Risk and responsibility: lay perceptions of COVID-19 risk and the ‘ignorant imagined other’ in Indonesia

Abstract

Lay constructions of risk impact upon public health activities and underpin social reactions to experiences and understandings of infectious diseases. In this article, we explore the social construction of COVID-19 risk and responsibility by citizens of Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta Area, Indonesia. We draw upon digital diaries produced each week by 37 participants across a 5-week period from April to June 2020, a time of substantial policy flux in Indonesia. Key findings reflect the everyday construction of risk within the context of changing government restrictions regarding physical distancing. In the context of perceived confusion around government activity, the participants narrated individualised accounts of risk production, as they reflected upon the transmission of COVID-19. Our findings indicate the emergence of the concept of the ‘ignorant imagined other’ as underpinning how lay persons locate risks in unknowledgeable others and see themselves as socially protected through their own perceived knowledgeability of COVID-19. Our findings contribute to the literature on the social perception of infectious disease through the examination of the understudied context of urban Indonesia and by demonstrating the social location of risk in relation to a generalised imagined other, within a wider context of public health governance.

Keywords:

• stigma
• Indonesia
• COVID-19
• qualitative
• lay narratives

Introduction

This paper draws upon social constructivist understandings of risk to explore lay perceptions of COVID-19 in Indonesia, in the context of changing government policy around the disease. While risk has a material and potentially measurable element concerning the probability of an event (Smith, 2006), in this article we are concerned with exploring the way in which lay persons reflect upon COVID-19 risk and so comprehend risk as constructed through, and dependent on, social and cultural processes (Adam et al., 2000; Beck, 2009; Joffe, 2003). Understanding such processes is pivotal to managing scientifically measured risk. Social constructions of risk impact upon individual actions, health-seeking behaviour, and adherence to public health messaging around social distancing (Link & Phelan, 2006; Valdiserri, 2002).

Here, the wider socio-cultural constructions of risk are situated within the context of narratives around the efficacy of government social distancing policy. We therefore aim to bridge two literatures in this field – the construction of risk and blame within public health policy (for example, Studdard & Hall, 2020), and the social perception of risk by lay actors (Joffe, 2003; Nelkin & Gilman, 1998). While the extant literature on the social perception of risk highlights how these perceptions are drawn from wider social mores and culturally contingent understandings of infection, the results of this case study inductively demonstrate that government policy is pivotal to the way in which lay people narrate risk. Within the context of changing government policy on social restrictions, people within Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta Area understood risk as coupled with ignorance, subscribing to discourses of individual responsibility and simultaneously critiquing the government as misunderstanding the state of (other) people’s lack of awareness.

Infectious disease risk, lay perceptions, and government interventions

Helman’s (1978) classic work on social narratives of cold and flu in England signals the start of the literature investigating how respiratory illnesses (e.g., Prior et al., 2011) are socially understood (Helman, 1978). These studies show how narratives of sickness diverge from biomedical understandings of illness and its transmission. More recently, work around HIV/AIDS (Lupton, 2012; Warwick et al., 2008) argues for the importance of lay perceptions in mediating the illness experience and interactions with biomedical care. During the 2013–15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the problem of the social perception and management of risk again came to the forefront in global health debates (Wilkinson et al., 2017). This literature highlights the culturally contingent nature of understandings of contagion and how these underpin social reactions to disease. While much of the prior literature focuses upon the relationship between lay and biomedical discourses, our findings suggest that the relationship between lay accounts and public policy requires further attention.

Social constructivist literature on policy aspects of infectious disease tends to be predominantly focused on high-income settings and on the issue of the regulation of populations from a macrosociological viewpoint, assessing risk discourses extended by the government and public health bodies. Drawing on Foucauldian perspectives, a key literature reflects on issues of border control and security in the regulation and management of risk (Bashford, 2002; Davies, 2008). When looking at the spread of disease across and beyond the nation state, border control activities are coupled with discourses of immigration, othering and blame, for example, in assessing the Australian government’s rhetoric around avian influenza (Abeysinghe & White, 2010) or the border control activities of governments in the global North around the 2013–15 outbreak of Ebola (Enemark, 2017; Roemer-Mahler and Rushton, 2018).

Blame is often evidenced in the literature in the othering of groups outwith the body politic. This is apparent in the emerging evidence surrounding COVID-19 from across the world. For instance, studies of blame and stigma in the US demonstrate the stereotyping and othering of Asian communities with COVID-19 discourses (Li & Nicholson, 2021). Joshi and Swarnakar (2021) similarly highlight identity-based forms of stigma surrounding ethnicity, as well as religious minorities, in India. Investigating blame in editorial cartoons in Canada, Labbé and colleagues (2022) found a focus on foreigners, travellers and the urban population more broadly. These findings suggest that lay and public explanations of risk and blame fall in line with pre-existing social disjunctures which have been replicated in relation to COVID-19.

