From human rights to sentient rights

Abstract

This article calls for a paradigm shift in the language, theory and practice of human rights: it calls for human rights to be reconceptualized as sentient rights. It argues that human rights are not qualitatively distinct from the basic entitlements of other sentient creatures, and that attempts to differentiate human rights by appealing to something distinctive about humanity, their unique political function or their universality ultimately fail. Finally, the article claims that moving to sentient rights will not lead to intractable conflicts between rights, but to a more inclusive, fair and rationally defensible normative enterprise.

Keywords:

• human rights
• animal rights
• sentient rights
• interests
• personhood
• welfare
• universality

Acknowledgements

The idea for this paper came about following several fascinating conversations with Conor Gearty on the relationship between human rights and animal rights – and I would like to thank him for those. For invaluable comments on previous drafts of this paper, many thanks to the following: Alejandro Chehtman, Katrin Flikschuh, John Hadley, Kai Moller, Siobhan O'Sullivan, Laura Valentini, Kerri Woods; two anonymous journal reviewers; the participants at the animal rights group of Manchester Metropolitan University's Political Theory Workshops, 2010; and the participants at the Human Rights Seminar, Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE.

Notes

1. Those rare human rights scholars who have acknowledged and taken seriously the exclusivity of human rights include: Dershowitz (2005, pp. 198–199), Douzinas (2000, pp. 184–186), and Gearty (2009, pp. 175–183). Animal rights scholars who have considered the exclusivity of human rights include Cavalieri (2001).

2. The ‘welfarist’ moniker is borrowed from Allen Buchanan (Buchanan 2004, pp. 132–133). The welfarist understanding of rights obviously has its roots in J. S. Mill’s theory of rights; for a discussion, see Hart (1982).

3. Thanks to Siobhan O’Sullivan for alerting me to this case.

4. Although it has not always been considered absurd to grant animals a right to a fair trial (Evans 1906).

5. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising and pressing me on this issue.

6. The issue of whether these decisions are best made by expert judges or elected representatives I leave aside. For a valuable discussion of this issue, see Dworkin (1996, pp. 15–35).