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Abstract
While critics have argued that the films of Singapore director Jack Neo posit a critique of the state, this essay will argue the contrary. In deploying Chinese ‘dialects’ his films may appear to give voice to the Chinese-speaking masses in Singapore, especially those who have been marginalized by the state's political economy, which clearly favours the educated and English-speaking milieu. For the Chinese-speaking masses, his films may even appear to act as a medium or outlet for ‘anti-state’ criticisms which they feel but cannot articulate, since criticism of the government is essentially prohibited here. However, as this essay will demonstrate, Neo uses such linguistic idioms only as a foil to further perpetuate government propaganda: he uses Chinese ‘dialects’ to draw his intended audience to his side, and once they are taken in, he persuades them to reconcile with unpopular government policies. In other words, Neo's films constitute an extension of state politics via cinematic means, rather than an authentic political critique. As this essay also suggests, unveiling Neo's manipulation of language in his films as such will be critical to uncover not only Neo's underlying political intent, but also the unequal distribution that underlies the state's language policies.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Robert JC Young for believing in this piece.
Notes
1Jack Neo co-wrote the screenplay of Money No Enough and played the lead role, but he did not direct it. We make reference to this film because Neo has received much credit and recognition for it.
2See especially Chua and Yeo (2003) and Tan (2008). We will refer to their work in the course of this essay. More recently, Chong (2011: 893) has also argued that Neo's films present an ‘acceptable critique’ of the state.
3The person who seeks to speak for another tends to assume a superior position in relation to the other, for he or she presumes to possess the know-how of speaking. We follow Deleuze (Citation1987: 52) in making the distinction between speaking for, which is speaking ‘in the place of’ the other, and speaking with, which can be considered ‘introduc[ing] a [critical] distance which allows [the subject in question, e.g. the victimized other] and us to observe, to criticize, to prolong’ existing political injustices.
4See Rancière (1995b), translated as Rancière (1998a), for his argument for ‘disagreement’ as a critical political intervention.
5‘Dissensus’ is a term Rancière (Citation1995a) uses. Rancière (2003) uses the word ‘dissemblance’ to argue for an aesthetics, in contradistinction to an aesthetics of representation, to disrupt or rupture what is made sensible or perceptible by the state in society. For references to ‘dissensus’ in Rancière's works, see Rancière (2010).
6Although the focus of this essay is on the Singaporean Chinese population, we are not suggesting that everything in Singapore concerns only this particular ethnic group. There are two other important ethnic groups: Malays (constituting 13.9 per cent of Singapore's population) and Indians (7.9 per cent). However, as we will highlight very soon, there seems to be a deliberate systematic targeting of the Chinese-speaking milieu by the state's politics of language.
7Just to name a few: Chung Cheng High School, Anglican High School, Chinese High School, Singapore Chinese Girls School and Nanyang Girls School.
8Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan were such figures in the 1950s. The English-educated Lee Kuan Yew understood their immense influence over the Chinese majority and initially sought them out as political allies to gain majority votes for PAP. But Lee also sensed that with the support of the Chinese majority, Lim and Fong could undo both his and PAP's political power, and hence sought to purge them from politics. For historical accounts of Lee's political rivalry with Chinese-educated intellectuals, see Lau (1998) and Hong and Huang (2008).
9Though never made explicit or officially declared, the closure may be said to be the culmination of PAP's political rivalry with the Chinese-educated. As early as 1963, Lee Kuan Yew, who had yet to become prime minister, already mistrusted the Chinese-educated at Nanyang University, associating them with violent communism. A ‘political abuse of the Communists in Nanyang [University]’ (Straits Times, 10 December 1963) was how he viewed their presence there.
10This is in opposition to what is commonly known as Singlish (see note 11). For the politics of Singlish and a fuller discussion of the state's manipulation of it, see Goh and Tan (Citation2007).
11Singlish is a contact variety of English that has a phonological, syntactic and lexical system influenced by substratal local languages like Malay and Hokkien. The state has taken great pains to eliminate Singlish by means of the Speak Good English Movement launched in 2000 (see Goh and Tan 2007).
12Commercial in nature, Neo's films certainly not only seek Chinese-educated or Chinese-speaking Singaporeans, but also, in Neo's words, the ‘masses’, to maximize earnings. Box-office hits like Money No Enough and I Not Stupid reach a wide audience. Nevertheless, in terms of narrative and language medium his films speak to or resonate particularly with the Chinese-educated or Chinese-speaking milieu (Chua and Yeo 2003: 122; Chong 2011).
1375.8 per cent of the Chinese population aged 15 and above speak only either Mandarin or the Chinese ‘dialects’ at home. Of this group, 51 per cent are aged above 40 and 75 per cent of this same group do not have education beyond secondary school, which would mean they would have most likely received a Chinese-based education. Neo's protagonists, as we will explicate above, are undoubtedly representations of this group of Chinese-speaking and/or Chinese-educated Singaporeans.
14Reminiscent of Neo's character in Money No Enough, Kok Pin's father (played by Neo) is a copyrighter whose boss denies him job advancement opportunities because he is Mandarin-speaking.
15Critics have noted that since Money No Enough and another slapstick film in Mandarin and Hokkien – Liang Po Po – Neo has gained an immense popular following among ‘heartlander’ Chinese-speakers and/or Chinese-educated. Politics aside, the use of Mandarin and ‘dialects’ in Neo's films undoubtedly has entertainment value in terms of its comedic effects.
16Such criticisms of the state and the jibes at government are already well known among the people. In other words, Neo's films offer nothing new at the level of opinion (or doxa) about state policies.
17It is interesting that a maternal figure is deployed to personify the paternalistic state. Without the space to explore this point further, we offer the hypothesis that this shift may be an attempt to displace or repress any implication of Oedipal father-/state-killing. This would fit with Neo's essentially pro-state position.
18Kok Pin, at the end of the film, is offered an arts scholarship to an American fine arts school – an echo of yet more government rhetoric that uncritically celebrates those who are educated in British or American schools.
19HDB flats are high-rise public housing wherein the majority of Singaporeans reside.
20To further argue that Neo's films are always aligned with the state and its rhetoric, there is a road metaphor that pervades Homerun, and the overcoming of obstacles along this road is symbolic of how Singapore will always win out in the end. This is in fact a direct reference to Lee Kuan Yew's famous ‘Next Lap’, which describes Singapore's nationalistic journey and road to success. Homerun's final theme song, with its message of perseverance and persistence, is also an echo of the state's nationalistic discourse.