The power of symbolic sanctuary: insights from Wales on the limitations and potential of a regional approach to sanctuary

ABSTRACT

This article explores sanctuary policies and practices from a regional perspective. Following a declaration by the Welsh government in 2019, Wales became the first and only European region to explicitly connect to the wider sanctuary movement, with the stated intention of becoming a true ‘Nation of Sanctuary' (NoS) (Welsh Government. 2019. “Nation of Sanctuary: Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan.” Cardiff: Welsh Government). We argue that the Welsh government’s approach to sanctuary is richly symbolic and is used strategically to compensate for the lack of formal legislative competencies in the field of immigration, and to position itself in opposition to the UK government. The article highlights the potential of symbolic policies to underpin a regional form of sanctuary, along with their limitations. We show that regions can use symbolic policies to overcome their lack of legislative competency in asylum policies and argue that symbolic policies allow regional governments to position themselves as allies to those supporting refugees and asylum seekers, and as an opponent of the state. In addition, we illustrate how a regional government's symbolic commitment facilitates concerted action on the part of relevant actors within the region. However, we also highlight the fragility and inconsistency of symbolic sanctuary.

KEYWORDS:

• Regional sanctuary
• Nation of Sanctuary
• Wales
• symbolic policy
• discursive sanctuary
• hostile environment

1. Introduction

In 2019, the Welsh government declared its intention to become a ‘Nation of Sanctuary’ (NoS) (Welsh Government 2019a) following an intensive parliamentary consultation with local governments, governmental and non-governmental organisations and refugees and asylum seekers. To date, Wales is the only region in Europe to officially connect to the sanctuary movement and commit to becoming a ‘true Nation of Sanctuary for refugees and asylum seekers’ (Welsh Government 2019a, 6). Generally, European regions are unable to legislate and govern on immigration flows. Nevertheless, many European regions engage with the policy field through complementary integration policies, offering services and rights to migrants that go well beyond those provided by the state, but often also contradicting them (Manatschal, Wisthaler, and Zuber 2019). This fosters migrants’ attachment and sense of belonging to the region and strengthens the overall regional identity.

This article analyses the Welsh approach to sanctuary and demonstrates that symbolic policies allow regions to engage with a policy field in which they have no legislative competencies in a way that goes beyond window-dressing. While in Wales sanctuary is mainly enacted at the discursive sphere (Mourão Permoser and Bauböck 2023), this does not mean that the declaration of being an NoS has no political or material consequences. We argue that becoming an NoS also serves an important symbolic purpose, allowing the Welsh government to differentiate itself from the central government. While symbolic policies cannot challenge the state's primacy, they can alleviate their impacts by providing a powerful counternarrative and act as a rallying cry for concerted action by governmental and non-governmental actors. It also has a ‘signalling function’, communicating to migrants with precarious status that here they will be treated with respect (Boudou 2023). Hence, the Welsh government's commitment to being an NoS serves to bolster Welsh identity, norms and values.

The article makes a number of theoretical and empirical contributions. It sharpens our theoretical understanding of how sanctuary is enacted at multiple levels of government. Thus far, analyses of sanctuary in Europe have failed to consider all governmental levels, notably eschewing the regional level. Nevertheless, an emerging scholarship on Canadian provinces (Hershkowitz, Hudson, and Bauder 2021) and US states, notably California and New Jersey (Villazor and Godinez-Navarro 2019; Sleiman-Long 2020), highlights the importance and potential of this lens.

We understand symbolic policies as those that indicate intention and commitment to an issue through slight policy change. They may be presented to the electorate in a digestible, simplified manner with the aim of ensuring support and strengthening mutual values and identities. However, while such policies may appear superficial and unable to tackle policy issues, they can lead to tangible effects. The article also makes a theoretical contribution to the scholarship on symbolic policymaking and the role of ideational or discursive frames (Fischer 2003). It does this in three ways; First, we provide an alternative perspective to the scholarship on symbolic policymaking by evaluating the power and potential of symbolic policies in contexts where legislative competency is lacking. Analysing sanctuary in a devolved context, we show the performative power of symbolic discourses and their concrete impact on public policy. Second, by illustrating how the Welsh government uses the concept of being an NoS as a way to enact sanctuary at the discursive sphere, we bridge symbolic policymaking scholarship and sanctuary scholarship, showing the multiple dimensions and levels contained within the symbolic policy concept. Third, our article highlights the fragility of symbolic policies in a context where there is limited competency. It also stresses the importance of taking a holistic approach to sanctuary that includes refugees and asylum seekers – of all immigration statuses and backgrounds – and extends beyond the third-sector organisations and governmental officials involved.

Finally, this article makes important empirical contributions to the literature on sub-state and regional responses to migration. With few exceptions (Piccoli 2019; Mulvey 2017), this scholarship overlooks regional responses to refugees and asylum seekers in general, and sanctuary in particular. Analysing the Welsh government's approach to sanctuary highlights the limitations, tensions and opportunities involved in providing sanctuary on a regional level. Moreover, the article presents an original case study on Welsh sanctuary. Apart from Bernhardt's work (2020, 2022), scholarship on sanctuary in Wales has focussed on the urban context (Guma et al. 2019) and Welsh civil society organisations, whereas this study scales up from the local to the regional level.

The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop the article’s theoretical framework on the role of regions in providing sanctuary by engaging with the notion of symbolic politics and discursive and territorial acts of sanctuary. In Section 3, we outline the article’s research methods before providing, in Section 4, the context for the Welsh NoS project, namely the UK’s ‘hostile environment’ policy and the legislative constraints on the Welsh government. Section 5 provides an in-depth discussion on the emergence and conceptualisation of the NoS and its significance for governmental and non-governmental actors in Wales, arguing that it is a powerful symbolic tool with a discursive and a territorial dimension. Furthermore, this symbolic policy aims to strengthen a shared identity based on the distinctiveness of Wales vis-à-vis the UK and aspires to consolidate the position of the Welsh government as ‘guardian’ of Welsh values and as a reliable partner for the third sector. The Welsh government also substantially engages with asylum policy at the regional level. The article concludes by recapping the key points of the article and identifying areas for future research.

2. The symbolic power of regional sanctuary

European regions have engaged substantively on immigrant integration over the last ten years. This has resulted in numerous policies on the socioeconomic, cultural and eventually the political participation of migrants at the regional level (Pasetti et al. 2022), highlighting that European regions make use of their (often limited) decision-making competencies to actively shape immigrant integration processes (Manatschal, Wisthaler, and Zuber 2019), and to contradict or complement policies developed at the state (Xhardez 2019) or even the local level.

Minority nations, such as Catalonia, South Tyrol, Scotland and Quebec have attracted particular attention due to the distinct link between identity politics and immigration. Interpretations of minority nations’ responses to immigration have focussed on tensions between the region and the state, and the centre – periphery cleavage (Franco-Guillén 2015). Regional governments adopt a blame-shifting strategy, accusing central governments of inadequately addressing regional preferences (Arrighi 2014), or specific regions implement a distinct immigration discourse and set of integration policies for nation-building purposes and to strengthen their own interests (Wisthaler 2016).

Previous scholarship on the role of regions in immigration policymaking has concentrated on immigrant integration as this is generally the only area in which European regions have legislative or regulatory competency. As a response to restrictive state practices, in both the US and Europe, alternative subnational and non-governmental actors have emerged (Villazor and Godinez-Navarro 2019), engaging in discourses, practices and activities, resisting enforcement of the state's immigration laws, instead offering protection or sanctuary to persons with an irregular migration status.

A plethora of scholarship focusses on the local level, portraying cities as the most active polities in the provision of sanctuary (Bauder and Gonzalez 2018; Bazurli and de Graauw 2023). Bauder and Gonzalez (2018, 126) identify four features that unite sanctuary cities in the US, Canada and the UK: (1) an official commitment by local authorities to the premise of sanctuary; (2) a public challenge to the prominent narratives that criminalise migrants; (3) the articulation of collective urban membership and identity; and (4) the rejection of state immigration and refugee laws.

