On ethical principles for social research

Abstract

In some quarters today there are arguments to the effect that research ethics codes should be formulated in terms of principles, rather than specific prescriptions and proscriptions. This derives in part from what is probably the most influential approach to bioethics: principlism. What is provided here is an exploration of the nature of ethical principles as these relate to social research, and of the debates around them. It is argued that principles are useful, so long as they are treated as reminders of what ought to be taken into account, rather than as premises from which specific ethical judgments can be derived. At the same time, it is concluded that any move towards formulating codes in terms of principles is likely to make little difference in practice for researchers under the present regime of ethical regulation.

Keywords:

• research ethics
• principalism
• situationism
• casuistry
• ethical regulation

Notes

1. This process is sometimes referred to as ‘ethical review,’ but this term is a euphemism.

2. This is one of three ethics codes produced by BPS, two general ones and one relating to online research. A similar approach underpins current efforts by the Academy of Social Sciences to produce ‘generic ethics principles’ for social science: see http://acss.org.uk/developing-generic-ethics-principles-social-science/ (retrieved April 23, 2014).

3. Interestingly, this seems to be at odds with what Jonsen and Toulmin (1988, p. 18) claim about discussions within the Belmont Commission: they suggest that there was more agreement about what is and is not acceptable in particular cases than there was about how to reach such judgments.

4. For an interesting historical sketch of the emergence of an emphasis on ethical principles in bioethics, see Jonsen (1994).

5. However, Capron (2005) suggests that the Report’s and the Commission’s influence on the subsequent legislation was less direct and straightforward than is often assumed.

6. It is worth noting that, from the beginning, the emergence of ethical regulation of social research stimulated criticism from social scientists (see Wax & Cassell, 1979).

7. Explicating the nature of value, and distinguishing amongst various types of value, has been central to the discipline of axiology (Findlay, 1970; Frondizi, 1971).

8. It is worth noting that Beauchamp seems to treat the terms ‘principles’ and ‘norms’ as synonyms.

9. Similarly, Dworkin (1978) argues that all other ethical principles derive from the principle that each person is entitled to equal concern and respect.

10. Consistency relates to what Steiner (1994, pp. 2–3), following Leibniz, calls the compossibility test: how far is adherence to each of the principles compatible with adherence to all of the others, or do they generate conflicting requirements for action? Steiner writes: ‘any justice principle that delivers a set of rights yielding contradictory judgments about the permissibility of a particular action either is unrealizable or (what comes to the same thing) must be modified to be realizable’ (p. 3).

11. There is some uncertainty and debate about exactly what this term means, about what the process can deliver, and about its relation to other forms of reasoning, such as subsuming a case under a rule or ‘balancing’ the implications of one rule against those of another (see Richardson, 2000). The key point is that, whatever means are employed, the assumption is that reasoning moves from abstract principles, whose validity is treated as largely given, down to specific judgments; and that it frequently seems to be assumed in practice that this reasoning process will lead to a single, consensual conclusion – even though this assumption is often denied. For a somewhat similar notion of specification, this time in relation to rights, see Shafer-Landau (1995).

12. For illustrations of other dimensions of potential disagreement, see DuBose, Hamel, and O’Connell (1994): Part 2. See also Hanson (2009).

13. See Evans (2005) for the argument that general processes of rationalization are involved. In equally general terms, what we have here is a classic dilemma built into the exercise of control over activities that have a high level of complexity and indeterminacy. This often results in oscillation between attempts at micro-management and the assignment of autonomy, and therefore responsibility, to those on the ground.

14. Interestingly, as with Beauchamp and principlism, their work also came out of their involvement with the Belmont Commission.

15. Levi (1949, p. 2 and passim) argues that legal reasoning involves making judgments about particular cases, not the application of rules, but that throughout the process there is a concern with the general rules that seem to be implied.

16. For a discussion of research ethics drawing on this position, see Leder (1994). See also the phenomenological approach to ethics outlined by Zaner (1994).

17. This is the focus of what has come to be called virtue ethics (see e.g. Crisp & Slote, 1997).

18. See Kymlicka (2002). Interestingly, while Root (1993) notes this parallel, he sees it as grounds for challenging conceptions of research adopting this model.

19. However, inevitably, the constraints they imply will rule out some goals, as we saw in the disagreement between Beauchamp and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

20. By contrast, Nietzsche criticizes these ideas as constituting a ‘slave morality’ deriving from Christianity, one that works against the pursuit of noble excellence by elite individuals. See Leiter (2001).