Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors

Abstract

In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue to operate as our ordinary and everyday basis for social cognition. I also argue that enactive perception rather than implicit simulation is the best model for explaining these capacities.

Keywords:

• interaction theory
• simulation
• folk psychology
• primary intersubjectivity
• enactive perception

Notes

Even in such cases we do not have to revert to the idea that there are hidden mental states that need to be mentalized. Rather, it is enough to say that things don't add up – the words, the emotional expressions, the bodily stances, the situation, etc., lack a certain coherency, and this may motivate us to engage in folk psychological practices or simulations.

Indeed, in contrast to the claim by ToM approaches that subjects with Aspergers or Autism Spectrum Disorder lack a theory of mind, in fact high-functioning austistics and Asperger's subjects have only theorizing to resort to; they have problems at the level of primary and secondary intersubjectivity (see Gallagher 2004).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shaun Gallagher

Email: [email protected]