The same four features also characterise the state of sanctuary, hence the meso-level of government in the US. First declared in 2017 through the California Senate's Bill 54, the state of sanctuary contests federal legislation and prevents federal authorities from implementing restrictive policies on its territory; at the same time, it creates a narrative of a state with an inclusive membership and identity (Villazor and Godinez-Navarro 2019). Since then, many other US states have followed suit, advancing and rescaling the sanctuary movement from the local level to the meso-level, with 11 out of 50 states currently identifying as ‘sanctuary states’ (Centre of Immigration Studies, Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States 2021).

Thus far, the meso-level in Europe has not formally engaged in this upscaling and Wales is the first and only region in Europe to formally commit to becoming a sanctuary region. Similarly, there is a paucity of scholarship on the upscaling of sanctuary to the regional level. Nevertheless, a number of European regions have implemented piecemeal measures targeting and supporting migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and persons with a precarious migration status; Scotland extends social rights to refugees and asylum seekers (Mulvey 2017), while Tuscany in Italy and Andalusia in Spain offer expanded healthcare services to persons with an irregular migration status (Piccoli 2019). Although these policies are not framed as ‘sanctuary’ measures, they do mitigate restrictive state policies and contribute to an inclusive regional identity (Bauböck and Permoser 2023).

Often, these social and economic policies are accompanied by a distinctive regional discourse portraying the regional government as open, protective and benevolent, in contrast with an exclusionary and hostile state (Ruiz Vieytez 2016). Thus, regional integration discourses and policies also serve to strengthen regional identity, particularity vis-à-vis the state (Jeram, van der Zwet, and Wisthaler 2016; Wisthaler 2023), and increase the sense of regional belonging by creating a welcoming environment that supports migrants, refugees and asylum seekers alike.

These are symbolic policies in that they signal intent through minor policy adjustments, rather than offering substantive policy change (Slaven and Boswell 2019). They aim to influence the attitudes of the electorate by proposing a certain interpretative frame, simplifying an issue to generate consensus and strengthen shared values and identities. Slaven and Boswell (2019, 1479) see this as instrumental ‘manipulation’ and Suntrup (2018) differentiates symbolic policies that distract from substantial problems from those that aim to secure government authority by framing complex issues in simplified, unobjectionable terms. Critics often denigrate symbolic policies as ‘window-dressing’ (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 8), ‘image making’ (Mazur 1996, 2) or ‘merely ceremonial’ (Dobbin and Kalev 2017). Nevertheless, even symbolic policies can lead to concrete effects (Law and Urry 2004) as will be exemplified in our article.

Migration scholars have explored the symbolic aims of migration policies (Slaven and Boswell 2019; Faist 1994; Mourão Permoser 2012) but there is no specific scholarship on sanctuary as yet.¹

Our study of Wales makes original theoretical and empirical contributions by showing that symbolic polices can go beyond window-dressing, resulting in tangible effects for the target population. Hence, our article shows that discursive sanctuary enacted through symbolic policies can positively affect the life-chances and perspectives of migrants in the territory by creating a certain interpretative frame that prompts follow-up actions by governmental and non-governmental actors. Thus, symbolic policies become a chance for regions to counterbalance the lack of legislative competencies and foster alternative nation-building aims.

3. Data and methods

This article draws on four types of sources covering a period of six years between 2015 and 2021. In the first phase of data collection and analysis, we examined the first three source types: parliamentary debates on sanctuary, including written and oral questions, speeches, motions and amendments, and statements of opinion between 2015 and 2020; grey literature pertaining to sanctuary including a series of governmental and non-governmental strategies and plans; and the written responses to the ELGCC's 2016 consultation on refugees and asylum seekers, comprising 46 submissions from governmental and non-governmental actors involved in sanctuary efforts. The latter includes local, regional and state-level viewpoints from stakeholders in the asylum housing and support sector, local authority representatives, service providers, support organisations, third-sector groups, and refugees and asylum seekers themselves.²

An inductive analysis of the consultation responses, parliamentary debates and grey literature allowed us to condense the extensive raw data into key themes (e.g. multi-level governance, identity, values), policies (e.g. housing, integration) and categories (e.g. cooperation, contestation) and establish clear links between the research objectives. This analysis also allowed us to identify the main actors involved in sanctuary in Wales along with the key policy fields and programmes, and revealed tensions between actors in Wales and the UK government. These key themes were then used to frame an interview guide to support the second phase of analysis. This second phase consisted of 19 semi-structured interviews, conducted between September 2021 and January 2022, constituting the fourth resource for this study. The transcripts were read and analysed horizontally, grouping segments of text by theme (Marshall 1999, 419). The interviews were key to understanding the symbolic nature of sanctuary, the emergence of sanctuary and its adoption by the ELGCC and Welsh government, the Welsh government's sanctuary measures and practices, and the limitations and opportunities involved in creating an NoS. Combining the various sources allowed us to identify tensions, opportunities, contradictions and constraints in the process of framing and implementing sanctuary policies.

The research design covers a span of six years, which includes the most important stages in the evolution of the sanctuary discussion: debates in the Senedd during the 2015 European migrant ‘crisis’; the 2016 committee inquiry on refugees and asylum seekers in Wales and the subsequent report titled ‘I used to be someone’ (2017); the 2019 publication of the Welsh government's ‘Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan’ (2019a); the housing of asylum seekers in Penally military barracks west Wales; the proposed Nationality and Borders Bill 141 of 2021–2022; and the Welsh response to violence in Afghanistan. This analytical timeframe allows us to trace the development of the NoS concept against a backdrop of wider political and societal contestations.

4. Welsh sanctuary within the UK's hostile environment

Sanctuary policies devised and implemented at the sub-state level generally aim to resist, contest or counterbalance the policies of the state in which they are located (Villazor 2008). This is the also case in Wales. The Welsh government's NoS concept stands in clear contradistinction to the UK government's approach to refugees and asylum seekers. Published in 2019 under a regional Labour administration, the Welsh government's ‘Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan’ outlines the long-term aim of Wales becoming a ‘true’ NoS (Welsh Government 2019a, 2) and reflects the development of a Welsh approach to sanctuary that is antithetical to the UK's immigration policy.³

In 1999, the UK Labour government introduced the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), establishing a centralised system of housing and welfare support in which asylum seekers were dispersed across the UK, on a no-choice basis, to local authorities outside of London and the South East. The aim was to ‘spread the burden’ (Robinson, Andersson, and Musterd 2003) and distribute costs among UK local authorities (Stewart 2012, 25). It also created the National Asylum Support Service charged with coordinating all accommodation and financial support for asylum seekers. Section 95 of the UK's Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 specifies that asylum seekers or their dependents who are likely to become destitute can apply for support (accommodation or subsistence) while waiting for their claim (or appeal) to be considered, on condition that they satisfy a destitution test (Immigration and Asylum Act 1999). The ‘no-choice dispersal’ approach led to a significant increase in the number and diversity of people seeking asylum in Wales (Payson 2015, 239), tripling from 3,565 in 1999 to 12,500 in 2009 (Payson 2015). Wales currently has six designated asylum dispersal areas: Cardiff, Caerphilly, Conwy, Swansea, Newport and Wrexham. As of December 2022, Wales hosts a total of 7,638 asylum seekers supported under Section 95 of the Act (WSMP 2022). Between 2019 and 2022, 459 individuals were resettled in Wales via various UK resettlement schemes (UK Government 2022b).

In 2012, erstwhile UK Home Secretary Theresa May announced her plan to create a ‘really hostile environment for illegal immigrants in the UK’ (Travis 2013). This built on the increasingly restrictive asylum system implemented since the 1990s, under both Labour and Conservative governments, with the aim of curbing irregular migration and further reducing the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. The ‘hostile environment’ policy is implemented through the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts and bolstered by secondary legislation, guidance documents and measures adopted by the Home Office and its partner agencies.⁴ Together, they include measures that limit access to work, housing, health care, bank accounts and legal representation, reduce and restrict rights of appeal against Home Office decisions, and simplify the removal process. They have also embedded immigration control within a range of public and private services.

For example, the Immigration Act 2014 imposed financial penalties of up to £3000 on landlords who failed to check a potential tenant's ‘Right to Rent’.⁵ The Immigration Act 2016, also passed by the Conservative government, goes even further, creating the new offence of ‘renting accommodation to “disqualified” migrants’ (Section 39), giving landlords new powers to terminate tenancy agreements (Section 40) and obtain possession (Section 41) without judicial oversight (Tai Pawb 2016, 7).⁶ The Immigration Act 2014 (Section 38) also saw the introduction of the ‘hostile environment’ into the National Health Service (NHS) with the introduction of an ‘immigration health surcharge’ for ‘overseas visitors’, which restricted free health services to those with indefinite (permanent residence) in the UK. The 2016 Immigration Act further tightened the prescriptions of the 2014 Act and included tougher and more punitive measures. Its aim was to:

to tackle illegal working, enhance the enforcement of labour market rules, deny illegal migrants access to services including housing and banking, provide new powers for immigration officers, as well as other measures to improve the security and operation of the immigration system. (Immigration Act 2016).

It is expected that ‘without access to work, illegal migrants will depart voluntarily, but where they do not, the Act contains other measures to support enforced removals’ (Immigration Act 2016). The 2016 Act also amended the Immigration Act 1971 to introduce a new criminal offence of ‘illegal working’ and increased the penalties for those who repeatedly and knowingly employ ‘illegal’ migrants. It also established a new ‘immigration skills charge’ for employers that wish to bring certain workers into the UK (Immigration Act 2016).

In April 2022, as part of the Conservative government's New Plan for Immigration (Nationality and Borders Bill 2021), the new Nationality and Borders Act 2022 was enacted to ‘fix the broken asylum system’ (UK Government 2022a). It has three key objectives:

to make the system fairer and more effective so that we can better protect and support those in genuine need of asylum; to deter illegal entry into the UK breaking the business model of criminal trafficking networks and saving lives; and, to remove from the UK those with no right to be here. (UK Parliament 2021).

The legislation also increases the penalty for ‘illegal’ entry from 6 months’ to 4 years’ imprisonment; introduces life sentences for people-smugglers; introduces expedited processes (including in detention) to allow rapid removal of those with ‘no right’ to be in the UK; introduces reception centres for asylum seekers and ‘failed’ asylum seekers (to replace hotels) while their claims and returns are being processed; and provides the UK government's Border Force with additional powers. Critics argue that the Act's provisions will further criminalise asylum and create two tiers of refugees based on how they entered the UK. Those who arrive in the UK after passing through a third country or without a pre-agreed legal route will receive a lower standard of protection. The act also seeks to redefine a number of thresholds that relate to standards in the UN Refugee Convention such as the standard of proof for establishing that an asylum seeker has a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution (Refugee Council 2022). The Act also enacts ‘offshore processing’ where asylum seekers whose claims are inadmissible can be removed to a ‘safe third country’. Despite being widely condemned, in April 2022, the UK and Rwanda announced a new Migration and Economic Development Partnership, leading to Rwanda receiving asylum seekers whose claims are ‘inadmissible in the UK’ (UK Government 2022a).

The UK asylum dispersal and reception system is highly centralised (Phillips 2006, 542, 544; Glorius, Doomernik, and Darling 2016, 486), making it difficult for the Welsh government and local authorities to have any impact on decision-making.⁷ Nevertheless, asylum governance in the UK is characterised by a multi-agency network operating at various governmental levels. Immigration and citizenship, including the granting of asylum, income support, accommodation and access to the labour market all fall under the responsibility of the UK government. Nevertheless, under the devolution settlement, the Senedd can legislate in certain policy areas that intersect with reception policy, such as the provision of housing, welfare benefits, education, healthcare and social services.⁸ These services and policies are implemented and delivered by various actors such as local authorities, third-sector organisations and private providers.

Although the Welsh government does not have an explicit role in administering asylum dispersal, it has been able to play a role in resettlement programmes, such as the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (SRVP), by providing ‘strong political leadership and garnering senior level support and resolution of strategic/policy issues, to underpin the work of Welsh local authorities’ (WSMP 2016, 2–3). Given that welfare and immigration policies are interwoven, and that the Welsh government possesses competencies in key areas that impact on the daily lives of refugees and/or asylum seekers (such as social housing, education, formation), the Welsh government has been described as ‘the middle person’ (Senedd Cymru 2017, 16).

Consequently, in recent years, the Welsh government has sought to work within the confines of a hostile environment and carve out its own role in sanctuary support within its own areas of devolved competency, highlighting its ability to resist and counterbalance state policies (Payson 2015, 250). As will be explored in the next section, the Welsh government has implemented a number of initiatives and policy interventions, implemented as part of the national strategy for Prosperity for All (Welsh Government 2017), an ESOL Policy for Wales (Welsh Government 2018) and the Welsh government's Nation of Sanctuary Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan (Welsh Government 2019a). Together, these policies set a strong basis for improving integration outcomes in Wales (Chick and Hannagan-Lewis 2019, 5). Thus, while Karamanidou and Folley (2020, 20) argue that there is ‘little scope for the development of distinct legal and policy frameworks at the regional or municipal levels in the field of migration’, the Welsh government has been able to devise policies that impact on the daily lives of migrants, including those without access to public benefits and housing assistance as a result of their immigration status.

5. The potential and limitations of symbolic sanctuary policies

This section explores the potential and limitations of the Welsh commitment to become an NoS. It first examines the NoS declaration as a discursive act that leads to both a consolidating narrative and to substantive measures. Second, it evaluates the Welsh government's sanctuary policies and reveals the frustration of the Welsh third sector at the piecemeal approach, and their desire for more tangible and ambitious actions.

The analysis shows how regions, such as Wales, in the absence of formal legislative competency, rely on symbolic policies to engage with asylum. Discursive sanctuary provides a powerful counternarrative to restrictive state frameworks and allows regional governments to position themselves as an ally to those supporting refugees and asylum seekers. It also facilitates concerted action on the part of various governmental and non-governmental actors within the region, which can then result in concrete policies and measures. Nevertheless, symbolic sanctuary is fragile and its transposition into real policies and measures inconsistent.

5.1 The symbolic power of discursive sanctuary

This section explores the mechanisms that led the Welsh government to promote a narrative of sanctuary and how this was employed to strengthen Wales’ identity in opposition to the UK, as well as to mobilise and signal alliance with governmental and non-governmental actors working to support refugees and asylum seekers in Wales. First, it highlights that a combination of factors enabled the development of the NoS narrative: inputs from civil society organisations in Wales, debates around the topic of migration against the backdrop of Brexit and the UK government's ‘hostile environment’ policy, the presence of the far-right Eurosceptic party, UKIP, in the Senedd during the ELGCC's 2016 consultation on refugees and asylum seekers,⁹ and the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’.¹⁰ Second, it shows how the NoS discourse in Wales mobilised further collaboration between civil society organisations in Wales. Overall, this section shows the symbolic and transformative power of the sanctuary discourse.

