Toleration, neutrality, and freedom: a reply

ABSTRACT

In defending toleration against its many critics, Respecting Toleration has both conceptual and normative aims. Conceptually, I defend and explain the coherence of political toleration. This involves, in part, highlighting a distinction between two forms of toleration; one of which always involves objection, and one which does not. Normatively, I defend a particular understanding of toleration as the best way of accommodating contemporary diversity. In brief, the state should be guided by an active ideal of neutrality, and citizens must at minimum engage in forbearance tolerance with each others’ differences. In this paper, I respond to four main lines of criticism. The first is that my understanding of toleration – in which objection is not always necessary – is too broad, and that my non-moralised understanding of forbearance tolerance requires additional context. Second, my discussion of neutrality runs together the distinction between an active/passive state with a large/small state; wrongly fails to distinguish between mere preferences and deeply held beliefs; and is really a concern about equality. Third, my freedom-based justification for toleration is too limited; and may, in fact, enable recognition rather than resist it. Fourth, my rejection of inter-citizen respect for difference is too quick.

KEYWORDS:

• Toleration
• tolerance
• neutrality
• respect
• cultural and religious diversity
• difference

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.(2017)

Notes

1. The characterisation of this example fits with what Glen Newey (1999, 2013) called ‘the symmetry thesis’, where two sides to a dispute call each other intolerant, and any state action, rather than be an example of toleration, just reinforces one side’s intolerance. I deeply regret that Glen’s paper from the London Symposium (by far the funniest academic paper I have ever heard) did not make it here. But not as I much as I regret Glen’s death. It was Glen and his brilliant arguments and ruthless spotting of argumentative weakness that I regularly had in mind when writing the book. Glen, we all miss you.

2. I apologise for not being able to address Jones’ primary criticism. Unfortunately, our disagreement on political toleration is too complex to satisfactorily outline and discuss in the space available. See Jones (2012) and Balint (2012, and Respecting Toleration).

3. Jones is correct that my understanding on non-neutrality uses ‘intentional’ in a broad sense, in that a state that knowingly and avoidably privileges some ways of life over others is, at least, non-neutral in intent, and has pro tanto reasons to remove such privilege.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Peter Balint

Peter Balint is a Senior Lecturer in International & Political Studies at UNSW Canberra. His most recent book is Respecting Toleration: Traditional Liberalism and Contemporary Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). His research is primarily focussed on the principles for diversity, including respect, toleration, neutrality, and social cohesion. He has held Visiting Fellowships at The University of Manchester (MANCEPT), The University of Ottawa, The Morell Centre for Toleration (University of York), and CAPPE (Australian National University), and a Senior Research Fellowship at The Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main on the project ‘Justitia Amplificata. Rethinking Justice − Applied and Global‘. He is a founding member of the Global Justice Network, and a regular editor of their journal, Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric.