Critical trust: understanding lay perceptions of health and safety risk regulation

Abstract

The binary opposition of trusting or not trusting is inadequate to understand the often ambiguous and contradictory ideas people possess about risk regulators, particularly when knowledge and experience of such institutions is limited. The paper reports qualitative and quantitative data from a major study of public perceptions (n = 30 focus groups) of UK risk regulators. We compare the complex and widely different ‘trust profiles’ of two regulatory organisations which are institutionally related (the Health and Safety Executive and the Railways Inspectorate) but very separate in the minds of our participants. The paper develops the notion of critical trust to interrogate the various ways in which people make sense of such organisations, as well as discussing the modes of reasoning that people deploy. The paper argues that views of participants are the outcome of a reconciliation of diverse perceptions concerning the role of the organisation, structural factors and the nature of the regulated risk.

Keywords:

• risk perception
• critical trust
• Health and Safety regulation

Acknowledgements

The research upon which this paper is based was supported by a grant No. Contract Ref: 4071/R64.062 from the UK Health and Safety Executive. However, the opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the project's sponsors. We are happy to acknowledge the enthusiastic support of Dr Jean Le Guen and Dr Laurence Golob of the HSE during the course of the research. Support during the period of writing has also been provided by the Leverhulme Trust as part of the Understanding Risk programme.

Notes

In addition to the current research, HSE has been particularly proactive in the UK in sponsoring a number of recent studies investigating public risk perceptions and risk communication, as well as contributing to the growing international interest in the role of public trust in risk regulation (Breakwell and Barnett 2003; Chilton et al. 2002; Cox et al. 2003; Petts et al. 2001; Pidgeon 1992; Pidgeon et al. 2003; TRUSTNET 2002; Walker et al. 1998).

Trust is also conceived of as a means of coping with ignorance and/or uncertainty about the potential future actions of others (Gambetta 2000).

However, O'Neill has suggested that many verbalised statements of mistrust actually reflect a climate of suspicion (O'Neill 2002). O'Neill suggests that there is scant evidence that the so called crisis of trust is a response to greater untrustworthiness on the part of public officials; rather a new mood of suspicion prevails, partly fed by the media.

The exact nature in the governance of risk will depend upon sector, issue and departmental intervention (Leroy and van Tatenhove 2000).

As an incentive to attend, a payment of £20 was made to each participant.

Gambetta has suggested that when we are forced to rely on someone else, it is more a matter of hope than trust—at least in the first instance, when we have no evidence either way, this is linked to the process of wishful thinking and the need to reduce cognitive dissonance (Gambetta 2000).

This is reinforced by the fact that the focus groups concluded by asking participants what HSE should do more of, these were in order of preference; an increase in resources for HSE, more public announcements by HSE, proportionate increase in fines (based on wealth of a company), randomly yearly inspections and to retain its non-party political status.

The privatisation of the UK railway industry in the mid-1990s saw extensive corporate fragmentation.

Railtrack was the privatised company set up in the mid-1990s to own and operate the UK railway system infrastructure (track, signalling etc.), and thus attracted much of the direct public criticism of the system. In 2002 they were once more brought under direct public control under the banner of Network Rail.

Included within the NVvivo code for ‘Critical trust’ are the following critical/limiting factors: Petty regulation; Too reactive/Prior Notice; Under funded. For a more thorough discussion see Pidgeon et al. (2003).