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ABSTRACT
In this paper I present the extensive discourse analysis of texts produced by the electorally exceptionally successful Greek and Hungarian ultranationalist parties. I first demonstrate that although both have adopted the topics, arguments and rhetorical figures of racist discourse, they differ in the relative importance they attach to culture and biology. That is, while GD imposes rigid, impermeable boundaries to a nation bound together by the ties of common ancestry, excluding ‘others’ on grounds of purported racial inferiority, Jobbik focuses more on culture as the dominant marker that separates off ‘us’ from ‘them’. I then try to explain the emergent patterns by relating them to context-specific categorisation strategies as well as the historically constituted conceptions of ‘Greekness’ and ‘Hungarianness’. I show that the construction of ‘otherness’ is markedly different in the two societies in terms of the chosen ‘enemies’, the preferred identity-markers as well as the processes of boundary drawing. The findings demonstrate that we need to think in a more differentiated way about the possible configurations of the culture/biology and difference/superiority nexus as shaped by the historically constituted and deeply rooted perceptions of difference in each context.
Acknowledgements
I am thankful to the anonymous reviewers of the JEMS for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. These are the defining characteristics of xenophobia.
2. Others doubt the usefulness of distinguishing between two types of racism altogether given that ‘culture can function like nature’ and that ‘a racism which does not have a pseudo-biological concept of race as its main driving force always existed’ (Balibar Citation1991, 22, 23).
3. Likewise, the political agenda of Jobbik and GD should not be reduced to its racist component. Given that our interests here are the processes of racial categorization, however, I will limit the discussion only to this.
4. The parties’ kinship and identification with historical fascism is also evident in their chosen symbols. The latter are the Meander for GD, an ancient Greek symbol whose resemblance to the swastika is obvious, and the so-called Árpád-stripes in the emblem of Jobbik, which constitute a historical Hungarian symbol now most closely associated with the Arrow Cross fascist organization.
5. Jobbik also targets immigrants and GD also targets the Roma, and they both target the Jews and other groups of people. Yet, the image of otherness with which they operate is primarily predicated upon the exclusion and hatred of the Roma and the immigrants, respectively, and this is why I mainly focus on them.
6. This strategy has an important limitation: the interconnected problem of context-dependent discourse on the one hand, and within-party variation, on the other hand. Namely, specifically in the case of Jobbik it has been observed that top representatives tend to employ a ‘milder’ idiom than lower level (typically local) politicians, whose exclusionary discourse is often more overtly biological (e.g. NOL Citation2015). This is an important limitation to the argument I advance here (as well as an interesting topic to explore in future research). That being said, there are good reasons for focusing on the discourse of the party’s leadership for this is what attracts the bulk of the public’s attention.
7. Excluded from the analysis are texts reflecting on the European refugee crisis. It would be interesting to see how this event impacted racist discourses, and especially whether it got incorporated in already existing schemata, or instead, it changed them.
8. GD, Ideology.
9. Jobbik, Catechism.
10. GD, Ideology.
11. PS, 22/04/13.
12. Gábor Vona, PS, 13/10/14.
13. Arvanitis-Avramis, PS, 05/09/14.
14. GD, Political Positions.
15. Ilias Panagiotaros, Televised discussion. 26/10/2012 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIkIfXVQulM.
16. Jobbik, Catechism.
17. Public speech, 02/03/13. Quoted in: http://nol.hu/belfold/konyar-1370793.
18. Public speech, 13/06/14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49iVKAmpQxA.
19. Konstantinos Barbarousis, PS, 05/09/14.
20. PS, 18/10/12.
21. Public speech, 12/01/13, https://kuruc.info/r/2/106556/.
22. Public speech, 29/01/11, http://jobbik.hu/rovatok/orszagos_hirek/vona_gabor_felnunk_pedig_semmitol_sem_szabad_mert_az_igazsag_szabadda_tesz.
23. GD, Ideology.
24. Jobbik 2014, 41.
25. 16/03/14, http://www.xryshaygh.com/gengramateas/view/to-ethnos-to-kratos-oi-poluteknoi-kai-oi-mousoulmanoi-arthro-tou-n.g.-micha#ixzz3M9nggoxG.
26. GD, Identity.
27. 22/11/04, http://jobbik.hu/rovatok/publicisztika/biber_jozsef_tibor_beszede_a_kinaiak_elleni_tuntetesen.
28. Public speech, 29/01/11, http://jobbik.hu/rovatok/orszagos_hirek/vona_gabor_felnunk_pedig_semmitol_sem_szabad_mert_az_igazsag_szabadda_tesz.
29. Jobbik 2014, 31.
30. GD, Identity.
31. Ilias Panagiotaros, 26/10/2012, Televised discussion https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIkIfXVQulM.
32. GD, Ideology.
33. Krisztina Morvai, Televised interview, 29/10/11, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Fo27zcQatA.
34. Jobbik, Catechism.
35. GD, Ideology.
36. For this reason successful democracies tend to qualify the principle of majority rule in order to protect minorities (especially cultural or ethnic groups) from the potentially harmful decisions of majorities (Schmitter and Karl Citation1991, 79).
37. Press release, 27/07/12, http://www.haon.hu/lakohelyem/ogy-valasztas-jobbik-alapfoku-iskolai-vegzettseghez-kellene-kotni-a-valasztojogot/2041650.
38. Katerina Zaroulia, PS, 18/10/12.
39. Ádám Mirkóczki, PS, 13/10/14.
40. Jobbik 2014, 31.
41. Nikolaos Michaloliakos, Public speech, 15/06/12, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NJXDvZiwG0.
42. PS, 05/09/14.
43. Public speech, 18/10/12, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nvx-jFq3KTw.
44. Egyed Zsolt, PS, 19/06/2014.
45. Valentína Karácsony, Education and Culture Cabinet, 08/03/10, http://szebbjovo.hu/2010/03/nemzeti-kulturakra-leselkedo-veszely-multikulturalizmus.
46. Ibid.
47. Summary of a GD discussion on multiculturalism: http://xa-stereas.blogspot.it/2013/11/blog-post_13.html.
48. This influential dichotomy goes back to such concepts as ‘Staatsnation’ and ‘Kulturnation’ (Meinecke ([1908] 1970) or ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalism (Kohn Citation1946), but it has not been without critique (Brubaker Citation1999). I use it to indicate some systematic differences in the relative importance attached to identity-markers such as territory, descent, and culture in constructing ‘Hungarianness’ and ‘Greekness’, and not as an exhaustive description of national identities.
49. I quote from this study in order to demonstrate that relatively high levels of xenophobia antedate the crises of 2006 (Hungary) and 2009 (Greece). These most probably have further aggravated popular perceptions of diversity as such socio-economic context privileges scapegoating as a way of finding easy explanations to the crisis as well as to reassert a common positive national identity.