The duty to naturalise refugees

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that states have a duty of legitimacy to offer refugees membership in the form of citizenship. This argument builds on a popular normative approach to refugeehood put forward by David Owen, which characterises the refugee protection regime as a ‘legitimacy repair mechanism’ for the international order of states. However, I argue that, because of the relationship between membership and the claimability of basic rights, the refugee protection regime only successfully fulfils this function when states are required to offer citizenship to refugees. This paper therefore offers an important extension to David Owen's view. I contend that the basic condition of refugeehood is the break-down of membership: a relationship which allows individuals to claim basic rights as a matter of standing. Therefore, the legitimacy repair function of refugee protection is only successful when such membership is re-established. This account demonstrates that states’ duties to refugees go far beyond allowing entry and the protection of basic rights on a temporary basis. Instead, refugees are owed citizenship in their state of asylum.

KEYWORDS:

• Refugees
• citizenship
• membership
• legitimacy
• human rights

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Matthew Gibney, Christopher Bertram, Rufaida Al Hashmi, Hallvard Sandven, and Jamie Draper for their helpful comments on numerous drafts of this paper.  An earlier version of this argument was presented at the LSE Political Theory Graduate Conference 2019 and MANCEPT 2019, and I am grateful to everyone who provided comments at those events. I am also grateful to my anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive feedback. This work was funded by The Economic and Social Research Council and St John’s College, Oxford, as a Lamb and Flag Scholar.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. I should note briefly that my view is similar though importantly different to Felix Bender’s (2020) recent account of refugees as politically oppressed. Bender defines a refugee as someone who lacks public autonomy due to a deficit of political-legal rights. Bender’s account importantly differs from mine in its normative foundations. My view that refugees are owed membership is ultimately based on the legitimacy repair function of the international system of states; that is, it draws heavily upon Owen’s conception of refugeehood. Bender’s account appears instead to be remedial in nature, drawing more heavily on the humanitarian approach. That is, he argues that refugees are owed a remedy for the harm that they suffer; namely, the harm of political oppression and disenfranchisement. Our views therefore reach similar conclusions but rest on different normative premises.

Additional information

Funding

This work was completed while receiving funding from The Economic and Social Research Council and St John’s College, Oxford, as a Lamb and Flag Scholar.

Notes on contributors

Rebecca Buxton

Rebecca Buxton is a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford. Her research interests include the political theory of migration and forced displacement, climate displacement, and statelessness. Her current research explores the political rights of refugees in various settings.