In 2010, a community of people came together to establish the ‘Swansea City of Sanctuary’ group to make the first ‘City of Sanctuary’ (CoS) group in Wales and the second in the UK.¹¹ Since then, other Welsh cities and towns have committed to welcoming refugees and people seeking sanctuary, providing them with support and dignity as part of the larger UK CoS movement. Largely influenced by the CoS campaign, the Welsh Refugee Coalition (WRC) embraced the sanctuary concept and included it as an aim within their ‘Seven Steps to Sanctuary’ programme (WRC 2016, 3; Interviews 2, 6), which was used ahead of the 2016 Welsh Senedd elections to influence Welsh politicians (2016: 3).¹² The third sector's vision of creating an NoS in Wales was galvanised through the WRC's work and was fundamental to the concept gaining political momentum. This led to verbal cross-party commitments to establish Wales as an NoS during pre-election hustings, which were then used to hold the Labour government to account once they had been elected (Interview 2).¹³

Following the 2016 elections, the Senedd's ELGCC undertook stakeholder consultations on refugees and asylum seekers, which revealed the Syrian refugee crisis as a key priority for respondents (Interview 1). The 2016 Welsh election saw seven UKIP members take seats in the Senedd, resulting in an unfamiliar political make-up (Interview 1). Significantly, the presence of a UKIP member on the ELGCC (Interview 15) and the fact that he was ‘aggressively against immigration, full stop. No refugees, no asylum seekers’ sparked a response amongst committee members. Those members who disagreed with the UKIP member's alternative report felt compelled to be stronger in their support for immigration and asylum, like a magnetic repulsion (Interview 1). Similarly: ‘That chemical reaction I was talking about with UKIP, kinda the same applies to the UK government's hostile environment’ (Interview 1).

The work of the ELGCC was also largely influenced by Brexit and the post-immigration narrative in Wales:

I think as the post-Brexit immigration narrative played out they became bolder and bolder in saying ‘this is not what we believe. We are not willing to go along with this’. I think the post-Brexit immigration paper the Welsh government published in like 2017, I think it was, actually that was phenomenal, there was research, there was a pretty bold vision, there was a policy, not an action plan. They’re acknowledging ‘this is a non-devolved thing, but it does not mean it is not a huge part of our economy, society, everything. We are going to have a view on it’. (Interview 1)

There was a sense that, because Wales voted in favour of Brexit, it was important to send out a clear narrative that Wales is a welcoming place to all migrants and to influence those holding racist, xenophobic or hostile views (Interview 15). The NoS term took hold quite early in the committee's conversations (Interview 1) and the committee perceived it as a powerful narrative, which would set the tone for subsequent positive action and allow the Senedd and government to carve out a specific Welsh approach to refugees and asylum seekers:

So, you know, we just felt that under the umbrella of being a Nation of Sanctuary sent such a strong message, really, and sets the tone for everything else. […] I think we felt that Nation of Sanctuary would really move things forward in terms of the way we approach these matters in Wales. […] We felt those things together would put us in a much better position and hopefully we can move on from there. (Interview 15)

The all-encompassing nature of the concept appealed to the Senedd’s ELGCC, as did the fact that it would provide a focal point for the Welsh government:

I think there was a discussion in terms of the power of the term really, capturing. It sort of speaks for itself in many ways, in terms of popular understandings, I think, doesn't it? […] We would provide such a strong focus for government and other agencies and hopefully make asylum seekers and refugees, you know, feel that it did mean something and, you know, they actually were in a country that was welcoming and we did want to help them. (Interview 15)

Adopting such as powerful phrase also allowed members of the ELGCC, notably Plaid Cymru Members of Senedd, to delimit a specific Welsh approach to sanctuary that stood in contradistinction to the UK government:

I don't think there was ever a good understanding of what it meant [Nation of Sanctuary]. I think it was a really good … it was a really attractive political phrase. It was attached to current events in a very real way. I think for Plaid (Cymru) in particular, the nation having a separate identity on something was very attractive as well. (Interview 1)

This shows that the term ‘sanctuary’ was deliberately chosen for its symbolic power; it is referred to as a vague term that nevertheless engenders a positive response from the public and from refugees and asylum seekers. Combining the term ‘sanctuary’ with ‘nation’ further highlights the distinctiveness of Wales within the UK.

The ELGCC's subsequent report, ‘I used to be someone’ (Senedd Cymru 2017, 7) included a recommendation to make Wales an NoS by using the powers available to them (Senedd Cymru 2017, 57–58). In 2019, the Welsh government published its ‘Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan’ (Welsh Government 2019a, 3), which was presented as a ‘major milestone on a longer journey which will drive us towards becoming a true Nation of Sanctuary’. While the concept of Wales as an NoS was ‘little more than a pipedream’ in 2015 (DPIA 2016, 2), the Welsh government's declaration of intent was the fruit of concerted efforts by third-sector organisations.¹⁴ The Welsh government's 2019 plan was co-produced by the executive with significant input from refugee and asylum seeker support organisations, public sector organisations, and refugees and asylum seekers. Thus, the Welsh approach to sanctuary is based on collaboration between a range of stakeholders across local, national and state levels. Despite the concept taking root politically and socially in Wales, neither the Senedd nor the Welsh government has provided a solid definition of the concept in their respective plans. This lack of clarity extends to the Welsh third sector, with key individuals developing their own definitions loosely based on being welcoming, providing support and facilitating integration. This further underlines that the symbolic power of the term, rather than its practical application, is what makes it salient. Its malleability means that it can also be used instrumentally:

I mean it is going to mean different things to different people of course so that's kind of that's where having a loose vision is so, I mean it's brilliant having a loose vision that everyone can work towards and everyone feels part of really is you know it's for someone like me who's passionate about movement building is a dream, you know. That's what's so exciting that Wales could be a Nation of Sanctuary because we've got this loose concept, we’ve got committed people wanting it to happen. (Interview 6)

The term is powerful in that it captures the Welsh government's commitment to a specific vision of the territory and its intention to distinguish itself from the UK. This power became evident in 2020 when the UK Home Office used emergency planning powers to house asylum seekers in the disused Penally military camp in Pembrokeshire (west Wales) without Welsh government consent. The move prompted immediate and robust criticism from campaigners and politicians on a local and Wales-wide level, and became the subject of local protests and intense scrutiny, including media coverage. The Welsh government objected to the scheme on the basis that it was unsafe and inappropriate as asylum accommodation and posed inherent risks due to the operational model being implemented.¹⁵ In addition, it was argued that using the camp contradicted the NoS approach and ‘has undermined our ability to implement an effective migrant integration policy, as set out in our Nation of Sanctuary plan’ (Jane Hutt, Deputy Minister and Chief Whip, Welsh Government 2021a). The Welsh government also perceived the use of Penally as negatively impacting on policy areas that fall under the Welsh government's competency, such as integration, community cohesion, local government and health, and argued for a full exploration of how the asylum system should operate in a devolved context. In November 2020, the Senedd agreed a motion that the Home Office should reconsider its decision to accommodate asylum seekers at Penally, calling for the closure of the Penally camp and the relocation of asylum seekers ‘to alternative accommodation which can properly cater for their needs, respect their dignity, and help them to progress their asylum applications’. The Welsh government and other actors in Wales also threatened the UK government with a judicial review (Interviews 11, 14, 16). Penally closed in March 2021, six months after opening, and asylum seekers were rehoused in other locations. This incident highlights the power of the sanctuary narrative and the way in which it was used to mobilise concerted action in Wales. Interviewees working in various sectors and governance levels perceive Penally as an example of positive collaboration between actors in Wales, and an example of an NoS at work:

It closed because of the considerable pressure being applied from … let's just say there was pressure coming from all sorts of places. There was pressure coming from Welsh government, there was pressure coming from the Welsh Local Government Association, there would have been pressure coming from the Welsh NHS [National Health Service] confederation [sic.], there would have been pressure coming from the police and crime commissioners, there would have been pressure coming from the chief constables, particularly Dyfed-Powys police. And in that respect, it was a concerted effort of pressure, and it was very, in that sense, in that working towards a Nation of Sanctuary message, was coming home. (Interview 16)

Interviewees also noted that a military camp opened in Kent (England) to house asylum seekers at the same time as Penally, and that it is still operating. They see this contrast as an example of NoS success and the strength of Welsh civil society (Interview 3, 4). Thus, the NoS concept is used as a tool to catalyse action in Wales. This was also in evidence during the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in 2016 and the creation of the Syrian resettlement scheme.

