Assessing the domestic political impacts of Turkey’s refugee commodification

ABSTRACT

Refugee commodification, or the use of refugee hosting to extract political and economic concessions, has attracted growing scholarly attention in recent years. Yet, studies tend to focus on its international component, neglecting the domestic political space and how these extractions impact domestic political dynamics. To address this gap, we ask: how does refugee commodification influence domestic politics? Our study focuses on the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Turkey, in order to assess the political implications of refugee commodification within domestic politics. Through a mixed qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews with opposition politicians and an analysis of policy documents, we examine the nexus of international and domestic spheres, assessing how political actors beyond the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) engage in, react to, and employ refugee commodification strategies. The findings of this study have implications beyond Turkey, demonstrating the transformative effects of refugee commodification for domestic politics across Global South states.

KEYWORDS:

• Domestic politics
• migration diplomacy
• opposition parties
• Turkey
• Syrian refugees

1. Introduction

We did not find this homeland in the street, we are not going to let this homeland to the ones who have let 10 million irregular refugees into our lands. Border is honor. […] I call everyone who loves their motherland to vote.

This statement was issued by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of Turkey's main opposition party – People’s Republican Party (CHP) – and a presidential candidate, on Twitter in 2023 following the first round of presidential elections, demonstrating an appeal to nationalist sentiments. His statement marked a salient shift in domestic politics in Turkey. What had once been predominantly an international issue became a driving force of domestic politics, in addition to Turkey’s economic crisis, impacting campaign rhetoric and the positioning of candidates ahead of national elections. As this paper explores, refugee commodification not only influences international and foreign policy dynamics, but also domestic politics.

Refugee commodification refers to the policy decisions of non-Western host states and how host states in the Global South can use migration policy as a bargaining chip to bolster their standing or project international influence (Tsourapas 2017). Refugee commodification can be a way for host states in the Global South to extract material resources and diplomatic gains from countries in the Global North (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; Micinski 2021; Norman 2020; Tsourapas 2017). Freier, Micinski, and Tsourapas (2021) identified an increasing interest in refugee commodification in the Global South through learning (relying on other country’s experiences and adapting behavior), cooperation (developing similar refugee policies at the regional level), and emulation (developing standard practices for refugee management). However, the domestic political impact of migration diplomacy, and more specifically refugee commodification, has been relatively neglected in this burgeoning literature (Irgil, Norman, and Tsourapas 2023). To address this, we ask: how do refugee commodification strategies alter domestic political landscapes?

To address this question, we utilize the case of Turkey, which became a prime example for refugee commodification during the negotiations with the European Union (EU) for the EU-Turkey Deal by the incumbent party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in 2015. Since their arrival began in 2011, Syrian refugees have occupied space within the domestic politics of Turkey. Thus, the increasingly high salience of the topic of refugees within domestic politics makes it a compelling case to analyze the political ramifications of refugee commodification in domestic politics. Within Turkey, we focus specifically on the main opposition party, CHP, and its political behavior from the perceived gain of refugee commodification – in other words, ‘vote seeking strategies’ – in order to come to power. The AKP and CHP are the most salient parties in the Turkish political system and stand to see a direct political gain or loss from refugee commodification. While the AKP has been the leading figure in Turkey’s response to Syrian refugee arrivals, we argue that focusing on the party in power only offers half the picture. Instead, we focus on CHP, which has been the main opposition party in Turkey since 2010. By focusing on the case study of Turkey and its main opposition party, we present a typical case (Gerring 2004), by which our findings may be applicable to other countries, and their opposition parties, in which refugee commodification stands to alter the domestic political landscape.

Addressing domestic politics through the analysis of refugee commodification offers three main insights. First, by studying refugee commodification at the domestic level, we can better understand the conditions under which material gain at the diplomatic or international level manifests itself domestically, and how it alters political dynamics. Second, by elucidating the refugee commodification strategies of domestic political actors, we can gain insight into when and how international decision-making impacts domestic politics. Third, while there are numerous dynamics at play within domestic politics, the findings from this case have the potential to present a compelling theory about the influence of refugee commodification at the domestic level in countries with similar vote-seeking strategies in the Global South.

The article is organized as follows. The subsequent section discusses the literature on migration diplomacy and refugee commodification in the Global South and domestic politics. The third section situates our study within the case of Turkey. The fourth section describes the methodology and the fifth section presents the empirical evidence and our analysis. Lastly, the sixth section discusses the implications of our findings for other countries across the Global South – or North – and discusses the scope conditions of our study.

