The ‘politics of speed’ and language integration policies: on recent developments in Austria

ABSTRACT

Taking the hasty implementation of ‘German support classes’ in Austria in 2018 as a starting point, I will lay out recent political developments in Austria similarly marked by speed, i.e. I will focus on language integration policies in more detail, which form a central concern for studies on bilingualism and bilingual education with regard to compulsory language learning in the context of migration policies. In order to understand the role of speed in this contemporary development (i.e. introduction and revision) of language integration policies, I will introduce speed as a theoretical concept, before turning back to what I will call the Austrian case of politics of speed, which goes hand in hand with executive decreeing and a disregard of parliamentary democracy. As I argue in the concluding discussion, this has serious effects on institutions and the population, in the form of institutional lag and systemic confusion. It is my aim to tease out how this politics of speed results in a culture of confusion that, in the end, could serve a political purpose.

KEYWORDS:

• Speed
• language integration policies
• accelerated law-making
• language testing
• assimilationist monolingualism
• Austria

The control of time is thoroughly enmeshed with the dynamics of power. (Wajcman and Dodd 2017, 3)

1. Introduction

In 2018, the Austrian ministry of education hastily introduced ‘German support classes’ (Deutschförderklassen) for primary and secondary schools. In theory, these classes are meant to promote equal opportunities and better in class-integration.¹ In practice, however, they replace existing supportive measures for bilingual children who are assessed with regards to their German competences with a standardized test before entering school. What is more, if they fail (i.e. in specific features of grammar or lexis), they are separated from their peers, put in either full time German classes or in parallel course structures. Every six months, these children are reassessed with highly regulated testing to decide whether they are to switch back to their regular classes.²

Since their introduction in the school year 2018/2019, resistance to these classes has been considerable, leading to a series of civic actions and petitions.³ In some schools, teachers simply refuse to implement them and have found counter-strategies to the official policy.⁴ Widely considered a segregationist and discriminatory measure, it is further criticized for addressing the potential gap in school success for so-called ‘migrant’ children mainly by pointing to a lack of German competences – rather than reconsidering the existing school structure and its ‘monolingual habitus’ (Gogolin 1994), as has been urged by researchers in German-speaking countries for decades now (Plutzar and Kerschhofer-Puhalo 2009; Terkessidis 2010; Erkurt 2020). Symptomatically, insights from second language acquisition and bilingual education have been ignored that highlight input from peer interactions (i.e. with speakers of the target language) as central – just as researchers, experts, and teachers have never been consulted in the preparation process nor upon implementation. In sum, any criticism and protests have gone unheard or their content rejected: Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and education minister Heinz Faßmann have insisted on maintaining this measure, also in the new government coalition in force since January 2020.⁵ Thus, it can be said that (once again) the bilingualism of migrant children is marked as deficient (i.e. only as lacking German) and assimilationist monolingualism as the only path thinkable, i.e. the language assimilation of speakers of other languages. So far, so familiar … yet, what is striking, is the speedy introduction of this particular language political and educational measure. The impending enforcement of the German support classes was only announced in the spring term of 2018 – in other words, to be implemented after the summer holidays, as of the new school year. Needless to say, this short-term announcement blindsided teachers, activists, and parents, overwhelmed school administrations, and prohibited concerted (counter-)strategies. Considering this, I argue that the speed of this implementation is not random but rather part and parcel of a development on a larger scale: Speed comes thus to stand as both an index of how policies on migration and integration are increasingly (hastily) tightened as well as a tool for ‘governmental precarization’ (Lorey 2017), which functions to destabilize actors, their infrastructure and agency. After all, the speed with which new policies are implemented and/or changed has led to a general confusion about the validity of specific policies on the part of migrants/refugees as well as of language schools, integration institutions, NGOs etc. that are supposed to implement the new policies or to consult the target groups accordingly (Netzwerk SprachenRechte 2018).