Taking a critical anthropological perspective, Briggs and Mantini-Briggs’ (2003) ‘Stories in the Time of Cholera’ articulates how risk became located in the ‘unsanitary’ activities of the marginalised indígenas population, and how this allowed non-indígenas Venezuelans to feel socially protected from the disease. This demonstrates how understandings of risk can be directly linked to government intervention. Within such contexts, restrictive government activities are politically acceptable, perhaps because repressive measures (such as quarantining and border control) tend to be targeted on the Other rather than the core body politic of the (‘sanitary’) citizenry (Briggs, 2005; Eichelberger, 2007; Horton & Barker, 2009). COVID-19 has presented an interesting departure from that arrangement. The epidemiology of the virus has meant that risk groups for transmission were, particularly initially, difficult to distinguish. Whereas, in the past, quarantine and isolation impacted on individuals who were infected, exposed, or within a confined (and usually socially marginal) ‘risk group’ (Studdert & Hall, 2020), policies of social distancing in reaction to COVID-19 are often society-wide. Given the prevalence of infection, it was also unclear whether patterns of targeting and blame would follow the example of previous epidemics and pandemics. In assessing these questions within this study, the domestic context in Indonesia presented a particular and unique case study in relation to the timing and forms of population-level social distancing measures implemented by the central and regional governments.

Context

Case study context

In Spring 2020, Indonesia emerged as a key locus of COVID-19 transmission within the Asia-Pacific region. At the time of this research, COVID-19 cases were rising in Indonesia, while the transmission rate had flattened out in many neighbouring countries. As of 9 September 2020, there were 203,342 positive cases and 8,336 deaths from COVID-19 (National Committee for COVID-19 Handling and Economic Recovery, 2020). There were large regional disparities within Indonesia, with the mortality rate in the Great Jakarta Area at 126 per one million population (World Health Organization, 2020a). Indonesia has also been an important global health actor in relation to infectious disease, due to its key role in prior international outbreaks and its sometimes challenging relationship with the World Health Organisation and other global actors (Irwin, 2010; Fidler 2008). Domestically, Indonesia maintains a complex governance system, with a powerful central government and a rising importance of local government actors and non-governmental and advocacy organisations (Coker et al., 2011; Padmawati & Nichter, 2008).

Despite the prominence of Indonesia in global infectious disease, there is a dearth of social scientific academic literature in the Indonesian context. Much of the existing work focuses upon the role of Indonesia within global health structures from an international relations perspective (e.g., Davies, 2012; Stevenson & Cooper, 2009). There is a smaller literature based on the experience of infectious diseases within Indonesia. With respect to avian influenza, Padmawati and Nichter (2008) interrogate the role of rumours in the lay experience of risk, and Hameiri and Jones (2015) assess the negotiation and social and political construction of insecurity between key stakeholders (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Peters and colleagues (2013), in exploring the social meanings of leprosy in Cirebon, Indonesia, further establish the importance of understanding lay knowledge and perception in the management of infectious disease in framing the illness experience in this setting.

Risk, COVID-19 policy in Indonesia, and the New Normal

In April 2020, several provinces in Indonesia (including the case study site of Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta Area) started imposing a form of lockdown, nationally termed the ‘Limitation on Large-Scale Social Interactions’ (referred to through the Indonesian acronym, PSBB) (Indonesian Government Regulation, 2020). By the end of May 2020, the government introduced the ‘New Normal’ transition policy, later changed to the ‘Adapting to New Habits’ policy (Post, n.d.) (though colloquially still referred to as ‘New Normal’, as seen in the results section). This was aligned with local policies in Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta area surrounding changes in the then-implemented large-scale social distancing policy (PERGUB 33, 2020). This indicated an end to population-wide physical distancing and the reopening of workplaces and business in an attempt to rehabilitate the economic sector. During these shifts in political rhetoric and public health guidelines, the number of cases was consistently increasing, placing a significant burden on health systems. On 8 September 2020, isolation bed occupancy rate reached 77% and the ICU bed occupancy rate was 83% in the designated COVID-19 hospital in Jakarta (Tempo, 2020; WHO, 2020b). As a result, the governor of Jakarta reimposed the PSBB restrictions starting on 14 September 2020. The data collection for this study took place towards the start of the pandemic in Indonesia – during the initial PSBP and throughout the New Normal, a period of significant policy changes and retractions.

Before the New Normal policy was implemented in May 2020, a survey of over 150,000 people indicated that more than 70% of participants believed that they and their immediate family had an insignificant chance of contracting by COVID-19 (Lapor COVID-19, 2020). The study further demonstrated that 58% of participants did not know whether COVID-19 was manmade, with 18% believing that it is. Rumours and confused messaging around COVID-19 predominated since the beginning of the pandemic, and this has been linked to perceived government mishandling. Government officials widely announced that the country should be safe from the virus by performing prayers (Gorbiano & Facriansyah, 2020). The government further dismissed scientists’ predictions of undetected cases and expressed concern for the promotion of tourism (Daraini, 2020; De Salazar et al., 2020). In the month following the first case, the government was criticised for being non-transparent in its release of data, for example, in relation to data around recovery rates (Daraini, 2020). At the time, the lack of transparency was followed by government officials claiming to have found the cure for COVID-19 in herbs and traditional practice (Allard & Lamb, 2020; Paddock, 2020). These combined public contestations suggest that the government may be seen by citizens as less reliable than religious leaders and health experts or medical doctors regarding COVID-19 (Lapor COVID-19, 2020).