2. Migration diplomacy and refugee commodification in the global south

The literature on migration diplomacy examines the way that both migrants and refugees can be commodified as a means to extract resources in order to provide economic or diplomatic gains. Migration diplomacy involves the strategic choices made by host states, predominantly in the Global South, to leverage migration policies in order to enhance their status and exert international influence (Tsourapas 2017). Specifically, states in the Global South have used migration diplomacy to alter asymmetrical power relations. Often, migration diplomacy is the act of connecting migration to other policy areas or state interests to gain tangible resources – including financial aid, trade deals, visa liberalization, and other resources – from the Global North. Thus, migration diplomacy can also help us understand the agency of states in the Global South, which has long been underestimated (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; Natter 2018; Norman 2019).

The literature examining the use of migration-related diplomacy toward the EU by its Southern neighbors is expansive, especially in the Mediterranean region (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Wolff 2015), but its use has also been examined by countries toward the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Denmark and other developed countries that are mainly destination countries (Adamson and Greenhill 2023). While migration diplomacy mostly focuses on material gains made by states, more recently Tolay (2022) pointed to the symbolic gains that could be achieved through migration diplomacy in inter-state relations, in which migration diplomacy creates a discursive space during negotiations, potentially altering reputation and status. However, this literature has predominantly focused on gains achieved at the international level, to the neglect of potential domestic gains. To explore how migration diplomacy operates at the domestic level, we turn to the literature on refugee commodification – a subset of migration diplomacy – as well as the literature on vote-seeking strategies within domestic politics.

Refugee commodification is a strategy that states adopt within the realm of migration diplomacy, and can be summarized as state behavior that uses the promise of the containment of refugees within a state’s borders in exchange for material, political, and military resources, shifting the presence of refugees into a negotiation tactic at the international level for migration management (Adamson and Greenhill 2023; Tsourapas 2019). While this creates a question of ‘whether to protect refugees here’ for countries in the Global North, it simultaneously opens up the question about ‘whether to accept’ for countries in the Global South (Aleinikoff and Owen 2022).

Refugee commodification as a strategy became increasingly pronounced in the Mediterranean region following Europe’s 2015 refugee ‘crisis’ (Arar 2017; Tsourapas 2017). Countries hosting Syrian refugees utilized them to demand material gains – mainly financial aid, but also diplomatic concessions – through deals with Europe. Depending on the agreement, different outcomes were prioritized. In exchange for containing refugees within the borders of the countries in the Global South, some countries agreed to projects that benefitted both refugees and citizens, while others negotiated improved labor market access for refugees in order to advance a diplomatic agenda (Adamson and Greenhill 2023; Tsourapas 2017).

Prominent examples of such states are Pakistan, Kenya, Libya, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Mexico, among others from previous decades (Adamson and Greenhill 2023; Micinski 2021). Most recent examples include Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon following the arrival of Syrian refugees (Tsourapas 2019) and many Latin American countries following the arrival of Venezuelan refugees (Freier and Doña-Reveco 2022; Freier, Berganza, and Blouin 2022). These types of deals attempt to prevent ‘unwanted’ refugees from reaching states in the Global North while allowing countries in the Global South to enjoy material and non-material benefits, ultimately creating aid dependency for Global South states with domestic political consequences (Adamson and Greenhill 2023).

Studies focusing on countries in the Global South and their asylum policies can be categorized under two streams. The first stream examines national policies and often analyzes the evolution of asylum laws in relation to factors such as geographic proximity to civil wars (mainly neighboring countries), the relationship between a receiving country’s elites and ethnic ties to conflict countries, foreign aid flows, and national wealth or economic conditions, in addition to decisions around the delegation of asylum management to international organizations (Abdelaaty 2021; Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2022a; 2022b; Norman 2019; 2020). These cross-country comparisons offer overarching analyses on the patterns of asylum policies, yet they often fall short on dissecting the role of political parties in asylum policy formation at the domestic level.

The second stream focuses on the role of regime type and its impact on the development of immigration and asylum policies in the Global South. While the literature on refugee commodification mostly relies on cases drawn from the Global South, the politicization of refugees is still dominated by cases drawn from the Global North, most of which are wealthy democracies. Although it has been argued that regimes and migration policies co-produce one another, fed by the increasing politicization of immigration and shaped by structural and contingent political factors, autocratic or hybrid regimes feel less threatened by public opinion, which gives them more room to implement migration policies according to their agendas (Natter 2018; Natter and Thiollet 2022). Similarly, unlike in democracies, opposition parties in autocratic or hybrid regimes are often limited by structural constraints that are usually dictated by the ruling party (Kurtoglu Eskisar and Durmuslar 2023).

Yet, because countries in the Global North make deals with incumbent parties in Global South states, they inadvertently influence domestic politics, creating a political space for other parties to seek various political gains. For instance, during these deals, Adamson and Greenhill (2023, 713) suggest that the asymmetrical arrangement between Global North and Global South countries can shift dynamics in domestic politics, as other parties may attempt to cease cooperation or renegotiate the partnership. To further examine the literature on refugee commodification in domestic politics, we turn to existing studies that link refugee hosting to domestic politics.