Trying to get behind the logics of this development, I will in the following lay out recent political developments of language integration policies in Austria similarly marked by speed (Section 2), as they form a central concern for studies on bilingualism and bilingual education, especially with regard to compulsory language learning in the context of migration policies (e.g. de Cillia 2020), i.e. the obligation to demand certain language competences for the purpose of entry, residence and citizenship (e.g. Yeung and Flubacher 2016). In order to understand the role of speed in this contemporary development (i.e. introduction and revision) of language integration policies, I will introduce speed as a theoretical concept (Section 3), before turning back to what I will call the Austrian case of politics of speed (Section 4), which goes hand in hand with executive decreeing and a disregard of parliamentary democracy. As I argue in the concluding discussion, this has serious effects on institutions and the population, in the form of institutional lag and systemic confusion (Section 5). It is my aim to tease out how this politics of speed results in a culture of confusion that, in the end, could serve a political purpose.

It is neither the intention to claim that this is an entirely new phenomenon nor to say that it is restricted to the here and now. Rather, contemporary Austria shall serve as a suitable example of these tendencies that nonetheless appear to be happening across and beyond Europe, at a time when democratic processes and search for consensus are increasingly questioned and challenged by ‘alternative facts’ proposed by extremist groups. As such, this contribution shall be considered an exemplary study that attempts to address the political economic conditions under which language integration policies became accelerated, as well as the effects of this acceleration on organizations and individuals. On a side note, it is not my aim to decry speed as such, but rather to zoom into specific areas in which speed has proven detrimental: liberal democracies in general, and – taking the example of Austria – language integration policies for speakers of other languages than German, in particular (most importantly, migrants and refugees). This focus is clearly highly selective, but it is exactly in this area and with a temporal perspective that the potentially dire consequences of politics of speed become tangible – and become of direct relevance for researchers of bilingualism and bilingual education.

2. Language integration policies in Austria: a story of accelerated law-making

In the framework of studies on bi- and multilingualism, language policies, and education, many critical texts have been published – mainly in German – on the assimilative monolingualism trend in Austrian politics (Busch 2017; de Cillia 2011; Plutzar and Kerschhofer-Puhalo 2009), its hegemonic discourses on ‘language through integration’ (Dorostkar 2014; Plutzar 2010, 2013) and on the German language as constitutive of the ‘nation’ (de Cillia et al. 2020; Dirim and Mecheril 2017). As in so many European nation states (cf. Pochon-Berger and Lenz 2014; Wodak 2012), in Austria these policies have led to a dismissal of bilingual education and bilingualism other than prestigious European languages (most importantly, English and French) and to the enforcement of learning the ‘official’ language (i.e. German) for speakers of other languages, first and foremost migrants and refugees from outside the European Union (EU) (Yeung and Flubacher 2016).

It is rather dazing to attempt an overview of the recent development of language integration policies in Austria, considering its many amendments. For instance, in an article written almost a decade ago, Plutzar (2013) assesses that the former Foreigners’ Act (Fremdengesetz) – on 1 January 2006 renamed the Settlement and Residence Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz)⁶ – had been revised as often as no other federal act in the decade before. She writes that the incessant amendments had rendered the Foreigners’ Act complicated to such a degree that even public authorities were struggling to understand it in its entirety or to interpret it consistently (Plutzar 2013, 48).

Many amendments of the act from the late 1990s onwards were related to what has come to be considered ‘integration policies’ in most Western European countries. Soon enough – again, as in most Western European countries – ‘language’ was added to the programmatic integration regulations, i.e. the acquisition of German, the official language in Austria. In 2003, ‘Integration Agreements’ (i.e. legally binding stipulations for non-EU-migrants) were decreed, which had the aim to ‘promote’ (or rather: demand?) competences in the official language amongst migrants (Plutzar 2013, 51). While other European nation states had formulated similar aims for the ‘integration’ of their migrant population (Pochon-Berger and Lenz 2014; Flubacher 2016), Austria was the first to ask for the CEFR⁷ A1-level of German in a legally binding manner. In other words, if migrants were not to comply with this stipulation, their expulsion from Austria could be enforced as the ultimate negative sanction (Rheindorf 2017). In less than two years, in 2005, the Integration Agreement was incorporated into the new Settlement and Residence Act as mandatory with the following implications: Compliance with the agreement as necessary not only for naturalization but also for each and every newcomer, in particular with proof of German competences at A2-level within five years. In 2011, yet another reform introduced further increasing demands of third country citizens in language competences: even in the framework of family reunification purposes, A1 is now asked for entry visas (i.e. even before entering Austria); A2 is to be acquired within two years for residence permits; B1 has become the threshold level for permanent residence and naturalization and to be attested within five years (exempted are, as elsewhere in Europe, highly qualified ‘key employees’).