Our analysis focuses on the lay perception of risk of COVID-19 in the midst of changing government policy, and in a period of government contestation, during the early phases of the pandemic in Indonesia from May to July 2020. We examine the public perception of this change and reflect on how this perception intertwines with lay discourses of risk. Lay understandings of risk are revealed through representations of the actions of the general public and the impact of pandemic policy on these actions. In illustrating participants’ locating of risk in the individual ignorance of others, our findings suggest a prevalent perception that the government’s loosening of restrictions was misinformed.

Methodology

In the analysis we present below, we draw upon a 5-week qualitative data collection process in which we aimed to understand lay participants’ experiences and narratives of COVID-19, through the use of weekly digital diaries.

Sample, recruitment, approach

The study was conducted in the Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta area (Bogor, Bekasi, Tangerang and Depok), Indonesia. Participants were recruited by disseminating flyers through social media, contacting local organisations, and convenience sampling (for older adults) to obtain a demographic spread of participants. The latter was required due to the initial sampling strategy not capturing individuals in the 60+ age group though a cross-section of other groups was obtained through the initial strategy. Forty participants were recruited, with a retention of 37 until the conclusion of the study. Participants are aged between 20 and 70 years old, with sampling across age categories and across genders (17 males and 20 females by the end of the study) (see Table 1). Half of the participants lived in Jakarta and the rest were residents in the Greater Jakarta area, specifically Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi. Using participants’ self-reported profession as a proxy for socioeconomic status (SES), the sample was selected to include participants at all income levels: low income, lower middle income, higher middle income, and higher income. In the sampling strategy, we aimed for diversity across SES/profession, place, age, and sex rather than statistical representativeness of the wider population, in that the aim of the study was to capture consistent threads of narratives from across this diverse sample.

Table 1. Characteristics of participants.

	n/mean	%
(a) Age (years)
Mean	40
Min	21
Max	68
(b) Gender
Female	22	55%
Male	18	45%
(c) Socioeconomic status
Lower	5	13%
Middle-lower	3	8%
Middle	18	45%
Middle-upper	4	10%
Upper	10	25%
(d) Location
Jakarta	19	48%
Greater Jakarta (Bodetabek)	21	53%
(e) Field of work
Goverment	6	15%
Education	7	18%
Finance	1	3%
Health	4	10%
Non-governmental organisation	2	5%
Private	10	25%
Social culture	1	3%
Student	2	5%
Unemployment	3	8%
Other	4	10%

Through this recruitment, individuals who were interested in participating sent a direct message to AFL and completed an informed consent process. All participants joined voluntarily and were provided with a gift card valued at 5 pounds sterling (~100,000 rupiahs) to cover costs associated with the communication and time taken to complete the research. Ethics approval was obtained from the University of Edinburgh. The key ethical concern for the study was the time cost for participants and the anticipated sensitivities associated with the discussion of ‘stigma’. Digital diaries, rather than interviews, were chosen so that participants were able to respond to the questions at their own convenience, in addition to allowing the research to look at changes over this period of time. While issues of sensitivity were a concern prior to the piloting of the questions, it became clear through the course of piloting that participants were comfortable with the concept of stigma and about experience with COVID-19 more widely, having been sensitised to this idea via previous public health messaging; participants were able to speak directly and openly about these issues. Given the length of the study period, participants were also reminded before data collection points about the right to withdraw, to not answer any of the posed questions, or to request breaks.

Design, participants, data collection, analysis

The study employed a qualitative approach with a digital diary interview method. The diary prompts (semi-structured questions) were sent to the participants each week for five weeks from May to July 2020. AFL was responsible for engaging with participants via chat, sharing the questions, following up with prompts, and making sure each question was answered in detail. Prior to each week, the questions were discussed among research assistants and the principal investigator to decide on the prompts in reaction to the development of COVID-19 in Indonesia and the previous weeks’ responses. The timing of responses varied between some minutes/hours later the same day to a week later, depending upon participant availability. The chat conversations were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language, and were downloaded and converted to secured digital data storage and erased from the app. Towards the end of data analysis, participants were provided with a lay summary to provide feedback to the participants.

Prior to analysis, the data was cleaned (formatting for consistency when moved into a word file) and then translated by FH and with the assistance of a translation company, under a non-disclosure agreement. The data was anonymised prior to translation. Following translation, the text was checked for accuracy by at least two members of the research team who were dual-language speakers. Following this, the data were coded using a thematic analysis technique (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Operating under an inductive interpretivist orientation to the data, thematic analysis was considered most appropriate given that the data had been translated and given the broadly inductive nature of the research task. This was undertaken via an interactive approach, isolating the key broad themes and then coding for more specific sub-themes. The themes we present for this article were coded independently by three members of the team, who then met to discuss for inter-coder validation. Following the process, SA coded the data fully in line with the agreed categories and as a team of three we met again to validate and discuss the coding.

Findings

Within the study period, there was a large degree of variation across participants in the narratives surrounding risk, government policy and COVID-19. However, there are also core consistencies in some key areas. These include perceptions of the virus and disease and the critique and confusion around the New Normal period.