More recently, it has been used to engender and bolster concerted efforts, referred to as ‘Team Wales’, in response to the Afghan resettlement scheme (Interview 14). In September 2021, the Urdd Gobaith Cymru, a Welsh voluntary youth organisation, provided urgent temporary accommodation for asylum seekers from Afghanistan by housing them in their residential centre in Cardiff. For a period of five months, the organisation provided accommodation and meals, along with language classes, sport, arts and educational activities to 24 Afghan families (111 individuals, 73 of whom were children) as part of the UK resettlement scheme. While the idea originated within the organisation, under the guidance of activists and experienced individuals, the Welsh government and the Welsh First Minister, Mark Drakeford, were instrumental in convincing the UK's Home Office of its suitability as alternative accommodation. In addition, the Welsh government acted in an advisory capacity and facilitated links with partner organisations (Interview 19). One interviewee noted that, despite being a buzzword, the NoS ‘brand’ was instrumental in bringing about this unique arrangement, which activists have hailed as ‘world-leading’:

The NoS brand sends positive messages to refugees who are about to arrive in Wales and alleviates fears that they would be unwelcome and unwanted. It's been valuable that someone in the Welsh government has created this brand because we’ve been able to reinforce that and say, Welsh people want you.(Interview 19)

Welsh government statements regarding asylum seekers and refugees emphasise pride in being an NoS and often refer to Welsh values and the fact that the wider UK government approach is encroaching on equality, human rights, inclusivity and cohesion (Welsh Government 2021b). This also feeds into a narrative of standing up for those that need safeguarding: ‘Wales is a welcoming nation and we will always stand with those who need us the most. We want the UK government to change course and to advance – not diminish – the legal, equitable and moral standing of the United Kingdom’ (Welsh Government 2021b).

Hence the notion of the NoS has the power to strengthen a shared identity among actors and the Welsh public, with the Welsh government at its centre:

Put a bit of a (sic.) arms (sic.) around Wales and say no, that's not who we are. And they were particularly strong with them, on the camp in Penally, there was a really strong push back on that which was great to see you know when you know everyone in the sanctuary movement certainly were like really proud, I think, to live in Wales at that time because you know Welsh government were really strong against that, so that was good to see. (Interview 2)

Moreover, the Welsh third sector has used the commitment to NoS to hold the Welsh government to account (Interview 2) and pursue a dialogue rooted in the discourse of sanctuary rather than hostility. Beyond Wales, it also allows the third sector to portray Wales and the Welsh government as holding values that oppose those espoused by the UK government:

I suppose outside Wales then we would use it as something to be proud of ‘look at Wales, we’re different’, and we are different, so I think that's well deserved […] and it gives us something inside Wales to continue to push on things that they still haven't done. […] I think it's just you know at UK-level meetings it's useful to flag that Wales is a Nation of Sanctuary and then, I think, that's the main thing really that counterparts across the rest of the UK look to Wales I guess as obviously – it's not all rosy – but they looked to Wales as a more welcoming place because Welsh government have signed up to be a more welcoming place. (Interview 2)

In this respect, the term ‘sanctuary’ positions the Welsh government as a ‘guardian’ of Welsh values and as a ‘buffer’ to the UK's hostile environment. Claims of being an NoS also have international relevance and allow the Welsh government to present Wales as different to the UK government. The NoS narrative also portrays Wales as an outward-looking, inclusive nation to an international audience. When first adopted by the Welsh government, this was an important element:

There was a whole thing about let's take Wales to the international. Let's still be in Europe, kind of thing. Let's remind Brussels that Wales still wants to be in the discussions. I think there was a lot of, at the time, thinking around, how is Wales viewed internationally as wanting to be an NoS? That's also world-leading, in that respect. I don't know how that's playing out now. It was deliberately symbolic, I think, because it was trying to say, ‘we’re trying to do something that signals that we’re Wales versus the rest of the UK. We’re different, we’re doing this. Join with us, we want to be the first Nation of Sanctuary’. (Interview 17)

These interviews show how important the NoS concept is as a symbolic tool in Wales. As a form of discursive sanctuary, it allows the Welsh government to present itself as an influential actor and leader, to promote and safeguard specific Welsh values, and to strengthen the narrative of a distinctive Welsh nation that is outward-looking and inclusive, in contrast to the UK government's restrictive and exclusive policies. It has also proved to be an important focal point for cohesive action between governmental and non-governmental actors in the field.

5.2. Regional sanctuary as symbolic policy

The following section focusses specifically on Welsh government policies aimed at mediating the impact of the ‘hostile environment’ policy on refugees and asylum seekers. It argues that some of the Welsh government's initiatives contravene the UK government's Home Office approach by providing public services to migrants. However, this section also argues that the Welsh government's policies are symbolic in their aim. First, we show how the Welsh government works within the confines of its legislative competency, grouping a patchwork of initiatives together under the discursive frame of NoS. Second, we highlight how the power of the NoS concept can eclipse what is going on in practice.

The Welsh government's approach to asylum governance is not a consistent and coherent policy, but is scattered around policy fields such as health, education, welfare, and access to the labour market and political participation. One key policy field where the Welsh government has taken a stance is healthcare. While refugees and asylum seekers can access free NHS services in the UK once they have formally applied for leave to remain,¹⁶ Wales has legislated to extend this to those whose application has been refused, as long as they stay in Wales:

Far from being a hostile environment for charging, there are in Wales a number of exemptions for overseas visitors, particularly for those patients from vulnerable groups, to ensure that they can access the NHS treatment they require without charge. Some NHS services are also free of charge to everyone regardless of a patient's residency status. (Welsh Government 2021c)¹⁷

In addition, NHS Wales pursues a ‘firewall’ approach by not routinely sharing details with the Home Office or other agencies for immigration enforcement purposes (Interview 17); while the Home Office shares information on a patient's immigration status with the NHS, there is no reciprocal obligation. NHS Wales only needs to provide information to the Home Office or external agencies if they receive a court order, or if action is required for the prevention and detection of crime (Welsh Government 2021c). However, there is a lack of guidance for those working in the field and our research highlighted frustration amongst healthcare professionals and confusion among policy-makers and practitioners, given that the Welsh government is unable to ‘provide a guarantee that patient data is not shared outside of the NHS’ (Interview 7).

As of 2019, the Welsh government has also made the Discretionary Assistance Fund, which supports individuals who are in financial hardship, available to all individuals, including refugees and asylum seekers, experiencing destitution (Welsh Government 2019b). Similarly, the Welsh government recently provided training to staff in public authorities around individuals who are ineligible for UK-level public benefits and housing assistance as a result of their immigration status. A key aim of the training was to encourage staff to adopt a more rounded view of the individual and their needs, rather than focussing on their immigration status (Interview 14):

And no recourse to public funds¹⁸ might mean you can't provide this specific scheme or that specific scheme, but there will always be something you can do for that person, whether or not that's providing something through discretionary funding, whether or not it's referring to a third-sector partner who isn't kind of bound by the same rules, or the very least getting us to the case study and sharing it with us and sharing it with the Home Office of examples of where the [UK NRPF] policy is flawed. (Interview 14)

With regard to integration policy, Wales claims to offer ‘Integration from Day One’, which implies that access to language services are available to all, irrespective of immigration status. The ‘ReStart: Refugee Integration’ project also aims to improve access to language tuition, employability support and local cultural knowledge to aid refugee integration (Welsh Government, 2020).¹⁹ The fact that this takes place on a regional level is unique:

The ReStart project that we do around employability or the Migrant Integration Wales project […] You know, there's a lot more to be done, but we put in place a lot and I think all of that … almost none of that is available in the rest of the UK. Like I say, there is part of that in Scotland and you will find pockets of it in England, you know. But where you find pockets of it in England it won't be directed by the Home Office, or even the Department for Levelling Up. It’ll be something that locally they’ve decided it's a no-brainer. (Interview 14)

The Welsh government also funds the Asylum Rights Programme, run by the Welsh Refugee Council in collaboration with a further six NGOs. It aims to:

challenge incorrect decisions made by housing providers and the Home Office including supporting appeals at Tribunal; support people to complain about unsafe, insecure or damp asylum accommodation, and provide vital support to homeless asylum seekers giving urgent financial assistance in the short term, and identifying pathways back into accommodation and financial support. (NACCOM 2022)

The Welsh government also funds Asylum Justice, which is the only organisation in Wales (and one of the last remaining in the United Kingdom) to provide free legal representation for asylum seekers up to and including court level (Asylum Justice 2023).

