https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6799-5319
![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This study investigates how the civic nationalism of the current millennial generation is perceived and expressed in contemporary Indonesia. We define civic nationalism as nationalism in which the foundations of citizenship are civic ties that ensure equality for people of different religions or ethnicities. Since the post-New Order period, religious nationalism promoted by vocal Islamist groups such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defence Front, FPI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) has contested Indonesian civic nationalism. Despite this challenge, we argue that Indonesian civic nationalism has been vibrantly reproduced, with the current millennial generation playing an active role, despite studies that frequently portray them as apolitical remaja (consumerist youth). We use NusantaRun and SabangMerauke as examples of youth communities that actively promote civic nationalist narratives. We also contend that their ideas on civic nationalism emphasise interfaith engagement in activities centred on consumer culture, self-development, and volunteerism, all of which fit into the broader neoliberal milieu of post-New Order Indonesia. These findings, deriving from our interviews and analyses of their social media discourse, will help to advance research on changing nationalist expressions across Indonesian generations.
ABSTRAK
Studi ini meneliti bagaimana nasionalisme kewarganegaraan generasi milenial saat ini dipersepsikan dan diekspresikan di Indonesia kontemporer. Kami mendefinisikan nasionalisme kewarganegaraan sebagai nasionalisme yang landasannya adalah ikatan kewarganegaraan yang meyakini kesetaraan bagi pemeluk agama atau etnis yang berbeda. Sejak periode pasca Orde Baru, nasionalisme keagamaan yang dipromosikan oleh kelompok Islamis vokal seperti Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) telah menyaingi nasionalisme kewarganegaraan Indonesia. Meskipun menghadapi tantangan semacam ini, kami berpendapat bahwa nasionalisme kewarganegaraan Indonesia telah direproduksi dengan kuat, di mana generasi milenial saat ini memainkan peran aktif, meskipun studi-studi sering menggambarkan mereka sebagai remaja yang apolitis (kaum muda konsumtif). Kami menggunakan NusantaRun dan SabangMerauke sebagai contoh komunitas kaum muda yang secara aktif mempromosikan narasi nasionalisme kewarganegaraan. Kami juga berpendapat bahwa gagasan mereka tentang nasionalisme kewarganegaraan menekankan keterlibatan lintas agama dalam kegiatan yang berpusat pada budaya konsumsi, pengembangan diri, dan kerelawanan yang semuanya sesuai dengan meluasnya suasana neoliberal pasca Orde Baru di Indonesia. Temuan-temuan ini, yang didapat dari wawancara dan analisis wacana media sosial, akan mendorong penelitian tentang pergeseran ekspresi nasionalisme antargenerasi di Indonesia.
Acknowledgements
This research was conducted as part of Bhirawa Anoraga’s PhD thesis at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (UNSW) Canberra. The research was carried out in compliance with Human Research Ethics UNSW Canberra for project no. HC17242. We are grateful for the generous financial support of the funders: LPDP of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia and the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW Canberra. We also would like to extend our gratitude to Jurian Andika with his Sahabat NusantaRun and Ayu Kartika Dewi with her Teman Seperjuangan in SabangMerauke and MilenialIslami. This research would not be possible without their exceptional support. We are also indebted to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback that contributed greatly to improving our manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 In general, the millennial generation refers to those born between 1982 and 2004 (Strauss and Howe Citation1991), though in the context of Indonesia, this term is frequently used loosely to refer to people under the age of 40.
2 We use ‘civic’ rather than ‘civil’ because it is the term most commonly used by scholars to describe a nationalism that promotes equality and ethno-religious pluralism (see Almond and Verba Citation1963; Eddyono Citation2020 in the Indonesian case, and Kreuzer Citation2006 in the Malaysian case). ‘Civic’ also refers to a sense of consensus, which describes Pancasila-based nationalism in Indonesia, whereas ‘civil’ emphasises the intrinsic value of civility (see Brown Citation2019). Pancasila is generally supportive of equality and religious pluralism, but as a consensus of the founding fathers of Indonesia in 1945, its implementation has limitations, as discussed below.
3 The implementation of civic nationalism through Pancasila has limitations from being mainly rooted in its ambiguity in enforcing certain religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism; later in 2000, Confucianism was added as the sixth religion). While claiming to be religious freedom, Jeremy Menchik (Citation2016) has described it as ‘Godly nationalism’. Therefore, while Indonesian citizens have a relatively free choice among the six official religions, other religions or beliefs held by some citizens are not fully recognised. Regardless of this limitation, we agree with Hefner (Citation2020) that Pancasila's inspired nationalism is meant to promote the idea of equality and religious pluralism.
