Going solo: the social organisation of drug dealing within a London street gang

Abstract

This paper presents a single case study of one street gang in one London borough. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 gang members, or former gang members, and seven practitioners. The practitioners and gang members/ex-gang members reported different perspectives on how the gang was structured and drug dealing was organised. The gang members/ex-gang members suggested that the gang is a loose social network with little recognisable formal organisation. Although individual gang members sell drugs, the gang should not be viewed as a drug dealing organisation. Rather it is a composition of individual drug dealers who cooperate out of mutual self-interest. Therefore, some gang members are best described as independent entrepreneurs while others are subcontractors looking to ‘go solo’. The seven practitioners, however, tended to describe a more hierarchically structured gang, with formal recruitment processes. This divergence of perspective highlights an important consideration for policy and research.

Keywords:

• gangs
• co-offending
• illicit entrepreneurs
• drug dealing
• crime

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. This paper takes as a starting point the Eurogang definition of a street gang as a ‘durable and street-orientated youth groups whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity’ (Klein et al. 2006, 414). We do, however, acknowledge that the term street gang is highly contested. For in-depth definitional debates please refer to Joseph and Gunter (2011), Smithson and colleagues (2012) and, Wood and Alleyne (2010). This papers reviewers questioned whether Red Gang should be labelled a gang. We acknowledge the ambiguity of the term, and the dangers of labelling a group a gang (see Klein 1995; Smithson et al. 2012), however, as the young people and practitioners we interviewed identified the group as a gang we chose to employ the term. Furthermore, Red Gang had lasted for more than a couple of months (i.e. is durable), hung around in public places (i.e. is street orientated) and members were involved in a range of illegal activities, including a ‘beef’ resulting in two murders. Red Gang thus conforms to the basic Eurogang criteria (see Weerman et al. 2009),

2. All names and locations have been anomysed to reduce potential stigmatisation of the research site and protect participants (see Aldridge and Medina, 2008; May et al. 2005).

3. Note how the use of language implies a group organised in a similar fashion to the most bureaucratic of institution: the military.

4. While some of the participants initially claimed to not be gang members, as the interviews progressed many began to imply or openly state gang membership. In one case, a participant repeatedly asserted that he was not a gang member, yet presented from his pocket a bandana showing his gangs colours.

5. This said, two of the participants identified as members of Red Gang were younger than the stated age range of Red Gang. They may, therefore, have been members of FDB, a younger gang connected to Red Gang in a loose coalition, or they may have been popular enough to be allowed to hang with Red Gang.

6. The Rose Town-based gangs are engaged in an ongoing conflict with a gang from a neighbouring borough. The conflict escalated after a core member of one of the primary Rose Town-based gangs was murdered. Participants, and one practitioner, suggest that ‘beefs’ are seldom overtly about drug territory, but rather reputation (see Aldridge and Medina 2008; Klein et al. 2006). This does not mean that reputation and business interests are not related. As signs of perceived weakness may be seen as an invitation to competitors (Hobbs 2013; Winlow 2001; Windle 2013) the development of a violent reputation may be instrumental in reducing the encroachment of competitors (see Bourgois 1995; Gambetta 1993; Windle 2013). This is not to suggest that all violence confirms to norms of economic rational choice, but rather there is a convergence of commercial and personal interests (Hobbs 2013; see Davies 1998).

7. While relationships are more complex than the core/fringe distinction implies (Papachristos 2006), it does represent a useful starting point.

8. Open markets have fixed geographical locations and there are no barriers to entry. This will often involve dealers waiting in public areas for buyers to approach them. In a closed market purchases are only permitted if the dealer knows the buyer and has pre-arranged an agreed time and place (May and Hough 2004). While the introduction of cheap mobile phones in the late-1990s reduced the need for open selling (Lupton et al. 2002), such markets are still operational within London (Hales and Hobbes 2010; May et al. 2005).This said, none of the practitioners we spoke to were able to clearly identify any specific open drug markets. Two expressed suspicions that two separate open markets operated in car parks, and that Red Gang had recently started to discuss owning ‘strips’.

9. Participants may have also developed reputations for violence by robbing other drug dealers (see Briggs 2008, Harding 2014; Hobbs 2013, Jacobs and Wright 2008; Windle 2013). A pursuit implied by several participants and practitioners.