The exemplarily accelerated amendments of the Integration Agreement as well as its demands can be taken as an indicator of how this legislative field has developed since then (de Cillia 2020, 86–87 for the following key points): Paradigmatically, in 2017 a separate law dedicated to ‘integration’ came into force (Integration Act⁸), bringing out two major changes. First, German and ‘orientation’ courses became mandatory for refugees with the right to asylum or subsidiary protection; second, ‘value and orientation courses’ were incorporated into the curricula of A1–B1 language courses – this newly combined testing of ‘values’ alongside language was a first internationally but soon to be copied across Europe. Already two years later, in 2019, this Integration Act was amended, and complemented by a new Welfare Act, in which German B1-competences became the requirement for accessing welfare for anyone,⁹ only to be overturned at a later point by the tribunal as unconstitutional.

This constitutional invalidity points to another issue of accelerated law-making, in that it is often ‘rushed and the resulting laws are poorly crafted’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 23), which is arguably due to the fact that ‘temporally overwhelmed parliaments increasingly hand over substantial decision-making authority to the executive and administration’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 23). This tendency is indeed noticeable in Austria, and heavily criticized by civil society, media, and politicians of the opposition. Even Reinhold Mitterlehner, former head of the ruling conservative party ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei [Austrian People’s Party]), took criticism with this and openly stated in a 2019 press conference that ‘[w]e are on a problematic path from a liberal to an authoritarian democracy’.¹⁰ According to this online article, Mitterlehner is quoted as saying that ‘[t]he government was not only populist because it paints foreigners as enemies […] but also because of its disrespect for the independence of the judiciary, for the media and for parliamentary democracy’.

In short, the acceleration of language integration policies is emblematic of accelerated law-making that tends to eschew democratic parliamentary deliberation for the sake of executive orders. It has resulted in accelerated and heightened demands of migrants and refugees in terms of language learning. From the perspective of sociolinguistics, this shows how assimilationist monolingualism is enforced. Language learning becomes once again a site for the exertion of political control (e.g. Khan 2016; Pochon-Berger and Lenz 2014) – as has been documented in critical sociolinguistic research on other contexts (cf. this issue: Del Percio; Lising) –, and policies of linguistic assimilation have led to a blatant disregard, suspicion even, of lived bi- or multilingualism. In other words, in today’s political climate in Austria (as in most other European nation states), bilingual education has become a matter for elites, while the languages spoken by ‘migrants’ and refugees are not welcome in the public sphere and subjected to policies of assimilationist monolingualism. In this vein, language competences have been considered a requirement even for the granting of social security or social housing, while the time span for complying with such demands has been reduced (de Cillia 2020): Language competences become seemingly quantifiable in this process, both temporally, in terms of hours accorded to their acquisition, as well as qualitatively, i.e. regarding the level of competences. And since this temporality, i.e. speed, appears to be an inherent phenomenon in the domain of language integration policies, the following section will delve into a theoretical discussion of speed.

3. Speed, critically unpacked

In their introduction to the 2009 edited volume High-Speed Society, Rosa & Scheuerman critically unpack ‘speed’ and its adoption in (critical) social theory (cf. also Wajcman and Dodd 2017). Offering a collection of (male) Northern scholarly thought on speed and acceleration across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in their edited volume, they establish that ‘[i]n debates about contemporary society, it is now something of a commonplace that core social and economic processes are undergoing a dramatic acceleration, while general rates of social change are intensifying no less significantly’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 2). And, indeed, ‘speed’, as it appears, can be considered as one of the keywords of modernity, in close semantic proximity to ‘acceleration’, ‘change’, ‘innovation’, etc. (i.e. affecting economic cycles of production and work conditions, technological developments, cultural production and consumption, and relationships and lifestyles).

