No roadmap, no global vision: Shortcomings and pitfalls of the first stage of decentralization reforms in Tunisia

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the shortcomings and pitfalls of the first stage of this process, which came to an end in 2021. After contextualizing the associated controversies within theoretical debates on decentralization as well as within the historical and legal context of current decentralization reforms, I investigate the process behind the drafting of a new legal framework for the local collectivities code (LCC). The analysis uncovers deep-seated contention regarding the content of the reform between ruling parties, national bureaucrats, legal experts and NGOs – most importantly surrounding the question of the financial autonomy of local units, which is a typical point of contention in decentralization processes. The analysis concurrently reveals numerous procedural weaknesses with negative consequences on the overall reform process. Moreover, the lack of a roadmap for the reform process proved to be disastrous, leading local elections to take place before the LCC was promulgated. Finally, the government’s lack of a clear vision for the reform process gave national bureaucrats an excessive amount of autonomy. The outcome of this was blockages and dysfunction among the elected councils, creating numerous challenges for the subsequent stages of decentralization reforms in Tunisia – if continued at all given the current political crisis.

KEYWORDS:

• Tunisia
• decentralization
• drafting-process
• reform
• controversies
• actors

Acknowledgment

Research for this paper has been generously supported by a grant of the Volkswagen-Stiftung in the context of the research project “Struggles over Socioeconomic Reforms: Political Conflict and Social Contention in Egypt and Tunisia post-2011 interregional Comparison”, a cooperation of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, the Arab Forum for Alternatives and the University of Sfax. I like to address many thanks first to Erik Vollmann, Irene Weipert-Fenner, and Jonas Wolff for their very insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and second to the DOI link at Harvard Dataverse.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For this case study, it is important to note that international donors financially sustained the legal drafting process without influencing its content. For a comparative analysis of GIZ and World Bank engagement in Tunisia, see Bergh (2021b).

2. I abide by the literature that differentiates between political and administrative decentralization, whereas I synonymously use ‘de-concentration’ for the latter. For the sake of clarity, this study limits itself to these technical terms. For an overview, see Bergh (2021a).

3. For an in-depth analysis of the conflicts between bottom-up and top-down attempts to gain control over the local level – including tensions between local activists, al-Nahda supporters, established civil society organizations and former regime elites up until 2014 – see Volpi et al. (2016).

4. Despite the removal of some well-known powerful national bureaucrats, who occupied the highest positions in the administrative hierarchy, and their subordinates at the local level after 2011, their administrative officials and collaborators remained in office.

5. After the appointment of the new government headed by Najla Bouden Ramdan, local affairs were moved once more to the Ministry of Interior.

6. One of the criteria was a horizontal division of the territory to connect prosperous coastal areas and marginalized interior areas.

7. Interview, November 2020, Tunis.

8. This committee is not part of the official parliamentary rule of procedures.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Volkswagen Foundation [Grant Number 93325]