2.1 Refugee commodification and domestic politics

States adopt various migration management regimes that might lead to the politicization of refugees, and refugee commodification is part of the politicization of immigrants and refugees in domestic politics, which is not a new phenomenon. Politicization of an issue, in this case migration, refers to the emergence and salience of a public debate with diversifying opinions triggering polarization that increases the demand for policy change with an expanding number of actors involved (De Wilde 2011; De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke 2016). Particularly in the Global North, the salience of migration policies becomes heightened during election campaigns and in parliamentary debates of political parties, in parallel with rising opposition to immigrants and refugees (see Dennison and Geddes 2019; Gessler and Hunger 2022; Hadj Abdou, Bale, and Geddes 2022).

Political parties, aiming to gain or stay in power, focus on the electorate and its demands. This is also true of migration policies once the issue becomes salient (Böhmelt 2021; Morales, Pilet, and Ruedin 2015). Regardless of the focus, research on migration diplomacy focuses on the benefits that incumbent parties – as the main agent in migration policymaking – derive from this type of diplomatic strategy and the influence of politicization. Yet, within domestic politics, in addition to the incumbent, other political parties also seek to commodify or politicize refugees as a result of migration diplomacy, which remains relatively unaddressed in the extant literature.

This is not to argue that national governments always have purview over migration policies and their implementation, but that other political parties may join the discourse if the issue has become salient. Furthermore, while the politicization of migrants has mostly been debated on the left-right dimension, particularly examining the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe after the 2015 ‘crisis,’ there is evidence that political parties also choose to follow a strategic path when it comes to targeting votes using the issue salience of migration as an opportunity window (Dennison and Geddes 2019; Gianfreda 2018). Focusing on this, we analyze opposition party behavior during an election period and how a party adapts aspects of refugee commodification into its strategy.

With the insights from these literatures as a basis, we make two main contributions in this article. First, by expanding the focus of refugee commodification to the domestic level, we are able to disentangle the gains that domestic actors – specifically, opposition parties – aim to achieve through the politicization of refugees. Second, by focusing on opposition parties in order to understand their role in influencing asylum policy decisions – while also acknowledging their limits – our paper can help bridge the divide between the politicization literature (mainly drawn from the Global North) and the refugee commodification literature (drawn from the Global South). This allows us to assess the conditions and mechanisms that drive politicization and to determine similarities and differences between cases drawn from the Global North and those drawn from the Global South.

3. The incumbent and the main opposition party in Turkey and Syrian refugees

Turkey is a highly centralized unitary state that has been influenced by a religious-secular divide in addition to socioeconomic and ideological rifts (Aydogan and Slapin 2015). Over the past two decades, the state’s centralization has intensified under the rule of AKP which came to power in 2002. This centralization coincided with democratic backsliding, rising competitive authoritarianism, and increasing populism under the AKP – under the leadership of Erdoğan – amassing control over public and private resources and the media, scrutinized by Islamisation (Elçi 2019; Laebens and Öztürk 2021; Oktem and Akkoyunlu 2016).

The arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey coincided with the gradual growth of social and political polarization, deepening economic hardship, and weakening political institutions (Esen and Gumuscu 2019; Oktem and Akkoyunlu 2016). While Turkey initially tried to negotiate with the Assad regime for a peaceful transition and to consolidate its role as a regional power in the Middle East (Oktav and Celikaksoy 2015; Okyay 2017), Turkey’s involvement in Syria quickly turned into siding with Sunni protestors and harboring anti-regime individuals in Turkey (Korkut 2016). Due to the prolongation and expansion of President Erdoğan’s power, refugee reception and accommodation strategies were decided almost single-handedly by the President himself. As a result, the reception of Syrian refugees fueled polarization, and welcoming Syrians has been associated with the AKP’s discourse of religious solidarity and humanitarian duty (Gumus and Eroglu 2015; Karakaya Polat 2018; Korkut 2016).

The issue of refugees became more salient in the discourses of political parties after the summer of 2019. Syrian refugees’ presence and the rhetoric associated with them turned from one of ‘guests’ to their perception as a ‘security and economic threat’ (Togral Koca 2016). The salience of the topic also increased within the statements and speeches of Turkish political parties. Both the ruling and opposition parties turned the refugee debate into a political tool to appeal to their constituents, although from different approaches (Yanasmayan, Ustubici, and Kasli 2019). For instance, Apaydın and Müftüler-Baç (2022) argue that although the issue's salience has lost its momentum over the years, its peak correlates closely with the discussions related to domestic and, mainly, foreign events, such as the EU-Turkey Deal. Similarly, Aydemir (2023) points out that AKP used the situation of Syrian refugees to expand its political agenda in parallel with its Neo-Ottomanist approach while adapting to the EU’s outsourcing of migration. Importantly, Aydemir (2023, 8) highlights that the refugee issue is rarely debated on its own but is instead always intertwined with discussions on foreign policy in addition to debates over the economy and ethnic identity.

