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ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the political economy of migration management. Based on ethnographic research in Manila in 2016, we explore the contradictory entrepreneurial character of IOM Philippines in its multi-stranded global migration management activities. As a major labour export country with a history of fractious politics over state reliance on migration, partly in response to neoliberalisation, the Philippines represents an ideal field site for examining triple-win migration and development scenarios. By way of example, we analyse how IOM’s global mission is represented in pre-departure programming for select visa-ready migrants destined for Canada. Such sessions occur in an increasingly competitive environment and exemplify the rescaling of migration management initiatives concerned to gain maximum advantage from labour export and import (for states and capital), while grooming a disciplined migrant labour force. On Canada’s part, neoliberalisation and just-in-time immigration priorities seek greater efficiencies from duly disciplined migrant arrivals. Here, we see the IOM’s signature history of protection and aid for vulnerable and displaced persons maintained in tension with its facilitating role in perpetuating the structured inequalities of global capitalism. IOM’s entrepreneurial activities in the governance gaps and market places of migration are, we argue, best summed up as labour brokerage by another name.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Thirty-eight thousand three hundred Filipinos landed in Canada in 2010 as permanent residents. This was the first time since 1983 that China was not the lead country. The number of Filipino immigrants had been steadily increasing between 2002 and 2010 (Chagnon Citation2013, 5). For some time now, the Philippines has also been Canada's top source country for temporary foreign workers (see http://www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/lmo/statistics/annual).
2 Following Manitoba’s remarkably successful immigration plan which commenced in 1998, provincial/territorial nominee programs represent the neoliberal flexibilisation of Canada’s immigration system (Carter Citation2009). Initially, contrived as a means to disperse immigration across all regions, the federal government negotiates contracts with individual provinces/territories to pre-select immigrants in accord with particular labour market and demographic targets. Aside from the complexity introduced by nominee programmes, there was considerable political agitation as provinces sought to expand immigration quotas under Harper’s conservatives. In 2015, Trudeau liberals moved quickly to expand national immigration targets and increase provincial quotas.
3 Many Filipinos seeking permanent admission to Canada were discouraged by the introduction in 2015 of the newly ‘modernized’ web portal for reviewing applications to certain economic immigration programs. Descriptively called Express Entry, the new system included adjustments to applicant screening. Potential immigrants submit a menu of online forms which are scored across a range of factors. If successful, applications are invited into a ‘pool’ where they are reviewed by potential employers entering through a ‘job bank’ portal. Scores increase for immigrants with job offers, Canadian connections, and appropriate pre-evaluated credentials. Acceptable scores for tests proving language abilities were also raised. Changes disadvantaged Filipinos without the highest levels of ‘human capital’ (basically high skill levels according to Canada’s occupational coding system) and previous Canadian connections. Many also had difficulty with language tests despite their high functional abilities in English and sometimes French.
4 Discussion of immigration fraud and queue jumping by would-be immigrants was a prominent feature of media engagement by Jason Kenney, Harper’s Minister of Immigration, presumably as a means to solicit the political interest of immigrant constituencies who had been traditionally been inclined to support Canada’s Liberal Party (see, for example, Metha Citation2013; O’Neil Citation2015).
5 As of October 2016, the IRCC Website lists 27 entries for ‘Pre-arrival Services’, including the IOM and CIIP also discussed herein. Most of the services provided are tailored to provincial labour markets and conditions. Important to note here is that Canada’s immigration settlement sector which provides such services are funded by IRCC and compete for funding resources, however, wherever funds are available. Here again we see neoliberal rescaling and entrepreneurialism on the part of actors in the settlement sector, with uneven, politicized results. Not all agencies competing for settlement and integration funding are in a position to offer reliable integration services. Nor is the ‘playing field’ level; some regions are under-serviced.
6 See also Rodriguez and Schwenken (Citation2013) for further analysis of the production of pre-departure migrant ‘subject-making processes’ by interrelated agencies and actors in the Philippines.