1. Narratives of risk and vulnerability

1.1 Nature of the risk

Across respondents, there was a clear common understanding of the transmission of COVID-19 and ways to minimise transmission, including physical distancing, handwashing and use of face masks. The participants themselves reported a high degree of compliance with these measures.

In characterising the risk, many participants reflected on the ‘hidden’ nature of the threat, with this underpinning a sense of uncertainty and fear:

I think it’s natural to be anxious and suspicious, because the Covid virus is invisible to the eye. It depends on what we see in terms of symptoms, for this sick neighbour whether he has symptoms related to Covid or suffering from other illnesses. (F, 40s, social care)

Part of the suspicion surrounding COVID-19 appeared to relate to the difficulty in identifying who in the community might transmit the disease. This was linked to the seemingly invisible nature of the virus, which was described here as a ghost:

Covid = ghost. It cannot be seen but it can attack anyone … (F, 60s, retired academic)

These narratives supported the prevalent sense of threat and risk that was evident across all of the participants’ accounts. The concept of ‘invisibility’ undergirding risk and uncertainty is also consistent with the findings within the infectious disease literature, where the unseen nature of viruses and bacteria is key (Lee et al., 2010; Peretti-Watel et al., 2019). These ideas were also linked with understandings of the universality of risk associated with COVID-19, as a virus that can ‘attack anyone’.

However, when reflecting upon personal risk, participants acknowledged the potential health impact of infection but simultaneously tended to focus their responses around economic impacts. This included the sense of a generalised societal instability incurred from the economic effects:

Initially me and maybe you might be fearful of the Corona virus because the fatality impact to health, and we can even die out of this Covid. But then as time goes by and these days, I am more fearful of the cause or impact of Covid to the economy, mainly to the people with lower income who are very vulnerable to the impact, who lost their job because getting laid off, those who experience a low season of buyers, even. (M, 40s, media)

These ideas reflected shifts in the sense of risk caused by the pandemic over time, and the perception that the economic risks of the pandemic and its handling posed a perhaps greater risk to community security:

… the next risk is economic collapse and the social fabric of society that is not ready for change (M, 50s, entrepreneur)

One of the key consequences of the pandemic was therefore seen not only in the health impact but through perceived breakdown of social norms and also by having created insecurity through the loss of pre-existing structures of work and sources of income:

This is certainly increasing the crime threat among the society, since the economic need is not fulfilled. (M, 30s, police officer)

Economic risk was also at the forefront of the sense of personal insecurity, particularly for participants who are engaged in insecure or informal sectors of work:

If it stays like this all the time, probably [I/we] would die out of hunger and not Covid. Anything that we do is wrong. … What about my child and family who are waiting? Furthermore, I am the breadwinner of the family. (F, 30s, sex worker)

In terms of both frequency and the strength of claims being made it was clear that economic risks, at both the individual level and at the societal level, were central to participants’ concerns. This corresponds with previous research that suggests that more than 80% of people in Jakarta assumed that the economic risk was equal to the health risk (Lapor COVID-19, 2020). As illustrated below, many participants linked these risks with fears of more overarching breakdown of societal norms due to the failure of others to conform with public health guidelines around issues of social distancing.

1.2. Spread of COVID-19 by Individual Behaviours

Risk was not seen as an outcome of society-wide factors but rather of individual actions. Research participants saw themselves as acting responsibly and morally in relation to risk management but complained about the exacerbation of risk from others in the wider community or society. In looking at the issue of transmission through asymptomatic individuals, participants formed distinctions between responsible persons and an imagined ignorant public.

In some cases, this resulted in the formation of distinctions around sanitary citizens (Briggs & Mantini-Briggs, 2003) who were understood as protected and as low-risk social connections:

hmm, so far we reduce interactions with other people. [E]xcept for the people we know [who] do protect their conditions. (M, 20s, office worker)

This line of thought has the potential to complicate understandings of transmission, where sanitary personal connections are viewed as ‘safe’. This was coupled with a tendency to socially locate the risks in more marginalised populations:

In my opinion, the most vulnerable to contracting COVID-19 are those with low education and densely populated locations. According to my observation, in the traditional market, for the lower class, they are still not applying good health protocols, because they do not know (are not knowledgeable about health), they have no perception about health risks. (F, 40s, healthcare)

Often the sense of risky communities was linked with the concept of discipline. Highly disciplined individuals were seen as more immune to the risks of COVID-19, while risks were located in those understood as behaving irresponsibly:

When it comes to the impact of the community’s lack of understanding of this new scheme, for people who have high discipline, it is not worrying, but for those who do not have high discipline, they become misguided, resistant and disobedient to the provisions previously outlined. There are also those who, because of their lack of understanding, even assume that New Normal is acting more freely, so that it is counterproductive to efforts to reduce the number of epidemics [infections] spread. (M, 40s, sales)

This understanding was often presented in discussions of the limitations of the New Normal, which will be explored further below.