From the perspective of CHP, AKP was transforming the character of Turkish society and politics into a more Sunni and less secular configuration, while also imposing economic costs and security threats (Aydemir 2023; Gulmez 2019; Gumus and Eroglu 2015). CHP was established by the founder of the republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as a long-standing secular leftist political party with major victories during the 1970s (Ciddi and Esen 2014; Gunes-Ayata 2002). The goal of the party has been to establish a welfare system in line with social democracy presenting itself as the defender of Kemalism, democracy, and secularism. Despite CHP’s success to appeal to periphery voters with its ‘left-of-center’ attempts – which portrayed CHP as a center-left party rather than leftist –, CHP remained a ‘party of the elite’ as decision-making mostly took place at the top (Ciddi 2008; Gunes-Ayata 2002). Although CHP gained votes from the secular middle-class in cities, working class in small cities and towns, market-oriented voters in rural areas, Alevis, and other groups that align with the party’s goals, the party continuously lost votes from the mid-1970s until 1999. This is mainly attributed to the party failing to frame its ideological choices and the lack of a structural plan for policy proposals (Gunes-Ayata 2002). In 1999, CHP could not gain sufficient votes to pass the electoral threshold and lost its chance to take part in the Turkish parliament for the first time in its history (Ciddi and Esen 2014), which came as a shock to its relatively stable voter base.

The next time CHP entered the parliament was in 2002, the same year that AKP entered the parliament for the first time as the ruling party. AKP and CHP were the only two parties in the parliament, with AKP as the sole majority. This also marked the beginning of the role of CHP as the main opposition party for the forthcoming decades. During its period as the main opposition party, CHP went through a leadership change in 2010, shifting from Deniz Baykal to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as leader. Hence, since 2002, CHP’s position within the political context has been influenced by the one-party rule of AKP, thus bringing in the criticisms of ‘opposition for the sake of opposition’ following a pragmatic political approach (Ciddi 2008; Gurpinar 2022). Moreover, CHP moved more towards the center while maintaining its claims to be a center-left party, increasing its nationalist and populist tendencies.

In order to appeal to a greater voter base, headed by CHP, the parties that are critical of AKP’s policies has formed a coalition in the pre-election period named ‘Table of Six,’ which consists of nationalist Good Party, center-right Democrat Party, Democracy and Progress Party, Future Party, and religious Felicity Party. Particularly aiming to unite over one candidate against the incumbent, the Table of Six proposed a transition to parliamentary system. In January 2023, the Table of Six published and announced a memorandum over two hundred pages that details their policies. In the ‘Foreign Policy, Defence, Security, and Migration Policy’ section of this memorandum, in addition to further policy suggestions, they propose revising the EU-Turkey Deal, preparing educational materials for asylum seekers to learn Turkish, and planning the immediate return of Syrians to Syria according to international law.

As reiterated by the memorandum of the Table of Six, CHP adopts a critical approach to the presence of Syrians by highlighting the economic impact and alleged crime increase (Aydemir 2023; Gulmez 2019). As the main dissenting voice, CHP has played a crucial role in shaping the political discourse and actions around refugee policies in Turkey, including how the issue is perceived and the priority that voters attach to the issue. CHP is therefore the leading opposition that clearly diverges from the ruling party in its approach to policies and its political stance within the Turkish parliament.

4. Case selection and methodology

Given this context, Turkey functions as a typical case. It is a country that has, quite famously, engaged in refugee commodification, currently hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. It also has a competitive authoritarian political system, in which parties vie for votes and respond to signals from the electorate. As such, if we are likely to see domestic political parties respond to, utilize and adapt to refugee commodification strategies, we should expect to see these dynamics at play in Turkey. As a typical case, the findings of this study could be generalizable to other refugee-hosting countries with competitive electoral dynamics (George and Bennett 2005). The final section of this paper explores the question of generalizability further.

To collect our data, we adopted a mixed qualitative approach. First, we conducted semi-structured elite interviews with eleven current CHP members of parliament (MPs) between November 2022 and January 2023. Elite interviews enable researchers to investigate complex policy processes within politics (Beamer 2002). Furthermore, this approach allowed us to ascertain the perceptions of politicians on a specific issue (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002). As we aimed to collect further information about the influence of refugees in the election period, political party dynamics, and the framing of refugee policies within domestic politics and parliamentary discussions, we adopted a targeted approach with the aim of diversifying the background of the MPs selected to be interviewed according to geography and the number of years spent in office.

