![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
Abstract
The complex debate about proceduralism in deliberative democratic theory is important for understanding alternative models for bridging theory and practice. In this article, I contrast Jürgen Habermas’ model of epistemic proceduralism with that of David Estlund. I begin by locating the differences between them in terms of contrasting interpretations of Rousseau’s idea of the general will. On this basis, I set out two competing models of democratic proceduralism – an instrumental conception and a constitutive conception – and show how Estlund’s critique of Habermas’ procedural theory of ‘deep deliberative democracy’ mistakenly presupposes that Habermas is committed to an instrumental conception. After clarifying the role of Habermas’ ideal speech situation, I explicate and defend a Habermasian model of reflexive epistemic proceduralism. I conclude by considering the implications of this model for understanding the relationship between normative theory and empirical research.
Acknowledgements
Early versions of this paper were presented at the conference Ideals and Reality in Social Ethics at the University of Wales, Newport in 2012 and at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory 2012 at the University of Manchester. I would like to thank the participants at both events for useful discussion and comments, as well as two anonymous referees for CRISPP for helpful suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. For example, the idea that ‘Deliberative democratic theory has moved beyond the “theoretical statement” stage and into the “working theory” stage’ (Chambers Citation2003, p. 307).
2. The more recent ‘systemic turn’ in deliberative democracy might be seen as one variant of the empirical turn, or as representing a further ‘turn’ in the literature (Parkinson and Mansbridge Citation2012). While some developments of this approach run the risk of undervaluing the role of philosophical frameworks for guiding empirical research, others are congenial to the methodological approach developed here, e.g. Hendricks et al. (Citation2013).
3. This follows the dominant understanding of Rawlsian ideal theory, even if Rawls’ approach is not best understood in this way; see Gledhill (Citation2012).
4. Estlund recognizes that the direction of influence is more likely to run from Rousseau to Condorcet (Estlund Citation1989). For an alternative interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of voting, emphasizing moral as opposed to purely epistemic factors, see Schwartzberg (Citation2008).
5. The example could also be run in terms of the policies a candidate supports, or a referendum on a policy itself.
6. I discuss this at greater length in Gledhill (Citation2011).
7. Indeed, as I will discuss in more detail below, while it might be thought a clear advantage of Estlund’s approach that it identifies clear substantive standards against which the legitimacy of democratic procedures can be assessed, Estlund makes only modest tentative suggestions in this regard, leaving as much need for judgement as a Habermasian approach.
8. Dewy attributes the internally quoted words to Samuel J. Tilden.
9. In borrowing Korsgaard’s distinction, I do not mean to endorse her own particular account of how moral agents confer value on their ends. The importance of Korsgaard’s two distinctions in goodness for debates about democratic proceduralism is also noted by Peter (Citation2008), although I draw a different conclusion. In contrasting her model of pure epistemic proceduralism with a Deweyan model of democracy, Peter argues that, for Dewey, ‘It is the common good which has intrinsic value, and which confers this value, via the necessary procedures, to legitimate outcomes. In pure epistemic proceduralism, by contrast, deliberative decision-making has intrinsic epistemic value. The conditions of political and epistemic fairness which shape this process are the only source for the normativity of legitimate decisions’ (Peter Citation2008, p. 51). But if the value of deliberative decision-making depends upon the conditions of fairness which shape the procedure, then it is incorrect to say that deliberative decision-making has intrinsic value, or value in itself. Rather, it can be valued for its own sake when appropriately related to intrinsic values of fairness. Such an account need not adopt a Deweyan view of the intrinsic value of the common good for, as I will argue, the common good can be interpreted in terms of a purely procedural ideal of the general will.
10. American constitutional theory can be seen as an implicit source of Estlund’s conception of proceduralism, his criticism of a ‘flight from substance’ in democratic theory (Estlund Citation2008, pp. 85–97) echoing criticisms of a flight from substance in constitutional theory (Tribe Citation1985, pp. 9–20). It is important, however, not to confuse Habermas’ idea of proceduralism with an idea of procedural fairness modelled on the idea of equal protection or due process (a conflation that is particularly apparent in Gutmann and Thompson [Citation2002]). Habermas’ approach arises out of a critique of Weber’s dichotomy of formal law and material law for ignoring the way in which law embodies an ethical formalism akin to that of the categorical imperative in the domain of morality (Habermas Citation1986, p. 228). The use that Habermas makes of the procedural approaches of Ely (Citation1980) and Dahl (Citation1989), to legal theory and democratic theory, respectively, should not lead one to neglect his criticisms of their lack of focus on the role of democratic deliberation in the public sphere (Habermas Citation1996, pp. 264–266, 315–318).
11. Cf. Cohen (Citation1999), Cohen and Sabel (Citation2009 [1997], pp. 217–219).
12. Estlund’s interpretation of Habermas is similar to that of Philip Pettit, who, in an analysis of Habermas’ initial discussion of the idea of an ideal speech situation (Pettit Citation1982), takes Habermas to have a realist view of truth and argues that he must be committed to a realist view of justice (rightness). At least in retrospect, however, it is evident that Habermas was concerned not with truth but with intersubjective justification. Habermas has subsequently abandoned a discursive conception of truth (which identifies truth with rational assertability under ideal conditions), arguing that his earlier theory was an ‘overgeneralization of the special case of the validity of moral judgements and norms’ and adopted instead a pragmatic epistemological realism (Habermas Citation2003, p. 8). While I cannot argue the point here, contra Cristina Lafont (Citation2003), I do not take this position to be unstable or to speak in favour of also moving towards a realist view of justice. In working with an idea of truth in the ‘minimal sense’ – according to which ‘a statement that ‘x is F’ is true in at least the minimal sense if and only if x is indeed F’ – Estlund claims to not be assuming any theory or conception of truth (Estlund Citation2008, p. 25, Citation2011, pp. 370–371). However, one might doubt whether neutrality is possible in this regard or whether under the guise of common sense Estlund unjustifiably helps himself to the assumption that truth is a substantive property. Like Pettit (Citation1982), Estlund presses Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma against Habermas, arguing that what is just is identified by democratic procedures because it is just, and is not just because it is identified by democratic procedures (Estlund Citation2008, p. 65). But in assuming that justice is a substantive property, this begs the question against procedural views.
13. Habermas long ago responded to a similar criticism made by Albrecht Wellmer, emphasizing that the ideal speech situation should not be seen as a substantive ideal capable of being realized. See Habermas (Citation1982, pp. 261–263).
14. According to this analysis of the double structure of speech, speech acts do not simply convey propositional content, but have illocutionary force, where propositional content is part of a pragmatic context of seeking agreement through communication. This provides a basis for responding to Estlund’s critique of Habermas in Estlund (Citation1993b).
15. Within the literature, Habermas’ model of reflective epistemic proceduralism is perhaps closest to Peter’s model of pure epistemic proceduralism (Peter Citation2007, 2008, 2013), although Peter’s approach lacks the element of reflexivity in the continual pursuit of better reasons.
16. Habermas raises the issue of civil disobedience at Habermas (Citation1998, p. 409).