Relatedly, the other groups of people often regarded as risky are those who, according to the narratives of the participants, acted irrationally in relation to the threat:

… the person who NEVER gets out from the house (stays at home) during covid is the person who are most prone to covid. People like that are weak because they cannot adapt to the outside world, so once they get out of the house, it is more dangerous. Dangerous. Like a boiler chicken, once hit by the rain or bad weather outside, they are immediately getting weak. (M, 40s media)

Interestingly, and somewhat in contradiction to the narrative of responsibility, this narrative seemed to also target people who were seen as overcautious and therefore ‘weakened’ by the virus. This suggests that it was not merely the actions themselves that were regarded as (ir)responsible, but that self-distancing actions were only considered health-protective if they were underpinned by accurate (from participants’ perspectives) knowledge about the risk.

In relation to those who do not physically distance, this explanation of irrationality was also directed at forms of faith-based response:

In my opinion, some people or groups who feel that it’s difficult to avoid the Covid 19 started to think irrationally and say that Covid-19 is a punishment from God that has to be accepted by humans and during the moment of Ramadhan and Eid Al Fitr, they desperately break the government’s warning to maintain physical distance and keep having the congregation in the mushalla or mosque, with the reason to increase their devotion and avoid Covid-19. (F, 30s, homemaker)

Overall, from our sample only a single participant indicated any degree of scepticism around the idea that COVID-19 is a high-risk event that requires stringent public health measures:

Personally, I can believe it more, if I see it by myself [first-hand] that someone is truly contracted by the Covid19. My activity since January to April is going back and forth to take care of my younger sibling who was hospitalized. Lastly in April she was sent home with an excuse that the hospital is more concerned of the Covid19 patients. I [had] never see[n] the [covid] patients myself. (F, 50s, social worker)

Even this participant appeared to partake in activities consistent with social distancing, and (at least from her own report), demonstrated a core understanding and response to the spread of disease. These findings then indicate that participants located failures in (ir)responsible behaviour of others – with a tendency to blame those of lower SES groups and weaker knowledge about the virus – and highlight their own responsible behaviours in response to the pandemic. This location of risk in others was linked directly to ways in which government intervention was critiqued by the participants.

2. The New Normal

The participants indicated significant confusion around the New Normal policy, and almost all participants believed the policy to be counterproductive, allowing unknowledgeable persons to exaggerate risk.

2.1. ‘New Normal’ versus ‘normal’ – confusion around the policy

Most participants expressed a belief that there was a widespread misunderstanding of what the term ‘New Normal’ indicated and how this differed from ‘normal’ social life and economic activity.

Because new normal for the general public is like returning to normal. Except for those who are really aware of the main differences. So that people start their activities as usual, and the compliance to the protocols that were previously run began to weaken. (M, 40s, office worker).

Many participants expressed a personal understanding of the difference between the ‘New Normal’ and ‘returning to normal’ but a distrust of the extent to which this distinction was understood in the wider population:

What most people understand about new normal is that they can do activities as usual again. Without paying too much attention to health protocols which ultimately makes the risk of spreading the virus higher. (F, 20s, consultant)

Other participants indicated personal confusion about what this policy constitutes:

Many people haven’t understood what does “new normal” mean, Sir, including myself. I think that is related to a new habit and way, that needs to be adapted with a new way. New behaviour, social distancing etc, and I am sure that it’s not easy … (F, 30s, sex worker)

While the term ‘New Normal’ had at the time been pervasive within pandemic-related reporting, encountered by all of the participants in the study, there was an apparent sense of confusion about the policy and the terminology surrounding the state of being. Some participants also expressed that the policy might be counterproductive in facilitating public acceptance of the realities of the pandemic and that the terminology might undermine the communications around the threat posed by COVID-19 and the need for compliance with public health messaging:

… in my opinion, the community awareness of “new normal” has not been maximized. In fact, instead of “new normal” there are some friends who are beginning to doubt, is covid19 really there or just a “conspiracy”. The fear is that if there is a lack of community awareness, people will not implement the “new normal” protocol. (F, 40s, finance)

While the general literature on public health management suggests that, in most cases, publics are resistant to activities that impinge on their personal freedoms (Studdert & Hall, 2020; Viens et al., 2009), the strong trend in our data is a preference for the government to continue with stricter measures at the present point in the pandemic.

2.2. Explanations for Inefficacy

The perceived inefficacy of the policy is explained through a variety of narratives, linking to perceptions about the role of the (Central and Regional) government/s and about the nature of the risk presented by COVID-19.

2.2.1. Community misinformation

One reiterated narrative surrounded the idea that the general public misapprehended the nature of the pandemic and the public health activities that surrounded the pandemic. Some participants cite an overarching public misunderstanding about the pandemic that, they suggest, needs to be rectified prior to the relaxation of PBSB:

Many Indonesians are not bothered about covid … don’t want to think about the impact on themselves and their families … don’t want to be separated from the opportunity to gather and death is considered inevitable … especially for uneducated people. When locked down it becomes chaotic … so this is the best choice … until their eyes are opened … (M, 60s, retired)

The construction of the general public as misinformed about the pandemic – often linked as below to narratives of illiteracy or ignorance more widely than COVID-19 – underpinned the suggestion that the New Normal strategy would not be efficacious:

… Covid education is still lacking (either due to lack of effort from the education providers, or lack of interest in reading/ literacy in Indonesia, or a combination of both, or other factors). [S]o many people are ‘paranoids’, many are ignorant too. [S]o, it is rather difficult to find an ideal point for implementing a new normal that is balanced between health aspects and economic aspects. (M, 20s, office worker)

For these individuals, further education of the general public will help to provide the grounds for introducing a policy like the New Normal.