4 We follow Bayat (Citation2013a: 7) in defining Islamism as those who ‘ … in general deploy a religious language and conceptual frame, favour conservative social mores and an exclusive social order, espouse a patriarchal disposition, and adopt broadly intolerant attitudes towards different ideas and lifestyles’. Their main goal is to ‘ … establish some kind of an “Islamic order”– a religious state, shari‘a law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities’ (ibid.: 4). This definition resonates with religious nationalism where citizenship is defined by people’s adherence to a certain religion (Formichi Citation2010).
5 An exception is the recent study on Indonesian Catholic youth by Nilan and Wibowanto (Citation2021).
6 As of November 2022, the Instagram followers of NusantaRun <https://www.instagram.com/nusanta.run/> and SabangMerauke <https://www.instagram.com/sabangmerauke/> were about 12,800 and 32,500 respectively.
7 However, the issue of Javanisation has also posed another limitation of civic nationalism in Indonesia where non-Javanese traditions often are seen as backward and not modern despite its acknowledgement of Indonesia’s diverse culture and religions (Gietzelt Citation1989). In this regard, we agree with Kymlicka (Citation2001) that there is a cultural component in civic nationalism.
8 Nurcholish Madjid was initially a member of the Muslim Students’ Association (HMI), a youth organisation ideologically close to Masyumi, an Islamist party banned by Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia. After gaining a PhD under the supervision of Fazlul Rachman, a neo-modernist Muslim from Pakistan, Madjid brought Rachman’s liberal ideas on Islam to Indonesia, rejected the idea of establishing an Islamic state and promoted an ‘inclusive Islamic theology’ that views all religions, despite having distinctive characteristics, as aiming to similar salvation (Barton Citation1997).
9 Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) was the grandson of Hasyim Asy’ari, Nahdlatul Ulama’s (NU) founder. NU is the largest Muslim mass organisation in Indonesia. Despite his traditionalist background, he had been well equipped with western knowledge during his studies on social theory and European philosophy in Baghdad from 1964 to 1970 (Barton Citation2002). When he returned to Indonesia, Wahid popularised his ideas on religious pluralism in NU which he led from 1984 to 1999. He was later elected as the fourth president of Indonesia (1999–2001).
10 Despite Baswedan’s support towards civic nationalism and interfaith engagement through Indonesia Mengajar, his candidacy in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election against a Chinese Christian candidate, Basuki Tjahja Purnama (Ahok) was coloured by the exploitation of religious identity to defeat Ahok who was the incumbent candidate (Mudhoffir Citation2020).
11 Interview with Jurian, Jakarta, 28 July 2017.
12 Jurian participated in a short Indonesia Mengajar programme where he shared his working experiences to inspire less fortunate students who lived on the outskirts of Jakarta.
13 Interview with Jurian, Jakarta, 31 July 2019.
14 Since 2013, the running events have taken place in Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Cirebon, Purwokerto, Dieng, Gunungkidul, Ponorogo, Blitar, and Bromo. The organisers plan a run to a new city each year with the aim of covering all the large cities in Indonesia.
15 The Youth Pledge in 1928 was supported by youth organisations to uphold one motherland, Indonesia, one nation, Indonesia, with one language, Indonesian. While Islamist youth wings also participated in the congress, they did not endorse the Youth Pledge that acknowledges Indonesia’s unity in diversity given their adherence to religious nationalism (Suryadinata Citation1978).
16 Interview with Ayu, Jakarta, 25 July 2017.
17 The slogan was also popularised through an Indonesian national song which is often sung during the Monday flag ceremony in Indonesian schools.
18 A marginal group that has not been addressed by NusantaRun and SabangMerauke is Indonesia’s LGBT community which has remained taboo in Indonesia given the rising conservative milieu. Only a few progressive Muslim groups, like Abdurrahman Wahid’s Gusdurian Network, have supported the community (Rodriguez Citation2022: 96).
19 Not his real name.
20 Pers. comm. with Rafigamaru, 18 July 2020, authors’ translation.
21 These two organisations are renowned for their promotion of moderate and progressive Islam.
22 Pers. comm. with Dhanny, 20 July 2020, authors’ translation.
23 Pers. comm. with Queenne, 24 July 2020, authors’ translation.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Bhirawa Anoraga
Bhirawa Anoraga is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII). His research focuses on youth, new media, Islamic philanthropy and interfaith engagement in Indonesia. Email: [email protected]
Minako Sakai
Minako Sakai is Deputy Head of School (Research) and Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. She has published widely on Islam, development policies and gender equality with a focus on Indonesia. Email: [email protected]