These substantive initiatives are strengthened by further regional and local measures such as the Senedd and Elections (Wales) Act 2020 and the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021, which allow individuals who have been granted refugee status or leave to remain in the UK to vote in the Welsh parliament/Senedd Cymru and local elections (Senedd Cymru 2020; Senedd Cymru 2021).²⁰ The Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020 (Senedd Cymru 2020; Senedd Cymru 2021) extended similar voting rights to individuals with refugee status and leave to remain in the UK. It is the case in both Scotland and Wales that those with a pending asylum applications are not eligible to vote in elections. Conversely, refugees in England and Northern Ireland are unable to vote in local elections,²¹ and refugees and asylum seekers are excluded from voting in the UK parliamentary elections.

5.3. Limits and shortcomings of symbolic sanctuary in Wales

Analysis of the interviews, however, highlighted that these substantive measures lag far behind the bold narrative of sanctuary. Both governmental and non-governmental actors expressed frustration and concern that the NoS risks being reduced to a soundbite, meaningless for those it was meant to protect (Interview 18). This concern initially arose among WRC members and CoS groups when the Senedd and Welsh government adopted the concept:

I think the Labour-led government obviously wants to deliberately set themselves apart from the UK government's approach, and some of these statements are very much – seem to be designed to be very, you know, clear and perhaps a bit provocative about that difference. Some of it is being … you can see that they just like to say, ‘Well, we are a Nation of Sanctuary’. Some of it just seems designed to be kind of a good thing to say in the Senedd chamber. I just think when whenever there's an opportunity to really translate it into policy it doesn't happen. Like an invisible kind of element of resistance to doing that, so unfortunately, I don't think it does. […] I would really like to see in terms of that that public Welsh government's commissioning power, their spending power, that you know that they would really build into all of their contracts and require like a social contract requirement to … you know, this percentage of their spend has to benefit people from minority and/or refugee, migrant backgrounds for example. There's lots of ways that they can make sure that their money has the impact that … you know, that is actually delivering the vision that they claim to have. (Interview 9)

Third-sector organisations are calling for an overarching, concrete strategy that connects with other departments within the Welsh government and with initiatives on a local, town and city level (Interview 6, 10, 17), instead of a high-level plan that ‘doesn't invite a huge amount to happen’ (Interview 17). This reflects wider disparities between statements and measures:

And to make Wales a Nation of Sanctuary you can have as many ministers stand up as possible, you can say Wales is a Nation of Sanctuary, but actually until you work in communities to alleviate those fears, ensure people understand, build those friendships and solidarity, then we’re never going to become a Nation of Sanctuary and none of that is in this strategy, we haven't got a strategy, we’ve got an action plan and a Welsh government action plan. So, you know it's kind of this is real disconnect between kind of, yes you know, positive messages of welcome and some good actions in the action plan, but there's no strategy as to how we’re going to actually become a Nation of Sanctuary […] (Interview 6)

There are also concerns that sanctuary actions and the Welsh government’s vision are largely personality-driven (Interview 9) and galvanised by a handful of committed civil servants, rather than being mainstreamed throughout all governmental departments:

In the same way that we talk about equality and diversity, and it's stuck on the end of agendas and we get to that point and we think ‘what are we going to do about that’. I haven't even seen the Nation of Sanctuary plan on any agendas. Not at a strategic level. (Interview 17)

Governmental and non-governmental actors in Wales want to see structural, systemic changes rather than cosmetic changes that ‘tinker around the edges’ (Interviews 11, 17):

It doesn't really impact on most of the day-to-day asylum work. I mean, there's bits and bobs, it's this tinkering around the edges. As I say, there's some nice stuff on the website, you know, a bit of some funding here and there, like the asylum rights project. But it doesn't plug the holes in asylum advice. It's not enough to plug the gaps, we ran out of lawyers years ago, capacity massively outstrips demand [sic.], we don't have that. So, I don't think it makes much of an impact on most people seeking sanctuary in Wales (Interview 11).

In a similar vein, governmental and non-governmental actors feel the Welsh government could do much more within their devolved policy areas by mainstreaming the issue and creating a holistic strategy. The lack of movement in policy areas such as transport and education has led to a suspicion that the concept is primarily symbolic rather than a means to get ‘really down to the root of some of the problems in the system’ (Interview 11). Furthermore, there are concerns that the Welsh government's recent Race Equality Action Plan has become the new priority, overshadowing commitments to sanctuary:

This is just the latest thing to be more excited about. It's newer, and shinier. That always happens in government anyway. They always find something that they all pile up on, and then they talk about it, present it, and then don't actually implement it. It is the age-old implementation gap. (Interview 9)

Moreover, interviewees noted that a compelling concept can mask the reality on the ground. For example, the NoS concept was brandished when all 22 Welsh local authorities committed to the Syrian resettlement scheme. However, some local authorities only received a handful of families (Interview 11):

Some of the commitments made – Syria – every LA [local authority] said yes – that was really driven by the Welsh government – lots of narrative, we are playing our part, the summits set up by Carwyn Jones. But then […] people are arriving here every day, people are coming through the dispersal process, UAs [unaccompanied asylum-seeking children], we don't take any of them really. It is a drop in the ocean. If you go to Kent, they’re dealing with 900 a day, we haven't even got 900 [overall in Wales]. That's where it falls away in terms of the great and ‘up there’ and really positive. (Interview 17)

Hence, although the Welsh government is publicly committed to becoming an NoS, its concrete policy measures are fragmentary and lack a holistic strategy. This is further compounded by a narrow focus on certain categories of migrants. An NoS sends a message of inclusivity, ‘that everybody, in my mind, feels safe, feels included, feels part of, that this is their home, whatever what way you want to cut it’ (Interview 17), but in reality, there is a focus on recent refugees and asylum seekers, or those coming through resettlement schemes. This ultimately excludes refugees and asylum seekers that have been in Wales for some time, as well as irregular migrants and individuals without recourse to public funds (Interviews 7, 10, 11):

Where are the Vietnamese kids? The Albanian kids? I look outside the part of the discourse and with refugees that it focusses on major disasters; so, a refugee is someone who flees war. Now, apart from being legally wrong, that discourse also creates a two-tier system, so to get to the people who are fleeing because of sexuality, because of religion, or people actually come into the refugee convention and they’re the ones who slip under the carpet because everyone's looking at Syria, everyone's looking at Afghanistan and no one is looking at Albania and I think that that's engagement, that real sort of understanding of who's around, what the problems are and what they need. (Interview 11)

Furthermore, the Welsh government uses the term ‘person seeking sanctuary’ or ‘sanctuary seeker’ as an umbrella term for migrants of various immigration statuses as a means of detoxifying the language used in relation to asylum seekers (Interview 1). While this suggests that sanctuary policy in Wales is inclusive and all-encompassing, it is somewhat misleading given that not all migrants in Wales have access to the same rights, protection and services. This catch-all term obfuscates vital differences between migrants and is quite unhelpful practically (Interview 1). More importantly, there is a risk of replicating the UK government narratives and measures that bifurcate migrants into ‘deserving’ and ‘un-deserving’ categories (Interviews 1, 17). For one interviewee, the sanctuary discourse maintains a hierarchy that renders some vulnerable groups more ‘invisible’ than they were before (Interview 7). While some asylum seekers and refugees in Wales must be protected, irregular migrants can still be deported under the UK asylum system. In fact, the sanctuary sector in Wales largely overlooks irregular migrants, and hence creates a hierarchy of deservingness. Furthermore, the failure to enact meaningful measures undermines the symbolic power of the narrative.