For others, the concept of the New Normal, and the suggestion of the (re)normalisation of social and economic activity, was deemed harmful in itself:

[O]ne more thing I see, sorry this a little unconnected with the question, but frankly I’m quite worried, if it turns out the community is not ready for the concept of New Normal. What are thought by the people? [S]o, people in many points around us, starting to ignore masks, the distance, etc. so, I am more worried. (M, 30s, healthcare)

This concern about the New Normal was grounded in the perception that public health measures were not being adhered to, and also in the sense that an exacting policy was needed to ensure that others adhered to public health practices:

But because there is no strict policy, the psychology of [the] lower-class community feels it’s safe, so now they go out to make a living without using adequate health protocols. In addition, many middle-class people have travelled out of town, attending weddings and meetings where the participants come from various regions. (F, 20s, legal)

As linked to the discourses of risk arising from the individual, the idea of enforcing or disciplining individuals into sanitary citizenship permeated these explanations of inefficacy, even with the relative minority of participants who were broadly supportive of the intervention:

… I believe the action taken by the government through their programmes has been good, but people still have lack of discipline. The government has an important role to manage the risk of the covid-19 transmission. If the government is strict, the risk of transmission can be reduced. (M, 30s, office worker)

Ideas of individual risk behaviours and responsibility were therefore the dominant theme in explanations of the problem with the New Normal policy. This resonates with the trend of the overall characterisation of the risk as explored in section 1 above.

2.2.2. Indecisive policy

A less common finding was among those participants who were critical of government activities. Instead of focusing on individual action, these respondents are more likely to point to issues in the policy itself, in particular, the contradictions in the policy:

… this also happens because regulations are still backward and coercive. Like large scale social distancing, but airports are open, terminals are open, markets are open, stations are open, etc. The government’s attitude of moving back and forth gives an impression that the large-scale social distancing is only an appeal/public advice, not a serious matter ….(M, 30s, healthcare)

Within this narrative, participants also reflected on the communicative confusion surrounding the rollout of the New Normal, where the messaging was perceived as unclear and inconsistent:

However conflicting communications between several ministries makes conflicting communication in terms of regulations; makes people confused. Examples of cases of masks vs not masks, going home vs not going home. (F, 30s office worker)

This sense of unclear messaging was also linked back to perceptions of the ability of the general public to cope with inconsistency:

I think the social distancing/ PSBB is very indecisive. It’s too loose for our society which has a low risk perception. Family members in my hometown still break their Ramadhan fasting together, congregate for the Tarawih prayer, and other activities. (F, 50s, healthcare)

Even within these narratives there was a tendency for participants to link these inefficacies with issues of public misunderstanding and non-compliance, more directly linking policy inefficacy with public ignorance.

2.2.3. Focus on economic impact

A second strand of critique of the government, and one which did not draw directly from narratives of individual behaviour, was the suggestion that the policy privileged economic consequences above public health consequences. This narrative was particularly interesting in that the risks expressed by the participants focused on forms of social and economic risk. Yet, in describing the management of the pandemic, participants expressed a concern that government activities should be focused on public health measures.

For example, some participants expressed a distrust of official communications from non-health sectors:

[I distrust] officials who are not in their fields but comment on this pandemic[…]those appointed to complete [manage] the pandemic in the health sector but look like economists. (M, 20s, student)

At an individual level, the pandemic and its management were seen by participants as an economic concern. However, simultaneously, participants indicated that from their perspective, it was (and for many participants, solely) the health impacts that should be focused upon in government intervention:

… I personally want to trust the government basically, but because economy is taken as priorities, I don’t agree. Because gradually, the increase in the number of covid patients is getting higher, it will still have a great impact on the economy. […] Like a time bomb. The main focus should be: the impact of transmission risks, then the economic impact. (M, 30s, healthcare)

While descriptions of personal risk therefore tended to disentangle the economic from health impact of pandemic and pandemic management, others reflected on the interaction between these issues at the societal level and emphasised that transmission of the virus should be the primary governing concern. However, government activities were seen as vague and inadequate in mitigating the health risks posed by the virus:

So far, what the Government has done is still to promote a “safe together” pattern, which in my opinion means that the Government has not dared to take firm decisions regarding lockdowns/strict restrictions on the community activities. One consideration is related to the social and economic community …. As a result, the level of spread in the country continues to rise and the graph is very difficult to suppress. In my opinion, at this time Indonesia is really not ready for “new normal”. (M, 30s, police)

Many respondents linked economic wellbeing with physical wellbeing and suggested that the government had misunderstood these impacts. This was apparent even in the explanations of those (the minority) who were broadly positive about the policy:

