Abstract
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain signed treaties to secure the right to establish concessions along the Yangtze River in China. Despite extensive scholarly analysis of the history of British concessions, one aspect that is often overlooked is that these treaties did not specify the locations for these concessions. As a result, the British had to negotiate with local Chinese officials to acquire suitable sites. This essay aims to delve into the history of Sino-British relations and the spatial dynamics of occupation by examining the interactions between the British and Chinese in determining concession sites within Yangtze River port cities – specifically Zhenjiang, Hankou, and Jiujiang. It reveals that, following the Second Opium War, British arrivals and Chinese authorities established an implicit understanding. Despite diverse strategies employed by Chinese authorities in managing foreign affairs – ranging from appeasement to radical measures – the British consistently pursued potential advantages and preferred negotiation to maximize their respective interests. Consequently, these concessions were located in less desirable positions along the Yangtze River, surrounded by waterways. This strategic placement facilitated British cargo landings while enabling the Chinese to retain control over foreign arrivals, effectively transforming them into metaphorical islands within these cities.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions, Siwei He for assistance in collecting archives at the National Archives, and Haohui Huang for assistance in figure drawings.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).