How does Westminster view it? When they look across and go, ‘Wales as an Nation of Sanctuary’. I don't think they understand what that means. They see it very much as a symbolic. Wales is just trying to be different. Trying to do ‘we’re sanctuary, and you’re not’. When it gets to that territory it starts to feel a little more symbolic than having much teeth because if I was in Westminster, I’d say, ‘well, they can't because they haven't got the levers. They haven't got the policy. They haven't got the legislation to be able to do anything about the courts, the tribunals, the accommodation provision’. The first stage of the process. The process itself, you know. ‘They can do this that or the other, but you’re never going to be a Nation of Sanctuary, are you, unless you’ve got all of that.’ Boomph! ‘And you’re not having it’. (Interview 17)

The divergence between values and actions together with legislative limitations has engendered a feeling that Wales cannot become a true NoS under the current political system. Nevertheless, the Welsh Government seeks to make the best use of, and constantly expand, its room for manoeuvre through small steps and piecemeal policies:

If we had control over, you know, asylum support and no recourse to public funds […] the issues that we’re discussing would have been resolved by now, because it would all be within our remit and our gambit to be able to influence. The problem here is where we have to tread carefully when we’re engaging with another layer of government who we know have a very different view of the cohort that we’re trying to help. Our stakeholders want to help, but we’re not convinced that that layer of government wants to help. […] But I think from our perspective it's a really difficult balancing act for us to tread. (Interview 14)

At the same time, Wales is making no attempt to gain legislative competency in immigration policy areas.

They, they being the Welsh government, have got no aspiration for immigration as a policy area […] so even though, we’re kind of espousing this Nation of Sanctuary, we’re not politically saying, at the moment, certainly, I’m not hearing it, that there is any aspiration to have any more power around that system. So that's the first problem in my eyes because how on earth can you do that then because you’re always going to have to fall back on, ‘well, we can't do that bit, we can do this bit, we can't do that bit’. (Interview 17)

Taken together, the lack of formal legislative competency and the failure to maximise existing opportunities make the NoS symbol somewhat fragile and hollow.

6. Conclusion

This article has evaluated the Welsh commitment to sanctuary using the lens of symbolic policymaking. To date, Wales is the first and only European region to officially commit to sanctuary on a regional level. While this commitment is the result of several factors, the main driver was unease among Welsh civil society, especially third-sector organisations and certain local authorities, about the UK's ‘hostile environment’ policy. Inspired by the wider CoS movement, Welsh NGOs (especially the WRC) were able to promote the notion of sanctuary and influence the Welsh government through consultations with the Senedd's ELGCC. The article reveals how symbolic sanctuary emerged as a response to the UK's ‘hostile environment’ policy and was influenced by the presence of UKIP politicans in the Senedd. In doing so, the article traces the development of symbolic policy making and furthers our understanding of the various factors at play in sanctuary narratives on a regional level.

The article has argued that there has never been a concrete definition nor a shared understanding of what ‘sanctuary’ would mean in the Welsh context. The fuzziness of the concept highlights its symbolic power; it allows the concept to be shaped by multiple interpretations, while at the same time sending a powerful message of inclusivity to political and social actors, both within Wales and externally to the central UK government. Moreover, the NoS concept highlights the distinctiveness of Wales within the UK, underpinning Welsh regional identity and shared values.

In this sense, the Welsh NoS is largely symbolic. We argue that the process of becoming a NoS, formalised in documents such as ‘Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan’ (Welsh Government 2019a) is a form of discursive practice that distinguishes Wales from the rest of the UK. We argue that such discursive practices also create a joint interpretative framework, which facilitates collaboration between governmental and non-governmental actors and unites them around a common vision. Moreover, the Welsh government was able to position itself as an ally to third-sector organisations and local authorities, and in opposition to the UK Home Office. The Welsh government's role as ‘guardian’ of Welsh values and ‘protector’ of sanctuary was particularly evident during the Penally affair.

Beyond pure symbolism, the government of Wales has enacted a number of individual policies within areas of devolved competency, including healthcare, welfare and political participation. However, critics point to unused potential in sectors such as transport, housing and education, highlighting the need for a holistic approach that mainstreams the concept of sanctuary across all policy fields. While each individual policy has an impact upon refugees and asylum seekers’ lives, their piecemeal nature fails to challenge systemic inequalities, discrimination and destitution.

Symbolic policies can therefore drive real change by facilitating concerted action and cooperation, but it can also detract from real change by obfuscating substantive issues (see also Humphris 2023). Conversely, observable change can give credence to a narrative, as in the case of the Penally protest, while a lack of concrete action erodes the power of the symbol. We have also highlighted how the ambiguous or malleable nature of symbolic sanctuary can make it very fragile; for example, a different political majority in the Senedd could do without this notion altogether.

Although we show the limitations of sanctuary as a symbolic policy, we argue that Wales has demonstrated a latent potential for regional-level sanctuary policies, perhaps providing a model for other jurisdictions. This article's theoretical and empirical contribution thus extends beyond the Welsh case and offers valuable lessons for scholars interested in the rescaling of sanctuary, in multi-level governance, sub-state nationalism, nation-building and symbolic policymaking. Further studies may seek to evaluate the aim of sanctuary movements, and alternative practices of sanctuary, in light of their symbolic nature.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to all those who made themselves available for interview, Ilaria Signori and Katherine Arena for their invaluable transcription assistance, along with Tiziana Caponio, Andrea Pettrachin, Aiden Selsick and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. The authors thank the Research, Innovation and Universiy Department of the Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano for covering the open access publication costs.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Serrano et al. (2018) are the exception; they study two higher education institutions in California that distributed campus-wide emails addressing the vulnerabilities of immigrant students with a precarious legal status. They interpret this as a ‘symbolic gesture’ that creates a notion of ‘campus as sanctuary’ rather than committing to ‘sanctuary campus’ policies and practices.

2 For a list of interviewees and written responses to the ELGCC's 2016 consultation on refugees and asylum seekers, see the Appendix.

3 The Plan commits to pursuing ‘Nation of Sanctuary’ status by reducing inequalities among people seeking sanctuary, increasing access to opportunities, and improving relations between sanctuary-seeking communities and wider society (Welsh Government 2019a, 2). Key priority areas include: access to health services (including mental health services) throughout the ‘asylum journey’; provision of information and advice to facilitate the integration of sanctuary seekers into Welsh society from day one; access to appropriate Welsh government schemes which would support their integration; preventing destitution; safeguarding all sanctuary seekers (particularly unaccompanied asylum-seeking children) and their access to advocacy support; access to educational opportunities, including language skills, to help them rebuild their lives and fulfil their potential (Welsh Government 2019a).

4 The 2014 Immigration Act was passed under the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government. For more on the changes to immigration and asylum implemented by the Coalition between 2010 and 2015, see: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05829/ (Immigration Act 2014).

5 The Immigration Act 2014 stipulates that these provisions apply to the whole of the UK, but thus far they have only come into force in England.