Yet, as literature will, ‘speed’ (or acceleration; often used synonymously, cf. Barnawi, this issue) is hardly theorized as much as it is used for diagnostic purposes of current times (cf. Crang 2010; Hassan 2009, 6; Rosa and Scheuerman 2009; Wajcman and Dodd 2017). Maybe this is why ‘speed’ has come to be seen as an unchallenged descriptor of current times with regard to economy, society and politics, and as a key attribute of modernity (Scheuerman 2006), while it ‘has been largely ignored by social and political analysis’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 3; my emphasis). But what does this imply? For instance, emphasizing its potential particularly for critical analyses of power and inequality, Hassan (2009; drawing on Scheuerman 2006) proposes a ‘temporal perspective’ and a ‘temporalized’ understanding of the political economy – in particular of the liberal democracy. In more detail, he proposes speed as an analytical lens to focus on time involved in specific processes or phenomena (rather than a diachronic analysis or historiography per se, as the word ‘temporal’ might also suggest). He argues that this allows considering the very conditions under which an accelerated global(ised) neoliberal re-ordering of the economy, society, and politics has been possible, which, in turn, has had specific effects on traditional liberal democracies in the North (cf. Hassan 2009, 8). In other words, we need to turn to speed as a function in itself rather than see it just as a co-occurrence. To this aim, not only the conditions of possibility for certain accelerated phenomena or processes are analytically relevant but very much also the effects of speed across the social structure, which are indelibly related to its temporality. Such a perspective further serves to address different scales, namely in that ‘temporal structures provide a special point of access to the necessary connection between systemic macro- and individual micro-level perspectives on social experience’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 15) – and different forms of temporality at different scales (cf. Del Percio, this issue). The focus of this paper is thus on politics of speed that serves to understand the example of language integration politics, thus limiting the scope of speed to stand for accelerated law-making. It complements other contributions in this special issue that address issues of speed in the context of language learning (Buzos, this issue), English language teaching (Barnawi, this issue), migrant language courses for employment (Del Percio, this issue), or expectations of migrant workers’ language assimilation (Lising, this issue).

In terms of its effects on politics, speed is ambivalently – or contrarily – discussed: ‘[S]ome writers embrace the political repercussions of speed, whereas others believe that it poses a fundamental threat to democracy’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 11–12). Following the second (more critical) stance – and explaining what this threat consists of in detail below –, this paper agrees with articulated concerns about the detrimental effects of speed in politics as observed in liberal democracies (Hassan 2009; Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 23). Hassan (2009, 6), for one, assesses the following: ‘The result, in very simplistic terms, is that liberal democracy does not now work, indeed cannot work in a neoliberal context that valorizes speed in the search for profit, and raises efficient and productive profit-seeking to be the central criterion of what it is to be human’. In this diagnosis, democratic principles are sidelined in favour of profit. Yet, clearly, there are caveats: First of all, it is an empirical question whether ‘slower’ law-making processes have never been also determined by profit-seeking, with the clearly exploitative and profit-driven agenda of colonial capitalism being the modus operandi for centuries (Harvey 2003). In other words, we need to be careful not to over-interpret profit-orientation as a purely neoliberal reason for the acceleration of law-making. Secondly, a broader and more detailed historical overview would help assess whether the politics of speed is only now emerging in democracies. Thirdly, liberal democracies always worked with exclusionary mechanisms reserved for specific groups.

In any case, what appears to be illuminating is the focus on the socio-political reasons and effects of such acceleration(s) in policy-making, as ‘judicial and legislative virtues will be neglected in favor of an impatient and oftentimes obstinate preference for resolute action or getting things done’ (Scheuerman 2009, 301; emphasis in original). Thus, in what are perceived as times of need and urgency, rather than relying on the lengthy and time-consuming democratic process of legislation, the people ‘may instead prefer an actor – typically the executive – who promises quick and decisive action’ (Scheuerman 2009, 298). This approach¹¹ can be considered populist and has been adopted in several (nation) states at the moment of writing, particularly eminent in laws being passed dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic but also beforehand in executive orders and decrees signed by Donald Trump, former President of the United States of America, or by Rodrigo Duerte, President of the Philippines, to name two prominent examples. While such decrees have proved to be very effective in the creation of popular and media attention, they have often turned out to be unconstitutional (e.g. Trumps infamous Executive Order ‘Muslim Ban’, signed in January 2017¹²) and leading to interventions by civil society, organizations, courts, etc. Similarly, in Austria the constitutional tribunal recently countered several orders that had clashed with the constitution, e.g. reforms of welfare and security that allocated different rights and resources to migrants in stipulating specific language competences (cf. above).¹³

Weaving together the different interpretations of speed in politics, we can draw the following intermittent conclusions: On the one hand, Rosa and Scheuerman (2009) and Hassan (2009) interpret accelerated law-making (or, as I would put it: politics of speed) as a sign of the dismantling of liberal democracies in its disregard of parliament and legislative. On the other, the rushed legislation on the integration of migrants in Austria (and, since 2015 refugees more particularly), ties in with the ongoing rise of right-wing populism across Europe, which employs an anti-migrant rhetoric that constructs images of fear and asks for nationalist assimilation, most commonly on the grounds of language competences (Wodak 2015).

