CSOs offer training sessions, lectures and workshops, roundtables for coordination, support dialogue with the government and share best practices. All these efforts have had positive impact on LGBTI activism as we have seen.

However, the anti-LGBTI domestic pressure and discrimination creates an environment of fear for individuals to be vocal about their sexual orientation and preferences – therefore resulting in slow progress. The interviewees also stressed the barriers posed by the inherent sensitivity of the issue due to the prevailing widespread domestic resistance to such liberal values (with veto players such as religious communities, political elites, societal restrictions), the sectarian political system, weak infrastructure for CSOs, in addition to the lack of cooperation among the various LGBTI groups. The EU’s role has largely been confined to supporting the initiatives taken by local CSOs. This implicit support and framing within the broader human rights context could in fact be more helpful to the LGBTI groups’ cause, as indicated by some interviewees.

Investigating the ‘why’ question is important to understand the progress and the rationale for EU practices, but it goes beyond the scope and space of this paper. Future research could embark on comparisons of MENA countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan to examine the extent to which the Lebanese case is comparable to those cases, also seeking wider lessons to be drawn from this research for an evaluation of the usefulness of EU activities around supporting LGBTI issues.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the editors of this Special Issue Anna Khakee and Sarah Wolff for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript as well as the participants of the workshop on 21May 2019 at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS)-The Hague. Also I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and comments in addition to the interviewees who took the time to answer my questions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).