The New Normal policy is in my opinion appropriate, if the supervision of the health protocol follows it. If not, the economic conditions of the people will be more severe. From the health side of course we are worried, but socially [I’m] more worried if the people starve. (M, 50s, entrepreneur)

These respondents consider the government’s role as balancing the needs of health and economic risks, and acknowledge the problem of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty:

But the conditions are sometimes difficult to achieve, the maximum conditions for both of the two factors (health and economy together) which sometimes conflict with each other, so it seems that the programs carried out by the government have not been maximized. But for me personally, because this is a lesson for our government in particular, so in my opinion, the government has tried several steps that consider the country and its citizens for sure, even though the results were still not effective. It’s called trial and error. (F, 20s, researcher)

As with the actions of many governments internationally, the weighing of health and economic risks was reflected upon here in both more critical and more sympathetic evaluations of the government’s focus in the introduction of the New Normal.

2.2.4. Individualising consequences of the New Normal

The overall consequence of the policy, according to the respondents, is the re-centring of the management of risk from the government back onto the individual. Participants suggested that the sanctions associated with not adhering to the measures were not enough to ensure compliance:

for those who don’t use a mask there is a 250K fine or [you will be asked to] sweep the street. And in reality, there are still many who do not use masks because the residents underestimate the sanctions because there are options (to sweep the road). (F, 20s, office worker)

At the intersection of the perception of risk as borne from irresponsible individual behaviours and the belief that the New Normal exacerbates conditions of public misunderstanding, several participants suggested that they had increased personal measures in response to the change:

Basically, now it’s back to each individual, if we want to stay healthy, we must always be clean, and follow medical advice about protocols for maintaining health during the covid19 pandemic, such as wearing masks, washing hands, social distancing, etc. (M, 50s, manager)

These participants were speaking of the individualisation of risk that had occurred through the introduction of the New Normal and the need to be particularly mindful of public health measures under these conditions.

My family and I are even more obedient to follow health protocols in the new normal period, further reducing the activity out of the house and apply more distant to our co-workers who ride the public transportation (F, 50s, healthcare)

This reflects a conception of individual responsibility for the management of the pandemic:

… as far as I am concerned, for this pandemic the government only makes appeals/ public suggestion but without a firm attitude … because at the end of the day it’s the people’s own awareness … (F, 30s, finance)

Distrust in both the government and the community were seemingly leading our participants towards the further individuation of risk and management, where individual safeguarding was seen as a necessary response, in the eyes of the participants, to the irresponsible behaviour of community members and the relaxation of large-scale social distancing in the context of an under-informed public.

Discussion

We began this study with a focus on the social construction of risk and blame among lay people in the urban areas of Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta Area, Indonesia. Through our analysis of the data, we found that in discussing risk, the participants related their accounts directly to government policies around physical distancing. This provides a potential departure on much of the extant work investigating risk narratives, which focuses on the role of expert knowledges in societal discourses of risk (Alaszewski, 2021). Further reflection on the interrelation between government messaging and lay understandings of risk would provide an important site of investigation in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. Chan (2021) demonstrates how this relationship can sometimes appear contradictory – where, in Hong Kong, it was seen that a lack of confidence in the government prompted individuals to take self-protective measures. In the Indonesian context, narratives of government efficacy interacted with constructions of an irresponsible generalised public and, therefore, of naive policy-making. Drawing inductively from the accounts of the participants, we found that risk narratives were linked to concerns about the relaxation of physical distancing measures. Personal risk and responsibility were innately understood as intertwined with this public health intervention, as these were considered increasingly necessary during the relaxation of social distancing given the perceived apathy of the wider public. This finding in itself subverts the dominant trend in the literature around the public perception of infectious disease, which tends to focus on the placement of these narratives within wider lay belief systems and the juxtaposition with the narratives, not of the government or public health, but of (individualised) biomedicine. Given the dearth of literature on the urban Indonesian context in this field, it is unclear whether this difference is borne from the case study site/population or the specific conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our findings also diverge from expectations in the literature in other ways. Dairini’s (202) study, conducted immediately prior to this research, indicated a high degree of misinformation and rumours around COVID-19 in Indonesia, including misinformation about the source of the virus (as man-made). Padmawati and Nichter’s (2008) work on avian influenza also found rumours to be a dominant social process, and global research has focused on COVID-19 hoaxes as a key site of concern (see, for example, Galvão, 2021). This also holds true in the Indonesian context, and combatting misinformation has been a key aspect of government policy (Nasir et al., 2020; Triwardani, 2021). However, we did not uncover closely held beliefs about COVID-19 that contradicted public health messaging. This is not to say that rumours were entirely absent from the data, but there are very few instances within our findings. Where present, these did not appear to be related to non-adherence to distancing practices; for example, one respondent suggested that consumption of spices might have a protective effect, but simultaneously stated that he was engaging in social distancing. Similarly, while many respondents commented upon the incidence of faith-based non-adherence amongst wider society, none of the participants themselves expressed such views. While it is possible that respondents were providing what they perceived to be socially desired responses, this at least does suggest that these participants were aware of the public health messaging.

