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ABSTRACT
In the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, Russia and Turkey emerged as two principal players providing security assistance to opposing warring parties. While interventions on the part of the two foreign powers have introduced new dynamics into intractable and volatile armed conflicts, the underlying intention was to inject extraneous goals into ongoing conflicts and project power in the southern Mediterranean region. This article investigates security assistance theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we propose a typology that distinguishes between formal, informal and semi-formal processes of wartime security assistance across the state-non-state dimension. Empirically, drawing on rare access to state officials, former and active rebels, as well as mercenary actors in Syria and Libya, we give a unique description of the patterns of security assistance provided by Russia and Turkey to state and non-state armed actors. We examine the ways in which the two foreign powers have created a nexus between the two conflicts by capitalizing on pre-existing security assistance frameworks in Syria to recruit and deploy fighters to Libya. Although security assistance has emerged as a competition site between Russia and Turkey, we demonstrate how mutual recognition of security interests has created margins for negotiation and agreement-reaching in Syria and Libya.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. The logic – or underlying aim of security assistance – may not always be discernable or explicitly stated; however, it can be extrapolated or inferred based on certain actions.
2. PMCs are companies selling services, such as logistics, consultancies, training or direct armed security provision in the context of armed conflicts (Leanders, Citation2010). While these companies are often ‘security’ companies, we follow the convention of referring to them as ‘military’ (Isenberg, Citation2008). For a discussion on the definitions, see: (Leander, Citation2006).
3. The Western military intervention to force regime change in Libya, and the chaos and fragmentation that prevailed after the overthrow of Qadhafi, was the immediate lens through which the developments in Syria were seen and analysed by Russia. As a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, Russia has used this power three times, in 2011 and 2012, to block proposed UN actions against Syria. Together with China, Russia vetoed draft resolutions on Syria (S/PV.6627) on 4 October 2011, (S/PV.6711) 4 February 2012, (S/PV.6810) and 19 July 2012.
4. For insights into the CIA’s ‘train-and-equip’ program, see the contribution of Øystein Rolandsen & Kjetil Selvik in this Special Issue.
5. In November 2015, Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet allegedly violating Turkish airspace near the Syrian border which led to almost entirely frozen political, economic, and cultural links between the two states (RT International, Citation2015).
6. According to a former supreme leader of the SNA, Turkey was the only state that supplied the SNA with salaries, weapons, and logistics (Al-Ashawi, Citation2018, August 12).
7. Particularly after Egypt shifted to the American camp in 1972 (See: Trenin, Citation2013).
8. Between 1956 and 1991, the USSR supplied Syria with 5,000 tanks, more than 1,200 war jets, and around 70 warships (Nizameddin, Citation2000, p. 99).
9. Many of al-Assad’s requests to Moscow were blocked by Israel in order to maintain the balance of power and prevent empowering Iran in the region.
10. To reassert its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Moscow signed a long-term agreement with Damascus in January 2017, which secured a 49-year military presence in two strategic facilities on Syria’s Mediterranean coast: Hmeimim airdrome in Latakia and Tartus naval base (TASS, Citation2017).
11. The creation of the Fifth Assault Corps came after the failure of the Fourth Assault Corps, which was established by Russia in October 2015. The Fourth Assault Corps was placed under joint Syrian, Russian, and Iranian command. However, the Iranian approach of relying on independent militias pushed Russia to revise its approach, dedicating more attention and resources to work on independently restructuring the Syrian army. See: (Al-Jabassini, Citation2019).
12. Interview, FAC military commander, 2019.
13. Interview, FAC admin officer, 2019.
14. In May 2017, representatives from Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara met in Astana, Kazakhstan, and agreed to set up four so-called ‘de-escalation zones’ within which there would be a suspension of hostilities between rebel groups and the state forces. One zone is in the south-west, around Daraa and Quinetra; one in Eastern Ghouta; one in Northern Homs; and one in Idlib.
15. Interviews, Libyan military intelligence officials, 2019.
16. Interview, high-ranking Libyan defence official officials, 2021.
17. Interview, Turkish defence official, 2021.
18. In early 2021, complaints over payment delays and financial commitment began to surface.
19. Interview, local mediator involved in the recruitment processes in Syria, 2021.
20. Interview, Syrian mercenary fighter recruited by Wagner Group, 2021.
21. Interview, Syrian mercenary fighter, 2021.
22. Interview, SNA field commander, 2021.
23. Interview, SNA field commander, 2021.
24. Interview, Syrian mercenary fighter recruited by SNA, 2021.
25. Interview, former rebel in southern Syria, 2022.
26. Interview, Syrian recruits in SNA- and state-held areas in Syria, 2020–2021.
27. Interview, SNA rebel, 2022.
28. Interview, Libyan field commander, 2019.
29. Interview, Libyan defence official, 2021.
30. Interview, Libyan interior ministry official, 2019.
31. Interview, Libyan field commander, 2019.
32. Interviews, Libyan field commanders and Ministry of Interior officials, 2019.
33. Interviews, Libyan field commanders, 2019, 2021.
34. Interview, Libyan field commander, 2021.
35. Interview, Syrian mercenary fighter recruited by SNA, 2022.
36. Interviews, residents of the oil crescent, 2021. Interview, Libyan security official, 2019.
37. Interview, Libyan high-ranking maritime navy official, 2022.
38. Interview, Libyan Interior official, 2022.
39. Interview, Libyan Military of Defence-affiliated armed group commander, 2022. Interview, and Libyan field commander, 2022.
40. interview, Libyan military intelligence official, 2022.
41. Interview, senior European diplomat, 2022.
42. Interview, residents of the oil crescent, (2022).
43. Interview, residents of the oil crescent, 2021, and Central Libya/Houn, 2022.