Cultural diplomacy and the reconfiguration of soft power: Evidence from Morocco

ABSTRACT

During the reign of King Mohammed VI, Morocco experienced a rapid expansion in regional economic and military ties that have given a gradual impetus to a shift in regional power constellations. But in the shadow of this hard power trajectory, the Moroccan regime is increasingly capitalizing on its soft power resources as well. In this paper, we demonstrate how the kingdom’s considerable cultural capital – arising from religion, historicity, and tradition – has become a political instrument to improve the country’s outward image. The regime inter alia employs cultural politics and public diplomacy measures in Islamic and Jewish religious policy, through the commercialization of material and immaterial cultural heritage and through the massive investment into cultural infrastructure to construct a new nation brand and subsequentially solidify Morocco’s regional and international soft power standing. This, in turn, has enabled Morocco to more successfully pursue its foreign policy goals, first and foremost its quest to gain sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The research is based on media analysis and original data from semi-structured interviews conducted between February 2020 and February 2021.

KEYWORDS:

• Cultural diplomacy
• Morocco
• foreign policy
• authoritarianism
• soft power
• regional power

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. When Spain succumbed to local and international pressure and began negotiating the end of its colonial hold of ‘Spanish Sahara’ in 1975, Morocco (in cooperation with Mauritania) opposed early plans by the United Nations (UN) to base the future of Western Sahara on a referendum of self-determination and immediately pushed to annexe large parts of the territory. When the armed Sahrawi nationalist movement, the Algerian backed Polisario Front, resisted Morocco and Mauritania’s occupation, war erupted. Although the UN peacekeeping mission MINURSO brokered a ceasefire in 1991, fighting has not ceased and the referendum has not been carried out to this day (cf. Hasnaoui, 2017; James, 1990; Zunes, 1995). The conflict remains at a diplomatic impasse, alternating between phases of simmering hostility and open warfare. Today, more than ever, the question of the Western Sahara is the ‘the first and most important subject on the mind of Monsieur Bourita’, the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (‘Interview 2 Cultural Diplomacy’, 06 March 2020).

2. Moroccan self-perception (and presentation) as an indispensable regional player became clear, when on 1 March 2021 Morocco suspended all relations to the German embassy and German intuitions active in Morocco due to ‘far reaching misunderstandings’ regarding foreign policy perspectives. Among the presumed causes is Morocco’s disgruntlement over not being invited to the German organized UN security conference on Libya, which Morocco perceived as an affront to its regional role (cf. Majdi, 2021; SpiegelOnline,2021).

3. All originally French literature, articles, and interview materials have been translated by the authors.

4. While no clear regional hegemon has been able to emerge in MENA (cf. Beck, 2014), several powers aspire to this position on the African continent: Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, and sometimes Egypt and Ethiopia. But ‘none of the much talked about regional powers in Africa have been able to harness the potential of their capabilities for the advancement of the regions’ security and peace’ (Boukhars, 2019, p. 242).

5. The AMU has been in existence since 1989, but has had little success in improving economic or political ties in the Maghreb. Its last meeting was conducted in 2008. The Maghreb is among the economically least integrated regions in the world (Parshotam, 2020).

6. Based on development in foreign direct investment and regional trade, Němečková, 2021 wagers that Morocco has potential to become a serious contender for the position of regional economic power among the states of North Africa. Morocco’s pending integration into the ECOWAS community would further shake the current balance of power in West Africa (cf. Kourouma, 2019).

7. A synopsis of our interviews yields the following priorities of Morocco’s foreign policy: The international recognition of the Western Sahara as Moroccan territory; the international acceptance of Morocco as an inevitable broker of peace and stability in Northern Africa and the larger Sahel; the international acknowledgement of Morocco as beacon of modernity and tolerance in the Arab-Muslim world; the recognition of Morocco as a safe harbour for foreign investments, a highly connected partner for trade with the African continent, and a reliable intermediary for development agency in the region.

8. For example, Bogaert, 2018 elucidates how neo-liberal mega projects such as the restructuring of the Bouregreg valley in Rabat/Salé are a feature of ‘globalised authoritarianism’, which contributes to exacerbated class divisions instead of the propagated improvement in general economic welfare.

9. The V-Dem Democracy Report 2021 lists the kingdom as a closed autocracy with some achievements in the liberal and deliberative components, but poor scores in the regarding liberal and electoral democracy, as well as for egalitarian and participatory components (Lindberg, 2021).

10. See also Abouzzohour & Tomé-Alonso, 2019; Hmimnat, 2018a, 2018b; Iraqi, 2019a; Régragui, 2013.

11. Examples include the Rabita Mohammadia des Oulémas, the Institut Mohammed VI des Lectures et Etudes Coraniques or the Institut Mohammed VI pour la Formation des Imams Morchidines et des Morchidates, and the Fondation Mohammed VI des Oulémas africains.

12. According to Abourabi, 2020, p. 203 this channel – that can be received in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Middle East – was created to counter extremism that damages the image of Islam.