However, our findings also indicate that participants also believed there to be widespread community ignorance around COVID-19. This is a dominant finding of the data – participants perceived the risk of COVID-19 as arising from individuals who were ignorant of the facts of the virus and its transmission. Thus, the perceived ‘ignorance’ of others was a defining explanatory tool in the lay narrative of COVID-19 in Indonesia. Individuals who were carriers of risk were those who had not understood the problem of the virus and its effects.

This core finding has interesting implications for studies of the social construction of risk. As indicated by the extant literature, risk tends to be socially located in the ‘other’. This might be the immigrant or non-citizen other or socially marginalised members of society. For example, Eichelberger (2007) demonstrates the social location of risk of SARS in Chinese immigrant populations of New York, and a rich body of work around HIV, SARS, H1N1 and Ebola demonstrates how stigma and blame of the out-group can act as a form of perceived social armour against the threat of infections (Nelkin & Gilman, 1988; Overholt et al., 2018; Petros et al., 2006). In her study of risk on policy judgements about acceptable risk exposure to road accident injury and death, Anderson (2022) charts the mutually constitutive notions of acceptable risk and inequality. Indeed, in relation to COVID-19, studies of risk and inequality clearly demonstrate how narratives around universal susceptibility mask the social relationships of power and difference that undergird the impact of the pandemic (Bowleg, 2020; Brown & Zinn, 2021; Patel et al., 2020).

Our study sheds light on these processes from different perspectives – here, a common narrative of the ignorant other was presented and discussed in a more generalised sense, rather than a targeting of any specific social grouping. Briggs and Mantini-Briggs (2003) provide an example that is perhaps most analogous to the current study, in assessing Cholera in Venezuela. Their explanation focuses on the distinction between ‘sanitary citizens’ (middle-class Venezuelans, compliant with government public health strategies) and ‘unsanitary subjects’ (indigenas Venezuelans who are unable to comply given their structural conditions and seen as outwith the body politic). In our research, many participants did locate risk in lower-SES individuals and communities. However, as opposed to a discourse of public health compliance and non-compliance, our findings differ in two important regards: 1) government actions were seen as inherently determining the conditions of these risky individuals and communities and 2) the findings show that it was not the public health activities that were emphasised but rather the knowledge about the virus was seen as protective. This is seen most clearly in the assertion that individuals who are too focused on social distancing are also weakened against the virus.

In discussing disease transmission, the distinction arose between not (only) sanitary and unsanitary persons but between ‘ignorant’ and ‘knowledgeable’ persons. These understandings intersected with the perception of government interventions and the loosening of physical distancing restrictions. Here, the perceived unknowledgeable masses were understood as being unable to act in socially protective ways. In this context, we therefore did not find a focus on othering of socially marginal groups, but instead an explanation rooted in ignorance/knowledge distinctions. Due to this, within this context, we found overwhelming support for stricter public health measures, contradicting arguments elsewhere (particularly arising from scholarly work in the US, but also other contexts in the global North) that have suggested protracted population-wide social distancing is likely to receive community rejection due to impingements on individual freedoms (Studdert & Hall, 2020; Viens et al., 2009). Indeed, although when presenting personal risks our participants predominantly referred to economic anxieties, in their critiques of the government, the participants stated a belief that the government should focus solely on health aspects and presented economic issues as an invalid reason for lifting restrictions.

This intersection of the belief in the ignorant imagined other and the loosening of government-mandated restrictions resulted in a rearticulating and emphasis on personal responsibility. This is a particularly interesting finding in the Indonesian context. Whereas research with populations in the global North indicates that the internalisation of (neoliberal) individual responsibility of health dominates, there is sparse literature on these patterns which are informed by studies in collectivist contexts such as Indonesia. As with our other findings, it is possible that the unique context of COVID-19 in relation to the existing literature may account for this result, but this remains an area for future investigation.

Conclusion

Drawing upon a qualitative analysis of the perspectives of 37 individuals across 5 weeks in Jakarta and the Greater Jakarta Area, in this article we have addressed the dearth of literature on understanding lay perspectives of infectious disease in the Indonesian setting by exploring the social construction of COVID-19 risk in the context of changing government policy surrounding physical distancing. Our findings show that respondents present their accounts of risk as individualised – based upon their perceptions of the ignorance of others – with a simultaneous widespread scepticism of government accounts.

We have argued that in relation to the unseen transmission of the disease, including through asymptomatic individuals, the concept of the ignorant imagined other underpins the lay narratives of COVID-19, as well as participants’ explanations of the ineffectiveness of government policies in easing physical distancing restrictions. Our findings underline the case for further exploration of distinctions of knowing and unknowing in processes of risk perception and (potentially) social exclusion surrounding COVID-19 in this context, as well as for further investigation of the intersection between these processes and lay understandings of public health policies.

CRediT Roles

SA: conceptualisation, funding acquisition, formal analysis, methodology, project administration, supervision, writing – original draft; VA: investigation, formal analysis, project administration, writing – original draft; NH: project administration; FH: investigation, formal analysis, writing – original draft; AFL: investigation, writing – review and editing; PVS: investigation, formal analysis, writing – review and editing; AU: writing – review and editing; AS: supervision.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the University of Edinburgh, Scottish Funding Council/GCRF Covid-19 Fund [COV_20].