Just add care and stir? The limits of mainstream liberal theory for taking on dependency care

ABSTRACT

Asha Bhandary’s Freedom to Care represents an important challenge to the idea that care ethics and liberalism necessarily stand in tension, arguing instead that most of the commitments of care ethics can be integrated within a recognizably mainstream liberal contract theory. Although I am sympathetic to Bhandary’s project, I identify three ways in which it falls short: Bhandary’s thin moral premises fail to support decent care for all; her survival baseline principle of care does not support some important forms of care; and her proceduralist approach offers little alternative other than coercion for assuring sufficient care for all. I argue a thicker set of moral assumptions based on the importance of decent care for all are necessary for reconciling liberalism and care ethics on more equal terms.

KEYWORDS:

• Care ethics
• liberalism
• contract theory
• Rawls
• Kittay

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Notes on contributors

Daniel Engster

Daniel Engster is Professor of Political Theory and Public Policy in the Hobby School of Public Affairs at the University of Houston and Director of the Elizabeth D. Rockwell Center on Ethics and Leadership. He is author of The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory and Justice, Care, and the Welfare State and co-editor (with Maurice Hamington) of Care Ethics and Political Theory