13. This radio channel is nowadays the most popular radio broadcaster in Morocco with a share of over 17% of all listeners in 2018 (MediaMarketing, 2019).

14. Through the finance law project 2020, the Ministry of religious endowments announced to spend 107 Million DH (~€ 10,7 m) for the propagation of the Moroccan Islamic model abroad and another 100 Million DH (~€10 m) for the Fondation Mohammed VI des Oulémas Africains in order to combat extremist views on the African continent and beyond. For more information see (Dahir-n°1-15-75, 2015; Hmimnat, 2020).

15. Since 2017 Morocco additionally participates in the physical reconstruction of cultural heritage destroyed by terrorists during the Malian civil war. With a contribution of $1,5 m the kingdom has joined the International Alliance for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Zones of Conflict (ALIPH), which strives to protect and reconstruct endangered cultural artefacts all over the world (ALIPH, 2020; Cot, 2019).

16. A similar programme has existed since 2005.

17. This view is confirmed, for instance, by the former Malian minister of foreign affairs, for whom the training of Malian imams in Morocco is part of a counter-terrorism strategy (Tilouine, 2013).

18. The data stem from an internal document received from a Moroccan government official.

19. A corresponding observation can be made for the Fondation Mohammed VI des Oulémas africains, dedicated to the intra-African exchange of experiences in the religious field, which takes on an increasingly prominent role in Morocco’s foreign religious diplomacy. In the inaugural speech in 2016, King Mohammed VI explicitly stated that the initiative serves to link the people of Sub-Saharan Africa to himself as Commander of the Faithful. Through its 32 branches, the work of the foundation aims at fostering support for Morocco among religious and political elites in Sub-Saharan African countries and expands the country’s cultural and religious influence (Dahir-n°1-15-75, 2015; Hmimnat, 2020).

20. Hmimnat, 2019 points to a number of problems regarding the imam training, including irregularities in the admission process of new students or issues with last-minute curricula changes and course cancellations due to a lack of students and staff. These issues concern mostly the non-theological courses, which are at the core of Morocco’s claim of addressing country-specific cultural and socio-economic realities.

21. Belhaj, 2008 described the Western Sahara conflict as the most important obstacle in Morocco’s foreign policy approach towards Africa. At the time of his writing, a majority of African countries criticized the occupation of Western Sahara as a colonial act, but many nations have since relativized their stance.

22. The Gnaoua are part of the black Maghrebian population, who are descendants of former slaves from Sub-Saharan Africa.

23. See also Abourabi, 2020, pp. 188 ff.

24. The recognition of the United Nations allegedly goes back to the year 2001. Despite prominence of the event, this information could not be checked to with the UNO nor the organizers themselves.

25. At the same time, it is clear that this is not a one-way effect. International companies and countries also benefit from being present in such events of wide radiance, since they provide an opportunity to generate good publicity or – in the case of France – improve its own often ambiguous image in its former colonies.

26. For Belghazi, 2006 this branding of Fès constitutes an elite project. It ‘imagineers’ the city of Fès as a place of intercultural peace and tolerance – a neologism that describes an intellectual act of crafting an image to reproduce the social order of the town. The elitist character of the Festival de Fès des Musiques Sacrées du Monde especially through the use of French as main language is reiterated by Azzaoui, 2019. Many authors like Qaissi, 2019, pp. 96 ff. see the risk of promoting ‘exoticism’ and ‘folklorisation’ of Moroccan culture for economic benefits.

27. The Dirham 9bn project (other sources speak of Dirham 18bn) was initiated on 12 May 2014 by King Mohammed VI and aims at creating 12.000 jobs and attracting 4 million tourists to Rabat until 2020 (El Kherraz & El Faker, 2017; LeMatin, 2014). Large parts of the old town have been restored; a modern tramway has taken up service and connects Rabat to its sister city Salé; the new Musée Mohammed VI de l’art moderne et contemporain was inaugurated in 2014; the Grand Théâtre de Rabat is about to open its doors which – according to officials – is supposed to equal the Opera of Paris, Scala of Milan, or the Theatre of Moscow. Furthermore the highest tower of Africa is under construction and carries the king’s name; in 2016 the monarch also launched the erection of the Art & Culture House destined to be Morocco’s National Archives’ Library; in 2017 the Musée de l’histoire et des civilizations was reopened after years of renovation; in early 2020 the new National Museum of Photography was opened in an newly restored fortress at the sea and the Musée national de l’archéologie et des sciences de la terre is in planning.

28. This title was originally supposed to go to Marrakech, Mehdi Qotbi, the Moroccan king’s cultural lobbyist, is said to be behind the transfer of the award to Rabat.

29. cf. also Abourabi, 2020, pp. 246 f.

30. The Kingdom remains a closed autocracy that has frequently committed human rights abuses, and systematically restricts free speech and fair elections – especially in the territory of Western Sahara that the country claims as its own (HumanRightsWatch, 2019; Lührmann/Lindberg, 2020).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation [Dissertation scholarship]; Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes [Dissertation Scholarship].