Democracy and the limits of political realism

ABSTRACT

This article explores the recent resurgence of realism in the political sciences, questioning its relevance for democratic theory. Starting from a critical review of recent works in the field, the article calls into question the relevance of empirical investigations of political reality for normative theorizing, and contends that some of the normative conclusions advanced in this literature are not warranted. More precisely, the article questions the reliability of studies of political behavior and of political opinion as a sound basis on which to draw normative inferences about democratic legitimacy. It contends that the kind of epistemic realism their authors promote cannot deliver what it promises. The article concludes by proposing an alternative interpretation of the democratic principle as a practical postulate of political reason that reconciles empirical evidence about political behavior with the classical interpretation of democratic legitimacy.

KEYWORDS:

• Democratic theory
• realism
• Walter Lippmann
• John Dewey

Acknowledgment

I want to thank Federico Zuolo, Emanuela Ceva, Lisa Herzog, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Previous versions of the paper have been presented at the Seminar in Political Theory, Università di Pavia, March 29, 2017 and at the Faculty seminar in Political Theory of the Hochschule für Politik München, May 8, 2017.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For an informed survey of this form of realism, see Galston (2010). Among more recent publications, see Rossi & Sleat (2014) and Sleat (2013) and the special issue of the Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20, 3, 2017. On the connection of this ‘new’ realism to the broader constellation of realist political philosophy, see (McQueen, 2017).

2. More ancient genealogies for the two traditions can, of course, be found. In the American tradition, romantics hark back to the leading figure of Thomas Jefferson, and realists to James Madison. In Europe the most prominent thinker in the romantic tradition is probably Rousseau, whereas Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli compete for leading the ranks of realists.

3. Among the most significant publications of the last decade, but with no ambition to be exhaustive, see Brennan (2016), Cain (2014), Caplan (2007), Elkin (2006), Lenz (2013), Przeworski (2010), and Somin (2016).

4. By ‘classical’ tradition in democratic theory, I refer to what Achen and Bartels denote the ‘romantic’ tradition, one they oppose to the realist approach they favor. Both these terms refer—one negatively and the other positively—to the tradition in political theory according to which democracy’s legitimacy depends on its capacity to realize collective self-government. In what follows, I will use the expressions ‘romantic tradition’ or the ‘democratic dogma’ when I want to emphasize the realist side of the argument, and the ‘classical tradition’ when I want to underline the standpoint of democratic theorists themselves. As it should be clear by now, the very terms of ‘dogma’ and ‘romanticism’ are part of a rhetorical strategy aimed at underlining their failing sense of reality, a diagnosis I do not share. By calling them ‘classical’, I intentionally aim to restate in neutral terms these thinkers’ place within political thought, in a way that leaves unspecified their attitude toward realism.

5. See Sabl (2015). For other attempts at bridging the divide, see Berger (2011), Mutz (2008), Neblo (2005), and Thompson (2008).

6. For a brief review and critical discussion of the argument in the literature, see Ashworth & De Mesquita (2014).

7. See, in particular, Achen & Bartels (2016, Chapter 5).

8. Data used cover 70 years of climatic events in the US and the results are consistent over the entire dataset.

9. On pandering, see Shapiro & Jacobs (2000).

10. Examples of good practices can be found, for example, in Fung & Olin Wright (2003) and Sirianni (2010). For a balanced survey see Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs (2004) and Thompson (2008). For an overview, see Newton & Geissel (2012). Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steenbergen (2004) provide compelling empirical evidence concerning the impact of institutional design on the democratic quality of deliberation, implicitly confirming that deliberative procedures increase the democratic accountability of democratic decision-making, provided that it takes place within appropriately designed institutional settings.

11. See https://www.latinno.net/en/. See also the results of the research institute V-Dem at https://www.v-dem.net.

12. For a temporal interpretation of the logical consistency of collective opinion consistent with this view, see Page & Shapiro (1992, Chapter 1).

13. The classical references are Almond and Verba (1963, 1980). More recent studies in this tradition include Inglehart & Welzel (2005), Putnam (1994), Thompson, Grendstad, & Selle (1999), and Wildavsky (1993).

14. For a similar line of criticism of studies of political behavior, see Lisa Disch’s theory of representation as collective mobilization and relative literature (Disch, 2011).

15. Dewey (1930, 1935) offers a strenuous criticism of this kind of rationalism, and Habermas (1984, 1987) is equally explicit in rejecting the kind of methodological individualism that lies at the basis of the economic theories of democracy.

16. Dennis Thompson’s idea of a division of deliberative work comes close to my argument, even if it is limited to deliberation. See Thompson (2008).

17. Sabl (2017) makes a similar claim.

18. On this specific point I concur with Ben Berger’s distinction between democracy and engagement (Berger, 2011): ‘more democracy’ does not necessarily mean ‘more engagement’ but, in a broader way, the pluralization of institutional forms and patterns of interaction that promotes the attainment of those goals that we associate with the idea of democracy as a norm for social and political life. These forms and patterns shield democracy against the inevitable and recursive ‘attention deficits’ that characterize citizens’ political engagement, making it at the same time a necessary and yet non sufficient marker of the democratic quality of a polity.

19. Works such as Croly (1914), Dewey (1927), Rorty (1999), and West & Unger (1998) exemplify this tradition.

20. For a more detailed discussion along these lines, see Thompson (2008).

21. Crouch (2004). For a survey, see Ritzi (2014).

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Roberto Frega

Roberto Frega holds a PhD in philosophy from the Université Paris 8. He is permanent researcher at the CNRS (French National Center for Scientific Research) in Paris. His areas of specialization are American philosophy and contemporary democratic theory. In the first field he has published two monographs on John Dewey’s philosophy (Pensée, experience, pratique. Essai sur la théorie du jugement de John Dewey, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2006; John Dewey et la philosophie comme épistémologie de la pratique, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2006). In the second field he has published a book on political epistemology (Voci della ragione, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2009), a book on social theories of normativity (Les sources sociales de la normativitè, Vrin 2013), a book on moral and political philosophy (Practice, Judgment, and the Challenged of Moral and Political Disagreement. A pragmatist Account, Lexington, Lanhan, Md. 2012).  His articles have appeared in many highly reputed international journals such as The European Journal of Political Theory,Constellations, Critical Horizons, Social theory and Practice, Metaphilosophy, Thesis Eleven, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, The Review of International Studies.He is currently completing a book manuscript titled The Democratic Project