Political realism meets civic republicanism

Abstract

The paper offers five desiderata on a realist normative theory of politics: that it should avoid moralism, deontologism, transcendentalism, utopianism, and vanguardism. These desiderata argue for a theory that begins from values rooted in a people’s experience; that avoids prescribing a collective deontological constraint; that makes the comparison of imperfect regimes possible; that takes feasibility and sustainability into account; and that makes room for the claims of democracy. The paper argues, in the course of exploring the desiderata, that a neo-republican philosophy of government does pretty well in satisfying them.

Keywords:

• Political realism
• republicanism
• moralism
• deontology
• transcendentalism
• utopianism
• vanguardism

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Erratum

Acknowledgments

Alison McQueen gave me very useful comments on an early draft of the paper, as did members of the Singapore workshop on a somewhat later version. The final paper benefited in addition from the suggestions of an anonymous referee and from those of Rahul Sagar. My thanks to all.

Notes

1. The recent movement, as I think of it, began from the historical work of Skinner (1978) on the medieval foundations of modern political thought, and from his subsequent articles in the 1980’s on figures like Machiavelli who wrote within the republican tradition identified by Pocock (1975). An up-to-date list of English works in neo-republican thought should include these books: (Brugger, 1999; Halldenius, 2001; Honohan, 2002; Lovett, 2010; MacGilvray, 2011; Marti & Pettit, 2010; Maynor, 2003; Pettit, 1997, 2012, 2014a; Skinner, 1998; Viroli, 2002); these collections of papers: (Besson & Marti, 2008; Honohan & Jennings, 2006; Kwak & Jenco, 2014; Laborde & Maynor, 2007; Niederbeger & Schink, 2012; Van Gelderen & Skinner, 2002; Weinstock & Nadeau, 2004); and a number of studies that deploy the conception of freedom as non-domination, broadly understood: (Bellamy, 2007; Bohman, 2007; Braithwaite, Charlesworth, & Soares, 2012; Braithwaite & Pettit, 1990; Laborde, 2008; Richardson, 2002; Slaughter, 2005; White & Leighton, 2008). For a recent review of work in the tradition see (Lovett & Pettit, 2009).

2. As it happens I have argued elsewhere for both sorts of autonomy, maintaining that the state is a corporate agent (List & Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 2012, Ch. 5) and that in seeking to promote republican freedom, it targets the achievement of a good that individuals could not bring about non-politically (Pettit, 2012, Ch. 3).

3. The two most prominent self-described realists are Williams (2005)and Geuss (2001, 2005, 2008, 2010). For a useful overview and critique of their work see (McKean, 2013). But on my characterization, realism also includes figures like Walzer (1981), in view of his opposition to philosophical hubris, and Sen (2009), in view of his critique of transcendentalism, as he calls it.

4. Desiderata 2, 3 and 4 correspond to three debates that Valentini (2012) takes to be involved, and often confused, in discussions of ideal versus non-ideal theory.

5. It is noteworthy that Cohen (2008) rejects the guidance assumption and represents a position that is diametrically opposed to political realism. For a useful discussion see (Valentini, 2009).

6. He may have been following Mandeville (1731, p. 332) who had earlier written that the best sort of constitution is the one which ‘remains unshaken though most men should prove knaves.’