Rents, Rights N'Rhythm: Cooperation, Conflict and Capabilities in the Music Industry1

1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the United Nations where two of the authors work.

Abstract

The need for better informed copyright policy and management is a huge problem because of the enormous and growing size and scope of the creative industries. In this paper we challenge the prevailing thinking dominating the theoretical literature on the economics of copyrights. By integrating the very real effect of cooperation (strategic interaction and creative interdependence) and conflict (asymmetric relationships in terms of interests, financial dominance, power and capabilities) throughout the economic system in generating value and appropriating rent from music copyrights, we argue how prevailing theory on copyright can be improved by integrating it into a framework of New Institutional Economics. Focus is on the interplay between (i) the “institutional environment” (or “rules of the game”) with respect to the regulation of copyrights underpinned by the economic rationales; and (ii) the “institutions of governance” (or the “play of the game”) with respect to the specific institutional mechanisms in organizing the creation and distribution of value and revenue from music copyrights, and with respect to royalty management.

1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the United Nations where two of the authors work.

Keywords:

• Music industry
• copyrights
• revenue and rent
• cooperation and conflict
• New Institutional Economics

Notes

1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the United Nations where two of the authors work.