4. On the Austrian politics of speed

A temporal perspective of the developments in integration language policies shed light on the populist tendencies of accelerated law-making in the sections above. Yet, there seem to be two more elements to consider for my argument that speed is neither coincidental nor without its function: (1) the political climate in which the Austrian politics of speed were implemented, and (2) the resulting transformation of the institutional landscape, with a specific focus on language testing. I will attempt to state my case in both regards in the following two subsections.

4.1. The political climate: new coalitions

In 2017, the conservative ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) won the general national election. Its head, Sebastian Kurz, was elected chancellor and formed a coalition with the far-right FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [Freedom Party of Austria]), making the party’s leader H.C. Strache vice-chancellor. Considering the populist transformation of much of Europe and the increasing acceptance of far-right discourse on immigration, this coalition-building was less of a shock to many, rather than a (albeit negative) confirmation of the direction of Austrian politics, i.e a shift to the political right.¹⁴ Shortly before, Kurz had ousted Mitterlehner as the head of the party in a party internal coup earlier in 2017. This shift in power had resulted in a rebranding of the party, which focused on Kurz and presented him and his close allies as a new generation of ambitious politicians: young (with the chancellor as the world’s youngest head of state at 31 years), dynamic, and getting things done. Also visually, the new orientation of the party was unmistakably semiotically signified: turquoise (türkis) replaced the traditional black as the official party colour.

This coalition with the FPÖ lasted only for 1.5 years. In May 2019, a video was released in which H.C. Strache and his ‘side-kick’ Johann Gudenus, fellow party member, were recorded making compromising promises of public-sector orders and the such to a decoy acting as the niece of a Russian oligarch in a villa on Ibiza. The scandal toppled the government and led to all FPÖ-ministers resigning from their posts. Kurz himself was thereafter presented with a vote of no confidence from the parliament and had to dissolve the government. Until new elections could take place at the end of 2019, an ad interim government was put in place.

As short-lived as this first coalition under Kurz was, as ‘efficient’ were its ministers. They incessantly decreed stricter laws over a short period of time for migrants and refugees, tightening conditions for NPOs and NGOs, defunding institutions and centres for women, LGBTQIA+, migrants, people with disabilities, etc. As a result, initiatives that had taken years to grow and function were basically dismantled overnight. In schools, formerly abandoned measures (such as numerical grades in elementary schools) were reinstated in spite of expression of criticism by experts, a headscarf ban for pupils was newly introduced as well as the German support classes mentioned in the introduction.

To conclude this description, it is worth pointing out a statement by Herbert Kickl, FPÖ Minister of Internal Affairs (2017–2019), known for his far-right rhetoric and responsible for the tightening laws for migrants and refugees. Reminiscent of the populist undercurrent of accelerated law-making, he was emblematically quoted as saying that old laws were sometimes in the way of doing that which is necessary: ‘Das Recht muss Politik folgen, nicht Politik dem Recht’ [‘the law must follow politics, rather than politics following the law’]¹⁵ – or that new laws are necessary to implement certain political aims. This is exactly what Austria has witnessed over the last few years in the guise of politics of speed, for example in the domain of language integration policies and more particularly in language testing.

4.2. The transformation of the institutional landscape in language testing

It would be short-sighted to assume that the outlined development happened over night. In fact, Kurz was State Secretary for Integration (2011–2013) and State Minister for Europe, Integration and External Affairs (2014–2017) before becoming head of the party and, eventually, chancellor. His focus on matters of integration is thus long-lived and many reforms were enforced already before his time as chancellor, i.e. still under governments considered ‘centre’ or ‘centre-left’. One of his politically most important moves was the reinvention of the ÖIF (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds [Austrian Integration Fund]) as the central player for language courses and certificates, with its pole position inscribed in the 2017 implemented Integration Act (see de Cillia 2020, 88). For the duration of only two years – until yet another legal amendment changed this in 2019 –, other language certificates were still accepted, e.g. the internationally recognized ÖSD (Österreichisches Sprachendiplom [Austrian Language Diploma]), based on a pluri-centric idea of German and officially evaluated and approved by ALTE (Association of Language Testers in Europe), or the traditionally valid German Goethe certificate. As of 2019, the ÖIF legally established its monopole, becoming the sole authority in issuing language tests and certifying language testing institutions.

