Civil society’s development in Tunisia’s democratization process, 2011-2021

ABSTRACT

In the years following the 2011 overthrow of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the international democracy promotion community enthusiastically embraced Tunisia’s burgeoning civil society. Ten years later, however, when the democratically-elected president Kais Saied began to dismantle the country’s democratic institutions, civil society largely stood on the side-lines. This paper examines what happened during the intervening decade that left civil society’s international funders so disappointed. The paper finds that three key changes over time help explain the gap between donor expectations and what civil society ultimately delivered: the development of an antagonistic and uncooperative relationship between civil society and the state; differences between Tunisian civil society activists and international donors on the types of issues they prioritized and other matters; and an overall lack of trust and lack of cohesion among civil society activists in working towards common goals – despite some successful coalition work around particular legislation – which came on full display after July 2021. This paper contributes to studies of Tunisian civil society’s development process in the context of its transition experience between 2011 and 2021, and of how and why donors continue to ‘miss the mark’ in their efforts to support civil society as a means of promoting democracy.

KEYWORDS:

• Tunisia
• civil society
• democratization
• transition
• democracy promotion

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. As theorized by de Tocqueville (1838)

2. An alternative view of civil society, sometimes called the Gramscian view, conceives it as a sphere in which the hegemonic ideas of the ruling class are reproduced.

3. For a review of the literature on whether democracy promotion has actually led to more democracy globally, see Snider (2022, pp. 10–11)

4. Warren (2011, p. 378), in his review of the relationship between civil society and democracy, describes how such democratic functions of civil society are not guaranteed and that many associations can even be harmful and cultivate ‘hatred, violence and sectarianism’.

5. Bilateral assistance from the United States is generally divided into two categories: economic and security. Programs with the objective of countering violent extremism can fall into either of these categories.

6. In summer 2013, a ‘quartet’ of CSOs successfully facilitated a national dialogue among political actors and was subsequently awarded a Nobel Prize.

7. Activists estimate that only 300–400 of these organizations are actually active.

8. In addition to governance issues – that is, a focus on free and fair elections, on holding elected officials accountable, etc. – the types of concerns covered by this plethora of associations include women’s issues, the environment, LGBTQIA+ rights, educational concerns, cultural concerns (e.g., arts, media), athletic activities and more (Tunisian Center for Information, 2022.

9. Fortier’s work in particular provides an excellent mapping of Tunisian civil society at the time.

10. Hawthorne (2004) had also noted that civil society in MENA tended to be highly fragmented.

11. Fortier (2019) does not use this term, but she discusses similar attitudes.

12. See works by Inglehart.

13. Interviewees included civil society activists mostly based in Tunis and working with NGOs focused on topics such as elections, youth engagement, education, and human rights, as well as representatives of the foreign donor community (European embassy staff and American and INGO staff). A small number of interviews were conducted outside Tunis with civil society activists working on cultural topics. I also interviewed one lawyer working closely with civil society organizations on legal issues.

14. At least one of these studies surveyed civil society activists specifically on their attitudes towards questions such as whether Islam and democracy are compatible (Martin, 2020).

15. The following discussion is based on research published in January 2023 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

16. For more detail see Chomiak and Parks (2017). Weilandt (2019, pp. 461–464) also gives a helpful overview of the state-civil society and intra-civil society dynamics in Tunisia before 2011.

17. See https://www.acm.gov.tn/upload/1410083987.pdf (last accessed 29 August 2023) for full text of DL 2011–88.

18. Prior to this government, an elected assembly took charge of drafting a new constitution and also formed an interim government.

19. Interview with head of Tunis-based NGO (Tunis; October 2022).

20. The government of Béji Caïd Essebsi took seat in early 2015. It was led by the Nidaa Tounis party which had close ties with many figures from the regimes of Ben Ali and even Bourguiba.

21. Interview with Tunis-based lawyer advising NGOs on legal issues (Tunis; October 2022). This interviewee noted that the phrase request for declaration is in fact illogical because under DL-88 organizations simply declare themselves.

22. Interview with Tunisian civil society activist (Washington, D.C.; October 2022).

23. Interview with Tunisian civil society activist (Tunis; October 2022).

24. For more detail, consult the recording of ‘NAPI-MEI Youth Roundtable on Local Governance in Tunisia’ (Middle East Institute, 2022).

