ABSTRACT
This paper tests the theoretically assumed relationship between the parliamentary presence of radical right parties (RRPs) and anti-immigration attitudes over time. Data come from six rounds of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2012. Using multi-level models with applications for repeated cross-sectional data, the study examines the implications of changes tied to the political advancements of the radical right with a focus on three possible scenarios: people's attitudes about immigration have generally become more negative, opposition towards immigration has become more dependent on immigrants' ethnicity, and attitudes towards immigration have become more polarised. Contrary to expectations, it is found that neither the presence, the representational strength, nor the nationalistic framing of an RRP affect opposition towards immigration over time. Thus, the conclusion is that the RRPs, so far, have not driven anti-immigration attitudes in Europe. Possible explanations for these results are discussed in the concluding section.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 For some of the years, data on % foreign born is missing for Germany, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia. In the models displayed in –, we have extrapolated these values from the available years. Alternative analyses have been run using the original variable, without any implications for the findings.
2 Measured as 1000 current international $ PPP.
3 Thus, that the parties are ‘radical' does not necessarily imply that they are anti-system with a wish to overthrow democracy. In fact, all RRPs in this study operate within the democratic system, accepting its rules and procedures. Instead, ‘radical' refers to how RRPs deviate from other parties in European parliaments in the sense that they do not endorse the pluralistic and universalistic ideals of liberal democracy (Mudde Citation2007; Rydgren Citation2007). Similarly, ‘Right' should not be understood in socio-economic terms, but as a description of RRPs view of (in-)equality. As opposed to a left-wing position where differences between people are seen as constructed – and therefore an area where the state can and should intervene, RRPs approach differences as natural – and thereby outside the state's responsibility (Mudde Citation2007).
4 To control that the findings are not due to these differences in RRP focus, we have run separate analyses where we exclude the Eastern European countries. This, however, does not change the results.
5 However, we have also run alternative analyses based on Mudde's narrower definition to control that the results are not due to the inclusion of the additional parties (see ).
6 Some complementary information has been retrieved from the Parties and Elections in Europe database (Citation2014).
7 However, it is possible that the established political parties adopt some of the radical right's issues in order to provide a political alternative for voters that will keep the radical right out of parliament.
8 Missing data for Switzerland 2011.
9 In order to keep the tables at a reasonable size, we only present variance components for random slopes between countries (and not within countries over time). While the effect of some of the variables also vary over time, these variations are generally negligible in size.
10 We have also run this model, as well as the second model in and , using share of votes instead of share of seats as the size indicator, which does not change the findings.
11 Based on the theoretical assumption we examine the effect from RRP on attitudes. However, as stated in the beginning, it is possible that the effect run in the other direction. Our possibilities to examine the latter are hampered due to data limitations. However, we did make some Granger causality tests for each time point using the dependent variable as country aggregate. There is a significant Granger causality from RRP presence on anti-immigrant opposition in 2006, but not for any other time period. There is no significant Granger causality from the attitudes to RRP parties.
12 As visible in the random part, the unexplained variance at country level drops significantly between the empty model and models 1–3. This, however, is not attributed to any of the RRP measures, nor to the other macro indicators % foreign born or GDP/capita. Instead, it is the result of allowing the slope of the left/right orientation to vary between countries, which indicates considerable country differences in how ideological orientation relates to nativist beliefs.
13 See in the appendix.
14 To be clear, we do not claim that RRPs could not have other impacts beyond the studied attitudes. That is, it is possible that radical groups are more ready to act out their attitudes in a context where the radical right have more political power.