During the interviews we asked questions about opposition views on refugees in domestic politics and in the parliament, the opposition party’s plan for Syrians in Turkey, the impact of the EU-Turkey Deal on domestic politics and the CHP’s platform, the role of public opinion regarding refugees on party policy, the influence of the economy on refugee policy and vice versa, and the integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey. These questions offered us insight into party discussions and dynamics, how the policy is perceived by individual MPs, and individual MPs’ personal opinions on the refugee issue as well as the construction of the party’s refugee policy.

The interviews were conducted in Turkish and translated into English. Having known a consultant within CHP, our access to the MPs occurred through a gatekeeper, meaning that the individual created a gateway for reaching elites that would otherwise have been more difficult to reach in a political context like Turkey. Therefore, the gatekeeper created an opportunity for us to contact the MPs to explain the reason for the interview and present ourselves more clearly in addition to explaining how we planned to conduct the interviews within the tight schedule of the pre-election period. As we reflect on our positionality considering that a gatekeeper was utilized, it is fair to argue that this process influenced access to individuals, but not the content of the interviews, as elites were accustomed to answering questions related to political strategy.

As the MPs are constantly on the move, the interviews were conducted through Zoom, allowing us to replicate the experience of a one-on-one, face-to-face interview online (Howlett 2022). During the interview process, we opted for hand-written notes to increase trust, security, and candidness from the interviewees (Beamer 2002). To ensure the best reflection, the interviews were transcribed immediately after each interview. For similar reasons, we opted for verbal consent and guaranteed anonymity to the interviewees by assigning a code to each interviewee (for example MP4-21122022-F-CHP). Both strategies proved beneficial given the politically complex period of the interviews (pre-2023 election) and the politicization of the topic, as discussed in the previous section.

Second, we conducted an analysis of CHP’s policy briefs, the memorandum of the Table of Six on Syria, refugees, and immigrants, and other policy documents. Examining this documentation helped us analyze the policy establishment, policy evolution, and policy aims of the CHP. Moreover, we included our notes and media releases from the Syria Conference of CHP in 2019, ‘The Door to Peace in Syria,’ which is the only conference, best to our knowledge, on Syrian refugees held among the political parties in Turkey that involved politicians, academics, civil society workers, journalists, and other relevant actors. Combining our interview data with an analysis of policy documents allowed us to explore the evolution of refugee commodification as it has occurred at the domestic political level ahead of the 2023 presidential election, which we have chosen purposely as a ‘sensitive,’ and thus critical, time to discuss the situation of Syrians in Turkey, and how the opposition party perceived its position (Desmond 2004).¹

5. Refugee commodification by the opposition party in domestic politics

Our analysis revealed that refugee commodification, while initially occurring at the international level, can manifest itself in the political maneuvering of a country’s main opposition party. While the incumbent party has the majority of power over refugee-related policies, the main opposition party can adopt vote-seeking strategies related to refugees to gain advantage within domestic politics. In the case of Turkey and CHP, we identified three topics through which this process occured. First, this was visible in CHP’s attempt to use refugee commodification and international bargaining to its advantage, not to extract material resources from the EU as the AKP had done, but rather by directing the funds spent for refugees into reconstructing Syria. As such, CHP hoped to elevate the geopolitical role of Turkey while maintaining leverage over the EU. Second, this was linked to CHP’s assertions about the burden of hosting refugees on the domestic economy, attempting to convince voters that the AKP had prolonged the stay of refugees in Turkey by engaging in refugee commodification. Third, the CHP adopted a rhetoric of the ‘honorable return’ of refugees to Syria, as compliant with MP’s perceptions of general public demands. The CHP hoped to appease voters worried about the continued stay of refugees in Turkey by promising to send them back to Syria, while also adhering to the party’s center-left roots by ensuring that a return would happen under ‘humanitarian’ circumstances. While we identify these areas as three separate themes, we also acknowledge their overlap.

5.1 Refugees’ role in negotiations with the EU

The domestic implication of refugee commodification is visible in the discourse of CHP regarding the EU, especially surrounding the outcomes of the EU-Turkey Deal. Similar to the incumbent party, CHP stated that if it had come to power, it intended to use EU funds. However, contrast to AKP, CHP described the use of these funds for creating infrastructure in Syria that would assist the return of Syrians (MP3, MP4, MP7, MP9), rather than spending the funding in Turkey. For instance, MP3 stated:

While achieving this [return], it should not be only with the efforts of Turkey, an asylum seeker depot, but should involve the efforts of the international community. The transfer of EU funds to Turkey should be ensured for the reconstruction and development, for the infrastructure [in Syria].

