Voice, exit and voice again: democratic remittances by recent Russian emigrants to the EU

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to the research on diasporic and migrant communities’ engagement the democratisation of their home countries. It focuses on the case of the most recent wave of political emigration from Russia that has taken place during President Putin’s third term. It confirms the thesis that emigration, particularly forced emigration, whereby political dissidents are squeezed out from their country by the authorities in hopes of calming simmering political protest, has stopped being the safety valve it once was. Drawing on Levitt’s seminal work on social remittances, it analyses the content and channels of political remittances by recent Russian emigrants. In terms of the democratic remittances’ content, six main broadly defined thematic areas of mobilisation can be distinguished: free and fair elections; human rights and civil freedoms; fighting corruption; environmental protection; anti-war activities; counteracting Russian propaganda and the ‘hybrid war’. The channels of these democratic remittances are divided into direct (activities targeted at the Russian society) and indirect ones (targeted at Russian diaspora and political elites and society in the receiving countries). It draws the attention to immeasurable political remittances, those which cannot be easily assessed, yet undeniably impact the country of origin and its society.

KEYWORDS:

• Political emigration
• political remittances
• Russia
• transnational political participation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Morawska described it as ‘habits of coping with the previous system’, including a popular distrust of public institutions, civic apathy and pervasive corruption (2001).

2 All non-commercial organisations that accept foreign funding and engage in ‘political activities’ are required to register as foreign agents. After 2014, the Ministry of Justice can register NGOs as foreign agents without their consent. Fines for failing to comply amount to 300,000 roubles (around €4400), while heads of NGOs can face up to two years in prison. (For more, see e.g. Ow-Freytag 2018).

3 The law on ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations’ to minors makes neutral and positive information about LGBTQ topics a misdemeanour subject to penalties. (For more, see e.g. Kondakov 2019).

4 The prosecutor general’s office may declare any foreign organisation it deems a threat to Russia’s constitutional system and national security ‘undesirable’ and ban it from the country, without a judgment by a Russian court. Russians are banned from accepting financial support from organisations declared ‘undesirable’ and from disseminating their materials. Penalties include administrative fines and imprisonment. (For more see e.g. Ow-Freytag 2018).

5 The Russian World (Russkiy Mir) includes Russian speakers and all those who feel affinity with what Russia stands for living outside Russia and has been put forward in opposition to Western values of liberalism and individual human rights. It can be seen as a flexible ideological tool that justifies Russia’s interference not only in the post-Soviet space, but also far beyond it. For a good discussion see Lutsevych 2016.

Additional information

Funding

This work would not have been possible without the financial support from the National Science Centre, Poland (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) [grant number 2016/21/D/HS6/02973].