6 The High Court of Justice ruled the scheme to be incompatible with human rights on 1 March 2019, which initially resulted in the policy not being extended to Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, but the decision was appealed. The Court of Appeal ruled that the Right to Rent scheme is not incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights https://www.wrigleys.co.uk/news/property/are-right-to-rent-checks-a-breach-of-human-rights-/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedIn-integration.

7 The outsourcing of asylum to centralised private providers further limited the power of local authorities (Chick and Hannagan-Lewis 2019).

8 An exception to the devolution of housing policy is asylum accommodation, which resides with the UK Government's Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Home Office).

9 The 2016 Welsh election led to the presence of seven UKIP members in the Senedd, which changed its political make-up anew (Interview 1).

10 Wales’ electoral system is that of a Additional Member System (AMS). Seven members of UKIP were elected to the Senedd in the 2016 elections through the regional lists vote rather than to a constituency seat.

11 For a detailed analysis on the emergence of the City of Sanctuary movement in Swansea, see Bernhardt (2020:, 112–135).

12 Established in 2015, the Welsh Refugee Coalition now comprises of over 50 organisations representing, supporting and housing refugees and asylum seekers in Wales, including all the major Welsh refugee NGOs and others working in Wales with sanctuary seekers. Members of the WRC collaborate in the interests of asylum seekers and refugees to maximise their resources and to speak with one voice on policies and practices affecting people seeking safety in Wales. In 2020, the WRC produced its Manifesto Priorities (WRC 2020). The WRC was the result of increased collaboration between various third sector organisations ahead of the Senedd election in 2016, the Syrian conflict and the subsequent media coverage and outpouring of empathy (Interview 2).

13 More specifically, in their 2016 Welsh Senedd election manifesto, Plaid Cymru committed to ‘seek to make Wales a Nation of Sanctuary for those fleeing war or persecution with a basic level of support provided to help refugees and asylum seekers integrate into Welsh society’ (Plaid Cymru 2016, 163). The Welsh Liberal Democrats promised to: ‘Establish Wales as a Nation of Sanctuary, an open and welcoming place for those in need, and support cities establishing themselves as Cities of Sanctuary’ (2016, 97). The Welsh Conservatives stated that they would ‘Use devolved levers to support, and aid the integration of, asylum seekers and refugees seeking sanctuary’ (Welsh Conservatives 2016, 42). The Wales Green Party promised to: ‘Work with local authorities to house refugees, provide support services for those in need, and ensure they are welcomed into our communities’ (2016, no page number). Despite endorsing and committing to the NoS concept, no references were made to sanctuary, refugees or asylum seekers in the 2016 Welsh Labour Party manifesto.

14 In 2015, the first Sanctuary in the Senedd event was held with the aim of encouraging discussion amongst refugees and asylum seekers, allies, organisations and Senedd Members about making Wales the world's first NoS.

15 In January 2021, the First Minister of Wales called on the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) to undertake an inspection ‘to provide much-needed confidence in the standards in place in the camp’. A report published by the ICIBI and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) following an in-person inspection of Penally and another barracks in February 2021 revealed them to be ‘inadequate’ and ‘unsuitable’, with ‘serious safeguarding concerns’, along with self-harm and mental health issues, and problems how these were handled. The Welsh government shared these concerns. The report concluded that ‘There were fundamental failures of leadership and planning by the Home Office, which had led to dangerous shortcomings in the nature of the accommodation and poor experiences for the residents’ (ICIB 2021, 15). Medical professionals also called on the then Home Secretary to close the two military barracks claiming that that both sites were unsuitable due to the lack of access to healthcare services and risks from a lack of compliance with Covid-19 regulations. The group also voiced their concerns about the risks of trauma for those in the barracks, who may have been detained in similar environments in their home countries.

16 ‘Leave to remain’ is the permission granted to non-UK nationals to enter and stay in the UK for a limited period of time.

17 This currently includes: treatment given in an accident and emergency department or casualty department; family planning services (excluding abortion and infertility treatment); treatment for certain diseases necessary to protect wider public health, including sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and COVID-19; treatment given to people detained under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983; treatment given for mental health problems as part of a court probation order (Welsh Government 2021c).

18 According to the NRPF Network (2021), ‘A person will have no recourse to public funds (NRPF) when they are ‘subject to immigration control’, as defined by Section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. A person who is subject to immigration control cannot claim public funds (benefits and housing assistance) unless an exception applies. A person will be subject to immigration control when they have one of the following types of immigration status: Leave to enter or remain in the UK, which is subject to the ‘no recourse to public funds’ (NRPF) condition; Leave to enter or remain in the UK that is subject to a maintenance undertaking; No leave to enter or remain when they are required to have this. When a person has leave to enter or remain subject to the NRPF condition, the term ‘no public funds’ will be stated on their residence permit, entry clearance vignette, or biometric residence permit (BRP)’. See here: https://www.nrpfnetwork.org.uk/

19 In 2020, the Welsh government (Welsh Government 2020) commissioned research to better understand the local/regional labour market skill gaps and opportunities for refugees to increase their employment prospects within Wales.

20 The Senedd and Elections (Wales) Act 2020 also lowered the minimum voting age for Senedd elections from 18 to 16 and included qualifying foreign nationals. The Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021 also extended the franchise to qualifying foreign nationals for local government elections. Electors of any nationality are now eligible to register to vote in Senedd elections and local government elections, providing they meet the age and residency requirements and that they are not legally incapable of voting. A qualifying foreign national is defined as a person who is neither a Commonwealth citizen, nor a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, and who has or does not require leave to remain or is treated as having leave to enter or remain in the UK (Electoral Commission 2021). Irish and Commonwealth citizens are not included as ‘qualifying foreign nationals’ as they already have voting rights under other regulations.

21 The central UK government has responsibility for setting the criteria for the UK parliamentary franchise and the local government franchise in England and Northern Ireland. The Welsh Senedd and Scottish Parliament are responsible for setting the criteria for the local government franchise in their respective regions.

Appendix

List of interviews

Table

Interview	Type of organisation
1	Welsh parliament
2	Non-governmental
3	Non-governmental
4	Non-governmental
5	Local authority
6	Non-governmental
7	Non-governmental
8	Welsh parliament
9	Non-governmental
10	Governmental
11	Non-governmental
12	Non-governmental
13	Non-governmental
14	Welsh government
15	Welsh parliament
16	Local authority
17	Governmental
18	Local authority
19	Non-governmental

Welsh parliament consultation responses analysed:

1. Oasis

2. Gesajda Asllani, Coleg Sir Gâr

3. The British Psychological Society

4. Newport & District Refugee Support Group

5. Hywel Dda University Health Board

6. Churches Together

7. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Care

8. The Children’s Society

9. Welsh Refugee Council

10. Oxfam Cymru

11. Asylum Justice

12. Hiraeth Hope

13. Estyn

14. Welsh Refugee Coalition

15. British Red Cross

16. Children Displaced Across Borders

17. Tai Pawb

18. Together Creating Communities

19. UNISON

20. Children in Wales

21. City of Sanctuary

22. National Association of Schoolmasters and Women Teachers

23. Hawliau

24. Stonewall Cymru

25. Aneurin Bevan University Health Board

26. Equality and Human Rights

27. Carmarthenshire County Council

28. City and County of Swansea

29. Conwy, Gwynedd and the Isle of Anglesey Local Authorities (north-west Wales)

30. Welsh Women Aid

31. Hay Brecon and Talgarth Refugee Support

32. Welsh Local Government Association

33. Ethnic Youth Support Team

34. The Wales Strategic Migration Partnership

35. Torfaen County Borough Council

36. Public Health Wales

37. The Royal College of Psychiatrists

38. Ceredigion County Council

39. Cardiff and Vale University Health Board

40. Pobl i Bobl

41. Migrant Help

42. Space4U

43. Merthyr Tydfil Housing Association

44. Wrexham County Borough Council

45. University of South Wales

46. Displaced People in Action