The justification for using EU funds derives from the perception of Turkey as ‘a buffer zone for the EU’ (MP4), referring to the EU-Turkey Deal. This supports the perception of ‘not shouldering the burden alone’ (MP9) as the refugee issue is a global issue. MP11 describes the EU’s behavior as ‘taking advantage of the possessions but trying to relieve themselves from this situation. They [the Western countries] are entering into a debate in a vicious cycle with Erdogan’.

Yet, CHP also acknowledged the influence of the refugee presence in Turkey as a discussion topic with the EU and as a refugee commodification tool. For instance, MP5 stated ‘In the dialogues, the refugees should be discussed at the table, not as a threat towards the EU’. Yet, acknowledging the constituent demands and the geopolitical role of Turkey, MP4 described sending refugees back to Syria as a policy that ‘will also relieve the EU as well’. This makes it clear that CHP, like AKP, views Turkey as having been emboldened in its diplomatic power through refugee commodification.

However, CHP interviewees also understood the scope of their role in refugee commodification and direct dialogue with the EU was limited, unless the political party could come to power. As one interviewee explained, ‘one needs to be in power; otherwise, it is pointless’ (MP7). More than other topics demonstrating the domestic impact of migration diplomacy, the EU-Turkey Deal was used by CHP as a means for strengthening its stance against the incumbent party, which agreed to the deal with the EU and turned this deal into a domestic political tool. MP6 explained this dynamic:

First, he [Erdogan] conveys this situation as “I am standing up to the world.” For his constituents, by using the ansar-muhajirun rhetoric,² he gets them [constituents] to comply. By saying “what would these [opposition parties] understand from ansar-muhajirun”, he attacks the opposition. At the same time, from time to time, he states that cheap labor is making a contribution to the exports. He [Erdogan] lays the competitive prices [as a threat] before the businesspeople and lays Syrians [as a threat] before the laborers. […] He [Erdogan] signals to employers that “I gave you this leverage [over employees]”, while threatening (rest çekmek) the workers [at the same time].

MP8 further elaborated how the EU-Turkey Deal was viewed by CHP politicians as a domestic tool, helping to garner support among constituents:

This [Deal] is being talked about in every setting as a criticism to the government as they [the government] gave up on the national interests in exchange for money and why did not the EU take them [refugees] in. This is also being discussed during the election period. […] The EU’s approach disturbed [citizens] regarding this issue.

Therefore, the opposition did not hold back in alerting constituents that ‘He [Erdoğan ] made a bargain, he has been cheated, and he could not get the money either’ (MP6). CHP’s narrative surrounding AKP’s failure to reap the benefits of the EU-Turkey deal represents the most direct use of migration diplomacy as a vote-grabbing strategy in domestic politics. The opposition blamed the incumbent for making the deal in the first place, and then further for failing to properly capitalize on it to the benefit of voters.

5.2 Refugees’ link to the domestic economy

The presidential elections and heightening of anti-refugee rhetoric in Turkey coincided with a severe economic crisis. Given the circumstances, and similar to the scapegoating of refugees in domestic politics in the Global North, CHP highlighted the economic cost of hosting refugees during its election campaign. This strategy is similar to the means by which migrants and refugees are politicized in domestic politics in the Global North as a vote-grabbing strategy, although the size and scale of Turkey’s refugee hosting gives the issue even greater gravitas.

The most important point for opposition MPs was to highlight the ‘interdependence’ (MP5) of refugee policy and economic policy, with one individual stating that, ‘without solving the refugee issue, we cannot solve the economy’ (MP1). In these discussions, three elements were brought up repeatedly: (1) the high rate of refugee acceptance as a burden on the country, (2) the livelihood conditions of refugees, and (3) the perception of Syrians as a ‘cheap labor force’ by the incumbent party.

The issue of unregistered or uncontrolled migration also became central to the debate. One MP explained this ‘burden’ both by comparing the refugee numbers in Turkey to abroad, and by asking how refugee hosting had impacted the labor market:

The refugee issue has high public awareness. When you ask why the economy is bad, people point to the Syrians, but the economy is not being governed well, just like foreign policy is not being governed well, just like in other areas, as there is bad governance overall. But if the situation of refugees is improved, it would help to improve the economy; yet, it is hard to say the same for the opposite situation. Refugees certainly create a burden on the economy, as they announced billion dollar spendings, but bad governance … [MP6]

Further elaborating on the high presence of Syrians, another MP explained:

After all, if the issues regarding the economy and unemployment are resolved, migration policies will inevitably be affected by this. For instance, why does the EU determine quotas for migration? They [the EU] determine the threshold they can handle. […] If poverty and unemployment would diminish, polarization and discrimination would diminish too. If the former issues are resolved, it would become a driving force for the resolution of the latter [refugees] [MP3].

