The Chinese presence in the Malian mediascape

ABSTRACT

Mali is known for its proliferating independent media scene, especially its numerous newspapers and radio stations. Less well known is the growing role China plays in Mali’s media. China contributed to Mali’s radio equipment and broadcast soon after the country’s independence in 1960. Its influence on the Malian mediascape has increased again since the mid-2000s when China began to invest in media infrastructure, the training of journalists and cultural exchange. Journalists have participated in training courses in China, wrote about their experiences in their newspapers, and have hereby enhanced China’s image in Mali. Other newspaper reports, however, contrast their authors’ views on China’s rhetoric of brotherly cooperation with daily experience, and evaluate critically Chinese activities in the country. This article analyses the growing Chinese involvement in Mali’s media from the point of view of Malian journalists. It explores the ways in which newspaper reports and radio broadcasts represent the two countries and cooperation between them. We argue that, despite a widespread appreciation of China’s infrastructure projects and affordable consumer goods available to Mali’s population, there is also much suspicion that ranges from uncomfortable feelings to outright criticism of the grand ‘win–win’ narrative.

KEYWORDS:

• Mali
• China
• media
• newspapers
• radio
• soft power

Acknowledgements

Research for this contribution has been carried out in the frame of the project ‘Africa’s Asian Options’ (AFRASO) at the Goethe University Frankfurt between 2013 and 2016, with the support of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 China also trains Malian photo reporters, organizes photo exhibitions and photo galleries, which, however, are not discussed in this article.

2 Radio journalists also participated in trainings in China, together with newspaper journalists, and radio technicians also receive training from China.

3 Interview with Somboro, Bamako, March 2014. There are different opinions as to the year of this intervention. According to Gibbons (1974, 118), Mali received two transmitters from China in 1971. It enabled Mali to offer external service (of about one hour a week) in other countries and continents; see also Hutchison (1975) who notes that China constructed short-wave transmitters in Somalia, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville and Mali by 1965 (see also van Staden in this special issue, pp.46–62).

4 Huawei became the biggest communication equipment company in the country and a partner/competitor of the two biggest telephone companies in Mali, the national Société des télécommunications du Mali (SOTELMA-Mali), now privatized, and the private Orange-Mali and spurs competition among them due to its unmatched prices (Daou 2011). The Chinese government also provided credit to finance an optical backbone network interconnecting the city of Bamako with the towns in the interior such as Markala, Mopti, Gao and Timbuctu (Camara 2014). The different communication sectors should be studied together to understand their interconnection (Gagliardone, Stremlau, and Nkrumah 2012; Wekesa 2013, 71).

5 So far, China has participated in more than 80 development projects in Mali. China also cooperates in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors with the Usine malienne de produits pharmaceutiques (UMPP). Chinese companies acquired shares invested in some of Mali’s state enterprises as well (CIFAM 2005) and the number of Chinese migrants has enormously increased in the country (Bourdarias 2009). Chinese traders created an intimidating competition in an economy in which the majority of the population makes a living from trade (Kernen and Vulliet 2008; Dupré and Shi 2008; Sanogo 2008).

6

Force est de constater qu’il y a depuis quelques années un regain d’intérêts de la Chine pour la presse au Mali depuis l’avènement de la démocratie et de la liberté de presse. Il est aisé de comprendre aujourd’hui que l’information est partie intégrante de l’agenda surtout au niveau de la radio.

7 ‘La presse est la porte d’entrée de toute activité.’

8 Some of the civil society initiatives are closely associated with the Malian government and its press organs, which has an interest in establishing a positive image of China in the national public space. The Chinese activities in Mali are coordinated under the auspices of the Association d´Amitié entre la Chine et le Mali, which is presided over by the Général d’Armée Kafougouna Koné, the ex-minister of the Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales (Guindo 2014). The Chinese migrants in Mali also have united to give a voice to their interests and created the Association des Résidents Chinois au Mali (ARCM) which consists of private Chinese business people (Bourdarias 2009). This association had 300 members when it was created in 2005 after Chinese shops and bars were demolished after a football match.

9

La Chine a des relations commerciales avec le Mali. Dans l’optique de les renforcer, les coopérations sont nouées. Je crois que c’est le troisième contingent de journalistes qui vient de séjourner en Chine. D’autres pays participent à cette formation. La Chine nous aide avec des dons de matériel et la formation. Ils viennent de nous aider à créer le site de l’Office des Radios et Télévisions du Mali (ORTM). Leur dernière action est la signature d’un prêt pour développer la fibre optique. Les Chinois ne mènent pas toutes ces actions chez nous pour rien.

10 ‘La Chine ne se raconte pas, elle se vit’; ‘ce pays où la tradition le dispute avec la modernité’.

11

Crée depuis 1931, l’agence de presse chinoise est aujourd’hui l’une des plus grandes agences mondiales. Elle traite des informations, publie des photos et infographies et dispose d’une vingtaine de journaux et magazines. J’attache une grande importance au continent africain. Xinhua dispose de 7 bureaux régionaux à travers le monde, mais sa plus grande représentation se trouve en Afrique. C’est l’agence la plus représentée à travers l’Afrique. J’espère beaucoup sur une franche collaboration et un bon esprit de confraternel entre le bureau de Bamako et la presse malienne.

12

L’Agence n’aime pas s’immiscer dans les affaires nationales. Elle traite les problèmes avec souplesse. Nous ne faisons pas de parti pris dans nos articles, ni trop de commentaires. Nous n’exagérons pas, nous n’alarmons pas. Nous nous en tenons aux faits … Je ne signe pas personnellement mes articles, ce n'est pas possible dans ce système d´agence de presse.

13 For example, 60% of the capital of the Malian sugar complex, Kala Supérieur (SUKALA), comes from the China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technical Co-operation (CLETC) and only 40% from the Malian state; the Malian state owns only 20% the cotton factory Compagnie Malienne des Textiles (COMATEX) S.A. whereas 80% belong to the China National Overseas Engineering Group Co. LTD (COVEC Mali LTD) (according to a study by CIFAM 2005).