The elitist defence of democracy against populists using education and money

ABSTRACT

Democratic backsliding and autocratisation tendencies raise the question of what liberal democracy can do to defend itself. Of particular concern are populists, who are often perceived to have an ambiguous commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The defence of liberal democracy has often been conceived in legal terms, for example, with party bans and propaganda restrictions. However, legal means are criticized for being elitist because they are directed against irrational and emotionally driven masses and because they allegedly violate the very values that they are supposed to protect by limiting the democratic freedom of some groups. Instead, critics have proposed cultural and socio-economic means as non-elitist and non-exclusionary alternatives more in line with the values of democracy. This article discusses whether the employment of cultural and socio-economic means against groups – in casu populists – who are perceived as a challenge to liberal democracy can avoid the charge of elitism and exclusion by analysing whether these means are consistent with the publicity constraint. It finds that the use of education and money to defend democracy against such groups relies on a form of elitism and exclusion similar to the one that the defence by legal means is charged with.

KEYWORDS:

• Populism
• defence of democracy
• elitism
• publicity
• civic values
• socio-economic policies

Acknowledgments

I am grateful for good comments and suggestions from my colleagues on the project on Populism and Democratic Defence in Europe (2020-2024), the members of the Political Theory Section at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. A special thanks goes to Fabio Wolkenstein, Christian F. Rostbøll, and two anonymous reviewers for CRISPP for particularly detailed comments on the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. To avoid confusion, note that by legal means I understand means like the ones listed here, which normally would be considered extra-ordinary legal means. They do not include the general application of the precepts of the formal rule of law, the existence of independent courts (or, for that matter, constitutional review of legislation) or, say, the prosecution under general criminal law of leaders and members of populist or extremist parties. The protection of both civil and political rights by independent courts would be inherent to democracy since this is the institutional precondition for having effective rights in general.

Additional information

Funding

This study was in part funded the Carlsberg Foundation grant number CF20-0008 and in part by the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University.

Notes on contributors

Tore Vincents Olsen

Tore Vincents Olsen is associate professor in political theory at Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. His research interest include multiculturalism, recognition, toleration, compromise, democracy, constitutionalism and the political theory of the European Union. He has published articles in journals such as International Theory, Nations and Nationalism, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Comparative Education, Acta Politica, and Journal of European Public Policy.