When arguing about the burden on the national economy, some MPs also acknowledged the dire living conditions of refugees in Turkey, as ‘most of the neighborhoods they live in are areas that are in need of help’ (MP10). Linking these conditions to undesirable living standards in Turkey, one MP argued for the return of refugees to Syria for their own sake, explaining:

We have seen the conditions that the families who migrated were living in – dire conditions. […] They [refugees] work in places without insurance. If there is no insurance, there is no tax as well, they work informally. The places they [refugees] stay are unhealthy, they live in groups, 15–20 families together. As soon as possible without harming them [refugees], they should return to their own lands … [MP9}

Hence, the refugee issue ‘[brought] about economic problems due to the indirect unemployment it creates’ (MP7), which resulted in ‘the exploitation of people [refugees] as cheap labor’ that increased ‘informality and unemployment’ (MP7, MP8).

MPs also aimed to extrapolate from these arguments in order to criticize AKP policies as a whole. One MP stated:

The society started to blame the refugees but the reason behind this situation is that the government brought this [refugee issue] to an uncontrollable level. […] [It is] The government’s incompetent wrong policies … Thus, this is a very sensitive process and should be handled as such; yet, at the same time, policies should be made responding to the expectations of the society as soon as possible. The party’s discourse is shaped according to this [MP7].

Overall, similar to opposition counterparts in the Global North, CHP stressed the economic burden of hosting Syrian refugees as a campaign strategy. Although MPs highlighted the dire work conditions that Syrians faced, and how refugees were used as cheap labor by the incumbent party, they still linked the arrival of refugees to AKP’s ‘incorrect policies’ that led to the current economic situation, as well as bargaining with the EU that, in their minds, prolonged refugee hosting. By foregrounding the economic burden, the opposition party positioned itself as more capable of making governance decisions, promising to return Syrian refugees as a resolution to the situation in order to alleviate the economic woes of Turkish citizens, allegedly exacerbated by refugee hosting.

5.3 Refugees’ return to Syria

The rhetoric of return was evident as a vote-grabbing strategy during the election period, in which the opposition differentiated itself from the incumbent, since AKP was so strongly associated with accepting and hosting refugees. To be clear, CHP held this position since the arrival of Syrian refugees and had consistently advocated for their return to Syria. At the Syria Conference in 2019, CHP party leader stated in his opening speech that, ‘After Syria becomes a safe country again, we should encourage the voluntary return of refugees in our country and develop policies suitable for this purpose’. Although CHP’s 2016 report on migration stated that ‘Syrians’ presence in Turkey should be accepted as permanent,’ it also stated that ‘those who want to return should be encouraged and facilitated’.

The issue of return has been framed as an ‘honorable’ return, defined in the following quote by MP1:

Our party’s policy is consistent, sending everyone back without racist politics, within human rights, without discrimination, with peaceful language. Security of life will be ensured [in Syria], investments will be made [in Syria], and all this could only be solved with a peaceful language. Starting with Syrians, without discrimination, then everyone [meaning Afghans and other refugees] [MP1].

The phrase ‘honorable return’ was voiced increasingly by the CHP leader and party authorities throughout the pre-election period (CHP Science Platform Policy Notes 2019), and by MPs during interviews (MP4, MP6, MP7, MP9, MP11). This stance gained greater prominence due to ‘citizens’ demand that everyone return to their country of origin’ (MP2) and the issues in the previous section related to ‘uncontrolled’ arrivals of refugees and migrants (MP1, MP5, MP7, MP10). As stated in the memorandum of the Table of Six, in addition to coupling the migration topic with defense and security, the rhetoric of return was adopted and re-emphasised.

Descriptions of an ‘honorable return’ correspond to the increasing anti-immigrant or anti-refugee trend within public opinion in Turkey. Detailing the transformation of CHP’s refugee policy, MP6 described the last decade as the following:

When they became visible, they also talked about more. First, they talked about it from a humanitarian perspective. […] The more reaction these issues [about refugees] got, the more people started to say “Syrians should go” at the polls. At one point, our party leader said “I will send Syrians back” and this was reciprocated [by the public], which is happening in 2016, I think. […] We [as CHP] said, regarding sending the Syrians back, “with the responsibility of being a left-wing and a social democrat party, we are against the policies and politicians that create migration and migrants.” We also said, “Particularly regarding the neighbors [of Turkey], we are against policies that create all types of migration.” We are against Erdogan’s policies on Syria that result in civil war.

It is natural that, as the opposition party, CHP would oppose the incumbent. MPs also acknowledged how their statements regarding refugee hosting and commodification were influenced by their position as the leading alternative to AKP governance. For instance, MP1 stated,

The prescription to this issue is clear: to enable asylum seekers not to come from the countries they come from. To do this, Turkey should not intervene with the domestic politics of Syria. We told this but the AKP opposed it.

Similarly, MP4 stated,

When we come to power, from the first day on, we will solve this [refugee issue] within two years. We want peace with the neighboring countries and we know it is not being solved because the current government [AKP] is creating problems.

