The Ethics of Extension: Philosophical Speculation on Nonhuman Animals

Abstract

In contrast to rigid conceptions of nonhuman animals, several philosophers have put forth ideas that suggest a more flexible and extended vision of other animals. In articulating the condition of humans in the world, philosophers have referenced ideas that necessarily bring other beings in common with humanity. Significantly, conceptions of movement and biological transformation have played a central role in these ruminations, thereby suggesting the importance of geographical variables in human/nonhuman relations. By drawing out the connections between these perspectives, this paper outlines an ethics of extension.

Acknowledgements

Origami art created by Robert Lang. Images are reproduced courtesy of Robert Lang (www.langorigami.com). The author gratefully appreciates his participation.

Notes

Notes

1 The matter of movement complicates issues when it is cast directly in terms of ethics. As Aristotle (2001) noted in his book De Anima, from the earliest days of Western civilization, the soul was equated with movement. For Aristotle (2001, p. 59), movement took four forms: growing, wasting away, alteration, and change of place. The latter is emphasized here, because it bears upon geographical relations. Aristotle's conjecture is significant, moreover, because it affirms the belief that the soul is the form of the body (Frede, 1992). Yet, whereas Aristotle believed that this movement was directed toward a finality or completion (i.e. realizing itself), Deleuze contends this movement is open-ended and never reaches a final destination.

2 Several philosophers have outlined the perceived importance of organs in defining the essence of nonhumans—notably Aristotle, Heidegger, and Descartes. This tendency is of significance, for this perspective has been utilized to devalue the flexible connection nonhumans have with the external environment. Indeed, this perspective has deep roots. As Heidegger (1995, p. 213) notes, the word ‘organ’ derives from the Greek word for instrument, leading him to say that the ‘organ is a Werkzeug, a working instrument’. Thus, even at an early stage, functionalistic and mechanistic perceptions of the material body were in place. This viewpoint culminated in Descartes dualistic philosophy, in which the precision of the nonhuman body was seen as a sign of its own limitations. As such, the focus on organs defined the essence of the organism. In recent years, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have attempted to re-envision the relation between the organism and its organs. Accordingly, Descartes’ ordered description of the ‘disposition of the organs’ can be contrasted with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a Body without Organs (see below).

3 In reference to nonhumans, the term ‘identity’ is intentionally ambiguous. While the social sciences generally use the term in relation to consciousness, it may or may not imply the same characteristic in the current context. Because the question of nonhuman consciousness is still a subject of debate, identity offers a middle ground as it can refer to consciousness and/or the physical characteristics of an organism. The term is thus commensurate with the state of current thought. Identity is preferable to ontology, because the latter tends to speak of things rather than subjects who are active participants in their own construction.

4 As Benton (1988) notes, Marx also suggested that animals do not progress. For Marx, this signaled one of the primary distinctions between humans and nonhumans. This perspective may thus, in some respects, reflect the dramatic changes taking place during the nineteenth century, most particularly the emergence of modernism (and for Marx the progression toward communism).

5 The similarity between humans and nonhumans is confounding in Bataille's writings. While certain commonalities clearly exist (particularly those of a physical or libidinal nature), other traits express differences (particularly with regard to conceptions of the self). As such, Bataille acknowledges that animals have a feeling of self, but do not possess a consciousness of self. How this difference emerged is not explained. In either case, such representations implicitly reaffirm many traditional notions about the essence of humans and nonhumans. The overview presented herein attempts to work with the commonalities without rectifying many of the problems associated with these distinctions.

6 In many respects, the propulsive character of Bataille's communication resolves the conundrum regarding sociality and communication. As Reed (1988, p. 119) notes in regard to both, ‘The question naturally arises as to how communication could precede sociality—why should two or more animals’ subjective interpretations of reality have enough in common for communication to begin?’ Conversely, it may be asked how sociality could emerge prior to forms of communication that bind individuals together. Bataille's comments resolve this problem by suggesting that sociality (whether verbal or postural) is a by-product of a necessarily outward orientation. This sociality, which implies a spatiality, would seem to apply to nonhumans as well as humans.

7 Somewhat differently, Heidegger (2000) noted that one component of ‘being’ was to be seen.

8 The major exception to this distinction would occur when the act of killing is specifically directed against the process of becoming in its geographical and morphological manifestations.