This institutional move has been criticized as the infiltration of an agency on the basis of a political agenda close to the one by the ÖVP itself, the chancellor’s party. Criticism also concerned three other points: First, there was no linguistic or other scientific reason to devalue existing, longstanding certificates – yet, with this move, (often critical) organizations such as the ÖSD were basically rendered superfluous quickly. The centralizing of certification under the auspices of the governmental agency ÖIF furthermore has effectively defunded them. Secondly, the hastily implemented ÖIF-tests (of both language and value-courses) were neither transparently created nor evaluated by an association such as ALTE.¹⁶ Thirdly, there was no open (let alone, public) deliberation of which ‘values’ should be transmitted in the ÖIF value-courses as preparation for the tests. Suspicions have been raised that the so-called ‘Austrian values’ taught in these courses are basically identical with the values of the ÖVP and disconnected from real life experiences that transgress imaginaries of a monolingual and homogenous Austria.¹⁷ It remains to be seen how this rather rash rearranging of the institutional landscape and its power balances plays out in the future. In this respect, Rosa and Scheuerman (2009, 12) caution that ‘[t]he erosion of institutions – which, by definition, necessarily embody elements of permanence and stability – might inadvertently unravel the fabric of high-speed society, since many processes of acceleration necessarily depend on stable institutional frameworks’. In the following concluding section, I will assess the effects of the speedy rearranging of the legal framework and the institutional landscape on the ground.

5. Concluding discussion: institutional lag and systemic confusion

In this paper, I discussed speed as an inherent factor in current language integration policies (Section 2). For this aim, I elaborated on how speed can be critically read in terms of undermining liberal democracies in favour of an authoritarian shift, marked by populist enactments of getting things done (Section 3), before mapping such developments on contemporary Austria and its institutional reordering in the domain of language testing (Section 4). Now, in order to consider the effects of speed in Austrian language integration politics in the first two decades of this century – i.e. to recap the scurried executive decrees, legal amendments, and new acts regarding ‘integration’ requirements as well as the therein regulated increased demands for migrant language learning –, I propose that there are two main points to consider, namely the institutional lag (the much slower institutional adaptation to the new decrees) and the ensuing systemic confusion on the ground (the legislative confusion on the side of individuals and organizations). These effects are very much addressed in the on-going criticism of what was described above as a shift in the institutional landscape. Speed comes thus to stand as both an index of how policies on migration and integration are increasingly (hastily) tightened as well as a tool for ‘governmental precarization’ (Lorey 2017), as I will elaborate below.

The institutional lag points to the issue that as a result of the fast-changing legal stipulations facing migrants and refugees in Austria (e.g. in order to comply with the Integration Agreement, to obtain permits, or for naturalization), the relevant institutions in place have experienced ‘difficulties of synchronization’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 13) with the hastily implemented laws, emblematic of accelerated law-making. This became evident inter alia in the regular meetings of the Network Language Rights (Netzwerk SprachenRechte),¹⁸ in which activists, scholars, language teachers, legal counsellors, etc. foster exchange and civic engagement (see also Flubacher and Busch forthcoming). Interactions with migration services were reported in these meetings that clearly show how migration officers were overwhelmed with the constant changes, not up to date to current regulations, and even giving contradictory information when solicited – especially after the introduction of the new Integration Act in 2017. Therefore, without even the institutions and services officially mandated with the act’s implementation up to speed, it will come of no surprise that language teachers and their institutions were described as feeling at a loss of how to advise their students. It can thus be argued that a space of legal uncertainty had opened as a result of a politics of speed and its ensuing institutional lag, which goes beyond difficulties of synchronization.