Similarly, when the Table of Six was established as a political coalition and after it issued its memorandum on the return of refugees and revising the EU-Turkey Deal, most of the discussions related to refugees remained as policy suggestions without offering in-depth explanations in public.

Hence, while ‘return’ is in line with CHP’s policies, domestic implications of refugee commodification manifest themselves as vote-grabbing for the opposition, by situating itself against the incumbent party that ‘let the refugees in’ and continued to tolerate their presence by negotiating and accepting the EU-Turkey Deal. MP6 stated,

Of course the election pulls this issue to a populist line and at this point CHP must form its rhetoric distinct from the right-wing parties. An honorable return, not forced, not with briquette houses; in cities where Syrians choose [to go], a return that contributes to the domestic peace [in Syria].

Using the rhetoric of an ‘honorable return’ signaled that while CHP acknowledged the political weight of the refugee issue and would ensure a return – thus appealing to voters and criticizing AKP’s policy – the party also wanted to ensure that their return occurred under humanitarian circumstances.

6. Discussion and conclusion

The strategies for vote-grabbing adopted in domestic politics by the opposition party demonstrates that, despite previous discussions focusing on the role of refugee commodification on foreign policy, the strategy also manifests itself as a domestic political tool. Through the patterns we detailed – the domestic reverberations of the EU-Turkey Deal, the economic burden of refugees on the national economy, and the return of refugees to Syria –, we demonstrated that refugees are ‘a very comfortable topic if you want to use [them] politically’ (MP8). Although ‘there is the decision-making authority, a political institution, on the one hand; and there is the society that experiences the refugee issue on the other hand’ (MP7), there are also opposition parties. As much as the incumbent can use the commodification of refugees to extract material sources from countries in the Global North, opposition parties also acknowledge the power they have, especially if public opinion has become anti-refugee. While the commodification of refugees as a way to extract resources in order to provide economic or diplomatic gains is well established in the existing literature, we showed through our analysis that commodification also has direct implications for political behavior in domestic politics.

An important consideration is to what extent our argument applies to the Global North versus South. Vote-grabbing strategies by opposition parties related to migration, and especially around the topic of the impact of refugee hosting on national economies, are well-documented in European and North American contexts. However, countries in the Global South are much more likely to be in close proximity to the conflicts that produce refugees en mass. They are therefore also those more likely to engage in refugee commodification and bargaining with wealthy countries over the topic of hosting refugees. As such, our argument is more likely to apply to Global South countries than those in the Global North, whereby the deals negotiated to host refugees can themselves become a vote-grabbing strategy used by the opposition.

While we addressed a gap in the literature related to the domestic implications of refugee commodification deals, our study has several limitations. First, as we focused on the opposition political party that is in competition with the incumbent during elections, adding other political parties and their motivations around vote-grabbing strategies related to refugee commodification would expand our findings. Second, we focused on the salient case of Turkey, which we argued is a typical case for understanding the relationship between refugee commodification and the political behavior of a central opposition party. However, comparing opposition parties from other countries in the Global South that are entering into refugee commodification deals with countries in the Global North could reveal further patterns of refugee commodification at the domestic level. Although Erdoğan, who has implemented increasingly authoritarian policies over the last decade, was reelected in 2023, he only secured 52.14% of the vote. The opposition leader managed to gain 47.86% of the vote, indicating that elections in Turkey are free, though not fair (Tuysuz, Gezer, and Qiblaw 2023). It would be interesting to compare the case of Turkey to other countries with competitive electoral systems, whether quasi-democratic or semi-authoritarian in nature, which have also engaged in refugee commodification, in order to understand the extent to which regime structure shapes opposition party behavior in this realm.

The EU has signed numerous migration deals with countries across the Mediterranean, many of which have competitive electoral political systems, including Morocco and Tunisia, though Tunisia’s government has become increasingly authoritarian under President Kais Saied and various opposition figures have been jailed in recent years. In the Latin American context, Colombia has received significant funding from the U.S. to continue hosting Venezuelans, and the issue of migration was politicized by the opposition party that came to power in 2022. Overall, there is great potential for geographically expanding this study in order to further develop a theory for how refugee commodification impacts the domestic behavior of political parties and the electoral arena.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 During the election period, a major earthquake hit Turkey along with other countries in the region. Potential interviewees were necessarily concerned with other, urgent matters. As such, we stopped conducting interviews after the earthquake and all interviews were conducted before 6 February 2023.

2 This analogy is a reference to the arrival of Muslims from Mecca, muhajirun, together with the Prophet Mohammad in Medina (which was under the control of impious) and greeted by Muslims there, who are ansar and were supporting the Prophet (Karakaya Polat 2018), feeding into Sunni Muslim rhetoric and historical responsibility.