Recognition and judgement in social work

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to argue for recognition as a normative ideal for social work and to confront the ideal with the reality found in the social institutions. I shall use the concept ‘judgement’ to describe institutional routines and ways of thinking which constitute barriers to recognition. In the first part, I outline the normative ideal and show its relevance for practical social work on the basis of social clients’ experiences of disrespect. In the second, I explain the concept of judgement and criticise the prevailing forms of judgement to be found in social institutions. In my interpretation these pose an obstacle to recognition.

Formålet med artiklen er at argumentere for anerkendelse som normativt ideal for socialt arbejde og at konfrontere idealet med ‘virkeligheden’ i de sociale institutioner. Jeg anvender d⊘mmekraftbegrebet til at anlysere institutionelle tænkemåder og rutiner, som udg⊘r en barriere for, at anerkendelsesidealet kan sætte sig igennem i praksis. I den f⊘rste del udvikler jeg idealet og begrunder dets relevans for praktisk socialt arbejde med henvisning til sociale klienters krænkelseserfaringer. I den anden udfolder jeg d⊘mmekraftbegrebet og kritiserer de fremherskende d⊘mmekraftsformer i socialforvaltningerne, som i min fortolkning er en forhindring for anerkendelse.

Keywords:

• welfare
• institutional norms
• social practice
• disrespect
• change

N⊘gleord:

• velfærd
• institutionelle normer
• social praksis
• disrespect
• social forandring

Notes

1. In this connection I cannot discuss the comprehensive philosophical debate of whether or not normative claims can be substantiated at all. From a critical–hermeneutical perspective the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, which has dominated the ethics of modern science, cannot be maintained, and the idea of social scientists as neutral and dissociated observers is an illusion.