As a second note-worthy effect, and very much related to the institutional lag, systemic confusion spread among the population affected by the new laws. Facing ever so often changing information and regulations, it had become a sheer impossibility to retain a clear overview over questions such as the following: Who could give reliable information on the current state of stipulations? Were formerly passed tests still valid – or were new tests and preparation courses necessary, which would cost money, again? Which language institutes were still an option? How long were transition periods allowed until the new laws were taking effect? This multiple confusion was considered systemic and systematic by the Network, which published a press release in order to critically assess the situation early in 2018.¹⁹ The press release states:

Language teachers and legal experts criticize once again the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) for organisationally leading astray the population affected by the Integration Act. Gudrun Pürrer, course instructor in German as a second language, describes how the state does not adhere to the values explicitly demanded of migrants: ‘As German language teachers we are bound to teach our participants that there are "clear rules and principles" in Austria. At the moment, however, there are no clear rules and principles on the question of how to fulfil integration agreements – neither for the groups in question, nor for the people consulting them, and not even for the responsible authorities. For instance, the ÖIF mentions an A1-integration test, which does not even exist according to the act’. (OTS Netzwerk SprachenRechte, 27 February 2018; my translation)

Irrespective of these highly problematic points, the monopole of the ÖIF has only been strengthened over the years, as other institutions have been stripped of former rights to courses and tests, and critics have been ignored. Communication has remained vague and unclear to this day. The question thus emerges of whether the institutional lag and the ensuing/correlating confusion are accidental – or, indeed, intentional? And if so, why?

In order to answer this question, another perspective on the systemic confusion could provide illuminating, especially when conceiving of speed as a ‘principle of power and dominance’ (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009, 7). Confusion can be understood, I argue, as a tool for ‘governmental precarization’ (Lorey 2017), which is functionally used to destabilize actors, their infrastructure and agency. Preoccupied with making sense of the amendment of the amendment, etc., institutional actors (e.g. migration officers or counsellors), experts, and activists are trying to navigate these new realities, to re-arrange and reposition themselves and their institutions within the new power structures – in other words: not to lose their jobs! It can be assumed that with certain institutions rendered superfluous, and critical institutions and individuals muzzled and defunded, most energy is spent on the day to day rather than for building coalitions to fight back fundamentally. Already in 1998, Bourdieu commented in this vein on functional precarity, which immobilizes workers and employees who are rendered politically and socially paralyzed in the face of looming unemployment. A similar diagnosis is given by Lorey (2017, 203–204), who describes governmental precarization in that ‘the fear of precariousness has an individualizing effect and enhances governability within the framework of neoliberal governmentality’. Migrants and refugees, finally, who are at the receiving end of these policies are confronted with yet another level of precariousness: faced with ever-increasing requirements, i.e. raised in language and course level and related costs, as well as accelerated in the time allowed, their outlook is bleak should they not be able to meet them. Already in precarious positions within the societal social structure, they are most likely left to fend each for their own.

In any case, protests and counter-initiatives can hardly keep up with the speed set by the government, and basically have to choose their battles, i.e. fight against the speed of implementation, the systemic confusion, or – alas – the policies themselves? As it is, ‘acceleration often serves existing relations of power and inequality, and they consequently impact countless facets of human experience’ (Scheuerman 2009, 292). In other words, the accelerated making of language integration policies (in itself furthering the precarization of migrants and refugees through tightening demands) is far from accidental; rather it is an expression of politics of speed that not only destabilizes the typically lengthy democratic search for consensus but also serves to create confusion. Speed in the form of accelerated law-making is thus emblematic of governmental precarization, both in form and function – or as index and tool –, and has to be understood as such.

Concluding, I urge fellow researchers on bilingualism and bilingual education to study political developments as the ones outlined above – within and beyond Europe –, particularly with regard to language integration policies. As I tried to show with the example of Austrian politics of speed, it is not just the decreed content that is of relevance, but very much also the functional temporality inherent in the decreeing. In the end, while these accelerated instances of law-making potentially target our students, colleagues, or neighbours, they very specifically affect the most vulnerable members of our societies.

Acknowledgements

Thank is due to Osman Z. Barnawi and Alfonso Del Percio, my co-editors of this special issue – for their collaboration and their feedback on my work. I would also like to thank Sabine Lehner for her comments on earlier versions of this paper. Finally, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers and their insightful feedback. The article is better for it and remaining shortcomings are entirely mine.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mi-Cha Flubacher

Mi-Cha Flubacher is postdoc assistant in Applied Linguistics at the Department of Linguistics, University of Vienna, Austria. Her research experience and interests include ethnographic approaches to the economic commodification of language and multilingualism, to language as a site of the reproduction of social inequality, and to questions of language, gender, and race/ethnicity. She has taught courses and published on these issues, for example in journals such as the International Journal of the Sociology of Language, International Journal of Multilingualism, Multilingua, etc.

