https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4151-007X
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ABSTRACT
Building on the notion of the migration state, this article introduces the concepts of ‘migration rent’ and ‘immigration rentier states’ to describe how states that rely heavily on immigration for their wealth derive unearned income from immigration. Both concepts contribute to better understand of the role of migration in the historical transformation of states and the relationship between state, market and society in rentier monarchies and non-rentier states. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative data, I show that the Gulf monarchies, and Saudi Arabia in particular, progressively governmentalized direct and indirect forms of migration rent through migration control and taxation of migrants, both of which were initially brokered by private actors, notably through the kafala or sponsorship system. In doing so, states institutionalise labour market segmentation and differential exclusion of migrants intersecting class, race, nationality, gender, and age. This produces a ‘skill-based order of things’. Rather than outliers, Saudi Arabia offers a magnifying glass that reveals global dynamics of state-led migration control and class-based differential exclusion. Beyond empirical findings, this article thus demonstrates the potential for theoretical innovation in the social sciences based on non-Western polities calling to test the notions of ‘migration rent’ and ‘immigration rentier states’ across contexts.
Acknowledgements
The author first wishes to thank Fiona Adamson for inspiring comments and suggestions, Noora Lori, Erin Chung, Jim Hollifield, Gerasimos Tsourapas and all the participants in the online Rethinking the ‘Migration State’ workshop (Feb. 2022). She expresses her sincere gratitude to Laurence Louër for fruitful conversations. Fieldwork conducted in Saudi Arabia in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017 was financed by the French National Agency for Research through two research programs (ANR-12-GLOB-0004; ANR-10-PDOC-0018 and ANR-18-CE41-0013) and with the institutional support of the Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies (Riyadh).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 The term “social contract” has been debated in the context of the Gulf (POMEPS Citation2019), and I use it metaphorically in a non-democratic context where citizens do not formally agree to the state’s rule (Jones Citation2003).
2 The “rentier state”, as manifested in the Middle East region, represents a significant, yet contentious contribution to political science (Anderson (Citation1987, 9).
3 Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman.
4 See Thiollet (Citation2022a) for a comprehensive historical account. Adamson, Thiollet and Tsourapas (2018) have also shown the commonalities between colonial migration states across the Middle East before under direct and indirect imperial rule.
5 We here borrow the terms adopted by Herb (Citation2014, 10) to characterise extreme and middling oil rentiers.
6 Referring to the negative socio-economic impacts of the discoveries of gas reserves in the Netherlands in 1964, inducing economic and labour market distortions.
7 Yamada and Hertog (Citation2020) published a special issue on rentier states with no mention of migration.
8 Sponsorship exists across the world, both formally and informally, brokering both geographical and social mobility, integration, or exclusion and exploitation. See Bosma, van Nederveen Meerkerk, and Sarkar (Citation2012) for a historical survey, Linquist (2015) for general discussion on brokerage in anthropology.
9 No-objection letters are mandatory in KSA, Qatar, and Oman, and restricted to limited cases in Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain.
10 Interviews, Riyadh, 2006, 2015, and 2017.
11 Workers still had to ask their employer to “leave”. Non-payment of wages as well as abuses remain numerous, despite increased fines and penalties for employers.
12 The Absher and Qiwa online platforms in Saudi Arabia are used to register expatriate workers in private sector establishments. These exclude domestic workers.
13 Interview, Jeddah, 2015.
14 Source: https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/325
16 Source: ILO https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_125871.pdf
17 Interviews, Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, 2015.
18 Interview, Riyadh, 2015.
19 Interview, Riyadh, 2015.
20 Segmentation also depends upon gender and age. While working-age immigrants represent “only” 55% of adults, foreign workers represent around 70% of the total GCC labour force (ILO Citation2022). This discrepancy is caused by two factors: a majority of female GCC nationals are outside the labour force, and unemployment has been relatively high among GCC youth since the 1990s.
22 Interviews with migrants, Riyadh, 2017.