25. Interview with head of Tunis-based NGO based (Tunis; October 2022).

26. Interview with director of American NGO based in Tunis (Tunis; October 2022).

27. Turmoil within organizations was particularly visible in the historic organizations, the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the Tunisian General Workers Union (UGTT). For example, certain members of the LTDH board of directors were reportedly shunned for trying to oppose Saied, although in fall 2022, the organization elected a new board of directors more critical of the president. One younger activist said that the UGTT’s initially ambiguous or mitigated reaction caused concern among those who were worried about civil society’s ability to curb any authoritarian drift, noting the sentiment that ‘if we lost the UGTT that would mean we lost the war’. (Interview with Tunisian activist working for INGO, Tunis; October 2022). Leaders of several prominent historic organizations – including the LTDH, FTDES, UGTT, The Tunisian Union of Commerce and Handicrafts (UTICA), the bar association, the National Union of Tunisian Journalists, the National Union of Tunisian Women, and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) – also met with Saied on July 26, 2021 and the president reportedly affirmed his ‘commitment to ensuring rights and freedoms and respect for the rule of law and democratic processes in the country’. The LTDH held its elections for board of directors in November 2022. See Kapitalis (2022); Nouira (2022).

28. Interview with director of American NGO based in Tunis (Tunis; October 2022).

29. Interviews with representatives of foreign donor community (Tunis/virtual; October/November 2022).

30. Interview with director of Tunis-based NGO based (Tunis; October 2022). Interviews with Washington, DC-based officials working on bilateral assistance programs in Tunisia similarly noted the challenge of managing the perception that the US was funding the interior ministry to conduct human rights abuses – even among other USG officials (Washington, DC; March/April 2023).

31. For more detail, see for example Zoubir and Ait-Hamadouche (2006).

32. Interview with director of Tunis-based NGO based (Tunis; October 2022). According to this interviewee, preventing violent extremism was never a priority for Tunisian CSOs.

33. Interviews with civil society activists based in Tunis (October 2022). U.S.-funded projects in particular, such as the American-funded Ma’an project, have been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to building the capacity of small community-based organizations so that they could sustain their operations after a project ended (e.g., by learning how to apply for new funding) (Interview with Tunisian civil society activists; Tunis, October 2022).

34. Interview with representative of foreign donor community (virtual, November 2022). Research by Alexander P. Martin (2015) finds that Tunisian CSOs ‘selectively’ borrow from Western donors in their learning and ‘have not understood foreign influence and funding as necessarily problematic, imposing upon them obligations or constraining their autonomy’. Importantly, Martin’s research was conducted prior to 2015, when the operating environment for CSOs began to contract, according to civil society observers. Future research should examine whether this shift in environment (potentially including reduced levels of available funding) affected the ability of CSOs to engage in what Martin calls ‘democratic learning’.

35. For more see: Jebnoun (2022).

36. Interviews with foreign donor representatives (Tunis/virtual; October/November 2022).

37. Phrasing adapted from interviews conducted with civil society activists (Tunis/Washington, DC; October/December 2022).

38. This incident was also conveyed to me by the director of an American NGO working in Tunis (October 2022).

39. Interviews with representatives of foreign donor community (Tunis/virtual; October/November 2022).

40. Interviews with representatives of foreign donor community (Tunis/virtual; October/November 2022).

41. Interview with Tunisian civil society activist (Tunis; October 2022).

42. Interview with Tunis-based civil society activists (October 2022). Other sources of generational divisions are also discussed in Weilandt (2019).

43. Interviews with Tunis-based civil society activists and representatives of foreign donor community (Tunis; October 2022).

44. Interview with Tunis-based civil society activist and INGO employee (October 2022).

45. Interview with representative of donor community (virtual; November 2022).

46. One representative of the foreign donor community (Tunis; October 2022) said that the ATFD, for example, remained silent in regard to Saied’s authoritarian measures because Ennahda had always been its enemy and Saied was attacking the party.

47. Martin’s survey results generally show a presence of attitudes of trust, equality, tolerance and pluralism, but with limits. For example, only 46 per cent of respondents indicated tolerance of organizations with a religious agenda, which ‘may indicate … a mistrust regarding the intentions of Islamist CSOs’ (84). His participant-observation and interview results show that ‘CSOs’ ability to collaborate and cooperate is shaped by the perception of whether another CSO has Islamist sympathies or not’ and that some organizations even exhibit mistrust internally (i.e., in some cases ‘CSO operations and projects have meant that in some cases Pluralism is overlooked … as leaders focus on the development of their organization and the efficiency and effectiveness of their work. This may occur at the expense of democratic practices, which can reduce the development of democratic culture’.) (145).

48. According to a Washington-based expert familiar with Tunisian civil society dynamics.

49. Interviews with representatives of foreign donor community (Tunis; October 2022).

50. Admittedly, many have grown concerned about the military preserving its traditional role under Saied. See Masmoudi (2021).

Additional information

Funding

The research was supported by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.