Understanding change in Egypt’s social contract since 2011

ABSTRACT

This paper applies the Loewe, et al. framework (2024) to the Egyptian case from 2011 to the present. It finds that this framework could be strengthened by further exploring the following drivers of change in social contracts: - balance of power within the state. In the Egyptian case, a longstanding informal contract between the Presidency and the military collapsed in 2011. The new contract between the Presidency and the military that emerged after 2013 altered the elite coalition that underlay the regime and led to change in the social contract; - structure of the labor market. The Sisi regime faced a labor market that was divided into core insiders, legacy insiders, and outsiders. It revised the social contract to direct substantial support to core insiders while reducing support to legacy insiders. Outsiders were left with even less state support. - new technologies of repression enabled the regime to monitor society more extensively, target repression more effectively, and shape the public sphere in a manner supportive of the new social contract; - international sponsors. The Gulf states and China provided financial and military assistance that buttressed the revised social contract.

KEYWORDS:

• Egypt
• social contract
• military
• social media
• China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. I am indebted to Lauren Dirvonas for excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to Annabelle Houdret and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft.

2. These figures are taken from the ILO database entitled, ‘Employment by sex and public/private sector (thousands) – Annual’. The database is accessible through the ‘data explorer’ feature at the following link: https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/

3. These figures are taken from the ILO database entitled, ‘Employment by sex and public/private sector (thousands) – Annual’. The database is accessible through the ‘data explorer’ feature at the following link: https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/

4. For further detail on the extent of repression under Al-Sisi, see (Amnesty International 2021a, 2021b; Human Rights Watch, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c).

5. Private sector firms without connections to the military have been unable to compete with military-linked firms, which enjoy a wide range of advantages ranging from subsidized inputs to an inside track on government contracts (Sayigh, 2019, pp. 107–236).

6. For further discussion of how a state can engineer a new social contract and impose it on society, see Sudermann and Zintl as well as al-Ashmar in this special issue.

7. According to DADRI’s research, the number of persons arrested, injured, or killed for political reasons increased steadily from 2014 to 2018, then stabilized from 2018 to 2021 (the last year for which data are available). www.daftarahwal.com

8. The percentage of respondents in Egypt stating that they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust in the government rose from 22 per cent in 2013 to 66 per cent in 2018. www.arabbarometer.org

9. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this explanation for the trajectory of change in Egypt’s social contract.

10. These figures are taken from the ILO databased entitled, ‘Informal Employment Rate by Sex (%) – Annual’. The database is accessible through the ‘data explorer’ feature at the following link: https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/

11. For further discussion of the impact of digital technologies on the state’s capacity to monitor society, see Zintl and Houdret in this special issue.

12. Law No. 175 of 2018, the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law.

13. While several Egyptian laws assert a citizen’s right to privacy, the armed forces and security agencies are exempt from control or oversight by the telecom regulatory authority and other agencies responsible for protecting privacy (Amnesty International, 2014; June 4; see also, Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression, 2020).

14. This capability effects almost every citizen in the country, as Egypt has one of the highest mobile phone penetration rates in the developing world. In 2017, mobile phone penetration reached 111 per cent, amounting to 101 million mobile subscriptions, as well as 32 million mobile internet subscriptions (Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 2017).

15. Citizen Lab attributed the attacks to Egypt’s security services (Scott-Railton et al., 2017).