Notes

1 For an official description, see the following website: https://www.bmbwf.gv.at/Themen/schule/schulpraxis/ba/sprabi/dfk.html (accessed 15 March 2021).

2 These tests have been evaluated by third parties as not age-appropriate, nor corresponding to international standards: https://www.sprachenrechte.at/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/202008_StatementMIKAD.pdf (accessed 12 May 2021).

3 A petition was started in the fall of 2020, which assembled arguments and statements against this measure: https://mein.aufstehn.at/petitions/initiative-gegen-deutschforderklassen?fbclid=IwAR3FycvR0chZAYW8FJd09oVEJN3WgBkQeTYivKLk3YCnkDr6UXEWona4gJY (accessed 4 March 2021).

4 Cf. https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000125296522/die-verschwundenen-klassenzimmer?fbclid=IwAR0ZN_aGBfIS5POXgVzOR8ahAthg6bdfLfKi55xVLRSfRgXfWTSoltRPIEM (accessed 12 May 2021).

5 See for example an open letter by a coalition of critics: https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000082965007/deutschfoerderklassen-weiter-soganz-im-gegenteil (accessed 15 March 2021).

6 Settlement and Residence Act online: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20004242 (accessed 2 March 2021).

7 Common European Framework of References for Languages: https://www.coe.int/en/web/common-european-framework-reference-languages/level-descriptions (accessed 1 April 2021).

8 Integration Act online: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20009891&FassungVom=2019-05-31 (accessed 2 April 2021).

9 Welfare Act online: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20010649 (accessed 2 April 2021).

10 Online articles: https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2019/04/17/austria-moving-away-from-liberal-democracy-to-authoritarianism-ex-vice-chancellor-says or: https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Kritik-an-Sebastian-Kurz-Ist-Oesterreich-auf-dem-Weg-zur-autoritaeren-Demokratie-id54095156.html (both accessed 20 March 2021).

11 Cf. Wodak (2015, 7) for definitions of populism and right-wing populism: ‘Right-wing populism can be defined as a political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism. It is considered populism because of its appeal to the ‘common man/woman’ as opposed to the elites; this appeal to a quasi-homogenous demos is regarded as salient for such.’

12 Cf. for a timeline of the ‘Muslim Ban’: https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban (accessed 20 March 2021).

13 Cf. for a recent newspaper article: https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000120386911/der-respektlose-umgang-der-politik-mit-der-verfassung (accessed 1 March 2021).

14 Compared to the first coalition of the ÖVP with the FPÖ under Jörg Haider in 2000, the reactions were far less remarkable. In 2000, the European Union even issued a boycott against Austria and public uproar was immense. Cf. https://tocqueville21.com/le-club/_austria/ (accessed 3 March 2021).

15 E.g. quoted in: ‘Asyl: ‘Recht muss Politik folgen, nicht Politik dem Recht’’: https://www.diepresse.com/5566984/asyl-recht-muss-politik-folgen-nicht-politik-dem-recht (accessed 4 March 2021).

16 E.g. ‘Politische Übernahme: Wer in Österreich Deutsch prüfen darf’: https://www.addendum.org/news/deutschpruefungen/ (accessed 4 March 2021).

17 E.g. ‘Integrationsfonds: Deutschkurse als Hort von ÖVP-Ideologie’: https://www.semiosis.at/2020/09/04/integrationsfonds-deutschkurse-als-hort-von-oevp-ideologie/?fbclid=IwAR0yYA9-_CcWhfXDtkv0_FFLvxsbFkoosB0DonsPHgcGFxtiZy5gCXGb-Yc; or ‘Stellungnahme des Netzwerk SprachenRechte zu den Sprach- und Werteprüfungen im Rahmen des Integrationsgesetzes 2017’: http://sprachenrechte.at/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/20171019_NWSR_Stellungnahme-IV-Werte.pdf (both accessed 4 March 2021).

18 http://www.sprachenrechte.at.

19 The original press release in German: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20180227_OTS0010/abgepruefte-werte-und-die-oesterreichische-realitaet-wirrnis-um-integrationspruefungen (accessed 28 March 2021).