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Abstract
Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following, I take up this systematic query and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus’ ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to ensure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks the participants of the Ghent work-in-progress seminar, especially Bert Leuridan and Katinka Quintelier, and two referees of the journal.
Notes
The phrase ‘acting normally’ is derived from Mates (Citation1996, 70).
For similar approaches, cf. Lammenranta (Citation2008, 10), Mates (Citation1996, vii) and Perin (Citation2010a, 102).
Here and in upcoming principles of practical reasoning, ‘p’ is to be replaced with a full declarative sentence, and ‘ϕ’ with a verb.
Cf. Annas and Barnes (Citation1985, 23), Burnyeat (Citation1980, 39–40) and Mates (Citation1996, 6). Main sources here are PH 1.69–70 and M 8.362.
Cf. especially PH 1.13-5, 19-22, 197-200, and the analyses by Burnyeat (Citation1980, 36ff) and Mates (Citation1992, Citation1996, 11–6).
As a consequence, counterexamples would be ineffective, i.e. one cannot introduce a claim that purports to be of the non-epistemic variety (say ‘It seems to me now that I do not exist’), but which turns out to be false or voluntary. For in that case, the claim was just not of the non-epistemic variety.
As long as the evident/non-evident distinction is in place, it is a terminological choice whether to speak of beliefs if they concern appearances (cf. Striker Citation2001, 119).
Svavarsson (Citation2011) identifies yet another option: Pyrrhonists are free from worries that arise from the conflicts that exist between beliefs. This kind of tranquillity seems unrelated to the others, yet Machuca (Citation2011, 253) suggests the following link: Pyrrhonists are free from these worries because they do not believe that the conflicts between beliefs are bad and to be avoided.
Perhaps all such beliefs are still coupled with a belief about the good, viz. that it is good to believe what is true and bad to believe what is false, and so are coupled with related worries.
It has been objected that Pyrrhonists cannot be in such a state because having no beliefs entails worries on its own (cf. Annas and Barnes Citation1985, 167–8; Burnyeat Citation1980, 55; Mates Citation1996, 76–7). Whether for Pyrrhonists tranquillity also is to constitute happiness and the good life as a whole, cf. Striker (Citation1990). For critical comments, cf. Annas and Barnes (Citation1985, 170–1).
Sextus provides another motivation on top of this, which is theoretical rather than practical (and not beyond controversy either). Namely, Pyrrhonists would be better inquirers (PH 1.1-3, 2.10-11).
Sextus' own texts are ambiguous between (a*) and (b*), cf. PH 1.21-22 (‘the criterion of action, by attention to which in the conduct of daily life we do some things and not others') versus M 11.163-5 (‘in accordance with non-philosophical practice he is able to choose some things and avoid others’).
This distinction corresponds to two sorts of intentions usually distinguished in the literature (cf. Wilson Citation2009, Section 2): intentions for the future (‘I intend to help as soon as possible’) versus intentions with which someone acts (‘I am reaching my hand with the intention to help my teacher’).
For a defense of this account, cf. Buss (Citation1999).
By the same token, Pyrrhonists cannot base their theoretical (versus practical) reasoning on principles like ‘If it seems to me now that p and if it seems to me now that [if it seems to me now that p then q], then q’. For in that case, they would obtain beliefs about reality from beliefs about appearances.